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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines and evaluates Louisiana's
debt structure and debt management.

The experiences of the

American states in debt management contribute to the develop
ment of "principles of debt management" which are the basis
for this study.

Other debt management principles are derived

from the various factors considered by investment bankers
and investor services in their analyses of bond issues.
Since these groups prevail in the market, and since debt
management must often be passive and adaptive, the various
financial criteria must be recognized and exploited if state
debt management is to be successful.

Distinctions between

proper and improper purposes of borrowing and safe and unsafe
borrowing are examined.

Other principles deal with bond

provisions and the management of existing debt.
With the various principles established as standards,
Louisiana's modern debt experiences are examined in detail.
Individual issues are analyzed in terms of their purposes,
their provisions and features, and their effects upon the
debt structure.

General tendencies observable only when

issues are considered in the aggregate involve the timing of
x

issues, the use of the call feature, the ratings received,
and the administrative machinery.

A major effort is made to

emphasize both the desirable and the undesirable practices.
The findings in this study fall into two major cate
gories:

those applying generally to all states, and those

findings particularly pertinent to Louisiana.

Among the

findings that may be appropriate generally on the state
level are the following:

(1) The techniques utilized by

investment bankers and rating services in rating municipal
bonds are not entirely pertinent to state bond issues, but
they cannot be ignored and must be observed in debt
management.

(2) The traditional market concepts of safety

and propriety in borrowing do not take into account the fact
that considerations of what is proper and safe borrowing
will depend greatly upon expectations of secular and cyclical
economic conditions and upon what role the state government
has been assigned under various conditions.

(3) The planning

and execution of debt policy should be keyed to the objec
tives of simplicity and stability.

(i^) The timing of bond

sales and the reporting of debt are more important than is
generally recognized.

The value of debt reporting has been

dramatically demonstrated in Louisiana,

The use of a

seasonal index to aid in timing bond sales is not a tested
technique, but it would appear to warrant further study.
xi

Louisiana has frequently violated the principles of
good debt management; debt management has been character
istically uncertain and unstable.

The State presently has

no administrative machinery for coordinating, planning,
authorizing, issuing, reporting, and retiring debts which
directly or indirectly involve the State.

A recent improve

ment in the management of highway finance has yet to spread
to other areas of the debt structure.
Proposals for the Improvement of Louisiana’s debt
structure and management are necessarily general because of
the underlying philosophy that management requires flexi
bility.

Nonetheless, it is clear that Louisiana’s constitu

tional debt provisions need rationalization.

Extensive

planning would be necessary in the formulation of a desirable
legal framework; even if a large-scale constitutional revi
sion is Impossible, planning would help to minimize the
present legal impediments.

The responsibility for debt

management in Louisiana should be centralized in one or two
debt units.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It Is earnestly desired that this study make some
useful contribution to a better debt structure and to more
efficient debt management in Louisiana.

The body of this

study, therefore, consists of a critical analysis of
Louisiana1s debt structure and management.

This critical

analysis must not be construed to reflect adversely upon any
State officials or groups of officials who have been respon
sible for debt management in the past.

There Is no question

but that in recent years officials with this responsibility
have acted in good faith and with some measure of success.
However, Louisiana debt management, like debt manage
ment in most states, has not always been as efficient as was
possible.

One reason there has been inefficiency in debt

management in the American states is that the problems of
debt management are largely nonrecurrent except over long
periods of time.

Furthermore, there has been little formal

study of the peculiar problems that confront states in the
management of their debts.

Principles that might promote

better debt management on the state level have not been
fully developed.

It is little wonder then that the actual
1

2
operation of state borrowing has been subject to "false
starts."
gap.

It is hoped that this thesis will help bridge this

The appraisal of debt management experience in

Louisiana presented in this study should permit future state
officials to profit from the successes and the mistakes of
past officials.
I.

APPROACH AND METHOD

The analysis of Louisiana* s debt structure and debt
management practices contained in this study is based
largely on what might be considered a "traditional” view of
public finance.

This approach implies that the financing of

government expenditures normally should be by means of taxa
tion and that only special circumstances justify the
financing of government spending by means of borrowing.
The method of this study is to develop certain
principles of good debt management from historical data and
from the dictates of logic.

The basic criterion for the

formulation of these principles is whether the given prin
ciple will contribute to the welfare of the state and its
people.

One of the most important and tangible tests of

this benefit is the money that can be saved by using certain
techniques in debt management.

After the principles are

formulated, they become the basis for the appraisal of debt
management which follows in later chapters.

3
II.

ORGANIZATION OP MATERIAL

This Chapter reviews some of the major developments
in the debts of the American states.

Proposed principles of

debt management are presented in Chapter II.

Only the more

important general developments are analyzed in the period of
Louisiana's debt history before 1921, in Chapter III.
Chapters IV and V cover the period 1921-19^9 and deal with
the debt structure and the management of individual issues
in some detail.

In the final Chapter,

the problems of

Louisiana’s current debt structure are

examined, and general

proposals to aid in their solution are

offered.

III.

BACKGROUND OP AMERICAN

STATE DEBTS

A resum£ of the development of American state debts
is useful to this study for two reasons:

(1) the experiences

of the states contribute to the development of principles of
debt management, and (2) the debt experience in Louisiana
must be viewed in the context of common experiences.
Basic Porces Behind State Borrowing
State borrowing in the United States apparently has
followed at least two main tendencies:

there seems to have

been a direct relationship between the level of business
activity and the amount of state borrowing; and, there
apparently has also been a direct relationship between

k
transportation improvement (water, railroad, highway) and
debt growth.1' These forces probably were interrelated.
States borrowed in prosperous times, and one of the main
reasons why they did so was to finance transportation
improvements.

The spending and the borrowing may well have

had an influence on the degree of prosperity.

The two

elements, transportation improvements and the business cycle,
were involved in the development of American state debts in
the following stages:

(1) 1820-1860, transportation and

bank borrowing; (2) 1860-1900, Civil War and Reconstruction
borrowing; (3) 1900-1959* highway, bonus, relief, welfare,
and education borrowing.
Transportation and Bank Borrowing. 1820-1860
The first cycle in American state debts lasted from
1820 to 181;5.

2

Debt expansion continued from 1820 until the

Panic of l837> and the contraction which began at that time
lasted until l81|-5.

During this period, the Northern states

borrowed primarily in order to finance internal improvements

^B. U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, T ^ l J , pp. 5* 73-122.
2The states wefre relieved of $ 22, i|.92,915.5^ of debt
when the Federal government assumed their Revolutionary War
obligations, John Watts Kearny, Sketch of American Finances.
1789-1835 (New York: G-. P. Putnam*s Sons, The Knickerbocker
Press, 1887)> PP. 20-27.

5
such as canals, turnpikes, and railroads.

The only major

purposes of borrowing, other than for financing transporta
tion facilities, were to provide banking capital and to
finance state enterprises.

In some states, it was actually

hoped that these investments would provide enough profit to
eliminate the need for taxation.

Most of the bank borrowing

took place in the Southern states while the enterprise debt
was largely in the Western states.

The purposes of the

borrowing during this period differ somewhat from the under
lying causes of the borrowing.

For example, the transporta

tion needs were too great to be satisfied from private
sources, but the Federal government did not finance these
3
needs. The result was the first large-scale state borrow
ing which Henry G. Adams viewed as a part of the weakening
of centralized power.

Another underlying cause of the heavy

debt expansion during the period before 1837 was simply the
speculative spirit of the times.

As a result of this mood,

some of the state borrowing from 1820 to l8lj.5 probably was
I4.
unnecessary and wasteful.

•^There was also local borrowing for these same
purposes.
W i l l i a m J. Shultz and M, R. Caine, Financial Devel
opment of the United States (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1937), pp. 220-21; Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss,
Financial History of the United States (first edition;
New Yorks McGraw Hill Company, 1952), pp. 128-36; Frederick A.

6
In 1837, the great "business boom came to an end, but
It did not Immediately curtail borrowing in all of the states.
Some states attempting to complete developmental projects
continued to borrow along with those states that were not
convinced that the economic situation was serious.

According

to Ratchford, still other states continued their borrowing
and public works in order to relieve unemployment.

The

burden of the debts proved to be too much, however, after
another round of banking failures in 1 8 3 9 .

Some of the

states could no longer borrow, and their revenues fell with
the general decline in business activity.

The problem was

intensified where the banks that failed had been established
with funds raised by state borrowing.

When banks could not

repay the states, the states missed this source of funds in

Cleveland and Fred Wilbur Powell, Railroad Finance (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1912), pp. 31-32; Ratchford,
American State Debts. pp. 77-81, 8 7 -8 8 ; Horace Secrist, An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Restrictions Upon
Public Indebtedness in the United States, bulletin of the
University of Wisconsin, No." "637» Economics and Political
Science Series, Vol. VIII, No. i (April, I9 II4.), pp. 13-20;
Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States
(twelfth edition; New York: Longmans, Green and Company,
1 9 3 6 ), pp. 2l|3-)|6; Henry C. Adams, Public Debts, An Essay in
the Science of Finance (New York: D. Appleton and Company,
1 8 8 7 ), pp. 3 1 7 " ? and United States Bureau of the Census,
Tenth Census of the United States: 1880. Report on Valuation,
Taxation, and Public Indebtedness In the United States (hereinafter referred to as Tenth CensusT, Vol. VII (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 188^.), pp. 5>23-2 7 .

7
paying interest on bonds that had been issued to support
5
these same banks.
States in financial difficulty around 1 8 3 9 and l81|0
were unable to get much relief by means of increased taxation.
By 181^.2, nine states had defaulted and several others were
nearly as hard pressed.^

Mississippi and Florida had repu

diated part of their debts on technical points of the law.
Some states averted default by managing to increase their
tax revenues, while others adjusted their debts by selling
7
bank stocks and publicly owned railroads and canals.
One
of the more lasting reactions to this collapse of state
credit was the establishment of constitutional debt limita

ry .O, 8
tions in nineteen states within fifteen years after I84

^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 8 6 -8 7 # 96-100.
See also Reginald C. McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and
American State Debts (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1935)# P. 265# Shultz and Caine, o£. cit.. p. 235; Studenski
and Krooss, op. cit.# pp. 131-32; Tenth Census, VII,
pp. 5 2 3 -2 ij.; and Secrist, op. cit., pp. 21-31.
^McGrane gives a detailed description of the diffi
culties encountered by each of the defaulting and repudiating
states in this period, McGrane, op. cit.. pp. 62-261?..
7
There was also an attempt in I8J4.2 on the part of
some states to have state debts assumed by the Federal
government. Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the
United States from 1789 to i860 (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1803)# p p . 5 B 0 -8 2 .
Q
This movement was interpreted as a public reaction
against state participation in business. It has been
suggested that the collapse of the states* ventures In pro
viding internal improvements led to the rise of corporation
power in the United States. Adams, on. cit., pp. 3if.l-l|.2.

8
The states thus were occupied with debt adjustment until
9
about 181±$ when business activity revived.
Business revival marked the beginning of another debt
cycle which lasted from 181^5 to i860.

Borrowing again moved

with business activity, but it was somewhat more restrained
than in the first debt cycle.

The states that had defaulted

earlier generally did not borrow--their credit standings
were so impaired that their obligations were unpopular in
the European money markets.

Also, the previous experiences

of these states made them more conservative in their
policies, and they abandoned the notion that state operation
of enterprises was a sound way to finance government.
Western and Southern states did much of the borrowing in
10
this period in order to finance railroad construction.
Debt contraction ending the pre-Civil War period was
temporary and mild.

It came primarily in cases where the

railroads were unable, because of the crisis of 1857* to pay
interest on bonds they had sold to the states.

The states,

^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 98-99* 105-35?
Tenth Census, VII, pp. 523-5^4-? McGrane, o£. cit., p. 265*
William L. Raymond, State and Municipal Bonds (second
edition; Boston: Financial Publishing Company, 1932), p. 56;
and Shultz and Caine, o£. cit., pp. 220-21.
■^Raymond, op. cit., pp. 59-60; Ratchford, American
State Debts, pp. 122-23; McGrane, op. cit., pp. 268, 289;
and Shultz and Caine, o£. cit. , pp. 220-21, 263-62j..

in turn, found it difficult to pay the interest on their own
"bonds.

The slight reduction in debts that occurred in 18^7
11
was soon completely overshadowed by the war.
Civil War and Reconstruction Borrowing. 1860-1900
Civil War debt experiences were somewhat different in
the two groups of states.

States on both sides borrowed

during the war and then reduced their debts as soon as
possible afterward, but the methods of accomplishing the
borrowing and the debt reduction differed considerably.

The

Northern states borrowed between $100,000,000 and $110,000,000
to support the war effort, but they were fortunate in
receiving prompt reimbursement from the Federal government
and as early as 1880 had reduced their debts to about
$32,000,000.

In the South, the lack of experience and

taxing power on the part of the Confederacy made the problem
somewhat similar to that which had confronted the Continental
Congress.
borrowing.

The Southern states made up this deficiency by
This borrowing, which was sometimes supplemented

by Issues of paper money that occasionally bore interest,
consisted of both voluntary and involuntary bank (short-term)
loans and bond issues (long-term).

The total debts of the

Southern states were estimated to have increased by between

Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 122-34?
Shultz and Caine, o£. cit., p. 2 6 3 .

10
$81,000,000 and $96,000,000.

Default on obligations of the
12
Confederate states became common before the war ended.
A financial question that presented itself even

before the conclusion of hostilities was what to do with the
war debts of the Southern states.

Loyal constitutional con13
ventions protected by Union forces in four states,
in l86ij.
and 1865* invalidated all laws that had contributed to the

war effort of the Confederacy.

This action was construed by

some as a repudiation of war debts.

The majority of the

Southern Reconstruction conventions later specifically
repudiated their war debts upon the advice of President
Johnson.

This action, incidentally, is sometimes considered

to have set a precedent for and contributed to later repudi
ations by Southern states.

The Civil War debt cycle had run
Ik
its course of expansion and contraction.
Civil War debts had not been completely settled when
a new cycle of debt expansion was launched in the South.

The Presidential Reconstruction (1865-1868) brought inevitable

12

Tenth Census, VII, p. 55^J Ratmond, o ]
d . cl t .,
pp. 60-61; Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 135-61; and
Shultz and Caine, o£. cit., pp. 2&2, 310.
13

Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia.

^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 159-60; and
William A. Scott, The Repudiation of State Debts (ed. Richard T.
Ely, Library of Economics and Politics, No. 2; Boston:
Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1893)> p. 233.

11
increases in state borrowing.

In addition to the need for

revenues to help finance the replacement and completion of
Internal improvements, there was also a pressing need for
funds to settle unpaid interest and matured principal on
debts.

Moreover, the assets of the South had been greatly

reduced during the war, and there was a sharp decline in tax
revenues when the need for such revenues was quite great.
The result was a wave of funding and refunding as well as
the sale of some new issues for the financing of needed
improvements.

The debts of the Southern states increased by

between 133,000,000 and $35*000,000 during the Presidential
15
Reconstruction period.
Records of state debts during Congressional Recon
struction, which were kept by the usually untrained and
often dishonest persons who held office at that time, are
sketchy and confused.

In Alabama, no records were kept of

the amount of bonds actually issued, and an estimate of its
debt could be made only after asking all bondholders to
state their claims.

The total of all state debts in the

South had been about $110,000,000 in 1865 after the repudi
ation of Oivil War debts.

At the end of the Presidential

Reconstruction, 1868, it was approximately $llj.5> 000,000.

■^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 162-67•

The Congressional Reconstruction, which continued until
1877* increased the Southern debts by approximately
$100,000,000 to over $21^5*000,000.

Borrowing during both

phases of the Reconstruction thus totaled approximately

$135*000,000.16
The relationship between transportation and statedebt was not entirely missing even during the Congressional
Reconstruction.

The stated purpose of many bond issues in

the South was for the development of railroads.

In practi

cally every Southern state, however, statements as to the
reasons for borrowing were more nominal than real.

The

underlying purpose of state borrowing In the South during
the period of Congressional Reconstruction was to enrich the
"rings" of state officials, the members of which succeeded
in getting most of the borrowed funds.

17

The Reconstruction debt cycle had its contraction
phase as soon as the native whites regained control.

Most

of the Southern states repudiated the Reconstruction debts
and prohibited the issue of previously authorized bonds at
the first opportunity.

The method and extent of debt adjust

ment differed from state to state— some issues were completely

*^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 170* 181-83.
Shultz and Caine, op. cit.» pp. 3 ^ 3 - W r estimated the total
as $150,000,000.
■^McGrane, op. cit.. pp. 282-83* Ratchford, American
State Debts. p. 17^; and Shultz and Caine,, op. cit., pp. 3h3-hh»

repudiated while others were "scaled11 down to some fraction
of their face value.

Estimates are very crude, but the

amount of debt reduction appears to have been greater than
the amount that had been added during the Congressional
Reconstruction.

Pre-Reconstruction debt was scaled down

along with questionable debts in several states.

In some

instances, therefore, repudiations may have been opportun
istic; in most states, there were good reasons for the
repudiation of individual bond Issues.

Another predictable

occurrence resulting from the Reconstruction was the revival
of the debt limitation movement.
states revised their limitations.

Several of the Southern
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Outside the South in the period from i860 to 1900,
tax revenues were generally used to reduce debts.

State

debt was again moving in the same direction as the general
level of business activity.

The national economy was in a

somewhat depressed condition during the last quarter of the
century.

The total debt of all the states declined from

over $2 9 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 8 8 0 to about $2 2 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 8 9 0 .
Reduction of this total was accomplished by the application

1A
Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 162-96;
McGrane, op. cit., pp. 2 8 2 -3 8 I; and Shultz and Caine, op.
cit., p p .“501-5. For a detailed discussion bf repudiation
after the Civil War in twelve states, see Scott, op. cit..
pp. 33-196.

li(.
of surplus current revenues to debt retirement and by the
19
scaling of debts.
Highway, Bonus, Relief, Welfare, and
Education Borrowing, 1900-1959
After 1 9 0 0 , economic conditions began improving while
state borrowing increased apace.

Total state debt outstanding

rose to $23^,908,873 in 1 9 0 2 , $[{.22,796,325 in 1913, and
$£ 8 0 ,Ij.0 8 ,0 8 l in 1915*

The automobile, which was the next

important transportation development after the invention of
the locomotive, represented another attempt to meet the
challenge of space in the United States.

The automobile

brought problems of its own— highways were now needed.

There

was still an inability on the part of the private sector of
the economy to provide all of the capital necessary for
financing a highway network, and the Federal government was
not yet inclined to assume the responsibility.

States (and

local governments) again undertook the financing of the new
20
transportation medium.

■^United States Bureau of the Census, Eleventh Census
of the United States; 1890. Report on Wealth, Debt, and
Taxation (hereinafter referred to as Eleventh Census), Part
1, Public Debt (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1 8 9 2 ) ,^pp. 73, 77? Ratchford, American State Debts, pp.
253-59? and Shultz and Caine, o£. cit., pp.
, [|.05.
20
Edna Trull, Borrowing for Highways (New York: Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal Service Department, 1937),
pp. 3-13? Tax Foundation, Inc., Postwar Trend in State Debt:
A State-by-State Analysis, Project Note No. 27~TUew York:
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The expansion in state borrowing in the twentieth
century came to an end with World War I.

Capital outlays

declined and brought borrowing down with them.

However, the

first World War slowed debt growth only temporarily.

There

was soon a revival of borrowing for highway construction and
for financing bonuses for war veterans.

Borrowing continued

at a relatively high rate for the whole of the twenties.
Veterans1 bonuses were an important reason for bond authori
zations until the mid-twenties when these payments declined
substantially.

Highway construction continued to add to
21
state debts for the whole period of the 1920*s. Transporta
tion needs thus were still shaping the pattern of state debts

after over 1 2 5 years of development.

Tax Foundation, Inc., 1950)» P* 1| Studenski and Krooss,
op. cit. , pp. 377”76; United States Bureau of the Census,
Special Reports, Department of Commerce and Labor, Wealth.
Debt, and Taxation (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1907), pp. 131-32; United States Bureau of the Census,
Department of Commerce, Wealth. Debt, and Taxation, 1913,
Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19l5j, p. 37?
and United States Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce,
Financial Statistics of States, 1915 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 191677 PP- 118-19.
21
Raymond, o£. cit.. pp. 21-78, 66-67; Ratchford,
American State Debts, pp. 280-81; Shultz and Caine, ego. cit.,
p. 6 2 I4.; Tax Foundation, Inc., Project Ho. 27, op.. cit., p. 2;
Studenski and Krooss, o£. cit., pp. 377"76; Bureau of Public
Administration, National Defense attd State Finance (University,
Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of
Alabama, 1971)> pp. 61-62; United States Bureau of the Census,
Department of Commerce, Financial Statistics of States, 1922
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 19277, pp. 77-75;
1 9 2 3 , pp. 128-31; 1 9 2 7 , pp. 126-29; 1 9 2 7 , PP. 117-175 and
1928, pp. 110-15.
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During the 1930!s, relief "borrowing on the state
level became quite significant although total borrowing
began to decline.

The market for municipals was a failing
22
one from 1929 to 1933.
In 1932, relief issues constituted
about 20 per cent of the total while highways continued to

account for over ij.0 per cent.

By 1933» relief borrowing

almost doubled to make up about 37 Pei* cent of the total
while highway issues fell to only 23 per cent.

The trend

among the states toward more relief and less highway borrow
ing was accentuated in 193^4- and 1935?.

Although the composi

tion of the debt was changing, total state debt outstanding
showed only a small absolute decline by 1937.

Thereafter,

the total state debt remained relatively stable until 19i}-2.
During World War II, the total debt of the American states
declined in much the same manner as it had during World
23
War I.

For an impression of the situation facing state and
local governments in 1933» see Evans Clark (ed.), The Internal
Debts of the United States, Published for Twentieth Century
Fund, Inc. (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1933)> PP. 25i}.-90.
^Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 262; United
States Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Historical
Review of State and Local Government Finances, State and Local
Government Special Studies No. 25 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 19^8), p. 22; United States Bureau of the
Census, Department of Commerce, Compendium of State Govern
ment Finances in 19il7. State Finances; 19H7, No. 2
Washington: Government Printing Office, 19^8), p. 3 J Shultz
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State borrowing entered another cycle with the boom
in state spending and debt creation that began at the end
of World War II.

The total gross debt of the American states

before the war was about $3*600,000,000, and it declined to
about $2,i|_00,-000, 000 in 19ij-6.

Subsequent state borrowing

pushed gross debt to over $5»000,000,000 In 1950 and to
about $13*000,000,000 In 1956.

Part of the increase in

spending which led to this borrowing was the result of
Inflation, but there was also a major increase in spending.
The purposes of post-World War II borrowing and spending are
similar to those that operated in the debt cycles of the
past.

The Immediate post-war years brought veterans* bonuses

back as a major purpose for borrowing.

There was a great

need for the replacement and addition of highways.

By 1955*

the fading veterans* bonus borrowing was replaced by
borrowing for the expansion of educational facilities.

One

important characteristic of borrowing during this period was
the widespread adoption of the agency or authority device

and Caine, op. cit.. pp. 665» 718» Tax Foundation, Inc.,
Project Note No. 27, op. cit., p 2; Tax Foundation, Inc.,
Recent Trends in State Debt, 19i+l-19h7. Project Note No. 22
(New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 19^-8), pp. 2-5; Studenski
and Krooss, op., cit., pp. I|31-32, 1+3l+, 1+57-58; National
Defense and State Finance, pp. 61-62; and United States
Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Financial
Statistics of States, 19lt-0, Vol. Ill (Washington; Government
Printing Office, 19^2), pp. 1+2—1+1+.
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with a corresponding decline in the use of full faith and
2l\.

credit (general) obligations.
The end of the growth phase of the present debt cycle
25
is not yet in sight.
Transportation problems are far from
solved.

Although the Federal government is assuming a

greater share of the responsibility for providing certain
types of highways, this does not mean that state borrowing
can be expected to decline either relatively or absolutely.
There is some evidence that the shifting of functions (other
than highway services) to the Federal level has halted, but
even if the present division of functions between the Federal
and state governments continues, states will still need to
finance many expenditures by means of borrowing.

^ Compendium of State Government Finances. State
Finances; 191+7, N o . 2, p . £; United States Bureau of the
Census, Department of Commerce, Compendlum of State Govern
ment Finances In 1957. State Finances; 19^7 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1958), p p . 7-8; Tax Foundation,
Inc., Project Note No. 27, op.. cit., p. 2; Tax Foundation,
Inc., Project Note No. 22, ojo. cit., pp, 2-5; Allen D,
Manvel, "Postwar Trends in State and Local Finance,"
Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Conference on Taxation
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax Association” 1959),
pp. 259-61+; Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures on
Government Finance. 1952-1953 (New York: Tax Foundation,
Inc., 1952), p. 200; and Studenski and Krooss, op. cit.,
pp. 1+83-85.
2^Tax Foundation, Inc., Project Note No. 27, o£. cit.,
p. 1; and Dick Netzer, "The Outlook for Fiscal Needs and
Resources of State and Local Governments," American Economic
Review, XLVIII, No. 2 (May, 1958), 323.
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General Characteristics of American State Debts
Detailed principles drawn from the debt experiences
of the American states appear in the next Chapter; however,
there are certain general factors that stand out in this
background.

First, the roles of borrowing and taxation in

state financial structures are indicated.

Some states tried

to finance their pre-Civil War operations by engaging in
enterprises— sometimes highly speculative— as substitutes
for taxation.

The failure of these experiments indicates

that taxation generally must be the keystone of a state1s
financial structure.
A second conclusion that may be drawn from the
experiences of the states is that borrowing to aid railroads
and banks was very expensive and damaging to the credit of
the states involved; states take chances when they pledge or
involve their credit in supporting private enterprises.

It

would appear to be improper for states to borrow for this
purpose especially in this age when capital is not as scarce
as it was in the period before the Civil War.
The importance of having well trained and able state
officials is very evident in some of the state experiences
in the Reconstruction period.

The activities of state

officials were not always subject to public scrutiny.
Records frequently were not carefully compiled and were not

20
always made public.

Candid, forceful, and courageous leader

ship often made the difference between success or failure in
26
meeting crises.
The experiences of the states with debt limitations
indicate that these restrictions have not been highly
successful in preventing borrowing or in avoiding debt
difficulties.

(Of course, whether borrowing should be pre

vented is still an open question.)

The debt limitations did

not prevent the ill-fated Reconstruction borrowing in the
South.

Inflexible debt limitations are no cure-all for debt

difficulties.
Finally, the record of American state borrowing,
especially in the nineteenth century, gives some insight
into the market for state bonds today.

There were far too

many instances of lack of good faith on the part of states
in the payment of their debts.

For many bondholders and

investment bankers, their dealings with the American states
turned out to be traumatic experiences.

The actions of the

states in the past, therefore, go a long way toward explaining
the conservative attitudes that prevail in the market for
municipal bonds.

These prevailing attitudes should be

studied very carefully by states in formulating their debt
policies.

•

26
McG-rane, op. cit., p. 383*

CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES OP DEBT MANAGEMENT
The consequences of debt management are most signifi
cant.

The method of handling debt will have import not only

for credit standings, costs, and the ability of a state to
meet crises, but it may also affect the general welfare of
people within a state.

If those charged with managing the

state*s credit are careful In their selection of courses of
action from the many alternatives, they will be in position
to keep debt in manageable and orderly form, to maintain a
good credit standing, and to reduce the costs of borrowing.
On the other hand, the consequences of improper debt handling
will be unwieldy debt structures, poor credit ratings, high
1
interest charges, and perhaps even default.
There is no real excuse today for debt management to
deteriorate to the condition described above.

The factors

which go to make up the difference between "good” and "bad"
debt management are not unknown.

These factors can even be

formulated into certain principles, the observance of which
will contribute to the improvement of debt management.

^William J. Shultz and C. Lowell Harriss, American
Public Finance (sixth edition; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,

195*1-), pT3EB7
21
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Principles of good debt management can be drawn from
three sources.
evidence.

The most reliable source probably is empirical

What has proved to be good practice in the past,

and what has been conducive to default and failure?

The

experiences of the American states have provided sufficient
data for many sound principles to be established about
questions of state debt.

Principles that are evident from

historical analysis seem to be unusually reliable.

The

problems involved in debt management have not changed greatly
over the years.

Why then have the errors in debt management

been repeated so often?

The answer lies in the fact that

bonded debt is a long-term matter.

Financial officials have

little opportunity, unless they possess a good measure of
political longevity, of seeing the full effects of their
mistakes.

In the area of debt, one has little opportunity

to learn from his own mistakes.

If progress is to be made

in debt management, those dealing with the problem must be
prepared to learn from the experiences of others.

This

learning can be advanced if these experiences are formulated
into principles.

2

A second approach to the formulation of principles of
good debt management is based on the deductive method.

What

is the logical conclusion if certain propositions are

^A. M. Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds; A Century of
Experience (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936), p.TJI|.l.
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accepted?

What are the consequences if it is assumed that

most government spending should be financed by taxation?
These propositions or assumptions from which particular
courses of action may be decided can sometimes be formulated
from empirical observation.

Conclusions then can be deduced

from certain general assumptions about the nature of debt.
Authorities in the field of public finance have reached
agreement upon many points about debt management by this
means.
The final major factor that must be considered in
dealing with principles of good debt management turns away
from formal methods of reasoning to a pragmatic attitude.
Certain principles of good debt management must be based
upon observations of what is logical in view of extant
institutions.

It does not matter that the institutions

themselves may be irrational.

For example, investors usually

like to see that state property tax receipts are dedicated
to the payment of debt, but property tax revenues are steadily
declining in relative importance at the state level.

Never

theless, it is a sound principle for the state to provide
the investor what he wants, to know the current styles In
the market, and to provide necessary guarantees in bond
contracts.

Awareness of such institutional factors can be

gained by investigation of the determinants of good bond
ratings.

2k
The approach in this Chapter is, first, to analyze
the institutional framework of state borrowing and the
influence of this framework on the effective use of borrowing
power on the state level.

The next step is to move closer to

the more detailed problems involved in the planning of a
debt structure and the advantages to be gained by careful
planning.

Finally, this Chapter identifies some of the

desirable practices which can be observed in the issuance of
new bonds and in the management of existing debt.
I.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Institutional framework upon which debt management
rests seems to have several different bases.

The various

institutions Involved will be the broad economic and
political ones, the legal ones, and finally, the more
specific financial practices that so importantly affect debt
structures and debt management.
Economic and Political Factors
State borrowing cannot be viewed as an isolated
j

phenomenon or even as only a problem of state finance.

In

the most obvious instance, borrowing will be somewhat
dependent upon the economic characteristics of the state.
i

Some use of the state1s borrowing powers will be Justified,
but this use will be limited if the state is underdeveloped.
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An underdeveloped state will need internal improvements to
improve its economic position, but the income in such an
area will effectively limit the ability to service debt.
The political characteristics of a state will also
have a great deal of influence in shaping the debt structure
that evolves.

One state may have long before restricted its

borrowing activities, refined its debt management, and estab
lished an enviable credit standing.

Another state may have

had a series of experiences ranging from administrations that
have used the state’s credit unwisely to administrations that
have reacted radically against obviously wasteful borrowing
and spending practices.

It is unfortunate that reform admin

istrations have sometimes reacted unwisely by introducing
legislation that has proved to be highly inflexible and just
as undesirable as the practices that it was intended to
replace.
Another political factor which will influence the
state debt structure and the management of that structure Is
the over-all handling of state finance.

The attitudes of

people and politicians toward the taxing and spending func
tions will certainly influence a state’s debt structure.
Many of the debt problems that plague state finance start at
this point.

Some of the debt difficulties in the states

simply cannot be avoided if unfavorable fiscal relationships
have already been established at this level.

26
The more general political and economic factors which
may have an indirect influence on debt matters most likely
cannot be reformed merely to improve debt structures.

Little

more will be said of such factors; however, it should never
be forgotten that these elements are working to shape the
debt structures and management.

These distantly related

institutional factors bear watching so that improvements can
be made whenever possible and so that any favorable changes
may be recognized and used to improve debt structures and
management.
Legal Institutions
Policy concerning the use of a state*s credit should
be clearly and carefully established in the constitution.
But, if this policy is perverted in some fashion in the
basic document, another institutional problem has been
created.

The development of a sound debt structure and good

debt management should start logically with the modification
of the legal framework wherever this framework seems to be
faulty.

Policies that will make the debt structure more

efficient should be brought together, or codified, into one
constitutional article.

3

At present, Louisiana has debt

provisions strewn throughout its Constitution under sections

^Ibld., p . Ijif.2.
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such as those concerning the limitations on legislative
powers and those chartering particular agencies of the State.

k

Bringing these debt provisions together would he a very effec
tive first step in the removal of complexity.

Complexity is

severely penalized when ratings are assigned to bond issues.
Topics that may be included in state constitutional
sections dealing with debt are as follows:

the delegation of

the borrowing power; the prohibition of borrowing for certain
purposes as proper subjects for borrowing (provided that the
amending procedure permits change if economic and social
factors necessitate revision); and, the designation of
certain flexible debt limitations where they seem necessary.
Certain definitions should, of course, be included in
the above provisions.

A clear and careful definition of

state debt, for example, could be used to put an end to
the speoial fund doctrine which interprets debts of
agencies or departments, or debt supported by special
revenues (such as dormitory and bridge revenues), as something
other than state debt.

The main provisions above would also

be expected to cover methods of debt authorization, funding

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. lj., Secs. 2, 12;
Art. 6, Secs. 16, 21; Art. 12, Secs. 19-21; Art. 18, Secs.
1-5; Art. 20, Sec. 1; and Prolet of a Constitution for the
State of Louisiana (hereinafter referred to as ProjeTT,
Vol. I, Part 2, prepared by the Louisiana State LawTnstitute, I9$k., pp. 11^5-61.
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and refunding procedures, certain safeguards in both policies
and administration, and also perhaps some reference to the
policy for determining maturity schedules.
It would probably not be desirable for much else to
be included in a constitutional debt code.

It seems unwise,

for example, to place provisions in constitutions requiring
that only serial bonds or only callable bonds be used.
These two provisions are often desirable, but there may be
circumstances in which other types of bonds might be more
appropriate.

It should not be forgotten that a debt code is

no guarantee of a good debt structure.

A debt structure

cannot be truly effective without good management or admin
istration because financial conditions often change quickly
and radically.

A good debt code will be one that recognizes

the importance of management and leaves enough flexibility

6
for administrators to take advantage of changing conditions.
On the other hand, a faulty legal framework can so impede
debt administration that no satisfactory debt structure
could be designed or managed by anyone.

^Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. i4i4.2 -l4.3 - Hillhouse suggests
these provisions for municipalities, but they appear to be
generally applicable for state constitutional debt codes.
^Ibld .« p. I4I43 .
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One of the most obvious and important ways in which
state debts have been influenced greatly by legal institu
tions has been by the establishment of constitutional debt
limitations.

These limitations were established in many

states as a result of excessive borrowing many years ago.
The major purposes of the limitations seem to have been to
protect taxpayers against excessive tax rates and to protect
7
the credit standings of the governments.
Legislatures were
often deprived, by constitutional or sometimes by statutory
law, of the free and unrestricted use of borrowing power.
These constitutional debt limitations have not proved to be
very successful in operation.

They are a good example of

practices that were well intended but that have not proved
to be very beneficial in their application.

8

Constitutional debt limitations fall into several
broad groups.

First are the rigid constitutional provisions

that prohibit legislatures from borrowing except under

^Scott viewed the limitations as a result only of the
need for taxpayers to protect themselves. William A. Scott,
The Repudiation of State Debts (ed. Richard T. Ely, Library
of Economics and Politics, No. 2; Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell
& Co., 1893), PP. 2L]_6-V7.
Q

Harold M. Groves, Financing Government (fourth
edition; New York: Henry Holt and Company, 195ij-), pp. 568-69;
and B. U. Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations , ' 1
Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Conference on Taxation
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax Association, 1959),
pp. 2 1 5 , 2 2 5 -2 6 .
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certain specified extreme situations such as war or insur
rection.

Other constitutional limitations are those which

require that all laws concerning borrowing must be submitted
to a popular referendum.

This provision is similar to the

first group insofar as the legislature is again deprived of
the use of the state*s credit without approval of the people.
The main difference between the two groups is that there is
somewhat more flexibility and less formality in the rendering
of the final decision by the people.

A third major group

into which the states would fall is that group in which
there are limitations only of a procedural nature.

Finally,

several state constitutions do not restrict legislative
9
power to create debt.
In the first two cases above, the decision regarding
debt creation is reserved by the electorate.

It is not

uncommon for constitutional provisions of states in this
category to impose certain restrictions on the electorate
itself.

Constitutional provision may require that all

^B. U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 19if.l), pp. ij.29-33?
Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations," pp. 216-19;
Pro .jet, Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1130-31; William L. Raymond,
State and MunicInal Bonds (second edition; Boston: Financial
Publishing Company, 1932), p. 6 9 J Tax Foundation, Inc.,
Constitutional Debt Control in the States (New York: Tax
Foundation, Inc., 195^-)/ P* 13; and Jerry Peyton Simpson,
"Oklahoma*s State Debt,
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 19^8), pp. 291-92.
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Issues authorized by constitutional amendment Include
provisions for raising taxes to pay for the interest.
Another similar constitutional debt provision is that any
debt authorized by the electorate by constitutional amend
ment must also make adequate provision for repayment.
Prohibitions against the pledge of the state’s credit to
private enterprises are also not uncommon.

Where borrowing

can be authorized by legislative action, legislatures often
are governed by procedural provisions concerning maximum
Interest rates, maximum bond maturities, and whether bonds
10
shall be serial or otherwise.
Ratchford’s conclusions about debt limitations are
qualified ones.

Analyzing the existing limitations, he

found several constitutions that needed redrafting of debt
provisions.

In other states, he found that legislatures

were not restrained, but their records were such that they
did not really require any constitutional restraint.

In

some of the remaining states, he thought that certain provi
sions were altogether too rigid.

His recommendations, conse

quently, take Into consideration the various types of
constitutional debt limitations and legislative performances

'^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. ip30—ipO;
Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations," pp. 216-19;
and Raymond, o j d . cit.. p. 69.

32
that are found In the states.

Some states do not need them

at all, but in other states Ratchford suggests that clear
and effective constitutional limitations would be
11
beneficial.
The position taken by Harold M. Groves is somewhat
similar to Ratchford*s.

He finds the self-imposed discipline

of debt limitation especially undesirable in view of the
fact that there is such a clear movement in state finance
away from the stable property tax to the more cyclically
sensitive income and sales and excise taxes.

These taxes

make the likelihood of deficits very strong if there is a
downturn in business activity, and if this should be the
case, the states will need more freedom to use their credit.
With this attitude toward limitation in general, Groves then
notes the lack of self-control on the part of some govern
ments that might require some type of limitation perhaps

12
less extreme than the common restrictions now in existence.

11

Ratchford, American State Debts, pp.
♦ One
of the earliest evaluations of state constitutional debt
limitation was by William A. Scott. In 1893, he noted
the ability of debt limitations to restrict debt creation and
thus prevent debt repudiation. He did not recommend their
unqualified use, however, because he felt that the states
would need to use their credit. The needs that he predicted
were for irrigation, reforestation, education, and to finance
natural monopolies. It is understandable that he did not
foresee the higfcway problem. Scott, op. cit., pp, 2l^2~k31P

Groves, op. cit.. p. £69.
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The conclusion that debt limitations are sometimes necessary
is accepted in this paper.
For the states needing debt limitations, Ratchford
outlined the scope which limitations should cover.

They

should be written so that the special fund doctrine does
not apply, i.e., the limitation cannot be circumvented by
the process of agency borrowing.

Some of the more important

general characteristics that the debt limit should contain
are as follows:

the limit should be related to the wealth

or ability of the people and the state; the provisions
should be designed to become more restrictive as the
ultimate limit is approached; the actual limit should not
be radically reduced when business is depressed; it should
be written with the intention of reducing court interpreta
tion to a minimum, but it should also be expressed concisely
in the constitution; and it should be rigorous enough to
control borrowing where it has been consistently abused.

13

These characteristics were the guides which Ratchford
used in designing a limitation based upon average revenue
receipts.

Revenue receipts, of course, must be carefully

and realistically defined to include such revenues as net
collections from fees and taxes, donations from the Federal

13

Ratchford, American State Debts, pp, 592-9llo
also Hillhouse, o£. cit.. pp.'

See

3k
governraent, and net returns on enterprises run by the
Ill-

state .

The basic limit would be as follows: the
legislature could authorize borrowing so long
as the net debt incurred under such authoriza
tion did not exceed 1 0 0 per cent of average
revenue receipts for the five preceding years.
The electorate could, by a referendum vote,
authorize borrowing to a similar amount. The
normal or basic limit for the debt would thus
be an amount equal to twice the average revenue
receipts, as above defined, for the preceding
five years; it would be a moving limit to be
recomputed each year. It would be desirable to
keep the two parts of the debt separate to show:
(1 ) the part of the debt authorized by ttie
legislature and by the people and (2 ) the amount
of additional indebtedness which each might
authorize.^5
The proposal above would seem to avoid the basic flaw
that was present in most of the early debt limitation provi
sions --inflexibility.

Ratchford1s proposed limitation

offers the advantage of gradual increases in the pressure
16
applied against debt expansion.
Perhaps the greatest
advantage in the above proposal, however, is that this type
of debt limitation is really more of a debt plan than it is
a debt limitation.

It has some of the elements of determining

^■^Ratchford, American State Debts» pp. 59l}--95.
^Ibid., p. 595. These proposals were endorsed in a
special study of constitutional debt limitations which is
included in the Louisiana Pro .jet. Pro .jet. Vol. I, Part 2,
pp. 1135-36.
16
Ratchford, American State Debts, pp, 7-6, 595? and
Ratchford, "Statd'and Local Debt Limitations,” pp. 222-23,

225- 26 .
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ability to pay or ability to bear debt.

It is a method of

embedding into the basic document, a place so prominent that
legislators and citizens alike will be more aware of Its
existence, a constant reminder to the effect that there are
certain criteria which must be observed to promote good
credit standing.
In his above-mentioned proposal, Ratchford made it
clear that if any limitations were necessary, they should
not be easily circumvented; they have been widely circum
vented by the use of the special fund doctrine and the
17
authority device.
The special fund doctrine is the judi
cial principle that some debts are not state debts because
they are secured by special funds.

18

The use of the doctrine

Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations,"
pp. 219, 221-22; and Pro.jet, Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1132-3h.
There are methods of circumventing local debt restrictions
other than by use of the authority. The creation of special
districts and the use of lease-purchase arrangements are
common on the local level, and they have been used widely In
Kentucky. Legislative Research Commission, "Debt Adminis
tration," Staff Report to Committee on Functions and
Resources of State Government, Research Publication No. 30>
(1952), p. 1 2 .
In Oklahoma, circumvention of debt control was
possible before 19hl by incurring short-term deficits which
were .then funded into long-term debt. See Simpson, op. 'bit/.,
p. 7 6 . This method of circumvention has also been used in
other states. .See Ratchford, American State Debts.
pp. 3 7 6 -8 2 .
l8
See David M. Wood, "Legal Aspects of Revenue Bond
Financing," The Journal of Finance, X (1955)» 20^.
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depends upon the existence of some sort of revenues to
establish the special funds.

These revenues are often

available from the operation of capital improvements, and
this characteristic gives rise to the term "revenue bond."
The widespread use of authorities is at least partly a
result of the aforementioned debt limitations.

This devel

opment is a case in point that legal institutions greatly
influence debt administration."^
The use of agencies has been, and is, an expensive
way of doing things.

Authorities rely almost exclusively

upon borrowing to start their operations.

This borrowing

makes them expensive to start with, but they are also more
expensive because they depend to such a great extent on

19

Seven reasons for the creation of public authorities
in New York State were analyzed by Charles ¥. Ingler in a
paper before the National Tax Association in 1957. He found
that most of the reasons involved the " . . . avowed intent to
circumvent continuing restraint by the electorate, the Con
stitution, or the elected officeholder." Charles W. Ingler,
"Are Public Controls Over Authorities Adequate?" Proceedings
of the Fiftieth Annual Conference on Taxation (Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania: National Tax Association, 195*3), p. 259.
Others have viewed this same phenomenon and concluded
that the authority " . . . gets things done expeditiously, and
. . . contrasts favorably with the leisurely pace of achieve
ment we have often associated with established, old^line
governmental bodies." Lynn A. Stiles, "Economic Effects of
Authority Operations and Financing," Proceedings of the
Fiftieth Annual Conference on Taxation (Harrisburg. Pennsylvania:
National Tax Association, 19^8), p. 269. See also Roger A.
Freeman, "A Hundred Billion in State and Local Public Works,"
Municipal Finance, XXVII, No. 1 (August, 19514-)* 6 .
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revenue bond financing with its attendant higher costs.
The authority device also represents a fragmentation of
sovereignty that is not desirable.

"It would seem to be the

wiser course for the legislative body to exhaust every
possible governmental remedy, and to assume real leadership
and educational responsibility . . ."

21

This suggestion, of

course, turns attention back to the constitutional framework.
Debt limitations and the authority device are
political-legal problems that are both partly effects but
also causes of debt difficulties.

They cannot be neglected

if a sound debt structure is the goal.

Constitutional

provisions should be carefully reviewed and revised wherever
necessary so that they constitute a proper institutional
framework for the debt— including detailed yet flexible pro
visions pertinent to planning the debt structure, managing
the issuance of new debt, and managing existing debt.
Financial Factors
After the economic, political, and legal factors, a
fourth major influence on state debt is the whole set of
financial customs that are so critical where debt management

^ F o r an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages
of revenue bonds, infra, pp. 112-lij.,
21Ingler, ojd. cit., p. 262,
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is concerned.

Debt cannot be effectively managed until the

bond market itself is thoroughly understood.

There are the

market mores that will determine whether or not an issue is
well rated and well received.

Certain demands by bond

investors and the dealers affect the interest costs borne by
the states.

Complete cognizance must be taken of all these

factors, even those that may appear to be illogical or minor
in importance from the standpoint of economic analysis.

At

the present time, there is little alternative but to adjust
to the market.
State and local governments can exercise little
•control— other than to establish and maintain
themselves as good credit risks— over the yields
that must be offered on their new debt issues and
the market quotations on their outstanding obliga
tions. Their debt management problem is largely
one of passive accommodation to the circumstances
and demands of the investment market.22
Principles of good debt management, therefore, must be based
on thorough understanding and frequent review of financial
factors.

Principles of good debt management based upon

these factors can, to some extent, be formulated by analyzing
the actions of bond dealers and investors and their reactions
to certain practices that states have used in issuing debt.
The problem thiis is basically one of determining what factors
affect the marketability of state bond issues.

2?
‘Shultz and Harriss, op. cit.» p. 609.
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Leading investment surveys give an indication of the
standing of state bonds from the viewpoint of the investment
analyst.

Although some analysts are more cautious than

others, the over-all view appears to be that state bonds as
a class have a very high standing and that they are held in
23
high esteem by the investment community.
This good
standing seems to depend upon two main characteristics of
state bonds:

(1) they are generally secure, and (2) they

are tax exempt.

Since they are exempt from Federal income

taxes, very wealthy people and even commercial banks and
corporations with large net taxable incomes often find them
a distinct advantage.

2k

As a result, prices of the obliga

tions are usually bid up to the point where the resulting

^Ralph E. Badger and Harry G. Guthmann, Investment
Principles and Practices {fourth edition; Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951)* p. 569* and
George ¥. Dowrie and Douglas R. Fuller, Investments :(New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 19^1), p. b77•
^^For discussions about who buys state bonds and why
they do so, see the following sources: C. Cheever Hardwick,
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLXXXI, No. 5^30
I'T"hursday, May 19, 1955), 9; John S. Linen, "The Broad Field
of Municipal Bonds," The Commercial and Finanoial Chronicle.
CLXXXII, No.
(September 15, 1955), 3? George B. Wendt,
"Why Municipal Bonds are Desirable Bank Investments," The
Commercial and Financial Chronicle. CLXXXII, No. 5^88 (Thursday, December 8, 1955),27; and Fundamentals of Investment
Banking, Sponsored by the Investment Bankers Association of
America (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19lj.9), pp. 351-52.
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yields make the bonds unattractive to Investors in lower
25
income brackets.
As a result, investors with moderate
26
means are flatly advised to seek other investments.
Other investors who buy state bonds in significant
amounts are those that are restricted in their options by
law.

These investors are the institutional buyers such as

pension fund trustees, life insurance companies, trustees,
and mutual savings banks that are not permitted to invest in
obligations not on the "legal" list.

State and municipal

bonds usually are on these approved lists.

"Tax exempts,"

as they are called, are also in demand in some states where
they are accepted as security or reserve against deposits of
27
public funds.

25

This tax exempt characteristic is the reason for
the relatively small difference between the yields on state
and Federal obligations even though the United States bonds
have a higher credit standing. Tax exempt bonds, in fact,
may sell at a lower yield" than Federal obligations that have
the same maturity. Dowrie and Fuller, op. cit., p. lj.77*

26

David F. Jordan and Herbert E. Dougall, Investments
(sixth edition; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp.
33^~35* This situation points up a problem that will have to
be solved if the volume of state borrowing in the future
becomes so great that it cannot be absorbed by the extremely
wealthy and by institutional investors. Dick Netzer, "The
Outlook for Fiscal Needs and Resources of State and Local
Governments," American Economic Review. XLVIII, No. 2 (May,
1958), 323.
^Badger and Guthmann, op. cit.. p. 570; Hardwick,
loc. cit.; Linen, loc. cit.; Wendt, loc. cit.; Dowrie and
Fuller, og_. cit.. p. i|.8&;^and Fundamentals of Investment
Banking, pp."251-53.
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The over-all high regard for state and municipal
bonds and the popularity of these bonds with certain groups
of investors do not mean, of course, that investment bankers
who deal in these bonds do not evaluate each individual
28
Issue with a great deal of care.
Prospective buyers
concern themselves with such factors as the past records of
units in meeting obligations, economic reserves, political
structures and the quality of political administration,
legal provisions concerning the debt, and with certain
specific measures that show the strength of financial
29
structures.
Other general criteria observed in evaluating
the investment qualities of state bonds are the ability and
willingness to pay the debts, and the legal provisions
30
concerning tax rates and debt limitations.
The character
of the community or the state (in respect to its general
economic status and its degree of moral responsibility), as

W h e t h e r state and municipal bonds should be evalu
ated by different criteria from that presently used is a
question that is raised at another point. Infra, pp. £1-56.
It is also suggested elsewhere that states may benefit from
disassociating themselves from local governments. Infra,
Chap. VI, pp. lj.01-2,
^Dovwle and Puller, 033. cit., pp. ij.7 9 , h&l> and
Raymond, op. cit.. p. 197*
^^Jordan and Dougall, 0 £. cit., pp. 32i|-3£j and
Raymond, op. cit.. p. 197.

indicated by historical fact, is also of vital Interest to
the investment banker.

31

Some of the more specific questions which are raised
by investment analysts and investment bankers concern the
following!

the amounts of existing debt and the plans for

debt retirement; the extent of delinquency in tax collections
the status of the annual budget; the various comparisons
32
of taxable wealth and revenues with debt.
Investment
bankers are also Interested in details about outstanding
debts

its relationship to population and property values;

the trend of borrowing; the schedule of service requirements;
the ratio of service requirements to annual revenues; the
rate of debt retirement In relation to the life of Improve
ments that these debts financed; the existence of short-term
or floating debt; the provisions made to retire term bonds;
and the extent and type of protection provided to existing
issues.

Current operations of the governmental unit proposing

any bond issues and data showing revenue collections and
existing tax rates will be carefully scrutinized.

Budgetary

procedures to be followed in case of impending deficits, the

^Fundamentals of Investment Banking, pp. 37iv*lj-Olt.;
and Raymond, op,, cit.. p. 197.
32
Dowrie and Fuller, op. cit.. p. fy.87; and Raymond,
OP. cit.. p. 197.
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degree of centralized control or supervision, and the incli
nation to avoid a pay-as-you-go approach are all usually
observed.

Finally, legal opinion about any particular issue

is generally sought.
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If the foregoing review of questions that are fre
quently raised by investment bankers concerning state credit
is Insufficient to serve as a starting point to derive debt
principles, there is available still another source of perti
nent information.

Useful principles of debt management can

be formulated from a study of the rating systems employed by
investors services.

The Moody's rating system, described

here, is not only well known and respected, but it is also
representative of the rating devices used by these institu3k
tions.
Moody's uses nine rating symbols that range from
the highest rating of "Aaa" through nC.,T

The symbols are

intended to represent investment risk or investment quality.
This determination of investment risk involves economic
judgment that is based not only on the past record of the
borrower but also on the present and future potentialities

^ Fundamentals 0f Investment Banking, pp.
and Raymond, op. cit., p. 197*
^+For this reason, and in order to limit the scope of
this study, Moody's has been used throughout the study as
representative of all of the rating services.

1*4
of each issue.

MoodyTs ratings thus are only estimates of

long-term risks, and they are intended solely for the grading
35
of bonds in terms of their investment quality.
Bond ratings are of great importance to the states
regardless of their intended purpose.

There is a clear cor36
relation between high ratings and low bond yields.
Since

this relationship exists, some very valuable debt management

-^Moody*s Municipal and Government Manual (hereinafter
referred to as Moody's), 193>8 (New York:
Moody*sInvestors
Service, 1958)» PP. v-vi. A spokesman for Standard and
Poor's, another rating service, described the bond rating as
". . . the symbolic expression of the odds against loss to
the investor in any given bond issue.” Walter H. Tyler,
"The Validity and Use of Bond Ratings,” Municipal Financet
XXX, No. 1 (August, 1957), 52.
The average yields for state and local government
bonds for several recent years were computed by the Federal
Reserve System from samples of Moody's rated bonds as follows:
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS
Yearly Average
1955
1956
1957
1958

Rating
Aaa
Baa
2 .1 8
3.14
2.51
3.50
3.10
4.20
2.92
3.95

Source: Compiled from the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin.
XLV, No. 3 (March, 1959), 285: and Federal Reserve
Bulletin. XLIV, No. 2 (February, 1958), l65"I
When the four years above are averaged, the mean difference
between the two ratings is more than one per cent. If this
difference prevails for a sizeable issue or for a whole debt
structure, the amounts involved obviously are extremely
significant.

principles can be derived by observing and analyzing the
types of structures and the particular management practices
that are associated with high ratings.
There appear to be two main considerations that
determine the ratings given by Moody*s.

The first and

probably the most important consideration is that which
concerns the protection afforded bondholders.

The second

factor, which may not be fully appreciated by some fiscal
administrators and policy makers, is the characteristic of
"certainty" or "uncertainty."

This feature is carefully

studied for each particular issue, but the rating process
does not rule out the uncertainty that revolves around the
complexity and instability of the whole of the state* s
37
financial structure when a particular issue is rated.
The protection afforded to bondholders seems to be
measured primarily by the ratio of pledged revenues to debt
service requirements.

There are frequent references in

Moody's explanation of its ratings to the "margin of
protection."

This tendency is also reflected in the weekly

bond survey by the same institution which sometimes reports
the ratio of revenue to debt— the greater the ratio the more
protection afforded or the greater the margin of protection.^

J 'Moody's, 1958, pp. v-vi.
(June

-^For example, see Moody*s Bond Survey, XLVIII, No. 23,
1956), 522.

The ratio of revenue to debt is something that is
often superficial and something which can be changed.

One

practice that usually results in small margins is the dedi
cation of certain revenues or certain taxes to the repayment
of specific bond issues.

When this type of dedication is

used, there may be some issues that have large surpluses
over and above their service requirements.

These particular

issues will have extremely high ratios of revenue to debt
requirements, higher ratios than are really necessary, and
the result will be that the revenues or resources are not
being used effectively.

This type of dedication thus can

result in overprotecting some issues and underprotecting
others.

Besides the strictly mathematical ratio of revenues

to debt, there is also the disadvantage of having one tax
alone as support for each issue.

Dedication presumably

makes risk greater than if several bond issues of a state
were being paid from a pool of four or five major taxes.

In

the latter case, the failure of one tax probably would not
cause default on any issue.

Logic would seem to call for

freeing taxes and other revenues from specific to general
debt service.

Debt service requirements could then be the

first charge upon the entire receipts in the state.

The

ratio of revenue to debt service— the margin of protection—
would be much greater.

Ratings, in the hbsence of other

kl

undesirable factors, should improve, and bids for the
state*s new obligations should be more favorable.
The second characteristic that distinguishes the nine
different Moody*s ratings is the degree of certainty
surrounding the bond issue.
stability.

Here the key seems to be

For example, the difference between Aaa bonds and

Aa bonds can be either a smaller margin of protection or
else greater "fluctuations” in the protective elements.
Again, the A rating may result from a "susceptibility" to
impairment in the protective elements— more uncertainty.
The Baa bond rating might result from "unreliability" in the
protective provisions.
bonds being rated Ba.

"Uncertainty" is the cause for some
Bonds rated B are those that lack the

characteristic of "assurance" of principal and interest
payments.
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The certainty or uncertainty factor which is so
important in the rating of bonds can concern anything
connected with the issue.

The characteristic of stability

must be interpreted very broadly.

It is not just a question

of whether or not the provisions in the bond indenture are
clear.

The degree of assurance provided to the investor and

bond dealer will depend upon such things as the institutional
factors that were mentioned earlier in this Chapter as well

^Moody*s, 1 9 5 8 , pp. v-vl

as the specific provisions of the issue.

It may take some

time for the state to build up a reputation for certainty,
stability, and assurance, but there is little doubt that
success in the endeavor will be reflected in better ratings
and lower interest charges.
The general criteria used for bond ratings are
significant in themselves, but they provide still more
information when they are analyzed from another point of view.
This approach is to compare the ratings associated with
certain states and certain issues and to determine from this
certain principles for successful debt management on the
state level.

The characteristics of state debt structures

with excellent bond ratings are indicative of what the
market considers to be good debt management.
characteristics?

What are these

An excellent study of this type was

prepared by the staff of the Louisiana Legislative Council.
The Legislative Council study dealt only with general
obligations but included all of the states and grouped them
according to the ratings carried by their bonds.

Thirteen

states at the time of the study had no outstanding general

^Louisiana Legislative Council, ”A Comparative Study
of the Bonded Debt of the Forty-Eight States,” Research Study
No. 9 (hereinafter referred to as Louisiana Legislative
Research Study No. 9)> Prepared by the Staff of the Louisiana
Legislative Council, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, March, 1956,
passim.

obligations, and another twelve had Aaa ratiqgs on at least
part of their general obligations outstanding.

Seventeen

other states had ratings no higher than Aa on any of their
bonds, and six others had no bonds rated higher than A,

The

State of Louisiana general obligation bonds held ratings
that varied from Aa to Baa.
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Only five of the twelve states with Aaa ratings had
more than $£ 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 of general obligations outstanding.
These five states were Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio, Massa
chusetts, and New York.

Connecticut had $111,831,000 of

bonds which were all ultimately payable "automatically" from
one main fund.

A main characteristic of that state's general

debt, therefore, was simplicity.

Maryland, with $l£0,160,000

of general obligations outstanding, provided for their pay
ment from a single fund and had "no limit" an taxing power.
The simplicity again is striking.

Ohio had $l 6 £,7 0 l4-,000 of

full faith and credit debt which was serviced from a single
sinking fund from which payments were "required."

Again

there was no limitation on the ad valorem tax rate in the
simple structure.

Massachusetts had used its full faith and

credit freely when the survey was conducted and had
$1j.£9>8££,676 of general debt outstanding.

The Massachusetts

debt was serviced from dual funds which were sustained by

^ Ibid., p. 3

"unlimited" general revenues.

The fifth of the large

issuers of Aaa full faith and credit bonds was New York, the
largest borrower among the American states.

New York did

not have the simplest system of the group, but it did have a
successful debt structure.

A large sinking fund in that

state, which had assets of $ 1 7 7 *7 5 9 >6 9 1 > contributed to this
success.

Besides having these assets, the debt structure in

New York benefited as a result of the provision which made
payment of revenues "mandatory" and "judicially enforceable."
The Louisiana Legislative Council concluded its
analysis of state debt structures with bonds of the highest
rating as follows:
Aaa bonds are supported by the pledge of the
full taxing power of the state with no consti
tutional limitations thereon and the bonds operate
as a charge, which the Legislature may not touch,
upon either the general revenue or general fund of
the state or upon a sinking fund supported by dedi
cated revenues far in excess of debt requirements

^ Massachusetts lost its position within this exclu
sive group since the survey was conducted. All of its
outstanding full faith and credit debt was given a revised
rating of Aa in 1955* The reason for the change apparently
is that the volume of the debt was great enough to damage
the state's credit position. William A. Forbes, "The Billion
Dollar Debt of Massachusetts," Boston University Business
Review, IV, No. 2 (Fall, 1957)* 10-11.
^ I t is noteworthy that self-supporting debt in New
York, such as that connected with housing, was given the
benefit of mandatory payment machinery to make it even more
attractive. Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9*
pp. 16-32.
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or both. Alternative means are usually provided
for payment of the bonds in the event of a deficit
in the primary source of revenue allocated to the
payment thereof, such alternate means of producing
revenue being either automatic and/or enforceable
by legal process available to bond holders.44
The characteristics of state debt structures that
have highly-rated issues reveal that there is some legal
basis for the difference in ratings, but also that there is
a significant tribute to convention involved.

The legal

status of state debts differs from municipal debts in one

^Ibid., p. 3 . The state debt structures that had
lower ratings had the following characteristics*
Aa bonds either are payable from a sinking fund
with adequate minimum reserves and an excess of
revenue over debt retirement requirements or are
supported by dedicated revenue far in excess of
debt retirement requirements with alternative
provisions for added revenue in the event of
deficit in the dedicated source. The length of
time required to retire outstanding bonds, total
state debt, and available assets or revenue for
bond retirement are additional factors which may
be considered in according this type of rating.
A bonds are payable from dedicated revenue
sources with or without a sinking fund. Alternative
means of payment usually are not provided and these
bonds generally do not operate as a charge upon the
general revenue or taxing power of the state with
any means of enforcement thereof available to a
bond holder.
Baa bonds ordinarily are not payable on a parity
basis from dedicated revenues. Various issues often
have different priority of lien upon or payment
from a single dedicated revenue source. There are
no sinking funds and no alternative means of payment
of the bonds provided. Ibid.. p. 3 .
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very important respect--the state is a sovereign government
and cannot be sued without its consent.

The state therefore

can repudiate its debt or default on interest with very
little chance that the bondholders will gain any satisfac
tion.

As Ratchford points out, the bondholders, therefore,
h$
generally must depend upon the state*s good faith.
The
whole gamut of "required," "mandatory," and "automatic"
payments to bondholders may make it easier for bondholders
to build a case if there is a breach of faith on the part of
the state; however, there can be no assurance that payment
will actually be made.

Thus, one of the prime character

istics that is used to separate state obligations into grades
is certainly of questionable value.
The same thing might be said of the pledge of
unlimited ad valorem tax revenues.

Ad valorem taxes have

long been losing their importance on the state level.

lj.6

^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. [j.82-96.
The full faith and credit pledge, incidentally, has
been widely honored by the states. There were only three
states in default in the 1930*s. Alvin H. Hansen and
Harvey S. Perloff, State and Local Finance in the National
Economy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 19l|i}-), p. 52.
According to Business Week, full faith and credit
munioipals have an even more impressive record of no final
defaults. "Manning a Market in Municipals," Business Week,
No. 15^9 (May 9, 1959), 55.
^Shultz and Harriss, op. cit.. p. 258.

The states that do not have this unlimited property tax
pledge may also have certain ad valorem tax limitations in
their constitutions, but how much weight should be given to
these factors?

How real is any tax or debt limit?

Neither

of these is more than temporary if it really needs to be
eliminated or revised.

It is difficult to imagine that any

state would let a tax limitation interfere with the payment
of a just debt.

The pledge of unlimited ad valorem taxes,

therefore, is very unconvincing— but it is still the proper
thing for a state to use.
Even if the mandatory and judicially enforceable
characteristics of Aaa bonds are granted, these provisions
are questionable as criteria for ratings.

Legal clauses

requiring payment are not pertinent except in case of a
default or repudiation on the part of the state, and this
financial condition is quite rare In modern American states.
When states are beset with such difficulties, it is apparkl
ently largely a result of poor debt management — something
that need not happen.

At the present time, there appear to

be no real reasons why states should ever have to default or
repudiate debt.
If this optimistic opinion about state credit and
about the techniques available for state debt management is

^Ratchford, American State Debts, passim.

correct, the characteristics summarized above, which affect
ratings and interest rates to such a large extent, would
appear to have been given far too much weight.

Serious

doubt may be raised as to the justification of the average
difference of more than one per cent that existed between
Aaa and Baa rated state and local bonds in the United States
from 1 9 ^ 5 through 1 9 p 8 . ^
Several of the legal and administrative practices
that have proved to be so successful in the five states
referred to above are of questionable real value.

States

are to be imitated and complimented on their use of these
devices, of course, but have they done much more than conform
to the conventions of the bond market?

It appears that the

liberal use of such words as "mandatory," "required," judi
cially enforceable," "unlimited taxes," and "first charge"
has worked wonders in the market.

Large measures of psy

chology and semantics apparently are necessary in order to
have successful debt structures.

The successful states have

bowed in the direction of conservative market desires, and
the gestures have paid off handsomely.
If the market ratings of bonds are based so much on
remote possibilities and questionable clauses, what should

Supra, p. [|4

be done to supplement or revise the criteria on which
ratings are based?

It would certainly appear that the basic

strength of state obligations should be given more weight.

1+9

One way that states could help to accomplish this would be
by offering only their full faith and credit as valid and
sufficient security for bond issues.

This full faith and

credit pledge could probably be made more effective for the
state and more attractive to investors (and not much more
misleading).if the phrase were changed to read:

"full faith,

credit, resources, and wealth of the state of 'X1 are
pledged . .

This change would serve to emphasize the

economic strength of the state while also making more effec
tive use of the state* s name even though it would not
necessarily give the bondholders any more real legal
protection.
Surely, when it is apparent that, a state*s economy is
strong and that there is every intention on the part of the
state to honor its obligations, a penalty of one per cent
because of a cluttered debt structure is heavy indeed.
Market standards as characterized by the bond ratings are

1+9
The point here is that the economic condition is
not given the weight it deserves. There is no question, of
course, that the rating services do consider it in assigning
their ratings. It is the first factor named, for example,
by a representative of Standard and Poor*s. Tyler, op,, cit.,
P. 52.

not ultimate criteria.

It would appear that some reexamina

tion is in order in the bond market as well as on the state
50
level.
The questions raised about the validity of bond
ratings do not, of course, absolve the states from making
certain that they are not victims of the ratings.

Bond

ratings are important because they give a good indication of
credit standing and because they have a clear relationship
to interest charges that must be paid for borrowed funds.
It was indicated previously that the higher the rating, the
lower the interest costs.

Thus, if the factors affecting

the ratings are known, the method of lowering interest costs
should be very clear.

Careful consideration of conventional

market rules that Influence ratings and interest costs is
still of great importance and is a major concern here.
Financial customs represented by these ratings must be given
Important weight In the formulation of principles of debt
management.
Principles of debt management must be directed at
meeting the two basic criteria upon which ratings are based—

Personal interview with Dr. William D. Ross, Dean,
College of Business Administration, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, June 30, 1959.
The subject of bond ratings Is studied later from a
different approach. Infra. Chap. VI, pp. 396-99.

protection and stability— as well as at some of the more
specific characteristics discovered in the Legislative
Council report and the recommendations of investment bankers
and investment analysts noted above.

The key elements of

protection and stability clearly must be introduced into the
debt structure by careful planning.

Planning should be

concerned with specific protective provisions, but good
planning will also help to dissipate uncertainty in a debt
structure.

The next problem, therefore, is to develop a

debt plan based upon given institutions,
II.

P L A M I N G THE DEBT STRUCTURE

A major part of the constitutional section bearing on
the question of debt should deal with planning the debt
structure.

Main provisions, which are suggested by

Hillhouse for inclusion in a bond code, are merely debt
5l
plans that are given the weight of constitutional law.
However, since these long-term plans are not. always provided
constitutionally, and since they can certainly be useful
guides to the debt administrator whether they are codified
or not, It is perhaps better to emphasize the plan rather
than the constitution which may embody it.

This shifting of

emphasis does not mean that the constitution would not be a

Hillhouse, o]3 . cit., pp.

-[)!}-.

logical place to start in. planning.

But if the constitu

tion cannot be changed, this should not mean that planning
cannot be used at all to improve the debt structure.
The plan of a debt structure must take cognizance of
two distinct problems related to the efficacy of borrowing.
The two problems concern the propriety and the safety of
borrowing.

Whether the borrowing is "proper” or not is

mainly a question of whether the particular purpose of the
borrowing is suitable.

The "safety” problem concerns the

whole fiscal structure.

Is the state in a position where it

can safely add any debt to its existing structure no matter
52
how proper any particular purpose might be?
This section
will deal with both of these questions in the order given.
When to Borrow
In order to determine when it is proper to borrow,
some of the basic relationships in the area of public
finance must be reviewed.

These relationships are those

between spending, taxing, and borrowing.
To determine when It is proper to borrow, It must
53
first be established when it is proper to spend.
After the

Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 5>62;-65.

£3 It

Is generally agreed that spending should be
carried only up to the point where the additional social
benefit gained in the spending would balance that which
would be sacrificed by the taxpayers. This conclusion Is

decision has been made to spend, the next consideration is
to determine the method of financing--taxation or borrowing.
The basic advantage of the first method of financing is that
there are no interest costs involved, and the savings of
interest costs would be available for other spending if
needed.

Taxes, however, are not always preferred over

borrowing.

There are certain characteristics of taxation

that make it inappropriate in some situations,

An obvious

limitation is that taxation is not flexible enough to take
care of sudden changes in needs.

Then, of course, there is

the case where large sums are needed all at once so as not
to lose the advantages of large-scale operations.

Tax

systems may not succeed in raising the amounts that are
needed at one time.

Finally, borrowing may be a more equi

table method of distributing the financial burdens connected
with certain physical improvements over time among all of
the users of these improvements.
Borrowing, therefore, will be appropriate for certain
purposes and under some circumstances which are widely

widely accepted as a starting point in public finance even
though it involves welfare economics and there is little
agreement about how this principle can be applied. Shultz
and Harriss, op. cit., p. 61).; Kenyon E. Poole, Public Finance
and Economic Welfare (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc.,
19!?6) t P P . hk~k£ J and 0. H. Brownlee and Edward D. Allen,
Economics of Public Finance (second edition; Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19f?6), p. 160.
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recognized in the field of public finance.

These general

purposes are:
, . . (l) to finance large emergency or irregular
expenditures--including wars, {2 ) to finance
capital construction projects, (3 ) to harmonize
the divergent rhythms of current expenditures
and current revenues, and (1|) to refinance
existing debt. A fifth reason . . . government
borrowing should be an element of fiscal policy.
The first of these circumstances is inappropriate for the
states insofar as it applies to wars, but the balance are
applicable to at least some extent on the state level.

The

states have their emergencies in acts of God such as floods
and other destruction by the elements.

Another type of

"emergency” which is usually somewhat reluctantly recognized
and condoned is that which is due to past neglect of, say,
institutional facilities.

It is all too common for states

to find themselves in the position of having obviously
inadequate hospitals or prisons that require the replacement
of entire systems.

The cost

of such replacements oraddi

tions

is frequently so large that only borrowing will provide
55
the needed sums.

^Shultz and Harriss, op. cit., p. 568. The first
three of these conditions approximate those listed by
Henry C. Adams in his list of proper circumstances for
borrowing that was published in 1887. Henry C, Adams,
Public Debts, An Essay in the Science of Finance (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1 8 8 7 ), p. 78.

55Shultz

and Harriss, op> cit., p. 571; and Ratchford,
American State Debts, p. 56ij.*
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Borrowing to finance capital construction projects
can involve several different circumstances.

Borrowing for

capital expenditures may generally be justified if one or
more of the following factors appear:

(1) the outlays are

large and nonrecurrent; (2) the borrowing finances certain
state Enterprises;" (3) the expenditures finance improve
ments that indirectly generate revenues.
Borrowing to finance large nonrecurrent capital out
lays such as state office buildings, bridges, and highways
is very common on the state level.

The occasional large

capital construction need which is nonrecurrent in nature
can be properly financed by borrowing.

Another type of

capital expenditure borrowing that is rarely used in the
American states but which is sometimes accepted as proper
is "enterprise" debt.

Examples of these enterprises are

more easily found on the local and Federal levels; power
plants and dam projects would be representative.

Somewhat

related to enterprise debt would be borrowing which generates
income; this type of debt is called "self-supporting debt."
The question of what is proper is profoundly influenced if
the borrowing occurs in order to finance capital improvements
that directly generate revenues in amounts sufficient to pay
£6
the principal and Interest costs.
But, this concept need
^ Sh u lt z and Harriss, o£. cit., pp. $7 2 -7 6 ; and
Batchford, American State Debts, pp. $63-61]-.
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not be limited only to operations which support themselves
directly.

For example, port development can be expected to

contribute to economic growth and thus indirectly generate
revenues that will ease the burden of borrowing.

(Of course,

port improvement would also normally be expected to result
in certain operating revenues.)

Highways may also fit Into

this category of borrowing if they Indirectly generate debtpaying ability.

Some highways may Increase state revenues

indirectly by contributing to economic growth and this in
turn may lead to greater revenues if more traffic results
57
and thus increases gasoline tax collections.
Borrowing for the improvements described above may be
very sound economically.

Borrowing is a way of getting

Improvements that are needed when they are needdd and of
providing for their payment as they are being used.

There

may, in fact, be a responsibility to carry on such borrowing
If it is a significant factor In contributing to necessary
$8
and desirable expansion in the economy.
There is no need,

^ T h e references to the revenue-producing nature of
improvements here should not be Interpreted to mean that the
borrowing should take the form of revenue bonds.
^ Wi l li a m D. Ross, Financing Highway Improvements in
Louisiana (Baton Rouges Division of Research, College of
Commerce, Louisiana State University, 1955)# P* 18; and
William D. Ross, "State-Local Fiscal Policy and Economic
Growth,” National Tax Journal. X, No. 1 (March, 1957)> 76.
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if the timing and the method of retiring such borrowing are
properly planned, of passing any burden on to a generation
of taxpayers who will not have the use of the improvements.
There would appear to be little justification for hesitation
in borrowing Tinder these circumstances if available funds
are insufficient.

Furthermore, even if funds could be

raised by taxation, this might not always be the most
appropriate way of financing the improvements if the
increased taxes would pose a serious threat to economic
expansion.
When borrowing for large nonrecurrent construction is
involved, whether the improvements are self-supporting or
not, the most desirable method of planning the debt struc
ture is to engage in "capital budgeting."

Capital budgeting

is simply a ". . . long-term capital improvement program,
plus a coordinated program of the methods by which such
capital expenditures will be financed."

59

It is also some

times referred to as "capital planning" which is defined as
a continuous program in which the planning agency compiles
and analyzes the requests for capital improvements for
several years, assigns priorities to these requests, and

^ C a r l B, Chatters and Albert M. Hillhouse, Local
Government Debt Administration (Hew York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1939), P. 3S2:

puts these requests in financial terms which are then

60
related to the revenues or receipts available.
Viewpoints on the objectives of capital planning or
capital budgeting differ somewhat, and the differences
appear to be somewhat contradictory.

One view would empha

size three objectives:

(1) to schedule public needs in the
61
order of their urgency;
(2) to " . . . direct attention to
ascertaining the extent to which operating and maintenance
,.62
costs will be increased by a proposed capital project;
and, (3) to 11 . . . require state officials and the legis
lature to review all methods of financing, . . . and . . .
relate the amounts available from these sources to the needs
61
of the state and its ability to finance various projects.”
Other authorities recognize the objective of preplanning
capital spending as a method of making installments more or
less equal, but they also note the alternative objective of

AO

Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc.,
"Capital Planning,” No. 69 (hereinafter referred to as
Public Affairs Research Study No. 69), March 15, 1958, p. 2,
61
Ibid.. p. 3.
62
Ibid. A similar interpretation of capital budgeting
has been expressed by David M. Ellinwood, a Vice-President
of Moody1s Investor Service, who has recommended it for
municipalities. David M. Ellinwood, The Commercial and
Financial Chronicle, CLXXXI, No. $b3k (Thursday, June 2,
195^),27.
^ Public Affairs Research Study No. 69, p. 3.
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having unequal installments timed to counter the business
cycle. ^
In view of the generally accepted limitations of
effective counter-cyclical fiscal policy on the state
65
level,
the more restricted objective of capital budgeting
appears to be the more desirable one.

Capital budgeting

thus is planning directed specifically at capital improve
ments.

These capital Improvements may or may not require

borrowing for their financing, and one main function of
capital budgeting Is to decide this very question.

Of

course, the concept of the capital budget is much easier to
grasp than it is to apply.

One major difficulty In the

process of capital budgeting as well as in financial planning
in general is the problem of estimation.

The estimation of

revenues in preparing the capital budget is a problem that
has been seriously neglected in the past.

It has become a

more important problem since state spending has Increased so
greatly in the last twenty or twenty-five years.

66

There are

also signs that fiscal problems on the state level will be

^Shultz and Harriss, 0£. cit., p. 57k*
65
Infra, pp. 7*i--75.

66

Eugene A. Myers, Revenue Estimation and State
Fiscal Management,11 National Tax Journal. XI, No. ij. (December,
1958), 3*4-7-53.
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even greater in the future.

Finally, if capital planning or

capital budgeting is adopted as is recommended by most fiscal
experts, the states must of necessity make long-range projec
tions and plans.

The collection and analysis of adequate

information is a responsibility of government which is
necessary if the common good is to be furthered because
collecting information is basically a method of helping to
67
determine what is the common good.
Decisions about taxa
tion, services offered, and borrowing all depend upon
projections of revenue yields.

68

Much of the progress that has been made in the use of
estimation techniques and machinery in capital budgeting has
come from legislative committees acting somewhat upon their
own initiative when they have been dissatisfied with
available information.

Taxpayers* research groups are also
69
important in this area of research.
These groups can help

to force the government to accept its responsibilities in

67

James H. Maloon, "The Progress of Research at State
and Local Levels," Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Confer
ence on Taxation (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax
Association, 1958), pp. 298-99.
/Q
Myers, op., cit., pp. 3lj.7-lf.8.
69
Carlton ¥. Tillinghast, "Governmental Research by
Private Agencies," Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Confer
ence on Taxation (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax
Association, 1958), pp. 318-22.
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providing adequate information.

Where governmental research

units are operating, the taxpayer groups are also useful in
checking the official figures and perhaps in supplementing
70
them in certain instances.
Research units, as they exist
today, have at least succeeded, in most cases, in moving
away from the "rule of thumb" method of estimating revenue
which was still used by a majority of states as late as
1952.71
Obviously the whole process of revenue estimation in
capital budgeting will be very complex if it is based on
realistic assumptions— it must be complex since it deals
with such a complicated problem.

The technical nature of

the problems together with this complexity indicate that a
certain amount of specialization must be involved if the
estimation of state revenues is to be done thoroughly.

The

following recommendations would seem to conform to the idea
of capital budgeting and the method of establishing it.
First, it is recommended that the Division of the Budget be
given responsibility for making final decisions.

However, it

70
For an example of a typical project conducted by the
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, supra, p. 61^.,
71

See Lawrence A. Leonard, "State and Local Govern
mental Revenue Structures— A National and Regional Analysis,"
National Tax Journal, XI, No. 1 (March, 1958), 67-77? and
Myers, op. clt.. pp. 350-51, for examples of statistical
techniques which have been applied to revenue estimation.
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is also recommended that this agency employ a systematic
method for making the estimates and that this systematic
method should "be formulated hy a research unit within the
Budget Division.

Individual estimates probably should

originate from the various agencies responsible for collect
ing taxes and other revenues.

A research unit could be

utilized to check and evaluate these tax and revenue projec
tions and to assemble the various estimates.

Estimates

could then be checked by independent tax and fiscal experts.
Prom these sources, the Division of the Budget could then
make its final report which should Include an explanation of
the bases of the projections.

The various units Involved,

but especially the research unit, would be expected to con72
stantly analyze and review the latest pertinent data.
After revenue estimates are made, the next step In
setting up the capital budget is one of determining physical
73
needs;
available facilities must be Inventoried and future
needs must be estimated.

This determination would probably

best be initiated on the departmental or agency level with
objective review by some central administration agency that

7%yers, 2 E* clt.. p. 353.
'^Chatters and Hillhouse, op., cit., p. 3614-.
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is responsible to the executive branch.

Capital improve

ment needs then can be listed chronologically in order of
their relative importance in the £-, 6 -, or 1 0 -year capital
budget.
After physical needs have been considered and weighed
by a central agency, the next step is to try to reconcile
these needs and the ability to pay.

If ability to pay is

sufficient to care for the needs, the state probably should
shift to a pay-as-you-go basis and restrict borrowing to
approved purposes other than for capital improvement,

On

the other hand, if the physical needs outstrip the ability
to pay, the traditional approach is one of adopting a
partial pay-as-you-go program to whatever extent it is
possible.

75

The pay-as-you-go or partial pay-as-you-go system has
been widely accepted for many years as the soundest approach
to the financing of public improvements.

It has much to

recommend it--it is a cautious approach that is appropriate
to a problem which has such long-term implications.

If

needed revenues can be obtained by means of existing taxes,

Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana
has made a similar proposal that would create a planning
agency to review construction requests and a management sec
tion to check on office space utilization. See Public Affairs
Research Study No. 69» pp. ^-5*
79
1-^Chatters and Hillhouse, op., cit.. pp. 362-68
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or if needs are not pressing, it may be possible to raise
taxes soon enough to finance the planned improvement.

The

character of the spending will also have a bearing upon the
efficacy of pay-as-you-go relative to borrowing.

The more

regular the amount spent on improvements, then the more
feasible it is to shift to a pay-as-you-go basis because
there is more opportunity to plan taxes to take care of the
needs.

The main advantage claimed for pay-as-you-go is that

it saves on interest costs; capital improvements reputedly
can be supplied more cheaply if the timing of the improve ment is not affected.

Of course, lower interest costs
'77
will enable more capital improvements to be made.
A second
advantage which is sometimes claimed for the pay-as-you-go
system is that costs are felt immediately, forcing more
78
economical planning and eliminating extravagance.

^ Other advantages that have been noted are that
pay-as-you-go saves on bond issue expenses and on referenda
or the costs of amending constitutions. Prank Amandus Neff,
Municipal Finance With Emphasis on Trends Since 1900 (McGuin
Publishing Company, 1939), p. llj.0.
77
This theory does not take into consideration the
different effect that a secular trend of rising prices would
have on a pay-as-you-go program as opposed to a long-term
debt program. The long-term debt may prove to be cheaper in
the long run if the timing of the improvement is advanced by
brrrowing and thus entails lower construction costs.
^Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., pp. 375-80?
Shultz and Harriss, o j d . cit., pp. 57^-T^J and Hillhouse,
op. cit., pp. 1 1 , Jjl|-1 , 4557
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There is, however, one basic difficulty with the
pay-as-you-go system for state financing— it simply does not
provide a guide for the state that cannot pay but still needs
improvements.

There is also a semantics problem involved.

It should be recognized that so-called ’’p ay-as-you -go*’
really means "pay-before-you-go.”

Present taxpayers are

asked to pay now for highways or other improvements that
will be enjoyed only by those around to use them after they
have been constructed.

A public improvement financed by

bonds retired over the life of the improvement may involve
greater equity.

Besides promoting equity in some cases,

borrowing permits benefits to be derived from the use of
improvements years before they could be provided on a pay-asyou-go or "pay-before-you-go" basis and permits savings to
79
be realized if there Is inflation of costs.
Finally, the
pay-as-you-go plan ignores the fact that certain improve
ments have the ability in themselves to increase state
Income.

Borrowing, therefore, Is sometimes more appropriate

than pay-as-you-go financing of capital improvements, and it
definitely has a place in capital budgeting.

?9ross, Financing Highway Improvements in Louisiana,
p. 18; and Neff-, 0 £. cit.', p. IqO.
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Whether a borrowing plan or a pay-as-you-go plan is
adopted, many real benefits can be realized from capital
budgeting.
It gives perspective and method to capital
spending and enables state officials and
legislators to see the whole picture and thus
to keep the various parts in correct propor
tion. . . . its own reasonableness and logic
and the publicity which goes with the plan
give it considerable weight.SO
Perhaps the most important benefit of capital budgeting is
the step that it makes toward planning commitments in rela
tion to the ability to finance these improvements.

Another

striking advantage, however, is that needs of one state
agency are reviewed relative to the needs of other agencies.
Not only do priorities become clearer, but this comparison
of needs should also serve to eliminate some overlapping
projects.

Finally, of course, there results an orderly

arrangement of public needs in the order of their urgency.

81

The result of this scheduling is an increase in social
benefits.
Leaving the area of capital construction, a third
major justification for the use of credit an the state level
is to smooth budgetary Irregularities.

Government spending

®°Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 590.
^Public Affairs Research Study No. 69, p. 3.
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cannot easily be stabilized and tax revenues are often
received on annual or quarterly terms.

The discrepancy

between the timing of expenditures and receipts makes some
borrowing necessary, but this would justify only short-term
borrowing
Borrowing for refinancing is another purpose for
which credit has been used, but it is of relatively limited
importance on the state level.

Refinancing can refer to

renewing a maturing bond issue by more borrowing.

This type

of refinancing or refunding is widely disapproved because it
is an indication that the state has not made adequate provi
sions for debt retirement.

The term "refinancing," however,

has other more pleasant connotations.

Another type of

refinancing has to do with the calling of debt prior to matu
rity.

Circumstances sometimes permit the refinancing of

debt on terms more favorable to state governments.

This

benefit is dependent on the states having had the foresight
On
and the opportunity to reserve the call option.
Other refinancing which is somewhat less common would
be the calling and converting of certain issues so that
annual maturities can be rescheduled in more manageable form.

^Shultz and Harriss, op. cit., pp. 576-77.
®3ibid., p. 590.
option, infra, p. lllj..

For a discussion of the call

Finally, a less desirable type of refinancing would be the
8i(.
funding of short-term issues into long-term debt.
The final reason for borrowing is to influence income
and unemployment.

But, this type of borrowing is not uni

versally approved for states, and many would severely restrict
its use on that level.

The orthodox view on the role of

state borrowing in fiscal policy apparently is that states
should cooperate with the Federal government, while remem
bering that they are not in a position to borrow to the same
extent as the Federal government.
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The argument is that

reluctance on the part of prudent state governments should
result from the assumption that their debts are not inter
nally held debts as is the Federal debt.

States are

considered to be in a midposition between individuals and
the Federal government but more comparable to individuals.
Repayments of externally held debts are thought to place a
D
real burden on the state and on its citizens.
Furthermore,
the state’s resources for servicing and repaying debts are

8Il

Shultz and Harriss, 0£. cit., p. 577.

85

Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 562-63; and
Hansen and Perloff, op. cit., pp. 53~54-*
^Groves,

ojd.

cit.« p. 577.

0*7

'The orthodox view about debt has recently been
severely attacked. See James M. Buchanan, Public Principles
of Debt (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958),
p. 223.
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more limited than those of the Federal government.

States

also differ in that they do not have the monetary powers of
the Federal government.

88

Many fiscal authorities appear to he inclined to
accept as satisfactory any state fiscal policy that does not
seriously Impede the counter-cyclical policy followed by the
Federal government.

This opinion is based upon the premise

that state fiscal policy has tended to aggravate business
cycles.

But recent studies seem to indicate that this was

not really the case during the thirties.

If this new thesis

is correct, there should be little or no difficulty in
satisfying a minimum requirement that the states not
intensify fluctuations and make more work for the Federal
government.

These new findings would also seem to suggest

that perhaps the above requirement should be reviewed with
the thought in mind that the states might be able to make a
larger contribution and cooperate more in the area of fiscal
89
policy if it should ever be necessary,

88

Groves, 0 £. cit.. p. 568; and Ross, "State-Local
Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth," p. 69.
®^Ansel M. Sharp, "The Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Role
of State Governments During the *Thirties*," Rational Tax
Journal. XI, Ro. 2 (June, 1958), 138-Zj.5» and Ross, ^'StateLocal Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth," pp. 68, 75-77*
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When It Is Not Proper to Borrow
Since the careful planning of debt policy is the
first step toward establishing a sound credit structure on
the state level, this planning has recognized the conditions
in which the use of credit is proper.

It may be pertinent

also, however, to examine purposes for which borrowing
normally is not considered appropriate.

Perhaps the great

est danger of listing "improper" purposes Is that these will
tend to become inflexible.

Obviously, there can be no

standard of what is proper that will endure the various
financial, economic, and political changes that come in
time.

For this reason, a list of improper purposes may be

inappropriate for a constitution and especially undesirable
if the constitution is extremely difficult to amend.

With

these reservations about establishing a lasting standard,
however, it is worthwhile to review the conventional views
as to when borrowing Is proper.

These conventional views in

municipal finance naturally focus on financial factors and
do not consider political and social forces which some
people may consider even more important.

This conventional

financial approach was taken by Chatters and Hillhouse when
they concluded that bonds should not be issued for the
following:
(a) Subsidies to private enterprise, . . .
(b) Unneeded capital Improvements. . . .
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(c)
(d )
(e)
(f)
(g)

Minor capital expenditures. . . .
The purchase of movable equipment. . .
Deficits in the operating budget.
Emergency relief purposes. . . .
go
Regularly recurrent capital expenditures. . .

These rules were formulated with municipal or other local
forms of government specifically in mind, but they are
applicable to some extent to state governments as well.
Some of these rules have been arrived at by historical
analysis.

The violation of some of these rules accounted

for many of the defaults and repudiations of state debt
which took place in the nineteenth century.

The various

principles are worth reviewing separately.
The granting of subsidies to private enterprise is
undesirable on several counts.
credit to political abuse.

First, it opens the state*s

Certain influential or

"favorite11 groups have been the ones to get this state
backing in the past, and there is a good chance that collu91
sion with the legislatures will take place.
Another
difficulty which is involved in the providing of subsidies
to private industry is that public officials, perhaps not
well trained in business matters, would have to pass judgment
about the chances of success of private businesses.

These

state subsidies would also have one danger that is present

9°Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., p. 353.
^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 172-7£.

78
in tariffs; private industries subsidized by the states
might tend to become dependent and continue to demand help
from the state.

Still another possibility is that private

industry would put the states in the pos i t i m of having to
compete with each other.

Industries could begin "whipsaw"

tactics that could eventually lead to widespread state
subsidies to Industry.

Another objection to subsidies is

that capital no longer is so scarce in the United States
that worthy ventures essentially suited to private ownership
are unable to get sufficient capital without the help of the
92
state.
The use of state credit for "unneeded" capital
improvements--extravagences— is traditionally considered
undesirable.

Normally, there should be a clear need before

any expenditure is made and a still greater need before the
expenditure is financed by borrowing.

The obviousness of

this general rule has not precluded its violation in the
past, and for this reason it cannot be omitted.

The same

thing can be said about borrowing to finance minor capital
Improvements, to finance regularly recurrent capital

9 2 Ibid., pp. 5 8 7 -8 8 .
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expenditures,
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to cover deficits in operating budgets, to

purchase movable equipment, and to finance minor emergency
spending.

In the aggregate, these expenditures are recurrent,

and they should be provided for by means other than borrowing.
The frequent sale of small bond issues to finance such
expenditures is also undesirable because this type of borrow
ing is generally expensive and complicated.
One of the recent types of borrowing that is not
considered proper by financial standards is borrowing for
veterans* bonuses.

Bonus borrowing is somewhat different

from the Confederate pension borrowing that took place in
some of the Southern states.

The Issuance of bonds in order

to finance cash bonuses became a major reason for borrowing
only after World War II, although some borrowing for this
purpose did occur in the 1920*s.

914-

Two objections are

commonly directed against veterans* bonus borrowing.

First,

it Is felt that the obligation to veterans Is primarily an
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Regularly recurrent capital expenditures are not as
patently unsuitable purposes for debt financing as are some
of the other items listed above. The principal reason for
their Inclusion at this point is that there Is an alternative
which sometimes Is more desirable— a pay-as-you-go system.
The pay-as-you-go system was discussed in connection with
conditions under which It was considered proper for the state
to borrow. Supra, pp. 69-71.
^Ratchford, American State Debts. pp. 2 6 I4., 313-32.
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obligation that must be settled on the national level.
Secondly, and this is a value judgment, many feel that
states should reserve the use of their credit for more
95
urgent purposes than to pay bonuses.
A third possible
objection is that borrowing should be reserved largely for
lasting and tangible benefits normally associated with
capital improvements.

Veterans' bonuses are highly ephemeral

benefits.
Safe Amounts to Borrow
Once it has been determined that spending is desirable,
that no other method of financing is appropriate, and that
the particular purpose of the borrowing is a proper one, the
next question is one of determining the amount that can
safely be borrowed.

There must be a determination of the

maximum debt load which the economy can safely bear and then
it must be ascertained whether or not the particular issue
in question exceeds this limit.

Thus, a particular project

may be a distinctly proper subject for borrowing, but the
state may already have reached the limit beyond which it
cannot safely borrow.

Obviously, if the state has reached
96
this point, it cannot justify further borrowing.

^Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit., p. 578.
^Ratchford, American State Debts. p. 561f..
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When a question of safety is involved, therefore,
there must be some method of determining what the maximum
debt burden should be for the governmental unit involved.
This problem is basically a matter of determining ability to
pay, and it encounters some of the same perplexing diffi
culties that arise when taxpaying ability is being
97
me asured. 1
The ability of a state to bear debt burdens will
depend in the first instance upon some very general factors.
The population and population density, the wealth, income,
and resources of the state, the character of the state*s
economy (the degree of industrialization and urbanization),
the state’s tax revenues, and the economic characteristics
of the region of the country in which the state is located
will all have some influence upon the state's ability to
98
bear debt.
Other factors influencing ability are the less
tangible factors, such as the political stability of the
people and their representatives and their collective
attitudes toward debt.

The tax philosophy of a people as

evidenced by tax and debt limitations is also a pertinent

9?Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit. , pp. 19^-96.
98
Chatters and Hillhouse, ojc, cit., pp. 391-93;
J. I. Bogen (ed.), Financial Handbook (third edition; New
York: The Ronald Press Company, 19^0), pp. 298-300; and
Leonard, o]3 . cit., pp. 70-71.
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issue.

Some of these factors cannot he measured at all

and others can be only approximated.
One method of measuring ability is to select certain
factors which suggest ability and to combine them into an
index number to try to measure debt-bearing ability.

For

example, an index designed by Edna Trull is based upon the
following factors:

Federal income tax returns, retail sales,

the number of motor vehicles, per capita property values,
100
savings deposits, and gasoline consumption.
Some other more specific measures of debt-bearing
ability are ratios of debt to single series which represent
at least roughly the wealth or income of the state.
these measures are:

Some of

(!) the ratio of net debt to assessed

valuation of taxable property; (2 ) the rate at which debt
can be increased; (3 ) the safe per capita net debt loads;
(1^) the ratio of debt service to total expenses; and

qq
'These factors and other tests that follow, of
course, are the very same factors that investment bankers
analyze in determining the risk involved before making bids
on any issues. These factors are also related to those that
the investor services use in assigning bond ratings— they
represent a state's credit position. Supra, pp. 2pl— ■*-^Edna Trull, Resources and Debts of the Forty-Eight
States (New York: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal Service
Department, 1937)> PP. 91-105. See also Ratchford, Arnerican
State Debts, pp. 528-33*

(5 ) the ratio of revenues to proposed debt service requirements.
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These measures are somewhat arbitrary and crude

indications of taxpaying and debt-bearing ability.

The

first of these ratios, the ratio of debt to assessed property
values, has been used ^perhaps more widely than the other
concepts to arrive at ability, but this measure is losing
favor because of the instability of assessed valuations and
because of the declining importance of property taxes on the
102
state level.
The second idea above, that which stresses rates of
increase rather than debt totals alone, takes cognizance of
the fact that the timing of repayments is a more critical
factor than just the total amount that will have to be
repaid.

The translation of all debts into a per capita base

is beneficial if it makes the burden more comprehensible,
but, of course, no fixed norm can be given that would be of
any value.

Any per capita debt figure will probably need to

be revised frequently, but it may be useful for comparison
with per capita revenue and per capita tax totals and for
comparison with other states.

A comparison of various per

capita ratios from several states, especially those with

^^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit.. pp. 356-57; &n3
Financial Handbook, pp. 2 9 8 -3 0 0 .
■'■^Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., pp. 356-57*

8k
better debt and financial histories, provides still more
information for the establishment of standards for safe
107
borrowing. J
The weight of debt service in the total budget has
been used as an indication of debt-bearing ability in the
past.

Chatters and Hillhouse, in speaking primarily of

municipal debt, concluded that debt service should not
exceed 25 per cent of the total annual budget.

This debt

service would include not only the interest requirements,
but also a sum equal to 5 P©r cent of the,principal.
Retirement of 5 P©r cent of the principle every year would
imply, of course, that the debt should not exceed twenty
1 0 i(.
years in its maturity feature.
While it seems to be
desirable for the state to weigh carefully such factors, it
is doubtful that inflexible norms are valid for all circum
stances.

Too much rigidity is to be avoided because of its

conflict with the nature of debt management.
The various traditional measures of safety mentioned
above shed some light on a very important problem, but there
are still other factors that need to be considered.

Any

Judgment about the safety or suitability of borrowing
depends to a large extent upon what assumptions have been
made about economic conditions and about government's
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Ibid.

Ibid.
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responsibilities in each of these circumstances.

These

economic conditions may be secular or cyclloal ones.

A

further characteristic that would have a great and a compli
cating influence on determining the proper policy to follow
is whether the short and the long-term changes in economic
conditions are real or illusionary.

Real economic growth

may or may not accompany a long-run inflationary trend.
Cyclical changes can be real changes in economic activity or
changes in national income resulting mainly from changing
price levels.
Has economic growth been assumed or is secular stag
nation the thesis?
long-run problem?

Does it appear that inflation is the
Has it been assumed that severe cyclical

declines in business activity are no longer a threat?

Is

one of the assumptions that depression is still likely and
that states should engage in fiscal policy action?

10£

These

different assumptions greatly affect the problem of whether
a state should borrow and whether it can borrow with safety.
If economic conditions can affect the question of safety and
timeliness of borrowing, then the safe limit will change from
time to time as economic conditions change.

105

Therefore, there

The theoretical base for fiscal policy seems to be
shifting. Some of the important Implications of a reexami
nation of the consumption function and Its effect on fiscal
policy are noted by Ross, "State-Local Fiscal Policy and
Economic Growth," pp. 7 0 -7 7 .
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can be no universal rule as to what constitutes safe state
borrowing.
If real economic growth is predicted, the state may
be justified in taking this into consideration in planning
its borrowing.
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This real growth would tend to Increase

any safe limit upon which the state has previously settled.
It would be prudent, however, to inquire whether the assump
tion of real growth has been tacitly made all along.
Growth in real terms may or may not be accompanied by
long-run inflationary tendencies.

What Is the implication

if long-term increases in price levels are assumed?

How

does the case of secular inflation affect the questions of
safety or suitability of borrowing?

A long-run inflationary

trend not accompanied by real growth would still mean that
the state's nominal revenues would increase, and, in the
absence of escalator clauses in indenture provisions, the
relative debt burden would decline.

Secular Inflation, of

course, would normally be considered advantageous to debtors
because it is assumed that their incomes will increase
thereby making it easier for them to pay their debts.

State

governments are no different from other debtors In this
respect--Inflation will generally Increase state revenues

"^^William D. Ross and Bernard P. Sliger, "Dedication
of State Revenues in Louisiana," Louisiana Business Review
XXII (April, 19^8), 23.
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and make debt service less burdensome.

If a state govern

ment expected that the nation*s economy would experience
continued long-term inflation, the logical thing to do might
1 0?
be to borrow to finance its major capital expenditures.
Borrowing under long-term inflationary conditions may result
in a saving to the state because improvements that are made
possible by borrowing cost less than they would after several
108
years of inflation.
Savings in construction costs may
more than offset interest costs on bond financing.

If this

reasoning is carried even further, the conclusion may also
be reached that the state should borrow as much as it can,
and perhaps more than it really needs for immediate capital
improvements in order to avoid rising construction costs In
109
the future.
Planning based upon this assumption might

]07

Ross, "State-Local Fiscal Policy and Economic
Growth," p. 7 6 .
^ ® C a r l H. Chatters, "Municipal Finance Needs v.
Credit Restrictions," Municipal Finance. XXX, No. 1 (August,
1957), 17.
10^Chatters did not reach this conclusion in the
article mentioned in the footnote above, but Instead he
emphasized that high interest rates made it Important that
greater attention be paid to the planning of construction
programs. " . . . delete as well as defer. Greater selec
tivity is highly desirable. In other words, consider
whether a project is necessary— is it necessary now— is it
desirable or necessary enough so that it should be done
Immediately even at a high price?" Ibid., p. 1 7 .
This conclusion is a conservative one that is probably
the only responsible advice that could be given to all state
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even call for longer term borrowing and maximum payment
deferments in order to take advantage of rising prices and
increasing state revenues.

Just how far the individual

state should go in this type of inflationary debt policy, of
course, is a difficult question to which there apparently is
no clear or complete answer at the present time.
The last conclusion above— which suggests that the
safe limit to state borrowing may be raised--is based on the
assumption of inflationary bias alone.

But this need not be

the case--the long-term upward trend of pr.ices might be
associated with economic growth in the real sense.

If the

inflationary bias assumption is combined with expectations
of real growth, the conclusion about increases in ability to
borrow and to service debt is reinforced.

Borrowing by the

individual state might be more appropriate under this combi
nation of circumstances than in any other.
If It is decided that instead of economic growth
there will be secular stagnation,--long-term equilibrium at
less than full employment--the conservative approach would

and local governments faced with high interest rates and
inflation. The suggestion that Inflation would lead logically
to the policy of premature borrowing and building would not
be consistent with the objective on the aggregate level of
preventing inflation. However, If the concern is only with
a single state, the suggestion of premature borrowing is not
so preposterous.
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probably dictate a stable or even a reduced debt limit.

On

the other hand, the impact of the stagnation idea might well
be an expanded role for state governments with continual
large-scale spending and attendant borrowing if it is decided
that it is proper for state governments to try to help to
compensate for stagnation.
What are the consequences of debt management if
fiscal authorities assume that the economy is still subject
to short-run fluctuations in business activity?

Short-run

conventional fiscal policy would call for reduction in
borrowing in advance of depression--cyclical declines in
real income.

The same conservative approach would call for

reductions in borrowing in anticipation of national income
declines resulting purely from falling prices.
situations would reduce ability to pay debts.

Both cyclical
Again,

however, the question of safety may not be paramount and
many would question the traditional approach and consider
borrowing appropriate if it aided in preventing depression
and deflation.

Furthermore, if the assumption about depres

sion turned out to be correct and the state found itself in
a depression, the state might find depression no longer a
restraining influence on borrowing but rather a stimulant.
Depression might make secondary the usual concern for safety
in state borrowing and might bring about large-scale public
works programs financed by borrowing.

This case suggests
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that the question of borrowing is not only a question of
whether borrowing is safe--perhaps a more important question
might be whether it is appropriate or necessary.
Still another possibility would result from a combi
nation of the various short-run possibilities.

The recession

of 195>7 - 1 9 5 8 is an indication that depression and deflation
are not necessarily synonymous--recession accompanied infla
tion at that time.

What is the traditional policy if this

alternative must also be faced?

The traditional debt manage

ment reaction to this would probably be that the recession
would eventually result in a matching deflationary tendency
and that this would require restrained borrowing in antici
pation of the recession-inflation.

On the other hand, the

same reasoning that was applied in the situation above might
result in large-scale borrowing for two different reasons:
(l) in order to avoid recession; and (2 ) if the recession
comes with its inflation, to borrow in order to finance
counter-cyclical policy as well as to realize savings in
construction costs.
Finally, what if it were evident to everyone's satis
faction that there are to be no more depressions?

The state

would be relieved of a very great restraint in this situation.
According to the traditional debt management approach, there
would be no need to gear borrowing to the lower ability
which would come during recession.

On the other hand, the
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assumption that there will be no recession would eliminate
the need for short-run counter-cyclical borrowing, and it
would make possible the planning of public works and asso
ciated borrowing on a capital budget basis strictly according
to need.

Even more important a result of this change might

be its effect upon the financial market.

The market is

where the restraints resulting from the fear of depression
are made effective.
The question of whether it is safe or appropriate for
a state to borrow will depend, therefore, on a great many
things and will go much further than ratios of debt measures
to ability measures.

Each period may have its own set of

factors which indicate that borrowing is or is not appro
priate or safe.

Furthermore, it would not be fair to

review the suitability or safety of borrowing in any past
period of time except in the light of what the most accepta
ble economic thinking was at that time.

The conclusions

about what was safe or appropriate borrowing in the 1 9 2 0 's,
therefore, may be different from conclusions in the 1 9 3 0 *s
and both may be different from conclusions applicable to the
period since World War II,
Whatever criterion or criteria are finally settled
upon as the test of whether or not the borrowing should
proceed, it should again be emphasized that each particular
project must have merit on the basis of being a worthy or
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proper purpose for borrowing.

Then, if it is also safe

appropriate for the state to borrow,

or

the borrowing can

proceed.
Machinery for Debt Management
Another basic problem involved in debt planning is
that of providing efficient machinery for handling debt.
The broadest aspects of this problem are related to the
questions, considered elsewhere,

about whether authorities

should be used, whether bonds

should be direct or indirect

obligations, and whether debt

should be serviced from a

single or a dual source of funds or from many.

Should bor

rowing be the responsibility of one state board or should it
be in the hands of half a dozen or so agencies, authorities,
commissions or boards?

It does not necessarily follow that

any one board could manage all of a state's borrowing more
efficiently than could several agencies--the one board could
be completely uninformed or inefficient.

However, if it is

assumed that a single board or a pair of state boards are
using the same rules of debt management that the individual
agencies are using, then single or dual board systems would
probably be more effective because of their ability to control
the debt structure and their more efficient use of personnel
and facilities.

It may be that a single board would be the

most efficient system possible; however, it does not appear
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that this is absolutely necessary.

It may be more realistic

to recognize that separate financing of highways (basically
because of the benefit principle) has become deeply engrained
in the American state governments.

There would seem to be

no reason why a system of dual boards— one for highway finance
and another for other state finance— could not be made to
work.

110

The use of one or two major boards to handle all

of a state’s borrowing would help to eliminate much of the
complexity and instability that is so objectionable in the
market.

Bond ratings under such a debt structure would

normally be better and interest rates would tend to decline.
The debt management unit or units should probably be
an integral part of the state government in the form of a
board or administrative unit in the executive branch of the
government.

It is neither necessary nor desirable that debt

management be divorced from the normal channels of govern
ment as it has been in agency or authority borrowing in
recent years.

Agencies, authorities, commissions— whatever

they are called— appear to have become more and more inde
pendent and free of the regular checks and balances In state
government.

110

The result tends to be complexity and widely

The Louisiana Legislative Council study of states
with Aaa ratings showed that several of these states made
special provisions, including dual funds, for highways.
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, PP. 16-32.
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different debt management policies, for example, in the
timing of bond sales And in the indenture provisions used in
111
the issues.
The ideal state debt management unit would vary some
what from state to state, depending upon existing state
governmental structures.

It can be suggested, however, that

the debt management unit might have four important functions.
One important function would be to aid in the formulation of
a capital budget and to make recommendations about the need
and timeliness of borrowing to the legislature and the
governor.

Recommendations should include advice on how bills

or constitutional amendments should be written to make pos
sible better debt management.

It does little good to have a

team of experts handling debt if authorizations prevent
sound management practices.

Secondly, when authorization to

borrow has been provided, the actual process of borrowing
should be turned over to the debt management unit,

A constant

study of market conditions, the economy, and developments in
the theories of public finance would put the management unit
in a position to borrow on the best terms possible.

Funds

raised by borrowing could then be turned over to the regularagencies of government for their distribution as provided in
the various authorizations.

^•^Louisiana agency borrowing during the 19IpT—19^9
period is a good example of this. Infra, Chap. V, pp. 356-59.

A third function of any unit would be to retire debt
and to pay interest as it comes due.

This duty of the debt

units would include supervision of any funds established to
retire debt serially, by means of sinking fund accumulations
or by use of the call feature.

A final Important function

of the administrative machinery would be to engage in debt
112
reporting, discussed below.
The discussion here serves only,.to indicate a general
approach that can lead to more efficient management of a
state debt structure.

There are probably a number of

specific administrative plans that can be made to work.

The

administrative machinery found in the American states that
113
have efficient systems is not exactly the same.
The
important thing in getting any plan to work is an under
standing among the different state governmental units of the
objectives and techniques of good debt management.

This

type of understanding will go a long way toward solving many
debt management problems, even under the multiple unit
system of debt management that exists today in many states.
However, redesign of a complex system may be worthwhile.
The main objectives that should guide such redesign of debt

112Infra, p. 139.
-^Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9>
pp. 16-32.
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management machinery and a debt structure should be clarity
and simplicity.
Planning Indenture Provisions
The careful examination of alternative indenture
provisions can profitably be included in any debt planning.
Indenture provisions usually include considerations about
the duration or life of the bonds, their form, and whether
they are general, limited, or revenue obligations.
The first indenture provision should concern the
maturity of the loan.

Government loans can fall into

several different categories.

First, there are loans which

are called "perpetual loans."

It is possible for governments

to issue bonds that have no definite maturities.

These have

been used often by European governments, but they have not
been used by American governments.

Of course, American

governments have devised their own types of bonds, which are
actually perpetual in nature, although they are not recog
nized as such.

On the state level, a debt is perpetual for

all practical purposes when no adequate provisions have been
made for its retirement and it has to be refunded.

The

result of this type of borrowing is that the margin of credit
that remains and that can be used to meet any crisis or need
is reduced.

It is also possible that the creation of

permanent debt will tend to weaken the future credit of the
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unit.'1’'1'^

Also, permanent debts will require interest

payments and will generally entail great interest expense.
The second type of government loan is the long-term
loan.

Nominal long-term debt often develops into the type

of perpetual debt described above.

This effect would occur

where the life of an improvement is considered to be the
proper maturity term.

In this case, the issue would be

retired at the same time that the improvement must be
replaced, and the replacement of the improvement would
likely be financed by more borrowing.

This procedure is

sometimes defended on the grounds that improvements should
be paid for during the whole period when they are in use.
Generally, however, the length of life of an improvement
should not be considered anything but the maximum permissible
term and should not be considered the proper life of an
115
116
issue.
This rulehas often been violated in the past.
The life of the bonds should be as short as possible under

^■^Shultz and
^•^Ibid., pp.
Debts, pp. £91-92.

Harriss, op_. cit.» pp. 589-90.
591-92; and Ratchford, American State

116 One authority on the subject of highway finance
remarked that if the life of highway bonds is examined, one
would probably conclude that some of the issuers of highway
bonds must have expected the highways to last as long as the
Roman roads. Edna Trull, Borrowing for Highways (New York:
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal Service Department, 1937)»
pp. 50-56.
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the prevailing market conditions and conditions of ability.
Other things being equal {including economic conditions),
the shorter the .term involved, the less the cost of the
borrowing.

The sooner debt is repaid, the sooner the state

frees itself to better meet subsequent emergencies or
. 117
needs.
It is very likely that the debt activities of a state
will be more concerned with the long-term loan than with any
other variety.

However, two other varieties of government

loans are the intermediate loan and the short-term loan.
The intermediate loan is usually thought of as consisting of
borrowing which matures in periods ranging from one year to
five years.

This type of borrowing has only limited appli

cation on the state level.

117

Intermediate loans may be used

Chatters and Hillhouse, ojd . cit.. p. 3$ks
Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. £91-92; and Neff, op.
cit.. p. ll|.?n It has been suggested that an additional
absolute limit be imposed on the life of bonds. Ratchford
states that bonds should never run for more than twentyfive years, regardless of their purpose. While it is
obvious that shorter maturities will save on costs (except
perhaps in case of an inflationary secular trend), there
seems to be little Justification for the insertion of such
inflexibility into a debt structure. Emphasis should be
placed on flexibility whenever good management is the goal.
It is not inconceivable that certain circumstances could
make longer terms more appropriate. Some port improvements,
for example, may be expected to have a useful life of more
than twenty-five years. Also, if there is a stated or tacit
acceptance of a long-term inflationary trend, the length of
bond terms may perhaps be extended to take advantage of
inflated state revenues.
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when a debt has to be refunded, but at the same time it is
desirable to eliminate it from the structure as soon as
possible.

Another circumstance where it m a y b e appropriate

to make an intermediate loan would be where it appears that
a major refunding of a certain type of debt, say highway
debt, (or even a revision of the entire debt structure) is
due in a few years.

It is also possible that the interme

diate term loan may offer such attractive interest rates
from the point of view of the borrower that It is advisable
118
for the state to take advantage of it.
Short-term borrowing by state governments takes the
form of notes or certificates sold to banks or warrants paid
out to those selling goods and services to the state.

These

short-term instruments were, in the past, often called
"floating debt."

This type of borrowing is somewhat differ

ent in its application from those just mentioned.

It should

properly be used only to smooth out discrepancies between
119
expenditures and receipts,
and even in this use it should
120
be minimized by better budgeting.

•l-l^Shultz and Harriss, op.. cit.. p. 592.
11(?Ibid., pp. 5 9 2 -9 3 .
I20
Hillhouse, o£. cit., p. k-77 •
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Methods of Debt Retirement
The problem of debt retirement is closely related to
the question of the life of bonds.

In line with the conclu

sions reached about short maturities being more desirable,
it is not surprising that one of the first recommendations
about the method of debt retirement is that retirement
should normally begin within the same fiscal year, if
possible, or at least in the year following the issue of the
bonds.

Payments should also be mandatory and on as regular

a basis as possible.

Serial retirement is usually preferred,

but sinking fund retirement can be acceptable.

Debt retire

ment requires that plans be carefully laid concerning the
source of the revenues to be used for this purpose.

It has

been recommended that the most productive revenue source be
121
dedicated for debt service.
Judging from the criterion
used in rating bonds, however, it might be more appropriate
if all revenues were dedicated for debt service.

Total

dedication would make full faith and credit obligations more
meaningful.

All revenues could be paid into the single or
122
dual funds that were described above.
The first charge

upon these funds would be for the debt service requirements

1 21

122

Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., p. 3^5.

The whole question of dedicated revenues was the
subject of a special study in the Pro jet in 1954* The recom
mendation drawn from this study was that dedication of reve
nues to the service of individual bond issues be abolished.
Pro jet. Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1175-1220 and Vol. II, pp. 220-2l|..
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of the state*s full faith and credit obligations.

These

changes would probably increase tremendously the ratio of
revenues to debt service, improving bond ratings and lower123
ing interest costs.
If only full faith and credit—
general obiigations--were issued, there would then be no
subsidiary liens, and all debt would be paid on an equal or

12k

parity basis.

It is difficult to see how a carefully organized plan
for debt payment based on full utilization of all of the
resources of the state could result in anything but very
high ratings in the bond markets.

It is unfortunate that

the dedication of revenues for debt retirement (with
resulting inefficiency and added expense of interest costs)
has been practiced in several states because of institu
tional deficiencies in policies guiding bond financing.
This is one area in the planning of debt structures that is
extremely promising.
Kinds of Bonds to Issue
The kind or type of bond will depend upon three major
characteristics.

First, how is the issue to be repaid,

l23These changes could also obviously simplify the
debt structure and the machinery for administration of the
debt.
12k
Ross and Sliger, op. cit., pp. 20-23.
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serially or by sinking fund accumulations?

A second charac

teristic is the security feature— whether the bonds are
general obligations or revenue bonds.
can be either callable or noncallable.

Finally, the issue
125

Mention has already been made of one of the types of
bonds which can be issued; this type is the serial bond.
The serial bond is one in which part of the issue is retired
every year until the issue is completely retired. Serials
126
can be of several subspecies.
The "straight serial is
an issue that has approximately equal annual payments for
the retirement of principal.

If an issue of $1,000,000 Is

involved, it might be paid at the rate of $50,000 for each
of twenty years.

This payment schedule would eliminate the

principal and, since the interest charges would be based on
the unpaid balance, the annual amount of interest due would
decline over the years.

Thus, in the case of straight

serials, the total annual payments would decline steadily
127
from a maximum amount in the first year.
A second major type of serial bond issue is the
"serial annuity."

In this case, the characteristic of the

•'■^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 19-21.
126
Ibid., and Shultz and Harriss, o£_. eft., p. 598.
127
Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 19-21.
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issue is equality of total annual payments.

This equality

is accomplished by having the serial maturities of the prin
cipal increase steadily from the first year onward.

At the

same time, the amount of interest paid would be declining
because the unpaid balance is declining.

These divergent

tendencies can be calculated so that the total payments are
approximately the same over the life of the issue.
A third type of serial bond is the "deferred serial."
This type of issue is one in which the initial maturity
installment is deferred,

For example, if an issue is sold

in 1958 but its first serial block does not mature until
1963, it would be a deferred serial issue.

A final type of

serial is the "irregular serial" which does not attempt to
equate either the annual principal payment or the total
annual payment.

This type of issue does not have any
129
consistent pattern..
These irregular types may be some

what misleading.because they can give the illusion that pro
visions have been made for serial retirement while in fact
130
there may not be adequate provisions for paying the debt.

128Ibid.
l29Ibid., p. 21.
130
Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 269. Infra.
Chap. V, p. 290, for an example of an irregular serial issue.
The serial retirement of the Bonus Debt Refunding Bonds of
1953 comes in the final three years of the life of the issue.

lOLf.
Of the various types of serial bonds, the straight
serial is perhaps best known and is also the most preferable
under normal circumstances.
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The reason for the prefer

ence is that it causes the heavier burden of the debt to be
carried during the first years of the issue.

Heavier burdens

in the years immediately after the issue are generally
desirable because they automatically create ", , , a margin
for increasing maintenance costs, or for new capital improve132
ments,"
Of course, the bearing of heavy burdens soon
after issue will also have the effect of reducing the
average life of the bonds and will thereby lower the total
133
interest cost of the issue.
The serial annuity tends to be more appropriate if
the market conditions at the time of issue favor long-term
borrowing.

Since the average life of the bonds is longer,

or, to put it differently, since the serial maturities paid
increase over the years, the serial annuity would represent
a movement toward longer term borrowing.

If the circum

stance should be reversed (that is, if long-term maturities
carry higher interest rates than the short-term obligations),

■^^-It should not, however, be considered a panacea
for all debt problems, Hillhouse, op. cit., pp. 260-61, lUjlf..
132
Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., p, 22,
^•^Ibid.: and Ratchford, American State Debts, p. £67.
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it would then be appropriate to use straight serials instead
13k
of serial annuities.
A further necessary consideration in selecting the
maturity characteristic of an issue is a study of the exist
ing debt structure.

If any peculiar maturities have so

dominated bond financing in the past to the extent that the
general goal of having declining total annual payments is
impaired, a special type of serial--deferred or perhaps even
irregular— may be appropriate.

The chances are, however,
135
that these types will rarely be used.
The serial bond is not, of course, the only type of
bond that can be issued.

Instead of being either of the

three varieties of serial bonds described above, an issue
could consist of sinking fund bonds.

This feature of a bond

issue is closely related to the method of retirement.

In

the case of sinking fund bonds, a fund is established and
annual contributions are made into the fund so that upon
maturity there will be sufficient funds accumulated to pay
off the debt.

If this type of bond is issued, the most

advisable plan is for mandatory levies to be made, and it
is sometimes considered advisable that these levies be

^■^Chatters and Hillhouse, o]3 . cit., pp. 19-23.
X3

W
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incorporated into the bond contract.

Perhaps the greatest

disadvantage in using the sinking fund is that the fund must
constantly be guarded against raids for other purposes.
sinking fund issue can be made to work.

The

The most important

consideration is that definite provisions be made for repay
ment of debt so it will not have to be refunded and will not
become a perpetual debt.^^
Another major decision which must be made in deter
mining the type of bonds to issue is whether the bonds
should be general, limited, or revenue bonds.

137

General

obligations are backed by the full faith and credit of the
state whereas revenue bonds are payable from more specific
resources, usually, but not always, from revenues derived in
the operation of certain enterprises or agencies.

Revenue

obligations are usually not backed by the state's full faith
and credit.

A third category of bonds would be the limited

or special obligations, also frequently referred to as
revenue bonds, which are state obligations and payable from
state revenues, but they are not backed by the full faith
and credit alone or even primarily.

A final category of

•^^Ibld.% p. 3 5 5 ; and Shultz and Harriss, op. cit..
pp. 596-98.
^-^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., p. 355*
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bonds would be direct obligations— those that are issued in
138
the state’s own name.
The definitions given previously are not universally
accepted and caution must be exercised when the terms are

^ There is a great deal of confusion in the litera
ture about the meaning of these various terms. "General
obligation bonds" are those "Bonds for whose payment the
full faith and credit of the municipality has been pledged.
More commonly, but not necessarily, general obligation bonds
are payable from ad valorem property taxes and other general
revenues." Ibid,.,
p. lj.95>.
The reference here
to municipalities doesnot materially
affect the applicability of this definition to state
obligations.
Even the phrase "full faith and credit" poses certain
problems. The term has been used to mean not only that the
state intends payment and pledges all of its credit, but
also that the full faith and credit obligation has a first
claim on all ad valorem tax revenues. The full faith and
credit obligation apparently is also frequently expected to
be associated with
an unlimitedad valorem tax.
It is also
sometimes interpreted that full faith and credit obligations
are a first claim on all revenues.
The term "direct" debt is sometimes used almost synonymously
with the term "general obligations" because it appears that
general obligations will generally be direct if direct debt
is defined as "Debt which a government has incurred in its
own name . . ." Ibid,., p.
There are, however, some
exceptions to this. In Louisiana, the full faith and credit
of the State has been pledged to some agency issues which
are indirect debts. Infra, Chap. IV, p. 231.
Indirect debt, on the assumption that it is the opposite of
direct debt, would be debt which is not incurred under the
name of the government itself, but under some other name.
There is confusion surrounding the terms "limited obligations,"
"revenue bonds," and "indirect debt." The term "limited"
apparently is used primarily to differentiate from "general"
obligations or full faith and credit obligations so the
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found in some sources.

For example, Moody’s discusses

Louisiana bonds under two headings:

(l) General and limited

obligations, and (2) Bonds of the agencies of the state.

In

this usage, It would seem that limited obligations would still

connotation here seems to be nothing more than that the full
faith and credit of the state is not pledged. In this sense,
revenue bonds normally would be considered limited obliga
tions because the full faith and credit of the state is
seldom involved.
The terms are undoubtedly closely related,
Ratchford, for example, in the index of his classic book,
under limited obligations simply refers the reader to revenue
bonds. Ratchford defines "revenue bonds" as ". . , all
obligations of political units or their agencies, institu
tions, or departments which do not bear the full faith and
credit of any political unit but which are payable from
certain designated sources of revenue, whether such sources
be tax revenues, fees, or earnings of proprietary enterprise."
Ratchford, American State Debts, p. I(.97.
Another
bond is
derived
general
P. k99.

similar but narrower definition Is that the revenue
"An obligation payable solely out of the revenues
from a particular utility or enterprise and not a
obligation . . ." Chatters and Hillhouse, og.. cit.,

The Financial Handbook is somewhat different in that it
includes under the term "revenue bonds" those obligations
". . . serviced from the revenues of publicly owned facili
ties rather than taxes." Financial Handbook, p. 300.
These definitions would seem to lead to the conclusion that
revenue bonds are limited obligations for all practical
purposes since there is usually no unlimited pledge Involved.
But, limited obligations and revenue bonds would not neces
sarily be Indirect debts because they could be issued In the
state’s own name. Of course, it would be more common for
the revenue bond to be issued by some agency so that they
would frequently not only be limited obligations but also
indirect ones. In view of the difficulties posed by these
various interpretations, it appears desirable that these
terms be used in the most general sense and that when a
certain meaning is involved it will have to be clearly
explained.
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be considered direct debt so that the breakdown In this case
is basically one of directness and indirectness.

The publi

cations of the State of Louisiana have not always been
139
consistent in their usage of these various terras.
It must be decided which of these types of obliga
tions should be issued.

Should the state use Its own name

and make the bond a direct obligation, or should the lia
bility be incurred through some agency, in which case it
would be an Indirect obligation?

As a basic principle, it

would probably bfe most desirable for the state to use its
own name and its full faith and credit.
It would appear to be unfortunate that the full faith
and credit pledges of state governments have been given
limited and specialized meanings.

The ad valorem tax pledge,

for example, Is of limited value, and if this meaning is the
only one attached to the bonds, their marketability might
logically be impaired.

There is little chance that the

meaning of the full faith and credit pledge will ever be
uniform; however, the state can attach Its own meaning to
the pledge and make it as narrow or as broad as it wishes.
It would probably be wiser to use the broadest meaning of
this term.

This procedure would be more consistent with the

■^^Moody*s, 1959, pp. I-iv; Biennial Report of the State
Treasurer (hereinafter referred to as Louisiana, Treasurer* s
Report). 1922/23-1928/29: Report of the Department of Finance,
Division of the Budget (hereinafter referred to as Louisiana,
Financial Report). 1 9 W ^ - 1 9 5 7 / 5 8 .
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use of the word "full" in the full faith and credit pledge.
It would also be more consistent with the idea of a credit
standing.

The state's advantage in the money market is its

normally high credit standing.

The main advantage which the

state has that makes its credit so strong is that the state
has a wide assortment of taxes upon which it can draw to
make good its word.

As in corporation finance, the unit

with the highest credit standing is the one which can use a
general pledge most efficiently.

Of course, use of the

state's full faith and credit pledge in its broadest sense
would have to be accompanied by effective debt reporting.
(When the question is whether the state should borrow
directly or through some authority, another analogy to
corporation finance is suggested.

It would be a rare case

when the large corporation could profit by issuing bonds
through a smaller and lesser known subsidiary that has
fewer assets and less attractive prospects for raising
more.)

If a state makes effective use of its full faith and

credit and does not give it as an afterthought and in a
meaningless fashion, the full faith and credit guarantee can
have the weight of a sovereign government pledging all of
its various resources and revenues first and foremost to
the honoring of its obligations.

The wise use of general,

direct, and full faith and credit obligations can make state
borrowing easier and cheaper.

Ill

The general conclusion drawn above cannot always be
applied in the American states today.

There are certain

institutional factors which actually force states to issue
less effective and more expensive indirect or revenue bonds.
This unfortunate condition is largely the result of the debt
restrictions which were adopted in most states many years
ago.

These restrictions, both statutory and constitutional,

limit the amount of direct or general obligations that can
be issued.

The courts have contributed to the growth of

revenue bond financing by ruling that agency funds are
special funds and that debts payable from these funds are
not really state debts.

The states thus have frequently

been driven to the use of this subterfuge by well intentioned
but very inflexible laws.

This ability of revenue bonds to

circumvent debt limitations when borrowing is imperative is
the only important advantage for this type of borrowing which

llj.0
is recognized by Ratchford.

Chatters and Hillhouse do

not approve of revenue issues for this purpose, but they do
see some advantage in using revenue bonds where credit
Ikl
standings are very poor.
This conclusion, however, was

Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 512-13.
Simpson views the use of revenue bonds as undesirable but
apparently necessary.
Simpson, op_, cit., p. 3 3 8 .
^■^Chatters and Hillhouse, o]o. cit., pp. 2 I1J4.—i+7•

112
oriented to municipalities and other local governments, and
it is doubtful or at least rare for this type of credit
standing to be associated with a modern American state.
Revenue bonds are subject to serious criticisms on
financial grounds.

The contention that revenue bonds help

to distribute costs according to the benefit principle has
not been given much weight.

Ratchford points out that the

benefit theory could be implemented by means of general
obligations supported by the same fees, charges, and tolls
that support some of the revenue bonds.

Furthermore, justi

fication of revenue financing because of compatibility to
the benefit theory assumes that the benefit principle is the
most equitable method of distributing costs.
widespread agreement to this effect.

There is no

Another fallacy in the

argument that revenue bonds assure the application of the
benefit principle is that most revenue bonds in state
financing are serviced by special taxes or state appropri
ations that often have no relation to the services received
by the contributors.

The financial advantages of revenue
li|_2
bonds thus are quite limited.
Some of the more direct disadvantages of revenue
obligations are as follows:

(1 ) They are generally more

■^2 Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. £12-13; and
Shultz and Harriss, op.. cit.. p7 &01.
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expensive than full faith and credit bonds.

Greater expense

is the rule because bidders must investigate the bonds more
carefully before making bids and then the successful bidder
must exert greater effort to dispose of these bonds, which
(other things being equal) are less marketable than general
obligations.

(2) They are usually more complex than full

faith and credit obligations.

This greater complexity

associated with revenue issues normally will be reflected
in bond ratings as well as in yields.

(3) Revenue bonds are

no match for general obligations in most instances because
they are protected by limited assets whereas general obliga
tions can generally draw upon much greater protective assets.
Usually, of course, the revenue bond is secured only by
operating revenues while on the other hand the general obli
gation may be backed by all of the assets plus the taxing
power of the state.

(ip) Revenue bonds are generally not

subject to any of the traditional controls imposed on borrow
ing and this is inconsistent if there is a logical basis for
•t] A
control.
The use of the general, full faith and credit,
issue thus is normally superior to the use of revenue and

•*-^Daniel M. Kelly, "The Prospective Market for
^ Municipal Securities," Municipal Finance, XXXI, No. 1
(August, 1958)»
Freeman, op. cit., p. 6 ; Ratchford,
"State-Local Debt Limitations, pp. 223-25; and Ingler,
op. cit., p. 262,
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limited bond issues.

It can be concluded that state bonds

should generally be the full faith and credit type.
Another important feature of a bond as well as of a
debt structure concerns the call option.

The inclusion of a

call feature in a particular issue may or may not be desirable
depending upon the price that is charged for the privilege.
However, there are at least four general situations in which
it may be desirable to include the call provision in an
issue if the cost of the option is not considered prohibi
tive r

(l) When Interest rates are relatively high and they

are expected to decline; (2) When revenue bonds are being
issued and ultraconservative revenue estimates often asso
ciated with this type of issue make it likely that fupds
will be available for retiring all or part of the debt prior
to Its maturity;

(3) When the state’s offerings are

unpopular because of flaws in the state’s debt structure and
management and something will definitely be done to correct
these flaws; and (Ij.) When the market is unreceptive to a
state’s issues but without good cause.

^^Chatters and Hillhouse, oj3 . cit., pp. 295-96;
Alan K. Browne, "Municipal Underwriting Syndicates," The
Commercial and Financial Chroniclet CLXXXI, No.
(Thursday, April 28, 1955), 38; Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit..
p. 590?
£>. Lvnn Crossley, "Value of Call Feature in
Municipal Bonds, Municipal Finance, XXX, No. 1 (August,
1957), lj-8 .
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The ability to reserve the call option will differ
somewhat under the various conditions outlined above.

It

will normally be more expensive and less feasible to issue
callable bonds when market conditions have driven up bond
yields because this circumstance would be typical of a mar
ket where the state may have trouble even finding all of the
funds it may need.

The price that is associated with the

call feature may thus tend to be prohibitive in cases where
callable bonds appear to be desirable.
The call feature is equally desirable and probably
much more feasible in the next three cases.

A state that

recognizes flaws in its debt structure and plans remedial
action should use either short or intermediate term borrowing
or else long-term borrowing that can be retired--by call-prior to maturity.

If the state has significantly improved

its debt structure and this fact is overlooked or ignored,
the state should again refrain from creating noncallable
long-term debt until debt reporting can correct the situation.
The situations above are those in which the inclusion
of the call feature among the bond provisions would seem to
be appropriate.

A related problem deals with when the

feature, if it has been included, should be exercised.
interest rates are favorable and other conditions are
favorable, callable bonds of the following descriptions
should be called:

(l) old issues that need to be

If
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consolidated into a simpler and more effective debt struc
ture! (2 ) term bonds, in order to convert them into serials
lij.5

or otherwise to provide for their retirement;

(3 ) bonds

that were sold at unfavorable rates because of structural or
administrative handicaps which no longer exist; (Ij.) bonds
that were sold at unfavorable rates because of inadequate
debt reporting; and (5 ) bonds that were sold in such unfa
vorable market conditions that a saving can be realized by
calling and refunding them.
Even with these advantages of the call feature, it
must not, of course, be concluded that all bonds should
necessarily be callable.

The call feature is not so desira

ble from the point of view of the investor, and the state
must expect to pay a slightly higher rate to enjoy the
privilege.'*'^

It has been recommended that the borrowing

unit ask for alternative bids on a callable and noncallable

^ Chatters and Hillhouse, op_. cit., pp. 295-96;
Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit., p. 590; and Crossley,
loc. cit.
■^^The fact that the cost of the call option may be
wholly or partly in the form of a premium, which is paid
when and only if the option is exercised, is a complicating
factor. It is not clear whether the contingent cost com
pletely covers the expense of making a more complicated
analysis before the bids are made. If the entire cost is
covered, then the state would apparently obtain the call
option at no cost whatsoever although there would be a cost
if and when the option is exercised.
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basis in order that the cost of the privilege can be ascerlh.7
tained.
This technique probably is desirable; uowever,
it may, because of its complexity, increase somewhat the
costs of planning and computing bids and thus eventually the
lk8
costs of borrowing.
If the consensus in the market is
such that the cost of the call privilege appears to be
exorbitant, then it would be better not to include it.
The three major elements determining the character or
type of bonds described above are:

the serial or sinking

fund method of retirement; the use of the state's full faith
and credit pledge as opposed to the use of specific revenue
pledges to secure bond issues; and, the callable or noncallable nature of issues.

Of course, bond issues can consist of

any combination of the three elements and obviously no one
combination can once and for all be considered superior in
all circumstances.

Fiscal officials should carefully decide

what conditions will require the use of each of the specific
provisions.

Then, it should be easier to apply these criteria

to any particular issue.

li+9

Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit.. pp. 295-99* 356;
and Shultz and Harriss, ojc. cit., p. 590.
"'■^Browne, loc. cit.
l!±9
Chatters and Hillhouse, ojc. cit., p. 356.
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III.

MANAGING THE ISSUANCE OP BONDS

After the staters borrowing plan has been reviewed
and It Is decided that an issue is necessary, proper, and
safe, fiscal authorities are then concerned with the actual
process of issuing bonds.

The problems of issuing bonds

will depend upon some of the institutional factors that have
already been recognized.

Since the managing of an Issue of

bonds will depend so much upon such circumstances as the
legal and financial practices of the time, the principles
for managing the flotation of bonds obviously cannot be
detailed ones.

Circumstances dictate the best course of

action not only where the planning of a debt is concerned,
but especially when the debt is being incurred.
Authorization of Bond Issues
In a case where the state is free of any limitation
on debt creation, the state legislature usually is completely
responsible for the authorization of any debt.

The legis

lature can, in this case, authorize either direct (full faith
and credit) obligations or it may choose to operate indi
rectly through some agency to issue revenue bonds.

The

first choice would usually be preferable for the reasons
previously given.
But, either a statutory or a constitutional limita
tion may prohibit the creation of debt; it may prohibit
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direct or full faith and credit (general) obligations to be
issued in excess of a certain amount except under certain
circumstances.

These exceptional circumstances generally

include wars or insurrections and other unlikely events that
might require the utilization of the state’s credit.

In the

event that the purpose of the borrowing in question is not
in this special permissible category, the constitutional or
statutory limitation must be circumvented if borrowing is to
proceed.

If the limitation is a statutory one, the legisla

ture can free itself without much ado.

However, if the

limitation is a constitutional one, it may be very difficult
150
to get the issue authorized.
One approach Is to try to
get the constitutional limitation cancelled.
not done this to any appreciable extent.

States have

A much more popu

lar approach is to amend the constitution to permit a
particular Issue,
It is extremely important, whether debt authorization
is constitutional or statutory, that authorizations be
framed or written in such a manner that they are consistent
with principles of good debt management.

Basically, this

means that authorizations should not run counter to the

■^^Oklahoma voters, for example, rejected every amend
ment proposing debt creation during the period from 1907 to
19lj-l. Simpson, op., cit., p. 3 3 I4..
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objectives of simplifying debt structures while increasing
the protection afforded to bondholders.

If these objectives

are to be achieved, it is imperative that many decisions
about the nature of the authorized bonds be left to debt
administrators.

Flexibility through lack of detail, there

fore, should be one of the characteristics of a good debt
authorization.

Another important characteristic of a good

authorization is the generous use of phrases that will
provide assurance to bondholders and to those who influence
them.
The state has still another method of borrowing even
where there is a constitutional debt limitation-through
agencies or authorities.

Use of this method is possible

when there is an appropriate agency and sufficient precedent
in the courts to the effect that borrowing by this agency
does not constitute state borrowing.
ruled that the bonds issued by state

Courts have frequently
agencies

"special funds" (the "special fund doctrine")

are paid from
and that obli

gations payable from these funds are not really state obli
gations.

If they are not state obligations, of course, they

are not subject to the debt limitation provision.

l£l

1E>1
Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 1)46-66; and
Ratchford, "State-Local Debt Limitations," p. 221.
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Whatever particular circumstances surround the authori
zation of a bond issue, required legal steps must be followed
meticulously whether they concern the procedure for getting
the constitution amended or whether they outline the steps
necessary for a state agency to sell bonds.

Carelessness at

this point can cause the whole procedure to be repeated.
Any neglect of the law will also give opponents of the issue
l£2
opportunities to delay or defeat the issue.
These flaws
may create uncertainty in the minds of investment bankers
and investors and cause the bonds not to be well received.
Dealers are quite conscious of these dangers and usually
suggest that issuing units consult bond attorneys and often
insist on unqualified legal opinions regarding the legality
and regularity of the issue.

If the state has not secured

such an opinion, the bids submitted may be subject to such

c l e a n s e .153
Pitting the Debt Instrument to the Circumstances
The variables In a debt instrument have been mentioned
In connection with the general planning of the debt struc
ture.

The basic plan should contain a careful outline of

1^2
^ Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit.. p. 1$.
■iqo
^ Fundamentals of Investment Banking, p. 35>9J and
Browne, op. oj t ., p . 37.
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the general conditions under which the alternative features
should be employed.

If this recommended procedure has been

followed, the problem at this point is to observe conditions
present in the bond market and in the state’s debt structure
and to make appropriate choices as to the form of the instru
ment.
simple.

This description, however, makes the problem look too
It is at this stage that the decision is made

between a serial bond and a sinking fund issue, between a
full faith and credit or a revenue issue, and between a ealla
ble or noncallable issue.

If there is sometimes a difficulty

in implementing the most appropriate plans because of rigid
ity imposed by statutes authorizing the bonds (or by consti
tutional provisions in some states), then the responsible
officials should use whatever flexibility they possess to
fit debt instruments to the market conditions and to all of
151+
the institutions that confront them.
The term of the new issue should be consistent with
the life expectancy of the improvement with which it is
associated, and it generally should mature in an even shorter
time if this is possible.

Any decision about the maturity

schedule should be influenced somewhat also by the desire to
have the future debt load declining steadily to make way for

■'-^Chatters and Hillhouse, ojj. cit., p. 17.

new borrowing.

It may be important that maturity dates be

planned to coincide with revenue collections in order that
there will be a minimum of time during which funds remain
idle.

Another consideration is that savings can be achieved

in the amount of interest paid by having the first serial
maturity due within less than a year of the date of issue.
When this is done, the life of the bond issue will be short
ened by six months or more, and the interest saved Is at the
155
given rate on the whole principal.
Conventional Provisions in Bond Contracts
The provisions in bond contracts are important
because of their Impact upon the debt structure, but they
are also Important because they directly influence the
marketability of an issue.

This point might seem to be a

superficial consideration, but financial institutions and
individual buyers of municipals are particular In their
requirements, and failure to take into account their desires,
even whims, may result in a narrower market, possibly in
creasing the interest charges that will have to be paid.
Some of the provisions that are considered conventional
would concern the following details:

1 ^Ibid., pp. 2 3 - 2 k..

(l) the date of issue,

12k
(2 ) denominations of the bonds,

(3 ) interest due dates,
156
(Li.) places of payment, and (5) maturities.
The date of sale is an important matter because

unless bonds are dated very soon after the date of sale, the
investor will have a problem of paying back interest.

On

the other hand, if the bonds are dated ahead of the sale
date, the dealer is placed in a position of having to specu
late on what will happen in the future.

Finally, the bond

is really not a legal instrument until the day it is dated,
and any opinions by attorneys are qualified until that
157
time.
A second common provision in bond indentures concerns
the denomination of bonds.
for bonds is $1,000.

The most acceptable denomination

Institutional investors and large

individual buyers favor this size bond and sometimes even
larger ones because larger bonds require less bookkeeping
and coupon clipping and less storage space than would
several smaller denominations of bonds.

Odd amounts are not

popular even if they are greater than $1,000.

If an odd

amount of bonds is issued, the odd bond or bonds should be

156

Ibid., pp. 27-29. The importance of these provi
sions is evident in the treatment given to them in Moody*s.
Normally, each one of these details is given for every issue
described in the manual. Moody*s, 1959» pp. 672-77.
l^Chatters and Hillhouse, oj). cit.. pp. 27-28.
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part of the first serial maturity if the issue is a serial
158
one.
This procedure will serve to simplify the accounting
and reporting on the issue.

These preferences about the

denominations are rational, and the state should not hesitate
to provide the investors what they want.
Investors are also inclined to prefer semiannual
interest dates over a single annual payment.

After it has

been decided that interest payments will be on a semiannual
basis, the next question involves a determination of when
these two pay dates will come.

If the date of the issue has

been decided on the basis of tax receipts, then a date six
months later will usually be satisfactory as the first
159
interest due date.
A third important conventional provision concerns the
place of payment.

The place selected for the payment of

principal and interest can be the deciding factor for some
investors.

They will usually demand that payment be made in

a convenient and leading financial center.

The thoughtful

fiscal authority will provide for payment in Chicago, New
York, and one or more of the largest cities within the state
issuing the bonds.

160

■L^^Ibid., p. 28; Fundamentals of Investment Banking,
PP. 353- 5 b > and Browne, 0£. cit., p. 38".
•'■'^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., p. 28.
■L^°Ibid_., pp. 28-29; and Browne, loc. cit.
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Still another convenience which is often favored by
bond dealers is the scheduling of serial maturities in
conveniently sized blocks.

Dealers prefer annual maturities
161
that come in blocks of five to twenty-five or more bonds.
Of course, the size of annual maturities is seldom the
problem in state finance that it is for local governments.
Dealers not only find large blocks easier to handle but also
more attractive to large investors.
Timing the Issue
Proper timing in the issuance of bonds means that
borrowing should take place, insofar as it is possible, when
interest rates are favorable for the state.

One authority
162
has described it simply as picking the proper spots.
This
description gives some insight into the difficulty involved,
but how does one pick these spots?
being correct?

What are the chances of

How important is it to find the right time?

How often do these opportune times present themselves?
Timing would not be so important or so promising if there
were not significant changes in interest rates,

i

Chatters and Hillhouse, 033. cit., p. 29J and
Browne, loc. cit.
162

George T. Ragsdale, "Revenue Bond Financing and
Interest Rate Trends," The Commercial and.Financial Chronicle,
CLXXXVI, No. 5652 {July"Tji7 1 9 5 1 ) , 23.
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The right times or spots should be picked on the
basis of knowledge.

Officials must be familiar with the
163
literature available in the field,
not only as it applies
to municipals in general, but also as to how the outstanding

bonds of the state are selling and how recent offerings have
been received.

Attention must also be given to the many

factors that can influence bond prices.

Among the more

important of these are the tax exempt nature of the obliga
tion, the maturity terms, the quality of the obligation,
salesmanship, and the innumerable other factors which influence the demand and the supply of these securities.
Many of the factors which influence bond prices are
subject to rapid changes.

Furthermore, knowledge about

these factors is very imperfect.

The probability that the

timing of particular, issues will be exactly right, therefore,
is not great.

Over a long period, though, careful estimates

of market conditions— the variables that influence bond
prices— should prove to be superior to chance placement.
Timing would not be so important or promising if
there were not significant changes in interest rates.

The

importance of timing in bond sales can be appreciated from a

^ ^ S e e Chatters and Hillhouse, o]3. cit., p. 33» for a
list of this material.
^Ragsdale, loc_. cit.
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review of the range of yields in recent years.

The current

yields of Aaa state and local bonds during the months from
February through December of 1958 ranged from 2.72 in
February to a low of 2.69 in May and then increased to a
165
high of 3.28 in September.
For the 1957 calendar year,
the low was 2.79 in February and the high reached 3.^3 in
166
September.
There are, of course, other fluctuations besides
167
seasonal ones,
but these highs and lows suggest that
there may be a significant seasonal pattern to bond yields.
If there is a seasonal pattern to these yields, one tech
nique that might be of some value in timing issues would be
to use a seasonal index such as the one shown in footnote

^Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington: Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, March, 1959), p. 285.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington: Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, February, 1959), p. 165. For an
example of market conditions conducive to timing in 1956,
see C. Canby Balderston, "Present Problems and Possible
Plight of Local Finance," Municipal Finance, XXX, No. 1
(August, 1957), 10.
1 67
Other possible fluctuations are cyclical, secular,
and erratic ones.
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168.

The recognition and use of a seasonal index such as

this would be only a small part of the over-all knowledge
that good timing requires, and it is certainly not an infal
lible method of anticipating market conditions.

With these

important reservations, it is apparent that interest rates
are normally lower in the spring and early summer and higher

SEASONAL INDEX OF YIELDS OF STATE
AND LOCAL BONDS RATED Baa

Per Cent of Normal:

Per Cent of Normal:
Month

Month
Based on
the Mean

January
February
March
April
May
June

99.8-97.8
97.5
97.2
97.il97.8

Based on
the Median

99.7
9 8 ,2
97.7
95. k
98. k
97.3

Based on
the Mean
July
August
September
October
November
December

98.5
101.9
lOJp.O
1 0 1 .7
103 Jl
102.3

Based on
the Median

98.9
1 0 2 .1
1 0 5 .2
1 0 1 .0
1 0 5 .6
1 0 0 .6

Source: Computed from information available in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1955-1958* Volumes lj-1—Zpip, and
April, 19%9~.
&
This index was constructed by centering 12-month
moving averages. The monthly yields used in this computa
tion date from November, 195*1 to March, 1959 inclusive.
The fact that local issues are included should not
invalidate the findings since it is logical to expect that
state and local bonds would be subject to the same forces
because they are traded together. The Baa rated bonds
probably typify all bonds as far as any seasonal pattern is
concerned— there is a very close correlation between the
interest paid on Baa bonds and that paid on, say, Aaa bonds.
(Supra, p. ll-lf.). Finally, this index is based on the yields
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in the fall and winter.

If this is the case, and the index

in footnote 168 Is offered as evidence, then it is obvious
that state bond financing (other things being equal) should
be timed to take place in the spring months— preferably In
April.

A seasonal index can also be applied more specifically

of outstanding bonds. But, the yields paid on new issues
are very close to the yields paid on outstanding bonds.
They tend to be slightly higher because new Issues presumably
represent a more risky investment than tested bonds. The
point, however, is that yields which must be offered on new
issues will approximate current yields on similar outstand
ing securities.
The reasons for this apparent seasonal pattern are
neither clear nor simple. Probably the most important cause
is the same factor which tends to influence all interest
rates: the normal increase in the demand for funds which
corresponds with the rise in business activity In the late
months of the year. The increase in the demand for money
and the availability of investment opportunities elsewhere
in the economy evidently cause the demand for bonds to
decline, thereby lowering bond prices and raising bond
yields. This tendency is most apparent in November and
December, before and during the holiday season.
The explanation for the relatively high August and
September yields may rest on another institutional factor.
Yields in these months seemingly are influenced by the
apparent practice of financial intermediaries of taking
vacations as well as by their apparent tendency to slow the
pace of their activity In general at these times.
Another factor may be that the seasonal pattern is
partially self-generating. That is, the sale of bonds in the
early months fixes the interest and principal at Intervals of
six months. Thus interest and principal payments are being
paid to the same people who make the demand for the bonds.
This factor would tend to explain the drop in yields In October
which follows the most active month of April by half a year.
It would be expected that these individuals and Institutions
would normally tend to return a great portion of these funds
to the same market. This practice would tend to strengthen
the demand and drive up prices at regular intervals.
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in estimating yields for future months when historical rates
are available.

For example, if the seasonal index for

January {based on the mean) is about normal (100) and the
yields of Baa bonds in that month averaged Ap.0 per cent,
then the average April yields could be expected to be about
3.89 per cent, and the September yields would be around I|.,l6
per cent.

These estimates are based on the fact that April

yields average 97.2 per cent of normal and the September
169
rates, IOJ4. per cent of normal.
These estimates are based
on the assumption that the seasonal pattern will not change.
Changes in the trend and cyclical patterns, of course, may
also upset these estimates, and any irregular fluctuation
will also influence yields.

These other fluctuations would

require just as thorough a review as would the seasonal
pattern in the estimation of future yields and in the timing
of bond offerings.
Timing, especially that based on the use of a seasonal
index, depends upon whether or not borrowing can be postponed
for several months without incurring other costs which might
be prohibitive.

An example would be cost incurred as a

result of uncertainties in the letting of construction
contracts.

Proper planning will thus be the determining

factor in timing a bond sale.

169

If the issue is planned well

The change between April and September would be
even greater If the index based on the median were considered
more representative.
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enough in advance of the time when the funds will be actually
required, the state will be better prepared to take advantage
of the difference in interest rates that a few months more
170
or less can make.
Selling bonds earlier than the funds
will be used entails a cost that must be calculated to see
if it is worthwhile.

The best approach would be to plan

needs for the favorable periods and to make plans as flexible
as possible.
Sale of the Bonds
The actual sale of bonds is a highly complicated and
171
technical operation.
The marketing of the issue starts
with advertising and the publication of financial statements.
A prospectus or circular should always be supplied to finan
cial institutions and should be very complete as to related
facts as well as to the details of the specific issue.
After the information has been circulated as widely as
possible, the next step is to set up the procedure of
actually soliciting bids.

In order to get the widest market

possible, it is advisable that bond dealers be contacted.

170

Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 31-37-

171
1 For an interesting description of the preparations
carried on by bidders, see "Manning a Market in Municipals,"
Business Week, 0£, cit., pp. 52 ff.
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The guiding principle in these steps always should be to try
172
to get as many bids as possible.
The advertisement previously mentioned, which is also
called the "notice of sale," contains information needed by
dealers in preparing their bids.

The notice of sale, there

fore, should provide clear and complete information about
the time and place of the sale as well as the details of the
bidding.

The state must make its position clear on all
173
questions such as whether or not split-rate bids
will be
entertained, whether the bid can be for only part of the

bonds, whether all bids can be rejected, whether the interest
rate can be named by the bidder, whether there is any maxi
mum rate of interest, and any other features that may be
currently handled in different ways.
mine the

bases of bidding.

..X7U-

These questions deter-

Sales conditions obviously

should be made clear, but another objective should be to
establish bid conditions that are reasonable and
175
conventional.

^^Chatters and Hillhouse, oj>_. cit., pp. ipO—L^7?
Fundamentals of Investment Banking, pp. 358-59; and Browne,
op. cit.. p. 37.
-*-73a split-rate bid consists of two or more interest
rates on one issue.
I7J1

Chatters and Hillhouse, o]3. cit., pp. l|l-i|8;
Fundamentals of Investment Banking, pp. 358-59; and Browne,
op. cit., pp. 38-39.
175
'^Browne, o£. cit., pp. 37> ^J-0*

Finally, the sale of the bonds must be conducted at
the appointed time and place.

At public sales (and it

almost goes without saying that public sales are highly
desirable) bids should be opened promptly and read whether
they are presented by messenger or received by mail. Bids
176
should be examined to determine the best one,
and if this
bid is acceptable and is made by a responsible party, the
177
bonds should be awarded officially to that bidder.
Auction sales, when the buyers are given the opportunity to
make several bids, are generally not desirable.

It is

doubtful if they ever bring more favorable bids, and it is
178
possible that they can result in higher interest rates.
Of course, there are certain circumstances in which
the state may not wish to accept any of the bids.

These

circumstances would include changes in the market since the
notice of sale was given.

The fluctuation in yields noted

^ The most common method of calculating the best bid
is by the "net Interest cost" method— "Ascertain the total
amount of interest required to carry the issue through to
maturity at the coupon rate or rates specified in the bid.
From this total deduct the premium bid, or add the discount
bid, as the case may be." Chatters and Hillhouse, o j d . cit.,
p. 52.
^-^Bidders are often required to post good faith
deposits to ensure that only responsible bids are submitted.
Ibid., p. 5>1; Fundamentals of Investment Banking, pp. 3^9-61
and Browne, op_. cit., pp. 37-39.
178

Browne, o£. cit., p. 39.
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above would indicate that this is not a rare occurrence.
It is also possible that even the lowest yield is higher
than the situation really warrants.

Another possibility is

that the issue is a refunding one which was offered in order
to save on interest costs.

If the anticipated saving does

not materialize when the bids are received* there would be
ample justification to reject all of the bids.

It has been

suggested that the governmental unit rejecting bids should
explain legitimate rejection to the bidders in order not to
180
cause misunderstandings and to keep their good will.
Thoughtful and considerate relations with all bond dealers
would be a commendable procedure under all circumstances.
Once the bid is accepted, the fiscal authorities
must turn their attention to the preparation of the bonds.
Certain precautions must be taken to protect against counter
feiting and forgery.

These precautions entail authentica

tion or certification of the bonds by some bank or trust
company.

This process consists merely In attesting that the

bonds have been prepared properly and that signatures and

^ ^ Federal Reserve Bulletin. February, 1958? P« 165?
and March, 1959 > p . 2 8 5 .
■^°Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit.. p. 59; and
Browne, ojd. cit., p. lj.0.
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seal are in order.

One authority has remarked about the

poor quality of paper and printing used by some borrowers
181

and the deleterious effect of this action on their credit.
When these and other routine but important steps have been
taken, the bonds remain only to be delivered to the success
ful bidder.

It is good practice for this delivery to take

place within three weeks after the sale.

If for some reason

the bonds cannot be prepared in such a short time, temporary
securities may have to be issued.

This additional step, of

course, is a complicating and costly factor that should be
182
avoided if it is possible.
IV.

MANAGING EXISTING DEBT

Obviously not all problems connected with debt are
settled when the instruments are issued.

There are at least

four major and common considerations which may arise in
connection with existing debt:

(l) All debt, no matter what

the type, will sooner or later require interest and principal
payments; (2) The management of sinking funds is a very
challenging problem to the fiscal officials; (3 ) Another
very important function connected with existing debt is that
of debt reporting; (!}.) Finally, a problem that sometimes

nftn
Browne,

ojd.

cit., p. lj.1.

Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 62-68.
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requires careful watching and control concerns the
183

possibility of voluntary refunding.
Making Bond and Interest Payments
It is very important that the responsibility for
making bond and interest payments be carefully outlined.
Provisions should be made also for continuing authority to
make payments whenever they come due without any further
executive or legislative process.

18)|

Another related and

very important problem associated with making payments will
be the handling of debt service revenues.

Whether the

revenues come from a general fund or whether there is a
separate bond fund or funds, the revenues will need to be
guarded carefully and used only as they are authorized.
Promptness should not be neglected in making payments
because failure to meet the payments for any reason whatever
can bring unfavorable publicity that may hurt the state’s

^There are other miscellaneous problems which can
arise in connection with existing debt. For example, debt
adjustment might conceivably result from depression, and
this would require debt management skill. Chatters and
Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 8^-l6I(.. For an example of debt
management proposals that were recommended in 1933» s e e
Evans Clark (ed.), The Internal Debts of the United States
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 9 3 3 T , p. 2 5 5 .
■'-^^-Chatters a n d Hillhouse, op_. cit.,
Projet. Vol. Ill, p . 2 0 7 .

pp.

85-86;

and
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credit rating.

Promptness will be promoted by careful

recording of the various payments to be made.

Funds due

then are transferred to the authorized paying agents, and
the bonds and coupons are dully cancelled, recorded, and
filed.186
Managing Sinking Funds
Although serial bonds seem to be more popular today
than sinking fund bonds, there are still some situations
where sinking fund bonds may be appropriate.

Also, there

are many issues still outstanding that will be paid by this
device.

One of the problems involved in administering

sinking funds is that different issues usually have their
own sinking funds.

Whoever is responsible for the various

lg£

An example of this unfortunate situation, which
was related by a public official who does not wish to be
identified, occurred in Louisiana in the 1930?s. The State
was technically in default for a few days during the depres
sion because one of the New Orleans banks acting as a paying
agent for the State closed. Among the funds frozen was
$500,000 which the State had deposited for debt service. The
Governor at that time, Huey Long, arranged for another
$500»000 "to be deposited for debt service in order to
reassure bondholders. This case is the nearest approach to
default that Louisiana has experienced since the turn of the
century.
Louisiana has been included in a short list of states
that defaulted in the 1930*s. If this is the incident that
caused Louisiana to be placed in this category, the State
has suffered an injustice. See Hansen and Perloff, op. cit.,
p. 52.
^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. pit.. pp. 9 $ - 1 0 2 .
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sinking funds must keep track of the contributions, protect
them at all times, and either invest them, use them to call
outstanding bonds if they are callable, or, if it is inappro187
priate,
to buy the bonds of the particular issue on the
open market.
Debt Reporting
An extremely important function of management of
existing debt is the careful reporting of all conditions
affecting outstanding obligations.

The reporting of new

offerings is an important and obvious part of good debt
management, but the concept of debt reporting should also be
extended to include outstanding issues.

Sustained reporting

will certainly be welcomed by all of the reporting services
188
and by investment bankers and bond dealers,
but the
benefits of continued reporting in connection with existing
issues is not merely a matter of accommodating these groups.
The state has a great deal to gain if it can show any
improvement in its credit position.

Economic growth, the

discovery and utilization of new tax or other revenue
sources, improvements in political and legal institutions,

1 O n

Ibid., pp. 119-61;; and Ratchford, American State
Debts, pp. 268-69.
1 ftfi

Browne, op_. cit., pp. 6, 37? and Ellinwood, op.
cit., p. 2 7 .

improvements in the debt structure and debt management, and
any changes connected with one outstanding issue in particular
all of these things can lead to improved ratings on outstand
ing bonds as well as to increases in their prices.

How can

the state benefit from rising prices on its outstanding
bonds?

Investors will probably be inclined to look favorably

upon future issues of states whose bonds have given them
appreciation in value.

Careful reporting of outstanding

issues thus may have significant indirect results.
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The recording and reporting of debt changes to tax
payers and citizens is another extremely important part of
the reporting function and should not be neglected.

Tax

payers and legislators should receive accurate and complete
reports from the proper agencies in order to discharge their
respective duties.

This grade of information, unfortunately,

is not always available.

Agencies of the states are begin

ning to involve state credit more and more, and this is not
always made clear in state reports.

It is very desirable

that agencies be required to report to the legislatures and
190

the public.

189
190

Ragsdale, o£. cit., p. 3*

For example, In Louisiana the Financial Reports
are incomplete.
In Oklahoma, debt reporting is not required
of agencies of the state. Simpson, op_. cit., p. 338*

Ikl
Debt Retirement
There are three different methods of eliminating
debt:

serially, using sinking fund accumulations, and using

call options.

Whatever the method of repayment, a major

objective of debt management must be the retirement of debt.
This conclusion does not mean, of course, that states should
try to eliminate their total outstanding debts.
vidual issue is what must be retired.

The indi

This retirement is

the only conclusion to borrowing that can presently be
tolerated in the American states.

Refunding of bonds may

create perpetual debt, which is inconsistent with the
conventional objectives of state borrowing and finance.

CHAPTER III

LOUISIANA BORROWING BEFORE 1921
Chapter I briefly outlined the major debt trends in
the American states in order that developments in Louisiana
would not be considered in isolation.

This Chapter presents

a background that deals in general terms with the early
Louisiana debt.
I.

BORROWING BEFORE 1913

Louisiana’s early debt experiences arose out of
circumstances and practices that are no longer present in
state borrowing and are not likely to be repeated.

Perhaps

the two most important developments of this nature in
Louisiana before the twentieth century were the borrowing to
provide bank capital and the Reconstruction borrowing.
Ante-Bellum Borrowing and Default
The bank lending experience in Louisiana began in
182/
4. and reached a climax when the State defaulted in 18 /43 .

While most of the rest of the states were concerned with
transportation improvements during the boom before 1837 ?
Louisiana was borrowing mainly to provide capital for banks.
There was no restriction on borrowing in the Louisiana
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Constitution of 1812 to impede wide use of the State’s
credit.^

In fact, the hank borrowing in Louisiana was the

largest amount borrowed by any state for a single purpose
2
during the period. ' In 1840, Louisiana’s debt outstanding
3
was $23,309,2Ap6.14.3.
At the end of the boom period, Louisiana
shared the fate of eight other states--she defaulted in 1843.
Payments were resumed in 1844, and the State succeeded in
the rest of the l81|0!s in reducing its debt by selling bank
4
stocks and using the proceeds for retiring debt.

Louisiana, Constitution (1812), passim.
^Tenth Census, Vol. VII, p. £26.
3

The amounts of debt outstanding given in this
Chapter are not only bonded debt but include floating debt
which consists of various warrants, certificates of indebt
edness, and other short-term borrowing,
^Louisiana, Acts (1824), pp. 92-130; (1827), pp. 96116; (1828), Act 1 9 , pp. 30-36; (1830), pp. 68, 70; (1 8 3 1 ),
Act 18, pp. 38-62; (1833), PP. 172-92; (1 8 3 6 ), pp. 16-24;
(1837), Act 111, pp. 110-13; (1842), Act 22, pp. 34-62; Act
98, pp. 234-54; (1843), Act 92, pp. 56-59; (1844), Act 8 3 ,
PP. 49-52; (1846), Act 1 8 2 , p. 161; (1847), Act 100, pp. 7 6 “
7 8 ; Act 216,
p. 158; (1848), E.S., Act 5 9 , P. 34; Act 32,
pp. 16, 17; Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking History of
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1935), PP. 44-52, 102-3; B, U. Ratchford, American State
Debts (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1941),
p p ” 54-88; J.D.B. DeBow (ed.), DeBow* s Review of the Southern
and Western States, XIII, New Series, Vol. 1 (New Orleans:
1 6 5 2 ), pp. 633-35; Henry Wallace Stopher, "The Public Debts
of the State of Louisiana" (unpublished Master’s thesis,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1920),-pp. 7, 182;
William A. Scott, The Repudiation of State Debts, (ed. Richard T.
Ely, Library of Economics and Politics, No. 2; Boston:
Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1893), P* 107; United States Bureau

iM
Another reaction to Louisiana* s default of I81f3 was
the addition in 1 8 lj.$ of a constitutional debt limitation.
The Legislature was prohibited from pledging the State’s
credit for the payment of the bonds of any corporation.

The

debt was limited to $100,000 except as provided by specific
legislative authorizations for single objects or works.
These authorizations were required to provide for payment of
5
any borrowing they permitted.
Louisiana*s experiences during this period were not
at all unique.

The theory that states could engage in

various enterprises--such as banking— and thereby reduce or
6
eliminate the need for taxation was being tested.
If the
experience before 181|5 is considered in the context of the
activities of other states and of the thinking at that time,
the State of Louisiana cannot be condemned for its actions.
However, by today1s standards (e.g., the principles developed
in Chapter II), most of the borrowing which took place
before 1837 would not be considered proper.

of the Census, Department of Commerce, NLnth Census of the
United States: 1870. The Statists cs of the Wealth and
Industry of the United States» Vol. Ill (Washington: Govern
ment Printing Office, I8 7 2 ), pp. 6, 10, 35? and Tenth Census,
VII, pp. 523-26, 597-98.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1845) > Arts. 113 and lllj..
Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 8l.

Louisiana*s credit recovered sufficiently from the
experiences of the l8l).0's to permit modest participation in
the state internal improvements borrowing cycle of the
l850*s.

Borrowing was possible under the new Constitution

of 1852 which permitted State subscription, by separate
authorizations, to the stock of companies engaged in
internal improvements— up to one-fifth of their capital
stock.

The debt limitation, however, reflected the banking

disillusionment of the previous decade— aid to banking was
7
now prohibited.
In 1853, Louisiana subscribed to one-fifth
of the capital stock of three railroads and paid for these
g
subscriptions with State bonds.
Borrowing during the l850*s
was on a much smaller scale than in the previous period;
Louisiana*s total debt outstanding never approached the peak
that had been reached during the previous boom in state
borrowing.

When the Civil War came, the total Louisiana

debt was about $10,000,000.

110.

The parallel between aid to

^Louisiana, Constitution (1852), Arts. 108, 109, and

Q
Louisiana, Acts (1853)» Act 176, pp. llpl—ip2; Act 177,
pp. ll(.2-lj.3; and Act 17&, pp. lljl).-^.
^Louisiana, Acts (l8ij.8), E.S., Act 32, pp. 16, 1 7 ;
(185;?), Act 231, pp. 19^-97? Act 277, PP. 252-53; (1857),
Act 182, pp. 175-78; Tenth Census, VII, pp. 597-98;
Reginald C . McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and American State
Debts (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), PP. 192, 311-12;

llj.6

banking and aid for railroad construction apparently was not
realized— Louisiana had again given aid to private ventures.
Again, however, borrowing to aid railroad construction was
not uncommon and was accepted as proper at that time.
Civil War and Reconstruction Borrowing and
and Subsequent Debt Reduction
During the Civil War, Louisiana borrowed just as did
the other Confederate states.

The constitutional amendment

in l8 6 l, under which this borrowing took place, did not
10
noticeably change the 1852 debt provisions.
The amount
borrowed in Louisiana during this period is estimated to
have been over $13,500,000, but the Civil War debt did not
remain outstanding for very long.

A loyal assembly meeting

in the occupied part of Louisiana in 1 8 6 )4. adopted a Consti
tution in that year which declared that there was no liability
for any debts connected with the rebellion.

At the end of

1865, the State debt, much of which was not bonded debt,
amounted to $11,182,377.

The same Constitution provided

Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 127; Louisiana, State
Auditor, ”An Exhibit of the Public Debt for the Years 1861,
I 8 7 O to June, 1 8 7 1 , 11 p. 3; Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana after 1868 (New York: G. P. Putnam1s Sons; The
Knickerbocker Press, 1918), p. 83; and Scott, ojd. cit., p. 107.
"^Louisiana, Constitution (1852), Arts. 9 I4., 108-11,
as amended 1861, This Constitution, as amended, changed
Louisiana from an American state to a Confederate state.
The document of 1861 is the one which is disputed and which
raises doubt about whether the present Constitution is the
ninth of tenth one.
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that aid could "be granted to companies engaged in constructing
public improvements to a maximum of one-fifth of the capital
stock of such companies.

The maximum of debt incurred to

aid the financing of such improvements was limited to
11
$8 ,000,000 .
Louisiana borrowed heavily during the Reconstruction.

12

Heavy borrowing was made possible when the borrow

ing power was liberalized by still another Constitution
adopted in 1868.

This new Constitution required only that

borrowing in excess of $100,000 have the method of payment
of principal and interest designated in the authorization.
This provision did not include any limit on the maximum debt
13
that could be incurred in this manner.
In Louisiana,
major reasons for borrowing during the early Reconstruction

Louisiana, Constitution (1864)> Arts. 96, 112, 113,
111;, 12Ip,'129; Walter L. Fleming, Documentary History of
Reconstruction, Vol. I (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co.,
1906), pp. l 8 o - 8 l , 4 7 7 » 479; Henry E. Chambers, A History of
Louisiana, Vol. I (Chicago: American Historical Society,
Inc., 1925), p. 6£l; Scott, op.. cit. , p. 107; Tenth Census,
VII, p. 598; and Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 13>1.
12
Estimates of the extent of this borrowing are com
plicated by several factors:
(l) the officials generally
were untrained and many were dishonest; these factors had an
influence on the records they kept; (2) the bonds authorized
during the period were not always all sold; and (3 ) some of
the debt was contingent in the sense that it actually had no
definite limits, e.g., the railroad issues were on a per-mile
basis. Lonn, op. cit., p. 8 3 .
^Louisiana. Constitution (1868), Art. Ill,

1^8
period were to finance levee repair and to cover current
expenses."^

During the latter part of the Reconstruction,

the nominal purpose of Louisiana borrowing was mainly to
subsidize construction of railroads.

15

This purpose, however,

was clouded by many questionable activities that were taking
place in the State during this period.

16

^Louisiana, Acts (1866), Act 3, PP* 6 , 8 ; Act 5,
pp. 8-12; Act 15, pp7“2S, 28; (1867), Act 115, pp. 213-17;
and Scott, oj>. cit.. p. 108. .
15
Louisiana, Acts (1868), Act 108, pp. 136-41, (1869) *
Act 26, pp. 22-30; Act 55, pp. 56-58; Act 116, pp. 166-69;
Act IJ4.6 , pp. 21-22; (I8 7 O), Act 3 1 , pp. 55-63; Act 32,
pp. 63-66; Act 59, p. 8 7 ; Act 84, pp. 116-17; Act 105, PP*
174-76; (1 8 7 0 ), E.S., Act 4, pp. 5-10; Act 10, p. 52; Act 69,
PP. 153-54; (1871), Act 4, PP* 29-38; Act 28, pp. 66-72;
Act 31, pp. 79-80; Act 35, pp. 83-81;; Act 40, pp. 88-97;
Act 1;!, pp. 98-103; Act 45, PP. 137-38; Act 53, p. 155,*
Act 70, pp. 173-74? Act 95, PP. 211-13; and Scott, o p . c i t . ,
p. 108.

16

Louisiana is usually mentioned as having had some
of the worst officials and one of the most effective "rings”
of any of the Southern states. The activities of the ring’s
members apparently extended to debt matters. Governor
Kellogg described one bond issue as follows: "Two and a
half millions of these bonds were issued without any of the
safeguards required by law. The bill providing for their
issue was hurried through the Legislature during the last
hours of the session. It was kept by my predecessor for
several weeks, and was finally signed one day, promulgated
the next, and the bonds issued the next. They were delivered
by the Secretary of State at his house, in the night, without
the Governor’s signature, the Secretary of State having been
required first to sign them and attach the seal of State.
They were signed by the Governor in a hurried and surrepti
tious manner and immediately removed from the State. It is
even asserted, and I believe can be substantiated, that they
were signed on a train of cars between this city and Mobile.
No record was made of the issue of these bonds in the offices
\
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The State of Louisiana fell into financial difficul
ties even before Reconstruction ended, and an attempt was
made to restore the State's credit in 1870.

Act 69 of I8 7 O

provided for the payment or funding of floating debt.
•$3*000,000 could be issued for this purpose.

Up to

The agency

established to direct the funding was the Board of Liquida
tion of the State Debt.

This act was the origin of the

Board of Liquidation, which is still an important part of
Louisiana's debt structure.

A constitutional debt limita

tion of $ 2 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 was also established in 1 8 7 0 , but it was
ignored and exceeded.

The debt on June 1, 1 8 7 1 , would have

amounted to over $4 1 *0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , if the liabilities contingent
on railroad construction had been counted, and $22,295,790.58
if they were not included.

The $25,000,000 debt limitation,

therefore, was significant mainly because it later provided

where the law directs such records to be kept, nor does such
record now exist.’1 William P. Kellogg, ’’The Louisiana
Funding Bill, A Reply to the Protest of Certain New York
Bondholders,” (New Orleansi February 4* 1874)* P» 8. For
other examples of irregularities and for descriptions of
officials, officials* acts, and debt statistics during this
time, see; William 0. Scroggs, The Story of Louisiana
(revised edition; New York; Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936),
pp. 2 7 8 , 287; Albert Phelps, Louisiana, A Record of Expan
sion (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company,~~1905), pp. 3o7-71»
Chambers, I, o]D. cit., p.: 6 6 7 . Lonn, o£. cit., pp. 79* 8 3 ;
Louisiana, State Auditor (1 8 7 1 ), 0 ]D. cit., pp. 3-8; Louisiana,
State Auditor, ’’Statement of Debt and Liabilities of the
State of Louisiana on May 1, 1 8 7 2 ,” Auditor’s Office, James
Graham, Auditor, June 10, 1 8 7 2 , p. 1; Moody's, 1922,
pp. 839-41> and John Rose Ficklen, History of Reconstruction
in Louisiana (Through 1868), Johns Hopkins University Studies
in Historical and Political Science, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1910), p. 76.
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grounds for the repudiation of bonds that were sold after
17
the amendment was adopted in 1870.
The $25,000,000 constitutional debt limitation of
I8 7 O was reestablished in 1 8 7 4 by another consitutional
amendment which added the provision that this limit would be
lowered to $ 1 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 whenever the state debt was reduced
to that sum.

The $15,000,000 debt limitation of 187 J4. was

part of a comprehensive adjustment which included scaling
down part of the debt and declaring some of it "not fundable”
(repudiated).

The debt was refunded by the Board of

Liquidation under the authority of the Constitution as
amended by Act 4 in 1874* Act 111 of the Extra Session of
1 8 7 5 , and Act 86 of 1 8 7 6 .

The Board supervised the exchange

of old bonds and warrants for new consolidated bonds at the
rate of 60 cents on the dollar--this exchange Is estimated

Louisiana, Acts (1 8 7 0 ), E.S., Act 12, pp. 53-54?
Act 79, pp. 153-54? William L. Raymond, State and Municipal
Bonds (second edition; Boston: Financial Publishing
Company, 1932), p. 116; Louisiana, State Auditor (1871),
op. cit., p. 7» McGrane, 0£. cit., pp. 316-17? Scott,
op. cit.. pp. 109-10; Lonn, op_. cit., pp. 8 3 , 94?
^Louisiana*s *Little Legislature*,n A Study of the Board
of Liquidation of the State Debt, 1870-1945, Research Mono
graph No. 1 (New Orleans: Bureau of Governmental Research,
Inc., 191+5), PP. 3-4? and Moody*s, 1922, pp. 839-41.
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to have reduced the debt by over $8,000,000 to about
18
$12,000,000 by January 1, l88l.
The debt.adjustment of 1 8 7 ^ took place during the
Reconstruction, and the native Louisianians were not satis
fied with its results.

The State was also troubled with

unpaid interest that accumulated every year from 187)1 to
1878.

In l879> after the Reconstruction ended, the debt

adjustment of 187)1 was changed by a new debt ordinance.

The

scaling down of the debt which had been accomplished in 187)1
was accepted, but the interest rates on the refunded debt
were greatly reduced and part of the unpaid interest was
”remitted,” i.e., repudiated.

These changes were not

acceptable to the bondholders and major attempts were made
in 1882, 1 8 8 )1 , 1892, and 189)1 to effect some compromise and
to provide for the exchange of old bonds.

The results of

the various adjustments of 1 8 7 )1 , 1882, I8 8 I1, 1892, and 189)1
were simply that the State defaulted on the payment of
interest and repudiated some of its debt.

The actions of

T ft

Louisiana, Constitution (1868), as amended 1875,
Act i}. of 1 8 7 )1? Louisiana, Acts (l872), Act 8l, pp. 13b~37'>
{l87)l), Act 3, PP. 39-il2; TTBT5), E.S., Act 111, pp. 110-11;
(1 8 7 6 ), Act 86, pp. 130-31J Raymond, o j d . cit., pp. 116-17?
McGrane, o£. cit., pp. 317-20; Scott, op_. cit., pp. 111-14?
’’Louisiana* s *Little Legislature
loc. cit.; Moody*s, 1922,
pp. 839-)ll; and United States Bureau of the Census, Depart
ment of Commerce, Eleventh Census of the United States:
1890. Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation at the^Teventh
Census: 1890. Part 1, Public Debt" (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1892), pp. 97-99.
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the constitutional conventions and the Legislature were of
doubtful value in improving the State’s credit, although the
amount of debt was reduced.

Default and repudiation are
19
usually damaging no matter what the reason.
The Constitution adopted in 1879* in addition to its
other changes, provided the strongest prohibition against
borrowing that the State had ever had.

The General Assembly

was prohibited from borrowing except to repel invasion or to
20
suppress insurrection.
The appearance of such an inflexi
ble debt limitation at this time was no coincidence.

Debt

limitation was a common reaction to the Reconstruction in
all of the Southern states.

An inflexible debt limitation

probably was not inappropriate at the end of the Recon
struction.

The State’s credit had to be reestablished and

restraint in borrowing was one method of repairing the
damage that had been done.

But, the maintenance of this

Ip
Louisiana, Constitution (1879)* Arts. 1 and 3 under
State Debt; Louisiana, Acts (i860), Act 121, pp. l51|.-56;
(1882), Act 76, pp. 96-97; (1892), Act 65, pp. 85-86; (l89lp),
Act 75, pp. 88-89; Raymond, pp. cit. , pp. 116-18; Stopher,
op. cit., pp. 127-28, 130; Scroggs, op. cit., pp. 261^.-65,
27 )4.-7^7 278-79, 281-82, 287, 290, 2 9 3 -9 I1 ; Phelps, pp. cit. ,
pp. 367-71; Lonn, op. cit., pp. 79, 8 3 -8 J4., 91+-95; Louisiana,
State Auditor (I8 7 TT, op. cit. , pp. 3-8; Louisiana, State
Auditor (1872), op. cit., p. 1 ; Governor Kellogg's Letter of
187^, op. cit.. pp. 1 , 5-6; Scott, op. cit., pp. ■llip-1 9 ;
Moody’s, 1922, pp. 81p0—1(,1; and Eleventh Census, Part 1,
pp. 6 8 , 73, 77, 97-99.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1 8 7 9 ), Art. ipTp.
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type of debt limitation after the credit position has been
repaired is another matter.

The present debt limitation in
21
Louisiana is very similar to the provision of 1879,
and
since no serious debt difficulties occurred between that
time and 1921 (when the present limitation was adopted), it
can be concluded that the present debt limitation is probably
a result of the Reconstruction evils.
The difficulties described resulted directly from the
Reconstruction.

Another problem during the same period,

however, could not be attributed directly to the Recon
struction.

This problem was the 1879 issue of "baby11 bonds

sold to pay State expenses which were in the form of
auditor's warrants.

Of course, the condition of the

Treasury which made this issue necessary was certainly
partly the result of the Reconstruction.

The baby bonds

were in denominations of $5, paid 3 per cent during their
6-year term, and were secured by uncollected taxes from
1879.

The State subsequently refused to retire some of

these maturing intermediate term obligations, maintaining
that there were irregularities in their issue and that some
22
of them were fraudulent.
PI

Ibid .1 and Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Zp,

Sec. 2.
22

Louisiana, Acts (1880), Act 93, pp. 120-21; Act 10lj.,
pp. 129-31; (l89l(.), Act 150, pp. 188-89; Caldwell, ojd. cit.,

After new, "clean" bonds were Issued in 1892 (to
replace bonds which had been stamped in the earlier scaling),
debt controversies subsided temporarily until they were
revived by the approach of the 191J+ maturity date of the
l|_0-year consols.

The debate about what to refund began in

earnest around 1910 when the holders of unpaid coupons and
23
bonds revived their claims.
Bondholders were unsuccess
ful in getting the State to pay these overdue obligations
and coupons, but they did cause a flood of apologies and
rationalizations to be made in defense of the State’s past
actions.

Despite pressure from the bonholders, the

pp. 108-10; "Joint Report of the Auditor and Treasurer to
the Governor; Result of the Investigations of the Deficien
cies and Irregularities of the Consolidated, Constitutional
and Baby Bonds of the State of Louisiana," (1916), p. 3; and
Moody’s, 1922, pp. 8i).0-[|.l.
23

The $911,000 of baby bonds was the largest portion
of unpaid debt in 1912. Other elements of this debt were
certificates of indebtedness, various warrants, and certain
interest coupons on the old consols. There was $126,733*96
of coupons one to eleven that had never been presented to
the State for payment. Coupon number twelve on the old
consols was also still held by some of the bondholders who
wanted them refunded. United States Bureau of the Census,
Department of Commerce, Wealth, Debt, and Taxation, 1913,
Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915),
p. 57,* and Stopher, o]3. cit., p. 1 3 8 .
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recognized debt was not Increased— it stood at $ 1 3 ,5 ^ 6 ,1 5 0

;

21

in 1 9 1 2 .

Louisiana debt experiences during the Civil War and
the Reconstruction were similar to the experiences of the
other Southern states.

The period after the Reconstruction

was also typical in the South, where the problem centered on
restoring ruined credit.

Louisiana's actions in this connec

tion certainly were not always wise, but they can be viewed
sympathetically because of the circumstances.
Port

of New Orleans Borrowing Before 1913
The Board of Commissioners of the Port

of New Orleans

was established in 1 8 9 6 , but it did not start borrowing
immediately.

The first Board issue of $750,000 was sold

under the authority of Act 1;!; of 1901;, but this act was of
such doubtful constitutionality that the issue was refunded
after a new authorization was provided in Act 180 of 1908.
These acts marked the beginning of agency borrowing in

^Louisiana, Constitution (1 8 9 8 ), Art. ll;6 ; Louisiana,
Acts (1910), Act 299, pp. 503-4J Act 3 0 3 , pp. 521-22;. Dally
[New Orleans} Picayune. October 21;, 1912,p. 1;; October 30,
1912, p. ij.; June 21)., 1913, P. 5; Times ^New Orleans} Democrat
and Daily Picayune, April 1 1 , 1911;, p. 5? Ratchford, American
State Debts, p. 25k? Caldwell, o£. cit., pp. 108-10;
Louisiana, "Joint Report of the Auditor and Treasurer,"
(1916), p. 3? United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Wealth, Debt, and Taxation, 1913, Vol. I,
PP. 37, 58; and Moody's, 1922, pp, 81;0-1;1.
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Louisiana.

The State did not contribute directly to the

security of Port bond issues which followed, but the State's
credit was involved.

The refunding issue amounted to

$3,500,000 and was known as the Serial Gold Issue of
January 1, 1909.

The purpose of the borrowing was to finance

dock improvement— more transportation debt.

The $3,500,000

issue, which exhausted the authorization, was a noncallable
serial issue scheduled to mature between 1921), and 1958.

The

5 per cent bonds were payable from Port revenues and were
also considered general obligations of Louisiana although
25
they constituted only indirect debt.
It might have been better if the Port of New Orleans
debt had been incurred directly.

The State certainly had an

Interest in developing the Port and could not avoid involve
ment.

Direct participation by the State might have increased

the marketability of early issues and would have simplified
the debt structure.

The State could have participated

Louisiana, Constitution (1898), Art. 32; Louisiana,
Acts (1 9 0 8 ), Act 180, pp. 262-66; Board of Commissioners of
the Port of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization Require
ments for All Outstanding Bonds of the Board of Commissioners
of the Port of New Orleans," {hereinafter referred to as Port
of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization," 1922), (June,
1922), pp. 1-2; Louisiana, Acts (1 8 9 6 ), Act 70, pp, 102-5, as
amended by Act 26 of 1900, pp. iqip—Ip6; A. M. Smith, Compila
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans:
A. M. Smith Investment Company, 1933), PP» viii, 9-10;
Louisiana, Acts {190lp), Act [}![., pp. 98-102; Ratchford,
American State Debts, p. 375; and Moody's, 1918, pp. 191-92;
1938, pp. 639-lj-O.
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directly without losing the services of the Port Commission
in their other responsibilities,

It is very doubtful,

however, that the public would have approved direct borrow
ing for this purpose at this time.

The debt limitation of

1 8 9 8 , which was Just as strong as the one of l879» was not

simply an outmoded institution but was a very clear indica26
tion of public opinion.
Any attempt to amend this limita
tion probably would have been doomed to failure.

Under

these conditions, therefore, it probably was better that the
borrowing took place indirectly rather than not at all
because the Port undoubtedly has played an important role
in the Statefs growth.
Another significant feature of this early Port
Commission issue was that it consisted of serial bonds.
None of the Louisiana refunding and consolidating issues
starting in I8 7 I; provided any method whatsoever of retiring
the debt— neither the serial feature nor any sinking fund
was provided.

The use of the serial device in this 1909

issue, therefore, was important not in itself, but because
it provided for systematic debt retirement.

Port of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization,"
1922, pp. 1-18; and Louisiana, Constitution (1 8 9 8 ), Art. lj.6.
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II.

LOUISIANA BORROWING, 1913-1921

There was relatively little borrowing during the
years from 1913 bo 1921, but the period has more importance
than the earlier years because what borrowing did take place
had a distinctly modern character.
of both direct and indirect issues.
A. )

This borrowing consisted
(See Table I, Appendix

The direct issues were the refunding issue of 191i). and

the early highway borrowing.

The indirect borrowing

consisted of the Port of New Orleans and the Penitentiary
issues.
Serial Gold Bonds. The Refunding of 191iiArticle 321). of the Constitution of 1913 dealt with
maturing debt by establishing conditions under which the
Board of Liquidation could refund the Reconstruction obliga
tions.

The General Assembly was again prohibited from

contracting any debt, but the Board of Liquidation was
authorized to issue enough bonds to refund most of the debt.

27

27

'The portions of the recognized State debt that were
not to be refunded consisted of a "Perpetual Loan" to the
State and a certain sum that was held for the exchange of
old bonds. Louisiana, Constitution (1913)* Art. 32; Louisiana,
Treasurer1s Report, 1922/23-1934/35> Louisiana, Financial
Report, 19III7112-1957/58: and Louisiana, Board of Liquidation,
"Constitutional Provisions in Reference to Louisiana Bonded
Debt," certified by Auditor of Public Accounts on Minutes of
the Meetings of the Board of Liquidation (Baton Rouge:
November and December, 1913), pp. 2, 7-8.
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Refunding bonds authorized by the new Constitution of 1913
were prohibited from running more than fifty-one years or
from bearing more than 1|.5 per cent interest and were
required to be callable serial bonds.

In conjunction with

the debt authorization, the Constitution of 1913 also levied
a tax of one and three-twentieths (1 .1 5 ) mills on all
property subject to the State property tax.

The revenue

raised was to be put into the "State Bond and Interest Tax
28
Fund" for debt service.
This fund and the tax dedicated
to it are still part of Louisiana*s debt structure.
The constitutional authorization of 1913 was the
basis for the 191U refunding issue of "Serial Gold Bonds."
(See Table II, Appendix A.)

The bonds amounted to

$10,991,5°° ar*d were scheduled to mature serially until
29
I 96 J4.. The rate of interest was ij.,5 per cent,
and the

Louisiana, Board of Liquidation, "Constitutional
Provisions in Reference to Louisiana Bonded Debt," p. 2;
Louisiana, Constitution (1913), Art. 32ij.; and Huey P. Long
(comp.), Constitutions of the State of Louisiana (Baton
Rouge: 193°), P.
Interest rates given throughout this thesis are
nominal or coupon rates unless it is otherwise indicated.
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State reserved the right to call outstanding bonds.

The

Serial Gold Bonds of 19!l| (later often called the "Old"
Serial Bonds) were direct or general obligations of the
State, i.e., they were issued in the State's name.

Provi

sion was made for payment of the bonds from the 1.15 will
State property tax that had been dedicated for that purpose
in the Constitution of 1913*

A further safeguard was the

constitutional provision for the levy of a "special tax" in
the event that the 1.15 mill tax proved insufficient at any
31
time.
The

Serial Gold Bonds were an important link

between the nineteenth and the twentieth century debt devel
opments in Louisiana.

The bonds bore the scars of the

Reconstruction in the difficulties associated with their
sale, but they also exhibited definite provisions for retire
ment as had the Port Commission debt.

The two previous

^Louisiana, Board of Liquidation, "Constitutional
Provisions in Reference to Louisiana Bonded Debt," pp. 10-12,
22-23; Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal
Bonds, 1933* p. 1; Louisiana, Constitution (1913). Art. 32kt
Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report, 1922-23, p. ix; "Schedule of
Bond and Coupon Maturities Handled by the Treasurer, State
of Louisiana," compiled by H, B. Conner, State Treasurer
(corrected to December 31 , 1929), p. 2l(.; and Moody's, 1918,
pp. 191-92.
^Louisiana, Board of Liquidation, "Constitutional
Provisions in Reference to Louisiana Bonded Debt," p. 6;
Louisiana, Constitution (1913), Art. 321+; and Moody's, 1918,
pp. 191-92.
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refundings, in 181|.? and l87l|, had followed default in one
case and default and repudiation in the other.

In 1913>

there were signs of forethought in the refunding that took
place in a relatively more favorable climate.

The use of

the serial feature was a step in the direction of better
debt management; its use was an indication that retirement
of debt was being planned.

Another very desirable feature

of this issue was the provision of a special tax in case the
1*1? mill tax proved insufficient.

This type of provision

is very attractive to bondholders and can add to the markets'
bility of bonds if it does not unduly complicate the debt
structure.
Highway Borrowing Before 1921
The only other direct debt created before 1921 was
incurred to finance the Chef Menteur and Hammond-New Orleans
Highways--another transportation project.

Act 18 of the

Special Session of 1918 provided that bonds authorized for
that purpose would be payable from a newly created fund that
would be called "Highway Fund Number 2."

The fund was to be

supported by the motor vehicle license revenues from the six
interested parishes of Jefferson, St, Charles, St. John the
Baptist, Tangipahoa, St. Tammany and Orleans.

The first

issue under this act was Series A of 1919 that consisted of
$700,000 of ? per cent noncallable obligations.

(See Table
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III, Appendix A , )

These Highway Fund Humber 2 bonds were

not full faith and credit obligations although they were
called " . . .

State Highway Bonds" and thus were direct

obligations.

The $700,000 issue of 1919, which comprised

the total amount authorized by Act 18 of the Special Session
of 1918, matured in 1939.

However, both the tax dedication

and the special fund established during this period remain
part of the debt structure and add to its complexity until
32
this day.
Port of Hew Orleans Borrowing Before 1921
The most significant debt expansion in Louisiana
during the first quarter of the century took place in the
category of indirect debt.
of Hew Orleans borrowing.

This borrowing was the Port
Bond issues sold for Port

development continued under the powers granted in 1910 and
reenacted in the Constitution of 1913.

The Board of

Commissioners was given continuing authority to build
warehouses and other structures and to finance these

-^Louisiana, Constitution (1913), as amended 1918,
Special Session, Act 1 8 ; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report.
1922-23, pp. ix-x; "Schedule of Bond and Coupon Maturities
Handled by the Treasurer, State of Louisiana," 1929, p. 25;
"Tax Laws and Revenues, State of Louisiana," Bulletin Ho.
2 3 6 , Compiled by John A. Barrett, Assistant to the State
Treasurer (New Orleans : March 15, 1936), p. 2l\,; Moody* s,
1919, p. 21^4; 1939, p. 559; Smith, Compilation of Louisiana
State and Municipal Bonds, 1933, P. 9; Louisiana, Acts- TT^Ti}.),
Act 260, pp. l;98-50l4.; (1917), E.S., Act 1^0, pp. 67^597
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structures by selling bonds.

Bond issues were not limited

as to their amount except that they could not be greater
than the value of the buildings.

Bonds were to be paid from

warehouse revenues and secondly from the general revenues of
the Port subject to prior liens.

The authorization speci

fied that issues sold under these provisions would be
subordinate to previous issues sold under the same consti
tutional provisions.

Other authorizations in 191^ and 1918

enabled the Board to borrow still more for a related purpose.
Act

of 19ll|. amended the Constitution of 1913 to give the

Board power to construct a Navigation Canal between the
Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain.

Act 3 of 1918

affirmed Act 2l|4 of 1911-1- and authorized the Board of Commis
sioners of the Port to cooperate with and to receive
financial assistance from the various jurisdictions in and
around New Orleans for the construction of this canal.
Bonds issued under these acts were to be backed by the real
estate involved and to be paid from net receipts of the
canal . 33
Serial Gold Bonds totaling $3?000,000 were sold in
1911+ under the terms of the Constitution of 1913» and this

^Louisiana, Constitution
amended 19!l|* Act 2liE; Louisiana.
p. 209; (1918), Act 3» PP. 5-10;
ment of Amortization, 1922, pp,

(1913), Art. 322; As
Acts (1910), Act 1 3 3 ,
Port of New Orleans, 'State
3-8.

sale was followed by another offering in 19l£ for $1 ,2£0 ,0 0 0 .
(See Table IV, Appendix A.)

The Port Commission floated a

fourth issue of Harbor Improvement Bonds in 1917 for
$1}.,000,000, and a fifth one of Serial Canal Bonds in 1918
was for $6,000,000.
were as follows:

Two more Port Commission Issues in 1919

$2,000,000 of Harbor Improvement Bonds,

and $6,000,000 of Canal Bonds.

In 1920, the eighth and

ninth Issues produced $£,000,000 and $2,£00,000 respectively
34
for canal purposes<
The Port Commission Bonds Issued from
1 9 1 3 to 1 9 2 1 were revenue bonds to be serviced first from

the structures or facilities they financed, and then from
general Port revenues that consisted of wharfage, tollage,
and storage fees.

These issues before 1921 were also

considered full faith and credit obligations of the State
although there was no specific acknowledgment of this in any
of the authorizations.

The indirect debt added to the

State*s liabilities during the period from 1909 through 1920

3 I1
Louisiana, Constitution (1913)> Art. 322; As
amended 19l4> Act 2I|1|., pp. 18-19, (this act was continued in
force by Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 6 , Sec. 16;
Louisiana, Acts (1910), Act 133» P. 209; Port of New Orleans,
"Statement of Amortization," 1922, pp. 3-17; Moody*s, 1918,
pp. 191-92; 1919, P. 2i+4; 1920, p. 302; and Louisiana, Acts
(1918), Act 3, PP. £-10.
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for the purpose of furthering the development of the New
Orleans Port area came to a total of $33»250,000.

35

All of the Port Commission bonds sold during this
period were noncallable deferred serials. The minimum
36
period of deferment was six years.
Normally, deferment
is undesirable because it adds to interest costs.

In this

case, however, the reason for deferment is obvious— it would
take many years from the time funds were first raised before
the canal and various structures could be put into opera
tion.

Deferment in a case such as this probably should not

be considered improper, although it does add to costs, as
payments are deferred only until the facilities become
operable and productive.
These issues were also all scheduled to be completely
37
retired in forty years.
If the life of the improvement is

-^Port of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization,"
1922, pp. 1-18; Port of New Orleans, "Information Concerning
Bonded Obligations of the Board of Commissioners of the Port
of New Orleans (An Agency of the State of Louisiana)," com
piled by Tiley S. McChesney, Assistant Treasurer (New Orleans:
June 1, 1928), pp. 1-19; Smith, Compilation of Louisiana
State and Municipal Bonds, 1933> PP« viii, 9-12; Ambrose M.
Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation of Louisiana State
and Municipal Bonds TNew Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment
Co., June 3 0 , 1 9 3 M » P«
Moody*s, 1918, pp. 191-92; 1919,
p. 2UU; 1920, p. 302; 1922, p. 839; and 1938, pp. 6 3 9 -ij-O.

"36

Port of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization,"
1 9 2 2 , loc. cit.
37Ibid
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used as a criterion, forty years would seem to be a reasona
ble term for the issues used for digging the Navigation
Canal.

For warehouses, however, a 1^.0-year term may be

questionable.

If the term of the retirement is questionable,

however, the method of this retirement certainly was not.
The use of the serial method of debt retirement by the Port
Commission throughout the period showed good debt management.
State Penitentiary Borrowing Before 1921
Other indirect borrowing in the 1913 to 1921 period
consisted of relatively minor amounts used to operate and
maintain the State Penitentiary.

(See Table V, Appendix A.)

A $2^0,000 Penitentiary Issue of noncallable 5 P ©*1 cent
Coupon Notes was authorized in 1912 and sold In 1911|.

The

State pledged its full faith and credit for the support of
the 25-year Penitentiary serial bonds although they were to
be serviced from the revenues of the Penitentiary.

The

Penitentiary debt thus was very similar to the Port of New
Orleans debt.

The only other Penitentiary issue before 1921

was a flj.00,000 Issue of Penitentiary Liquidation Notes.

The

funds raised by this bond sale were to be used to retire
floating indebtedness of the Penitentiary.

These 1917 bonds

were also noncallable and were secured in the same manner as
the I9 1 J4. issue.

The interest paid on these obligations was
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£ per cent, and the bonds were to mature serially between
38
1 9 1 8 and 1927.
The appearance of Penitentiary borrowing in the
indirect portion of the debt structure probably was at least
partly the result of the debt limitation provisions in the
39
Constitutions of both 1 8 9 8 and 1913.
Again, however, the
nature of the debt limitation at this time made it more than
just a legal obstacle to be surmounted.

Indirect borrowing

probably was the only type of borrowing that would be
tolerated by public opinion.
Summary of Borrowing, 1896-1921
The debt change probably of most practical signifi
cance during the period from 1 8 9 6 to 1921 was the beginning
of the indirect Port of New Orleans borrowing.

This devel

opment was to be one of the more lasting legacies of the
nineteenth century.

The Port borrowing was to outlast and

overshadow the Reconstruction debt which was refunded in

-^Louisiana, Constitution (1913)* as amended 1916,
Act 13^4-5 Louisiana, Acts (1912), Act 71> p. 82; "Schedule
of Bond and Coupon Maturities Handled by the Treasurer,
State of Louisiana," Corrected to December 31» 1931>
compiled by H. B. Conner, State Treasurer, p. 32; Smith,
Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 19333
p. 5; and Moody’s, 1918, pp. 191-92.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1 8 9 8 ), Art. J1 6 ; (1913)»
as amended 1916, Act 1 3 !{.; and Louisiana, Acts (1912), Act Jl,
p. 82.
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1911+.

Finally, the period before 1921 brought some early

highway borrowing.

The amount of this highway borrowing,

however, was not large enough to place it higher than third
in importance.

CHAPTER IV
DEBT STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT IN LOUISIANA, 1921-19i|.6
Much of the present structure and management of the
debt in Louisiana is a legacy of the 1920*s and 1930*s.
After these decades, activity in Louisiana halted temporar
ily during World War II.

This Chapter emphasizes the

purposes of Louisiana borrowing during these recent eras.
Each type of debt that was created is examined to determine
the purpose, authorization, and the amount of such debt,
from whence and how it was payable, whether it was direct or
indirect borrowing, and the maturity or redemption provi
sions.

The relationship of this debt to the constitutional

framework of the State is also explored.
I.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1921

It was noted in Chapter II that some of the basic
factors which will influence a state*s debt structure as
well as its financial structure are constitutional or legal
ones.

This influence of institutional factors Is very much

the case in Louisiana today.

Many of the difficulties that

confront the State in debt matters can be traced to the
Constitution of 1921 which is still in effect.
169

Since this
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document has had such a hearing on the present debt
structure of Louisiana, it is appropriate to analyze care
fully the pertinent provisions of that document and to note
the changes that have been made in It from time to time.

Historical Background
The Constitution of 1921 was either the ninth or the
tenth constitution adopted in Louisiana depending upon
whether a disputed one is counted.

Constitutional changes

in Louisiana have always had important effects upon the debt
structure.

Assuming that there were nine constitutions, the

second and third constitutions came at the end of the first
and second debt booms of l8!}.5 and 18£2 and contained articles
which attempted to restore the State’s credit.

The docu

ments of 1861}. and 1868 were Reconstruction constitutions,
and the one in 1879 dealt with Reconstruction debt problems.
The Constitution of 1913 provided for the refunding of
Reconstruction debt into Old Serial Cold Bonds.

The present

Constitution of 1921 has been equally important in debt
developments since that time.

The document of 1921 resulted

from the unsatisfactory nature of the 1913 Constitution.
The 1913 instrument had failed to repeal specifically the
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provisions of the 1898 version, and the result was conflict
1
and confusion in the law.
The Constitution of 1921 Appraised
The corrective action of 1921 was treated rather
severely by Alden L. Powell.
An examination of the long, wordy, detailed
Constitution of 1921, which probably includes
within its provisions all of the fundamentals of
democratic government, and most of the non
fundamentals as well, reveals that the framers
seemingly disregarded all of the precepts which,
political scientists say, constitution makers
should follow. 2
A recent Louisiana Legislative Council study revealed that
the Louisiana Constitution is the longest in existence among
the states.

It was reported to contain approximately

181^,000 words— more
state

constitution.

than twice as many as the next longest
The conclusion that the Constitution

of 1 9 2 1 is too long and detailed was concurred in by
Kimbrough Owen.

He points out that a constitution is

Alden L. Powell, "Amending the Louisiana Constitu
tion," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XVIII
(June, 1937'-Mar'ch, 1938), 25-28; and Kimbrough, Owen, "The
Need for Constitutional Revision in Louisiana," Louisiana
Law Review, reprinted from Vol. VIII, 1-lOlj. (November, 1947)>
pp. 1 -2 .

2

Powell, op., cit.. p. 28.

^Louisiana Legislative Council, "Constitutional
Revision In Louisiana— An Analysis," Research Study No. 3,
(hereinafter referred to as Louisiana Legislative Research
Study No. 3), p. 1.
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supposed to "be primarily an instrument which outlines funda
mental policy.

The Louisiana Constitution contains detailed

provisions, for example, concerning the levying of taxes and
the floating of bond issues.

This characteristic of too

much detail almost inevitably brings a large number of
constitutional amendments on even minor provisions as they
1+
are found to be unsatisfactory.
Louisiana's Constitution
practically insures a multitude of amendments by adding to
its detail a relatively easy amending process.

Furthermore,

the actual process of amendment can be considerably speeded
by the practice of the State Legislature of passing selfoperative acts which automatically become law if and when
their substance is accepted by the voters as a constitutional
amendment •

^Owen,
cit.. p. 3 . See also Powell, o£. cit.,
pp. 25-28; and Louisiana Legislative Research Study SoT 3»
pp. 3-15.

5

Between the adoption of the Constitution in 1921 and
the year 1 9 3 7 # there were 1 2 7 amendments proposed and 118
adopted. By 191+7» the number of amendments had reached 219.
In 1953* the total number of amendments that had been added
to the 1921 Constitution was 302. Between 1951+ and 1957# 31
more were approved. Debt creation contributed its share to
these totals in each period. Powell, oj). cit.. p. 28; Owen,
op. cit.. pp. 1, 3j 1+7> 60; Public Affairs Research Council
of Louisiana, Inc., The Debt of the Louisiana State Govern
ment, 1950 and 1951,” No. 6 (March 3 1 , 1952), pp. 8-9;
Prolet. Vol. I, Parts 1 and 2, pp. 1+95, 1392; Louisiana,
Constitution (1921), as amended 1951+; and 1957 Supplement,
p. 3.
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Another major flaw In the Constitution of 1921 is its
lack of systematic codification— subject matter is scattered
throughout the instrument.

When the mass of detail is com

bined with this dispersion, the problem of determining basic
policy is made more difficult.

But even this is not all:

according to Kimbrough Owen, the Constitution of 1921, as
amended, also contains "confusing terminology," "inconsist
encies," "errors," "references to other legal documents,"
"informal amending procedures," "duplication of material,"
"contradictions," and "omissions." These are all difficulties
which are encountered in any attempt to determine the basic
structure and policy of Louisiana government in the original
Constitution as well as in the amended versions.

6

An appraisal of the Constitution of 1921 based on
principles of debt management produces conclusions that are
not much more favorable.

There are at least three serious

flaws in the Constitution in its fiscal provisions:

(l) the

debt provisions of the Constitution are scattered throughout
the instrument; (2) the Constitution contains specific tax
dedications and other provisions for the payment of bond
issues; and, (3) the Constitution contains an inflexible
debt limitation.

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), as amended 19$k>
Owen, oj>. cit.. pp. l-l'6 ; and Louisiana Legislative Research
Study No. 3 , pp. 3-15.

m
The various constitutional articles that deal directly
with the debt structure in the 1921 Constitution are as
7
follows:
Article 12 deals with public education and
interest payments to certain educational funds; Article 18
deals with Confederate veterans* pensions and the dedication
of the 0.75 mill tax for their payment; Article 6 deals with
administrative officers and boards and contains provisions
relative to the Port of New Orleans; Article Ij. deals with
the limitation of legislative borrowing and the pledging of
the public credit; and, Article 20 deals with Penitentiary
g
borrowing.
In addition, there is another type of disper
sion to be found in the 1921 Constitution.

An example Is

found in Article 6 , Section 2lj., In which it is stated that
the provisions of Act 18 of 1918 are not changed; but, it is
not indicated exactly what these provisions consist of other
than that they concern the building and financing of the
New Orleans-Chef Menteur and New Orleans-Hammond Highways.

9

Both types of dispersion are regarded by Owen as weaknesses

7

In order to avoid repetition, the various articles
mentioned here are explained at length below where they
resulted In borrowing or otherwise affected the debt structure.

8

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Secs. 1, 2,
12; Art. 6 , Secs 16, 21; Art. 12, Secs 19-21; Art. 8 , Secs.
1-5; and Art. 20, Sec. 1.
Q
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 6 , Sec. 2I4..
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10
in constitutional planning.

The ideal constitution

probably would have an article or two carefully planned to
cover policy questions that concern the State*s credit.
Louisiana was far from this norm of a codified debt policy
when the Constitution of 1921 was ratified, and it is even
further from it today.
The specific tax dedications which contributed to the
lack of organization found in the original version of the
1921 Constitution were in Articles 6 and 18.

These articles

dealt with the 2 -cent gasoline tax, the motor vehicle
license tax, and the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax.

The 0,75

mill ad valorem tax was dedicated to the payment of Confed
erate veterans* pensions.

(The original Constitution of

1921 did not authorize any borrowing for this purpose.)

In

addition to these specific tax dedications, other provisions
were made for the payment of bond issues in which Louisiana
had an Interest.

Article 20, for example, authorized the

general manager to issue Penitentiary bonds which would be
payable primarily from the revenues of that Institution but
which were also backed by the State*s full faith and credit.
The Board of Commissioners of the Port of Few Orleans was

1 0 0wen, oe.. cit.. pp. 3 , 9 .
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authorized, in Article 6, to carry on "both short and long
term borrowing which would be payable from the revenues of
the Port.'*’'
1'
Only one of the articles mentioned above restricted
the use of the State*s credit.

Article Ij., paradoxically,

prohibited the State Legislature from borrowing.
The Legislature shall have no power to
contract or to authorize the contracting of any
debt or liability on behalf of the State; or to
issue bonds or other evidence of indebtedness
thereof, except for the purpose of repelling
12
invasion, or for the suppression of insurrection.
Kimbrough Owen considers this particular provision
one of the serious defects of structure and policy in the
13
Louisiana Constitution of 1921.
It was also concluded
in Chapter II that inflexible debt limitations are generally
unsatisfactory.

The shortcomings of debt limitations should

have been suspected even in 1921, but it is since that time
(since large-scale borrowing has become necessary) that they
have come to be considered especially questionable.

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Secs. 2,
12; Art. 6, Secs. 16, 21; Art. 18, Secs. l-£; and Art. 20,
Sec. 1.

12

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Sec. 2.

13

.,
Owen, op. cit., p. 2 3 .
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The debt limitation provision made it necessary for
the Constitution of 1921 to be amended before any debt, other
than that constitutionally provided for, could be incurred.
However, a significant amount of Louisiana*s debt has been
authorized by this method of constitutional amendment
because of the relative ease of the amending process.
Powell considered the skill of State leaders in getting
people to vote the amendments into law as perhaps even more
significant in explaining the wide use of the amending process
in Louisiana.

lk

There was, also, another way whereby Louisiana
borrowing could proceed regardless of constitutional debt
limitations.

This method was by the use of the agency or

authority device which had grown out of the special fund
doctrine.

The Constitution of 1921 contained provisions

which concerned the Port of New Orleans, and the State Peni
tentiary.

The Board of Commissioners of the Port of New

Orleans was given borrowing power far in excess of its
immediate needs so that later borrowing, if it was necessary
1$
would not require additional amendment.
Agency borrowing

^Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9* p. 79
Powell, op> cit.. p. 30j and Owen, oj). cit.. p. 60.
l£

In fact, according to the Louisiana practice of
detailing the constitutional provisions, the Board was
authorized to engage in a great deal of borrowing without
even legislative enactment. This was not the case with the
Penitentiary authorization which is discussed later.
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thus was also to play a role in Louisiana* s debt structure
along with constitutional amendments as a method of debt
creation*
II.

DIRECT BORROWING, 1921-1927

There is little question that the burden imposed by
the borrowing during the 1921 to 1927 period was within the
State*s ability to pay.

Moody*s general analysis, which

represents so well the traditional viewpoint about safety in
borrowing, indicated in 1920 that Louisiana*s economy was
sound.

Some of the conventional measures of debt-bearing

ability also point to the same conclusions

the assessed

valuation of property, which was based on 5 0 per cent of
estimated true value, was $587,008,713 in 1916 and $ 7 2 6 ,2 9 1 ,114.5
in 1919.

In 1920, when 100 per cent valuations were used,

the assessed value of all property rose to $1,698,561}.,216.
The total amount of taxes collected by the State increased
from $5*086,569 In 1919 to $8,lj.92,7lj.9 in 1920 and to
$9,021,183 in 1921.

The assessed valuation of all property

and the amount of taxes collected both declined between 1922
and 19214., but they were still much greater than the 1919
figures.

On the debt side, the general bonded debt declined

from $28,935*500 in 1918 to $25,750,000 in 1919 and then
increased sharply to $^,588,500 in 1920.

Per capita debt

declined from $7.79 in 1917 to $7.2lj. in 1919 and then
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increased to f>7*i]-5 in 1922.

16

The State Treasurer*s Reports

indicate that total State receipts were increasing steadily
17
during the same period.
The per cent of taxes collected to the amount of debt
outstanding in 1919 was 19.8; in 1920, it was 19.0 per cent.
In 1919, debt outstanding was 1.77 P en cent of the assessed
valuation of property, but this increased to 2.63 P®** cent
in 1920.

These measures indicate that the Louisiana debt

burden was increasing; however, it would appear that, by
even conservative standards, the State was in a position,
around 1920 and 1921, to borrow without seriously endanger
ing its ability to pay its debts.
The 1921 to 1927 period in the history of Louisiana
debt was, like the 1913 to 1920 era, a relatively quiet one.
Some of the scattered borrowing that had marked the 1913 to
1920 period was continued after the new Constitution was
adopted.

The total amount of borrowing from 1921 to 1927

was $13,^00,000.

(See Table VI, Appendix A.)

This debt

creation consisted of both direct and indirect borrowing,
but borrowing in the name of the State was of secondary
importance.

There were only two types of direct borrowing

l^Moody* s, 1918-1925.
^Louisiana, Treasurer's Report. 1920-21, pp. 6, 2lj.,
lj.8; and 1922-23, pp. 6, 28, 35, !>o.
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carried on during the period:

Confederate veterans* pension

borrowing and special highway borrowing.

Special highway

borrowing was not considered direct borrowing by the State
reporting agencies, but it is so considered here.

The total

direct debt incurred for the payment of Confederate pensions
and the construction of certain highways together totaled

$3 ,000,000.
Highway Borrowing. 1921-1927
The only highway borrowing in Louisiana before 1928
consisted of a relatively insignificant amount of specialized
Highway Fund Number 2 borrowing. . No questions may be raised
concerning the purpose of this borrowing.

Highways— even

specific ones— belong with those improvements which may
justify the use of the State*s credit.

The lack of other

activity resulted directly from the provisions in the 1921
Constitution relative to general highway finance.

A pay-as-

you-go highway plan was contained in Article 6, Section 21,
of the Constitution, as follows:
No debt shall be created, or certificates of
indebtedness or bonds issued, to be paid in the
future out of the proceeds realized from any State
tax or license to be collected under and by virtue
of this section, or imposed thereunder by the
Legislature, but the said licenses and taxes shall
be collected from year to year and expended for
the purpose of the construction and maintenance
of the system of State highways and bridge s.
1ft
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 21(c).
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The taxes which were to pay the way were the motor vehicle
tax and a 2-cents per gallon tax on gasoline and other motor
fuels.

The Legislature was also authorized to provide

revenues to the General Highway Fund from any other sources
19
except borrowing.
The pay-as-you-go approach to highway construction
had been very strongly entrenched in most of the American
states for several years.

Only eleven states had borrowed

for highway purposes by 1918; thirteen more states borrowed
for this purpose between 1919 and 1922.
borrowing movement in 1927.

Others joined the

■

The delay in highway programs

in many states resulted from controversies over whether the
states or the local governments would finance them and
20
whether pay-as-you-go financing or borrowing would be used.
The bias against borrowing was still very strong in 1921—
it was to take several more years before large-scale borrow
ing would be socially and politically acceptable in
Louisiana.
The constitutional prohibition against highway
borrowing did not in any way affect the Highway Fund Number
2 provisions which authorized limited borrowing for a

•^Ibid.. and Pro let. Vol. I, Part 1, pp. ij.80-1.

20
B. U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 19^-1), pp. 2 7 8 -8 2 .
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specialized purpose.

Borrowing for special highway purposes

in Louisiana had its origin with the $700,000 issue of 1919
for the purpose of constructing the New Orleana-Chef Menteur
and Hammond-New Orleans Highways.

These bonds were authorized

by Act 18 of 1918 (which was carried over by the 1921 Consti21
tution),
and were the only ones issued until 1927 when
Series B was sold.

In the interim, another amendment was

necessary before this 1927 borrowing could take place.

The

amendment came in the form of Act 179.of 1921; which author
ized up to $2,000,000 additional borrowing.

This act

authorized the funding of the excess of motor vehicle license
tax receipts in Highway Fund Number 2 over the annual
service requirements on the original issue--the new issue
would thus be subordinate to the 1 9 1 9 bonds.

The purpose of

the 1927 issue was to complete the two highways, and the
Board of Liquidation was again responsible for the borrowing,
subject to the same restrictions that had been imposed in
1918.

Series B bonds were scheduled to mature between 1928

and 1939 and carried the maximum allowable interest rate of
5 per cent.

21

22

(See Table VII, Appendix A.)

Louisiana, Constitution (1913), as amended 1918,
Act 1 8 of the Special Session; and (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 21;.
22
Louisiana, Constitution (1913), as amended 1918,
Act 18 of the Special Session; (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 21;;
(1921), as amended 1921;, Art. 6, Sec. 21;.1, Act 179; and
Moody*s, 1928, p. 1211;.
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Series B bonds, like the first issue, were direct
obligations (as defined here), but they were not backed by
the full faith and credit of the State.

The bonds were

secured by the motor vehicle license tax receipts from the
23
six parishes that supported Highway Fund Number 2.
It
would normally not seem advisable for a State to dedicate
specific taxes for the support of individual bond issues.
But, if there is a dedication of state funds, such borrowing
probably would be best accompanied by the full faith and
credit pledge if the State is really the issuing party.
This pledge was not given in the case of the Highway Fund
Number 2 borrowing in either 1919 or 1927.
Confederate Veterans1 Pension Borrowing.
1921-1927
The second and final component of the direct debt
added in Louisiana during the 1921 to 1927 period was the
Confederate veterans1 pension borrowing which started at the
end of 1925.

The paying of Confederate veterans1 pensions

was common in the Southern states, but borrowing to finance

^Louisiana, Constitution (1913)» as amended 1918,
Act 18 of the Special Session; (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 21}.;
(1921), Art. 6, Sec. Z\\,1, as amended 1921}., Act 179;
Moody1s, 1928, p. 121 [(.; 1939# p. 559? Louisiana, Treasurer*s
Report. 1922-23# p. x; and Ambrose M. Smith, Compilation of
Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A. M.
Smith Investment Company, 1933J» P. 8.

iBk
2l|
these pensions was not widespread.

In Louisiana, the

Constitution of 1921 did not mention borrowing in connection
with Confederate veterans.

There were Included, however,

several general provisions relative to the payment of
veterans1 pensions; a number of legislative acts and consti
tutional amendments had to be added before this evolved into
borrowing.

Article 18, Sections 1 through 5> of the Consti

tution of 1921 provided that pensions be paid to Confederate
veterans or their widows in an amount of $ 3 0 per month as
long as the incomes of the applicants were less than $1,000
annually.

These pensions were authorized to be paid from

the receipts of the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax which was

25
dedicated for that purpose.
Borrowing for the purpose of paying Confederate
veterans* pensions in Louisiana was authorized by a legisla
tive act and a related constitutional amendment in 192!}..
The constitutional amendment validated the actions of the
Legislature in appropriating $1,620,000 for pensions and in
authorizing borrowing for pension purposes.

The significant

change was that the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt
was empowered to anticipate the proceeds of the tax and

i?atchford, American State Debts. pp. 3 2 6 -2 7 .
25
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Secs. 1-5.
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borrow annually an amount equal to the expected annual
revenues of the tax.

It was further permitted to borrow up
26
to $ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 more which was to be secured by the same tax.

Even this borrowing, however, was insufficient to finance the
full $ 3 0 per month pension, and the pension soon had to be
A
27
reduced to $20.
Bond sales under the 1921}. constitutional pension
provision came In 1925 and 1926 and totaled $1,000,000.
Series A was dated December 15* 1925* and consisted of
$500,000 of i;.5 P©** cent bonds.
in full In 1931*)

(This first issue was paid

Series B, which was dated November 1,

1926, duplicated Series A in amount and terms except that it
paid 5 P®** cent and matured in 1932.

28

The total borrowed

to finance Confederate veterans* pensions between 1921 and
1927 thus was $1,000,000.

(See Table VIII, Appendix A.)

There is a very important lesson to be learned from
the developments in the Confederate veterans* borrowing.
What started out as the dedication of certain revenues for

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, as amended
192t(., Act 176; and Louisiana, Acts (1921).), Act 1^6, pp. 250-51.
27Another amendment was added in the next period— In
1928— to pay veterans the amount that was lost when the
pension was cut.

nQ
Louisiana, Treasurer's Report. 1926-27, p. 59; and
Moody's, 1927, p. 1128; 1931,-p. 1 W .
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the payment of pensions eventually required borrowing; this
debt financing was introduced after the pension was already
established and could not easily be removed.

These develop

ments in Confederate veterans* pension borrowing indicate
that the debt structure can be affected by revenue dedica
tions even though these dedications start out with no mention
of borrowing.
Borrowing for Confederate veterans* pensions was
introduced in anticipation of tax receipts.

But all borrow

ing, in the final analysis, is in anticipation of tax
receipts or some other revenue.

This feature would not seem

to modify the general and conventional conclusion that
borrowing for veterans* pensions and bonuses is undesirable
and improper when viewed from the standpoint of conservative
finance.
III.

INDIRECT BORROWING, 1921-1927

Direct borrowing which took place during the 1921 to
1927 period amounted to only $3,000,000, while indirect
borrowing amounted to $10,^00,000.
A.)

{See Table VI, Appendix

Dependence upon the indirect form of borrowing in

Louisiana was not a new development but was a continuation
of the trend established by the Port of New Orleans
borrowing of the 1913 to 1920 period.
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Port of Hew Orleans Borrowing, 1921-1927
The purpose of the borrowing by the Board of Commis
sioners of the Port of New Orleans was basically the same in
this period as it was in the preceding years.

Port develop

ment again seems to have been a worthy reason for debt
creation.

The constitutional provision in the 1921 Consti

tution which had a bearing on this borrowing was the one
that dealt with administrative officers and boards— Article
6,

Section 16 of this article provided that acts and amend

ments relative to the Port of New Orleans in existence before
1921 would be continued in force to fulfill the obligations
on existing bonds, but the new Constitution prohibited the
issue of any further debt under such prior acts, except for
the New Orleans Navigation Canal.

The Board of Commissioners

was specifically authorized to borrow $6,£00,000 for "public
purposes," except current expense; it was authorized to
borrow further for similar purposes if certain revenue
requirements were satisfied.

The Constitution stipulated

that the total debt was not to exceed $3£>000,000, but this
sum did not include, nor did the article affect, the borrow29
ing for the development of the Navigation Canal.

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 6, Sec. 16;
and Moody*s, 1926, p. 1122.
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The Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans
was also empowered to issue refunding obligations.

Thus,

the debt could be maintained at $35,000,000 if the Port
Commission decided that it was necessary.

The bonds were

required to be serials, and it was Indicated that the annual
payments should be as nearly as practicable equal serial
annuities.

The Constitution of 1921 also provided that the

retirement of bonds issued by the Board could be deferred up
30
to not more than ten years from the date of their issue.
One thing which was not contained in Article 6, Sec
tion 16, was a statement of the precise support pledged for
Port of New Orleans issues.

Lengthy passages prescribed the

procedures that the Supervisor of Public Accounts, the State
Auditor, the Governor, and the Board of Commissioners would
follow in determining whether the revenues of the Port (none
of which came from the State) were sufficient to justify
issues beyond the $6,500,000 specified.

But, it was not

indicated in the Constitution whether the State*s full faith
31
and credit was pledged for any or part of the $35»OOOj OOO»
This factor is one which should have been made very clear.
Yet, it could only be assumed, from the impressive list of

3°Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 16.
31Ibld.
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State officials reviewing prospective issues, that the State
32
was at all concerned in the issue.
This situation was the institutional setting when the
Port Commission of New Orleans returned to the bond market
after the new Constitution was adopted.

The Port borrowing

declined in importance, but the Port Commission was still
the State*s heaviest borrower from 1921 to 1927.
VI, Appendix A.)

(See Table

The tenth issue of Port bonds was sold

under the new authorization shortly before the end of 1921
and amounted to $ 3 ,£00,000.

These deferred noncallable

serial bonds, which were simply called "Serial Bonds," were
given a £0-year term.

Issues of $3*000,000 each with

similar provisions were floated in 1923 and 1927.

The pur

pose of all these issues was to finance general Port

3^The Treasurer*s Report, after some of these bonds
had been issued, indicated that the full faith and credit was
pledged for the Port of New Orleans Issues. A. M. Smith of
the A. M. Smith Investment Company, in his compilation of
Louisiana bonds, also indicated that Port bonds were con
sidered full faith and credit obligations by bond attorneys.
Moody*s considered these obligations of the State or "general
obligations" although they were payable primarily from
revenues of the Board. A statement published by the Board
of Commissioners in 1922 also affirmed that the first issue
sold under the new constitutional authorization was a full
faith and credit instrument of the Port and the State.
Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report, 192lj.-2£, p. £7; A. M. Smith,
Compllatlon of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New
Orleans: A. M, Smith Investment Company, 193&), P. l^J
Moody*s, 1927, p. 1129; and Port of New Orleans, "Statement
of Amortization," 1922, passim.
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improvements.
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(See Table IX, Appendix A.)

Totaling

$9,500,000, this Port of New Orleans borrowing accounted for
f

about 70 per cent of all Louisiana debt incurred during the
period 1921 to 192?*

An important characteristic of the

Port bonds was that the first maturity installments were
deferred for ten years.

This deferment procedure, of

course, usually adds greatly to the cost of borrowing; as a
general rule, bonds should be retired as quickly as possible.
Another questionable practice made its appearance in the
bond denominations.

Some of the bonds issued were in

denominations of $500.

Any unit smaller than $1,000 is

generally undesirable because small units are less marketable
than large and even denominations.

3k

State Penitentiary Borrowing. 1921-1927
The State Penitentiary was the second agency to issue
Indirect bonds under the provisions of the hew Constitution of
1921.

There were some similarities between the Port of New

Orleans and the Penitentiary authorizations.

Both agencies

Treasurer’s Report. 1926-27, p. 59?
Moody’s, 1923, p. 970? 1925, P. 939! 1928, p. 121ij.; Smith,
Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1933,
pp. 10-11; Port of New Orleans, hiStatement of Amortization,"
1922, pp. 1-30; and Port of New Orleans, "Information
Concerning Bonded Obligations of the Board of Commissioners
of the Port of New Orleans (An Agency of the State of
Louisiana," compiled by TIley S. McChesney, Assistant
Treasurer (New Orleans: June 1, 1928), pp. 16-30.
^Louisiana,

^ S u p r a , Chap. II, p. 12k»
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could issue bonds secured by their revenues.

Bonds issued

by both of the agencies were full faith and credit as well
as indirect obligations.

The difference was that the Port

of New Orleans could have up to $35>,000,000 of indebtedness
outstanding while the Penitentiary was authorized to borrow
only $1,000,000.

35

This type of limited authorization is

not what is ordinarily meant when reference is made to the
special fund doctrine and authority borrowing.

These terms

are usually used in connection with blanket and/or at least
very broad borrowing powers which are delegated to agencies
without severe limitations as to amounts that may be
borrowed.
this type.

The Penitentiary borrowing obviously was not of
If the Penitentiary should have reason to borrow

more at a later date, it would require another constitutional
amendment.
The manager of the Penitentiary issued the authorized
$1,000,000 of coupon bonds in January, 1922.

The purpose of

the issue was to acquire 5>000 acres of land adjacent to
Angola Plantation on which to construct levees and to recon
struct a drainage plant.

Part of the proceeds of the bond

sale were also intended to pay $150,000 owed on Angola
Plantation.

The life of the noncallable serial bonds was

35
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 20, Sec. 1
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set at forty years, from 1923 to 1962.

(See Table X, ,

Appendix A.)
While the purchase of the land in question might have
been necessary and proper, it doe3 not appear desirable that
the State should have issued long-term debt in order to
raise $1,000,000 to finance the acquisition.

Short or

intermediate term borrowing might have been more appropriate
to raise such a relatively small amount.

Under the circum

stances, the life of the issue also seems to have been
excessive.

This case is an illustration of the danger cited

in Chapter II.

Whenever a maximum term Is established (be

it the life of the improvement or any other standard), there
is a danger that the maximum term will also be the modal
term.
Another questionable feature of the Port Commission
and the Penitentiary debt was that the Interest on this debt
was payable only locally.

Interest on the Port Commission

and the Penitentiary obligations was made payable in Baton
Rouge.

37

In order to make bond issues more marketable, it

is usually desirable for interest and principal payments to

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 20, Sec. 1;
Moody’s, 1922, p. 81j.0; Financial Report. 19lj.l-ij.2, p. 80;
Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds.
1933# p. 55 and 19357 P. 6.
^ M o o d y ’s, 1 9 1 9 , p. 2ijl|.; and 1922, p. 8J4.O,
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be payable in the large financial centers of the nation for
the convenience of the bondholders.
Summary of Borrowing. 1921-1927
The total amount borrowed both directly and indirectly
in Louisiana from 1921 to 1927 amounted to $13*500*000#
Indirect borrowing continued to be the more important
borrowing during the period.

The Indirect debt consisted of

$9,500,000 of Port of New Orleans borrowing and $1,000,000
of Penitentiary borrowing.

The direct borrowing over the

same span was made up of $2,000,000 of highway borrowing and
$1,000,000 of Confederate veterans* pension borrowing.

(See

Table VI, Appendix A.)
IV.

DIRECT BORROWING, 1920-19^0

The State»s credit position near the beginning of the
1928-I9ij.0 period can be estimated from the following data:
the assessed valuation of property in the State showed an
increase from $l,72i;,95!;,0i;2 in 1927 to $1,733,#2,71!; in
1928, and State tax collections were $9,958,758 in 1927 and
$9,995,9!;! in 1928.

The significant debt figures were the

$8 . 5 1 of per capita debt in 1927 and the $8.77 in 1928
compared to the $7.I;5 P0r capita owed in 1922.

The total

debt reported as of August 1, 1927, was $57»319,i;20 end on

19lj.
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September 22, 1928, It was $52*, 099,1*20.

Taxes collected

were 1 7 ,2* per cent of the debt outstanding in 1927 and 1 8 .5
per cent In 1928.
cent.

In 1920, this measure had been 19.0 per

The debt outstanding was 3.29 pen cent of the total

assessed valuation of property in 1927 and 3.12 per cent in
1928.

The comparable figure In 1920 was 2.63 P«r cent.
These comparisons Indicate that the debt burden was

somewhat greater in Louisiana in 1927 and 1928 than it had
been in 1920, but it does not appear, by the criteria of the
market, that Louisiana had exceeded her ability to pay.

The

State seems to have been in a position to borrow conserva
tively.

Whether the market would view the large-scale

borrowing that was to come very shortly in Louisiana as safe
is another question.

The bond ratings again provide some

insight into this problem.

The continuation of Aaa ratings
•50

on all Louisiana bonds through 1931

is a fairly good indi

cation that there was no immediate alarm over the largescale borrowing (general highway) that began in 1 9 2 8 , ^

3®Moody*s, 1 9 2 6 -1 9 2 8 and 193k-*
Louisiana,
Treasurer's Report. 1922-23, 1921*-2h, and 1926-27.
^ T h e ratings did begin to change radically in 1932
when they were all reduced to Aa and in 1933 when they fell
to A. Moody*s, 1931, p. ll*99; 1932, p. 11*82; and 1933,
P. 1512.
^ I f criteria other than the bond market*s had been
used in assessing the safety of Louisiana borrowing at the
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The yardstick by which Louisiana’s borrowing was
measured at the beginning of the 1928 to 19^0 period was the
conventional market criteria which did not indicate that the
State’s credit was questionable until 1932.

The State’s new

borrowing was accepted for a while on traditional grounds,
but Louisiana actually had embarked on a spending program
that was not at all common among the states at that time.
Louisiana was one of the very few heavy borrowers among the
states in the middle of the Great Depression.

This heavy

spending program apparently was not Intended as counterI4.I

cyclical fiscal policy;

it took place at a time when

heavy state governmental spending was considered inappropriate.
Debt changes from 1928 to 19^0 were quite different
from those during the preceding period.

First, there was

large-scale borrowing where before there had been relatively

beginning of the 1 9 3 0 ’s, the conclusion about the appropri
ateness of borrowing might have been reinforced but for a
different reason. For example, if counter-cyclical fiscal
policy had been recognized, states in the early thirties
might have found themselves in a position where the consid
erations about safety in borrowing would have been relegated
to a subordinate position. Or, it might have been concluded
that it was appropriate and even safe for states to borrow
at the start of this depression because borrowing and
spending might have been expected to contribute enough to
recovery to revive debt-paying ability. Neither of these
views, of course, was prevalent In the 1930’s.
^ A n s e l M. Sharp, "The Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Role
of State Governments During the ’Thirties *,11 National Tax
Journal. XI, No. 2 (June, 1958), 139.
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little use of the State*s credit.

Secondly, where the

greatest previous activity had been in the indirect cate
gory, direct borrowing now assumed the greater importance.
Direct borrowing was for the following purposes:

the

financing of Confederate veterans* pensions, the building
of a new capitol building, the payment of flood and drought
relief, and highway construction.

Highway construction was

by far the most important purpose for Louisiana borrowing,
(See Table XX, Appendix A.)
Highway Borrowing, 1928-19h.O
In Louisiana by 1928, the pay-as-you-go approach to
highway financing had been given a 6-year test, and the
improvements were far from sufficient.
proper?

Was borrowing now

Highway borrowing had characteristics which recom

mended it at the beginning of the 1928 to 19^0 period as a
proper use of the State*s credit.

First, it could be

expected that highway improvements would help by promoting
economic growth.

Highway borrowing was also proper because

highways are long-term, nonrecurrent, and durable improve
ments that are suitable for long-term Indentures,

In

addition to financial propriety, highway construction, and
borrowing for this purpose, were becoming more and more
accepted as desirable functions of state governments at that
time.

Thus, highway borrowing at the start of this period
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was not regarded as improper on political, social, or
U2
economic grounds,
Large-scale highway borrowing could not take place in
Louisiana, however, until the 1921 constitutional pay-asyou-go plan was modified.

The modification took the form of

seven constitutional amendments affecting highway finance in
the space of twelve years.

Act 219 of 1 9 2 8 ^ raised the

gasoline tax to h cents and authorized the Board of Liqui
dation of the State Debt to fund the proceeds of 1 cent of
the [{.-cent tax.

There was no indication in the amendment of

any specific limit to the amount of bonds that could be
issued on this basis.

It was provided, however, that the

bonds were not to pay more than 5 per cent nor to run for
more than twenty years.
be not less than $5>00.

Bond denominations were required to
Finally, it was stipulated that the

obligations offered should not be sold for less than par.^"

^ Edna Trull, Borrowing for Highways (New York:
Dim & Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal ServiceDepartment, 1937),
p. l£j and Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 2 7 8 -8 2 .
^ T h e r e was another amendment in 1928 relative to the
construction of toll bridges, but it was never implemented
because it was legally impaired. William D. Ross, Financing
Highway Improvements in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Division of
Research, College of Commerce, Louisiana State University,
19i>5>), p. hh-5 and Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6,
Sec. 25.1, as amended 1926, Act 2o6.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(d),
as amended 1928, Act 219.
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An important point that was not covered in the
authorization was whether the bonds provided for would be
full faith and credit obligations.

Two other unfavorable

elements in this first general highway policy were the
sanction of denominations as small as $5 0 0 , and the dedica
tion or pledge of one-fourth of the lj.-cent gasoline tax as
security for the bonds authorized.

Bonds are normally more

expensive and less attractive to investors when they are
offered in denominations smaller than $1,000.

The dedica

tion of revenues to a specific bond issue was undesirable
because it would prejudice the position of subsequent issues.
The constitutional amendment of 1928 resulted in
$21,000,000 of general highway borrowing which was to be '
serviced and retired from the proceeds of the gasoline tax.
Two issues were sold under this authorization during the
next year.

(See Table XII, Appendix A.)

together totaled $15,000,000.

Series A and B

Both issues consisted of

noncallable serial bonds that matured in 19k9»

The third

issue under this authorization, sold in 1930, amounted to
$6,000,000 and brought the total general highway debt to
$21,000,000,

The bonds of the A, B, and C issues

ij.6

paid the

^ Ibid.
^Frora 1918 through 1931, all of the Louisiana obliga
tions were rated Aaa by Moody1s. Therefore, the Moody’s
ratings are not analyzed until the next period when they
began to change.
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maximum interest rate of 5 per cent permitted under the 1928
authorization, and they also made use of the maximum life
authorized--twenty years.

kl

Twenty-one million dollars of borrowing in two years
made a big change In Louisiana*s debt structure, but it was
minor compared to what was about to happen.

Act 3 of the

Extra Session of 1930, which was accepted as a constitutional
amendment in 1930, established a large-scale highway plan.
This time, the Louisiana Highway Commission was given the
responsibility of borrowing under the supervision of a newly
created State Advisory Board,

The main purpose of the

authorization was to construct paved State highways and
bridges required in connection with these highways.

The

Commission was authorized to borrow $68,000,000 for this
purpose.

Another purpose, in the same act, was to finance

the construction of a bridge over the Mississippi River in
New Orleans.

The sum of $7,000,000 was granted for this

purpose bringing the total borrowing authorized to
$72,000,000.

Act 3 of the Extra Session of 1930 further

provided that no more than $35,000,000 could be borrowed in

^Louisiana, Treasurers Ren or t . 1926-27, p. 59?
1928-29, p. 77; Louisiana, Financial Report. I9I4.I-I4.2 , p. 81;
Moody*s, 1930, p. Iii22; 1932, p. llj.82; and Smith, Compilation
of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1933» p. 6.
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any single year.

The bonds were required to be advertised,

to be sold publicly to the highest bidder, to be sold for
not less than par, to pay no more than 5 per cent, and to be
retired in not more than twenty-five years.

Bonds were to

be in denominations of not less than $1,000, and the first
maturity installment could not be deferred more than four
years.

Finally, the bonds were secured by the following

pledges:

the surplus of the previously dedicated 1-cent

gasoline tax, the remaining 3-cent gasoline tax, and the
US
State1s full faith and credit.
Before 1930 came to an end, $15,000,000 of bonds were
sold Tinder the new authorization.

This sale was the fourth

highway issue, Series D, and the bonds had a maturity date
of 1955*

Borrowing for the purpose of paving highways and

the constructing of bridges continued in 1931 when another
$15,000,000 issue was floated.
matured in twenty-five years,

This Series E issue also
A third issue under the same

authorization was Series F of $15,000,000 which came early
in 1932.

The three issues of $15,000,000 each ran for the

maximum allowable term of twenty-five years.

Series G-

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(e),
as amended 1930, Act 3, E.S.j Louisiana, Financial Report,
19l+l-l|-2, p. 81; Moody's, 1931, p. lij-9^; and Smith, Compila
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1933, P." 6.
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bonds, which amounted to $7*000*000* were sold to the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932 and were also
given a 25-year life.

Five of the seven issues, from A

through G, paid the maximum interest rate provided under
the authorization— 5 per cent.

The other two issues paid

ij.,5 per c e n t . ^
The final highway issues sold in the 1930 to 1932
period of heavy general highway borrowing were Series H and
I, dated in September and October of 1932.

Series H

amounted to $7*500,000 and I amounted to $2,500,000.
of the issues were callable at par.

Both

This instance was the

first use of the call option on the provisions of any high
way bonds sold in Louisiana.

The two issues were designed

to pay 5 per cent and to mature between 193& end 19^0.
50
bonds thus were deferred callable serials.

The

The reservation of the call feature on Series H and I
bonds later made possible a very profitable and efficient

k9

Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1932-33* P. 82;
Louisiana, Financial Report. 19i^l-h2, p. 81; Smith, Compllaticn of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1933, pp. 6-7;
Moody*s, 1932, p. 1 I4.S2 ; 1933* P. 1512; and Ambrose M. Smith,
A Supplement to the Compilation of Louisiana State and
Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment
Company, June 3 0 , 193k)t P. 5.

^Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 1932-33, p. 8 3 ;
Moody*s, 193^, p. 5I3J Smith. Compilation of Louisiana State
and Municipal Bonds. 193^* P* £» and 193&, P."1H
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debt refunding.

It appears at first glance that much

wider use should have been made of this feature during the
whole period when interest rates were so high.

None of

the nine issues (amounting to $83*000,000) sold between 1929
and 1932 carried interest rates of less than

per cent,

and seven of the nine issues paid f> per cent.

The rates on

these bonds were so high that the State would have been
fortunate if it could have retained the call privilege.

By

this time, however, Louisiana was having a great deal of
trouble floating bonds of any description.

The State

probably would have been unable to sell any callable bonds
with its credit standing in the market which prevailed
during this period.
There are several other Interesting features of
highway Issues D through I.

There was a shift of responsi

bility from the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt,
which had been responsible for the earlier issues, to the
Louisiana Highway Commission, subject to the approval of the
newly created State Advisory Board.

Such shifts of adminis

trative responsibility should occur very infrequently and
only when the change will clearly bring more efficient

51Infra, p. 206.
^Ratchford, American State Debts. pp. 2 7 0 -7 1 .
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operation.

Abuse of this principle can cause uncertainty

In the minds of the investment analysts and their customers
and can conceivably lead to higher interest costs.

Although

it cannot be concluded that the shift in this case was
undesirable, there Is no Indication that the change had any
important favorable implications.

Another noteworthy

characteristic of the highway borrowing which resulted from
Act 3 of the Extra Session of 1930 was that the bonds issued
from 1930 to 1932 all had maturities equal to the maximum
time allowable.

53

When maximum terms are stipulated In

constitutional provisions, some effort should be made to
encourage shorter terms.
The differences in the security provisions of issues
A, B, C and of issues D through G were also Important.

The

first three issues were given the security of 1 cent of the
gasoline tax.

No other bonds could henceforth be issued

payable on a parity from that portion of the gasoline tax.
Bonds subsequently issued, of course, might not be as
desirable to investors as the senior issues, and they would
consequently tend to require higher interest rates to attract
buyers.

Louisiana, Financial Report. 19l|.l-^2, p. 81.

20i-|Series D through P were payable from the surplus of
the 1-cent tax, from the remaining 3 cents of the lj.-cent
gasoline tax, and they were also secured by the State*s full
faith and credit.

Pledging the surplus of the first 1-cent

tax to issues D through P may conceivably have done more
harm than good because it lent a second lien flavor to those
issues and introduced undesirable complexity into the pro
tective features of the bonds.
The next development in Louisiana highway finance was
another constitutional amendment which came in 193ij..

For a

change, Act 2 of 193^1 did not make any important debt manage
ment revisions and served mostly to bring together and
reenact all of the constitutional provisions relative to
highway borrowing that had been added since 1921.

Some of

the bonds issued after this time thus were issued under the
terms of Act 3 of the Extra Session of 1930 as amended and
reenacted by Act 2 of 193^»

Series J through N and P (there

was no Series 0) that were so issued in 193U» 1 9 3 and 1936
totaled $13,000,000.

Of this total, $5,000,000 was intended

for the completion of the planned road system and the remain
der was for the continuation of farmer and feeder road
construction. $k

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22, as
amended 193^» Act 2; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19l|l-ij.2,
p. 8l; and Ambrose M. Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation
of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (Hew Orleans: A. M.
Smith Investment Company, June 1, 1935)> P. 7.
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Series J, the only highway issue sold in 1 9 3 was a
relatively small one of $500,000.

It was also somewhat

•unique in that it contained the call feature and was
scheduled to mature in only five years— in 1939.

The

interest rate of 5 pen cent was typical of those of the
period.

The call feature was not exercized in this case,

and Series J was retired at the end of the 5-y®ar term.

The

rest of the general highway issues in 1 9 3 5 and 1 9 3 6 were
Series K of $1,000,000; Series L of $5,000,000; Series M of
$1,500,000; Series N of $2,500,000; and, Series P of
$2,500,000.

Series J through P (except 0) thus amounted to

$ 1 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 and completed the $ 7 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 of borrowing that
had been authorized initially in Act 3 of the Extra Session
55
of 1930.
None of these obligations except Series J was
callable.

Interest rates continued to be relatively high—

between I4..25 and 5 pen cent.
Act 66 of 1936 authorized $2lj.,500,000 of regular
general highway borrowing in addition to $5 ,5 0 0 * 0 0 0 Ton
refunding.

The bonds were secured by the proceeds of the

[j.-cent gasoline tax subject to all of the prior pledges in
Acts 219 of 1928, 3 of the Extra Session of 1930, and 2 of

^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lpl—14.2 , p. 8 l; 1 9^7 -11-8 ,
p. 58; Moody*s, 1936, p. 573* 1937* P. 588; and Ambrose M.
Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation of Louisiana State
and Municipal Bonds 7Wew Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment
Company, June 1, 1936), pp. )j-5.
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193l+«

All of these bonds, except for the refunding bonds,

therefore, were junior to the outstanding general highway
obligations.

Other requirements were unchanged:

the bonds

were to be general obligations of the State, denominations
were to be not less than $1,000 each, the interest rate was
not to exceed 5 psr cent, and the life of the bonds was
56
limited to twenty-five years.
Three issues sold under the terms of Act 66 of 1936
in 1937 were followed by two more in 1938, three in 1939*
and a single one in 191+0.

Series Q of 1937 was the first of

these issues and differed somewhat from the rest of them
because it was the refunding issue authorized by Act 66.
The call option reserved on Series H and I of the highway
issues of 1932 was partially
this sale.

57

exercised in 1937 6y means of

There was still $£,500,000 of the bonds outstand

ing by 1937 when prevailing interest rates fell below 5 Per
cent.

Sufficient funds were not available, however, to take

advantage of these lower rates without further borrowing.
The refunding was authorized by the aforementioned Act 66 of
1936.

The sum authorized was exactly $5,500,000, and it was

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(f),
as amended 1936, Act 66.
57
^'Some of the serials had already matured, and some
of the outstanding bonds due in 1939 and 19i+0 had been
called in 1936 and paid from Highway Commission revenues.

207
specifically stated that the funds raised would be used to
retire Series H and I prior to their maturity.

Bonds issued

to raise the $5 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 were assigned the same protective
provisions as had the bonds they were replacing.

The

refunding issue was scheduled to be retired between 19it-l and
I960.

The interest rate paid on these refunding bonds was

3.75 as opposed to the 5 Per cent on the H and I issues they
replaced.

This issue was noncallable and was rated Baa by
59
Moody1s at the time of issue and A the following year.
Series R and S were the other issues sold in 1937
under the authority of Act 66 of 1936.
$6,500,000 and paid 3*5 P e^ cent.

Series R amounted to

Series S of $5*000,000

was sold at split rates of lj. per cent on the serials
maturing from 19^-1 to 1957 and 3*75 P©** cent on those
maturing from 1958 to I960.

These two issues, like those
60
of Series Q, were not callable. The use of split rates here

was the first instance of their use in Louisiana up to this

■^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(f),
as amended 1936, Act 66; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana
State and Municipal Bonds, 1938, p. FI
^9Moody*s, 1938, p. 6 3 6 ; 1939, p. 558; and Smith,
Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 1938,
pp. 9-10.
60Moody»s, 1938, p. 639; and 1939, p. 558.
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time.

Split rates would appear to be a proper technique of

debt management since they can add to the marketability of
61
bond issues and thus perhaps to better interest terms.
The remaining Issues authorized by Act 66 of 1936
were Series T through Y sold in 1938* 1939* and 19^0.
Series T and U of 1938 were both split rate issues totaling
$6,500,000 together.
by I960,

Both were designed to mature serially

In 1939* $lj.,000,000 of bonds was sold under the

1936 authorization.

These Series V through X bonds were

scheduled to mature in 1961.

Series Y of 19^0 amounted to

$2,500,000 and matures in I960.

Like the 1938 bonds, these

^ T h e rating of Series R and S at the time of their
issue was Ba— a very low rating for state bonds. The Ba
rating at that time was given the following meaning:
Bonds carrying the Ba rating generally
have some elements of uncertainty.
Invest
ment characteristics are not entirely absent,
but speculative elements begin to dominate,
Moody's, 1928, pp. viii.
These Ba ratings on Series R and S were lower than those
that had been assigned to the other Louisiana highway issues.
This lower rating was probably a result of the subordinate
nature of the security pledged for the payment of the bonds.
However, it may also have been Indicative of the undesirable
complexity and the pressure on the ability to pay that was
growing in the Louisiana debt structure with each additional
highway issue. The raising of the ratings on the same
issues, R and S, in 1939 to Baa still recognized them as
less attractive than the prior lien A through Q, Issues that
were rated A. Moody's, 1939* p. 558.
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issues were all noncallable and were rated Baa.
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The

remarks relative to the split rates and the junior security
of these bonds apply equally here.
Still other bonds were being sold in 1939 under a
separate authorization.

This authorization was Act 39 which

was adopted as a constitutional amendment in 1938.

The

total amount of bonds authorized under this amendment was
only $^,000,000.

The purpose of this borrowing was to

construct farm-to-market roads and to finance maintenance of
State highways and bridges.

The bonds were to be general

obligations and the [(.-cent gasoline tax was also dedicated
to the payment of these issues subject to three substantial
prior claims.

The retirement of these bonds was required by

the constitutional amendment to begin not more than three
years after the date of issue and to be completed in not
more than eight years from that time.

The interest maximum

continued at 5 per cent and the administrative relationship
between the Highway Commission and the State Advisory Board
was also maintained for this authorization.
The bonds sold under the second authorization of 1 9 3 8 Act 39— were Series AA, BB, and CC, which together totaled

62

Louisiana, Financial Report. I9 I1.I-I4.2 , p. 81; Moody*s
1 9 3 8 , p. 636; 1939, p. 558; 1 9 IJ.0 , p. 1^39; and iglj.1# P. lf-63.^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(h),
as amended 1938, Act 39.

$5*000,000.

Series AA and BB were of $1,000,000 each while

Series CC, which bore split rates, accounted for the remain
ing $3,000,000.

These three issues carried strikingly

different interest rates;

Series AA of May 1, 1939, bore a

3.5 per* cent rate; Series BB of June 15, 1939, had a 3»2f?
rate; and Series CC was split between $2,500,000 at 2 per
cent and $500,000 at 1.75 per c e n t . ^

The security pledged

In each ca3e was the same, and the complexity factor was not
different between the bond issues.

There was one major

difference between the first two issues and the last one;
this was the fact that the first two matured in 19lj-7 while
the CC issue would be fully retired in 19l|4*

The difference

in the life of the bonds is more than enough to explain the
difference between the interest rates of Series CC and those
of the other two issues, but there is no such obvious reason
for the 0.25 per cent difference between the AA and BB
issues except six weeks of time.

This difference does not

mean, of course, that the rate paid on the AA bonds was too
high or could necessarily have been avoided, but it does
indicate how much interest rates can change from one month
to another and how borrowing must be planned sufficiently in
advance so that the debt managers can try to take advantage
of the changes which seem inevitably to come.

6*H b l d .s Moody*s, 19l|.0, p. lj.39? and 19l|l, p. 1^63
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All of the highway borrowing discussed thus far in
this section was for general highway purposes.

The total

amount of this borrowing during the 1928 to 19l|-0 period was
$12^,500,000.

(See Table XII, Appendix A.)

There was,

however, other State highway borrowing for a more limited
purpose.

The motor vehicle license tax collected in six

parishes had been used to issue $700,000 of bonds in 1919
and $2,000,000 more in 1927.

How, by a constitutional

amendment accepted in 1936, Act 71 authorized the dedication
of funds to State Highway Fund Number 2 for the purpose of
constructing and completing a highway and bridges between
Mandeville and New Orleans and to purchase the Pontchartrain
Bridge.

The funds set aside for this purpose consisted of

5 0 per cent of the license fees collected on farm trucks,

$ 7 . 5 0 of the fees on all other trucks, and 2 5 cents per
rated horsepower on all automobile licenses sold in the six
parishes.

The Louisiana Highway Commission was empowered,

with the consent of the State Advisory Board, to fund these
revenues except for an annual amount sufficient to service
prior issues.

It was further specified that the bonds were

to be general obligations of the State.

65

The limitation on

the amount of bonds that could be issued was set at

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(g),
as amended 1936, Act 71.
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$5,000,000.

The usual terras about Interest rates and the

life of the bonds were also included—
five years.

per cent and twenty-

The permissible deferment before the first

installment was paid was four years after issue.

66

The Highway Fund Number 2 amendment of 1936 brought
two issues, C and D, of $1,000,000 each in 1938.
XII, Appendix A.)

(See Table

Series C and D mature in 1961.

and F followed quickly in 1939!

Series E

the first of these was an

issue of $600,000, and Series F totaled $1,000,000.
and F mature in 1962,

Both E

Series C through F are subordinate to

the Highway Fund Number 2 issues of the earlier periods.
The total debt added during the years from 1928 to 19^0 for
the Chef Menteur and Hammond-New Orleans State Highways was
67

$3 ,600,000. 1

The Highway Fund Number 2 debt was a direct debt of
the State just as was the general highway debt, and they
were both used for highway construction.

The period that

lasted from 1928 until I9 I4.O brought $1 2 5 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 of general
highway borrowing and $3,600,000 of Chef Menteur debt— a
total of $129,100,000.

(See Table XII, Appendix A.)

66Ibid.
67
Ibid.; Louisiana, Financial Report. 19l|l-l}-2>
pp. 80-81; 191)-5-ij.6, p. 63; Moody*a, 1939, p. 558; and 19^0,
P. i+39.
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The State of Louisiana had two highway funds before
1 9 2 8 , so complexity in highway financing did not originate

between 1928 and 19^0.

What had happened in this period,

however, was that these separate funds had evolved, through
constitutional amendment, into somewhat complex units in
their own right.

By this time, each of the funds had junior

lien bonds to service.

This growth of complexity and

uncertainty in the Louisiana highway issues may have
penalized the State through higher interest rates.

This

loss may have been quite large because highway issues made
up such a great portion of the total borrowing in the State.
Flaws in highway borrowing in Louisiana during the 1928 to
I 9 I4-O period affected a large part of the total debt
structure.
Confederate Veterans 1 Pension Borrowing. 1928-19ii0
The second type of direct borrowing between 1928 and
I 9 I4-O was for the purpose of financing Confederate veterans*
pensions.

The constitutional amendment pertinent to

Confederate veterans* pension bonds mentioned in the
preceding section carried over into the 1928 period.

Acts

II4.6 and 176 of 1922]. had authorized the Board of Liquidation
of the State Debt to anticipate the proceeds of the 0.75
mill ad valorem tax and to pledge the proceeds of that tax
as security for any indebtedness incurred.

The Board was

211*.
allowed to borrow annually under the blanket authorization a
sura equal to the anticipated proceeds of the tax as well as
an additional $£00,000 annually.

Funds so borrowed were to

be used to pay $30 per month to eligible Confederate
68
veterans.
A sum of $£00,000 of Series C bonds were sold
under these terras on October 1, 1928.

Bonds of Series C

were full faith and credit obligations of the State payable
from the Confederate Veterans1 Fund and thus the 0.7£ mill
ad valorem tax.

The issue paid the maximum allowable

interest rate of £ per cent and was noncallable.
was scheduled to mature in 1933*

Series C

The issue had much in

common with the Confederate veterans' pension issues sold in
69
the 1921 to 1927 period.
(See Table XIII, Appendix A.)
Series D of the Confederate veterans' pension borrow
ing, dated January 1, 1929, had a separate authorization and
a different purpose from Series C.

The purpose of the issue

was Indicated In Act 23 of 1928 which amended the Constitu
tion to permit the payment of back or overdue pensions.
Back pensions had accumulated from October 1, 1922, to

68

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, as amended
1921;, Act 176; and Louisiana, Acts (1921;), Act lq.6, pp. 2£0£1 .
^Louisiana, Treasurer's Report. 1928-29, p. 77;
Moody's, 1929, p. 1314-1; 1930, p. 11*55; 1939, p. ££8; and
Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds,

1933, Pn n
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July 1, 1921}., when the pensions had to be cut from $30 to
$20 because of lack of funds.

Pensioners had lost $210 each

for a total of $589,260 because of the cut, and Act 23
provided for the borrowing of funds sufficient to restore
this amount.

The security which the Board of Liquidation

was empowered to pledge for the support of the bonds was the
proceeds of the 0 . 7 5 mill tax for the years 1 9 3 3 through
70
1938.
The back pensions were financed by the January 1,
1929, bonds of Series D,

The $589,260 of bonds was noncalla-

ble like the rest of the Confederate veterans* issues and
matured fully in 1938.

The interest rate on the obligations
71
was 5 per cent, and they were rated Aa by Moody*s.
Not long after back pensions were restored, there was
another development in Confederate veterans* pension borrow
ing.

Act 7 of the Extra Session of 1930, adopted as a

constitutional amendment in 1930, raised Confederate veterans*
pension payments to $60 per month.

The Board of Liquidation

was again authorized to offer as security the unpledged
annual proceeds of the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax for payment
of any bonds issued to finance the increase.

Act 7 also

70Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 6 , as
amended 1928, Act 2 3 ; and Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report.
193*4.-32, P. *4-2.
71
Louisiana, Treasurer* s Report. 193*4--3 2 , P* *4-2?
Louisiana, Financial R e p o r t , 19*il-lf-2, P. 80; Moody’s, 1930,
p. 1*4-52; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and
Municipal Bonds. 1938, p. 5.
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pledged the State's full faith and credit to the payment of
the bondse

The resulting offering was the noncallable

Series E of April, 1931, which amounted to $2,000,000.

The

bonds paid lj.,5 P©r cent and matured serially from 1 9 3 9 to
72
19^2,

Series E bonds ranked on parity with Series C and E>.
The third constitutional amendment pertaining to

Confederate veterans' pensions in the 1928 to 19lj.O period
was Act 82 of 193if-*

The act had two significant provisions.

First, it provided that bonds could be issued to pay pen
sions and that these bonds would be paid and secured by the
unpledged portion of the 0.75 mill tax. ^Bonds issued under
this 193^ act were subordinate to the previous Confederate
veterans' issues.

The use of multiple lien bond financing

thus had spread to another area of Louisiana's debt struc
ture.

The difference was Immediately recognized by Moody's

through a lower rating, than the other Confederate veterans'
73
bonds carried.
This difference in the rating was justified,

72Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Secs. 2,
3, as amended 1930, Act 7, E.S.; Louisiana, Financial Report.
19U-il2, P. 80; Moody's, 1932, p. 1^82; 1939, p. 559; and
Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds,
1933, p T T i r * * ----------------------------------- --------73

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec, 3, as
amended 193^, Act 82; Louisiana, Treasurer's Report, 1934-35,
p. ij.2: Louisiana, Financial Report, 19lil-k2, p. 80; and
Moody's, 1939, p. & 9 l -------- ----

)
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from the viewpoint of the prudent Investor, because the
bonds had a smaller margin of protection and were more
complex.
The second significant change which was made in the
Confederate veterans* pension borrowing by Act 82 of 193Uwas the revision of the maximum Interest rate provision.
Where the maximum interest rate had been constitutionally
fixed at 5 P©** cent, this amendment added the alternative
that the bonds could be sold for not less than 95 cents on
the dollar.

7^

Of course, this had the effect of raising the
75
maximum effective rate that could be paid on the bonds.
Confederate veterans* pension Issues sold during the period
had all paid £ per cent except Series E, and it may have
been necessary to raise the limit to ensure selling future
bonds.

It appears, however, that if the maximum allowable

rate needed to be raised, it should have been done more
directly.

^ L o u i siana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 3, as
amended 193^» Act 82; Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 193^1-35>
p. lj.2; Louisiana, Financial Report. 19kl-ii2. p. 80; and
Moody*s, 1939, p.

75

A bond paying a rate of 5 P©** cent that is sold at
par has an effective current rate of $ per cent. But the
same 5> per cent coupon rate on a bond sold at 95 bears an
effective current rate of 5*26 per cent.
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As a result of Act 82 of 1934> Series P of $2,000,000
was sold in 1935.

Like the other Confederate veterans* pen

sion issues of the period, Series P consisted of full faith
and credit bonds and was payable from the 0 . 7 5 mill ad
valorem tax proceeds.

But this time, the bonds were subor

dinate to the outstanding D and E bonds (Series C bonds had
matured by 1933).

The Moody’s rating given to the bonds of

Series P was A; the senior issues of D and E were rated Aa.
Series P was noncallable like the other issues payable from
the Confederate Veterans' Pension Pund, and it was retired
78
serially between 19^-3 and 1950.
This Series F issue was
sold more than seventy-five years after the beginning of the
Civil War,

By this date, 1935» there were still 1,891 pen77
sioners left.
Borrowing primarily for the purpose of

paying pensions to Confederate veterans and their widows was
ndw ended.

The remaining pensions continued to be paid,

of course, but borrowing primarily for this purpose was
discontinued.

The Confederate Veterans' Pension Pund

continued in operation and was supported by the same 0 .7 5
mill tax dedication.

"^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 3 ,
as amended 1 9 3 ^4-5 Act"T527""Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report.
193l|-“35> P. 42; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1 9 4 1 - ^ 2 p . 80;
Moody's, 1939, p. 559; and 1936, p. 573.
"^Moody's, 19lj-2, p. 1(48.
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Probably the most important change in the Confederate
Veterans* Fund and in the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax dedica
tion between 1 9 2 8 and 19lj.O was the change which permitted
their use for a new purpose.

The authorization for this

change was provided by Act 61 of 1936, and the new purpose
which it recognized was mothers* and children aid and
welfare.

This act seems to have been a logical extension

of the earlier pension borrowing.

Part of the rationaliza

tion for the Confederate veterans* borrowing had been that
the pensions were a reward for their service but another
apsect was their age and infirmity.

It is not surprising

that other aged and infirm would claim assistance from the
same funds.

Furthermore, a movement toward welfare legis

lation throughout the whole economy at the same time
probably contributed to the passage of this amendment.
The 1,713 Confederate pensioners living in 1936 were
not neglected in the new act.

The Legislature was authorized

to provide for the merger of these pensions with those for
the aged needy.

The Legislature was responsible for estab

lishing the security and welfare system as well as the
management of the 0,75 mill tax.

Borrowing was to be

processed through the Board of Liquidation in the same
nO
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 7 , as
amended 1936, Act 61.
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manner as in the previous authorizations.

79

Act 61 of 1936

allowed more latitude to the Legislature than most of the
debt acts mentioned thus far.

The act also established a

new type of relationship between the Legislature and the
Board of Liquidation of the State Debt.

The proceeds of the

0.75 mill tax had heretofore been dedicated to the Board of
Liquidation together with the power to borrow.

Now, the

funds were to be used by the Legislature for the purpose
indicated, but the collections could again be anticipated by
the Board of Liquidation.
The bonds sold under the authority of Act 61 were
those of Series G in 1939.

This Series was a relatively

small one of $ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 , but it was split into three parts:
$ 7 0 , 0 0 0 at 2.3 per cent; $180,000 at 2.5 per cent; and,
$250,000 at 3 per cent.

The bonds were also noncallable

full faith and credit obligations just as were the previous
Confederate veterans* issues, but the margin of protection
was narrower for this issue because of pf*ior liens on the
0.75 mill tax.

Series G bonds were junior to both the first

lien E bonds and the second lien F bonds.

The A rating

assigned to Series G was the same as the subordinated P
bonds carried, in contrast to the Aa rating that had been

^ Ibid.: and Moody* s, 19^2, p.
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given to D and E.

The use of split rates was the only new

factor involved in this issue.

Normally the provision of

split rates aids marketability and is therefore quite
desirable.

In this instance, however, the advantage may

have been offset by the small size of the offering.
State Bond and Interest Tax Pund
Borrowing. 1928-I9h-0
The final component of the direct debt created from
1928 to 191+0 was the debt supported by the 1.1$ mill ad
valorem tax.

Act 109 of 1921 pledged the proceeds of the

1.15 mill tax to the State Bond and Interest Tax Pund.

The

act also recognized several prior debts payable from this
fund.

These senior charges were the various constitutional

debts and the Serial Gold Bonds of January, 191^.

The act

did not, however, authorize any borrowing, and none of the
borrowing which took place during the 1921 to 1927 period was
secured by the 1.1$ mill tax.

The next period was quite

different; between 1928 and 19^0, five separate issues of
bonds were sold that were payable from the proceeds of the

81
1.1$ mill ad valorem tax.

(See Table XIV, Appendix A.)

Rn

Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1938-39» p. 5$;
Louisiana, Financial Report, 19hl-u.2, p. 80; Moody* s, 19^-0,
p. 14.3 9 » and 19*42, p. W .
^Louisiana, Acts (1921), E.S., Act 109, pp. 2 3 3 -3 $.
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Although the l.l£ mill ad valorem tax had been dedi-

{

cated to the State Bond and Interest Tax Pund by Act 109 in
1921, several authorizations were required before the five
issues could be sold.

The first amendment concerning the

1,15 mill tax after 1927 resulted from the flood of that
year.

Act $ of the Extra Session authorized the postpone

ment of taxes and the borrowing of money in case of
n . . . overflow, general conflagration, general destruction
82
of crops, or other public calamity.
The actual borrowing
of funds was predicated upon a separate authorization by the
Legislature.

The management of the borrowing would then be

the responsibility of the Board of Liquidation of the State
O *3

Debt.

This act was another somewhat rare instance of

power being reserved to the Legislature.

The nature of this

amendment would seem to indicate that it should have been
incorporated, if it was otherwise desirable, into Article
dealing with limitations of legislative authority.

Instead

it was included only in Article 10, which deals with revenue
and taxation.
While the amendment which added Act

of the Extra

Session of 1927 to the Constitution did not directly authorize
Op
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 10, Sec. 11,
as amended 1928, Act
E.S., 1927.

83ibid.
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the borrowing, it enabled Act 6 of the Extra Session of 1927
to become law without further constitutional amendment.

The

Legislature took the necessary steps in Act 6 of the same
8 i|.
Extra Session,
and the Flood Relief Bonds were issued dated
December 1, 1928.

The issue was quite small, amounting to

only $29ij-,6^2.35.

The bonds, which matured from 1930 to

1 9 3 8 , carried the maximum permissible rate of 5 pci* cent.

As were all of the

issues payable fromthe State Bond and

Interest Tax Fund,

the bonds were full faith and

obligations of the State.

credit

This issue was now the sixth item

paid from the fund; some of the prior liens were minor, but
there was still $9,8^7,1+00 of Old Serial Gold Bonds outstand89
ing on April 1, 1928.
The next State Bond and Interest Tax Fund borrowing
some two years later was similar to the flood relief Issue
insofar as the purpose was to repair the damages of nature.
Drought relief borrowing came in April, 1931 under the
authority of the same acts that had permitted the flood
relief borrowing--Acts I4. and 6 of the Extra Session of 1 9 2 7 .

20 .

^ T b id .; Louisiana, Acts (1 9 2 7 ), E.S., Act 6, pp. 1889

Louisiana, Treasurer* s Report, 1926-27, p. 99»
1928-29, p. 77* Moody1s, 1930, p. llf.55^ and Smith, Compila
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1938, pp. 1-3.

22\\.
The issue consisted of $502,000 of obligations that matured
in 1914-1.

The bonds were full faith and credit obligations,

86
but they were subordinate to six other issues.
One observation seems to apply to both the flood and
drought relief issues which took place during this period.
Considering the number of acts involved and the wording of
the provisions, one would have expected large issues to
result in case such calamities occurred.

This tendency was

not apparent; the two issues were quite small and together
amounted to only $796, 6 I4.2 .3 5 .
sold to finance this relief.

Yet, long-term issues were
If the disasters had been more

costly and greater borrowing had been required, long-term
borrowing might have been appropriate, but the sums needed
were so small that they probably should have been covered
either out of current revenues, or if that was impossible,
by short or intermediate term borrowing.

It would have "been

better if the State had not issued long-term debt, freezing
certain tax receipts and complicating debt structure, to
raise such a small sum of money.

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 10, Sec, 11,
as amended 1928, Act I]., E.S., 1927; Act 6, E.S., 1927;
Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report, 1930-31, p. 77? Moody*s,
1932, p. Ik82; and Smith. Compilation of Louisiana State and
Municipal Bonds. 1933t p. 2.
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The third issue between 1928 and 19^0 secured by the
1 . 1 5 mill ad valorem tax was the $5*000,000 borrowed to

finance the construction of a new state capitol building.
The general authorization for this borrowing was granted
when the voters adopted Act 5 of the Extra Session of 1930
as a constitutional amendment.

The amendment was then

implemented by Act 10 of the Extra Session of the same year.
Act 10 provided that the Board of Liquidation of the State
Debt could fund the unpledged surplus of the 1.15 mill tax
up to the sum of $5*000,000.

The subordinate bonds so

authorized were to be full faith and credit obligations.
The maximum interest rate was established at 5 PQr cent, and
it was required that the bonds be retired in twenty years
from the date of their issue.

It was further required that

the annual maturity installments should not exceed $ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 .
The most detailed part of the act, however, was that which
specified in advance the date of issue, February 15, 1931. 87
This specification of the date of issue was unique in Louisiana
borrowing.

Many of the constitutional amendments investi

gated thus far were somewhat detailed.

But the establish

ment of the date of issue in advance of even their

o*7

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. If., Sec. 12, as
amended 1930, Act 5* E.S.; Louisiana, Acts (1930) E.S., Act
10, pp. 39-Ul.
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advertisement was especially undesirable.

The practice must

be strongly condemned because it completely disregards the
fact that the timing of bond sales is Important.

The

setting of the date of issue in advance is a partial repudi
ation of debt management.

There can be no management in the

real sense when the fiscal authorities have their hands tied
to this extent.
The ninth item to be paid from the proceeds of the
1.15> mill ad valorem tax and the State Bond and Interest Tax
Fund was authorized by a new constitutional amendment in
1932.

This amendment, Act 122 of 1932, provided that the

Board of Liquidation could fund the surplus of the 1.1S> mill
tax for the following purposes:
. . . to pay or refund the indebtedness of the
State of Louisiana to the fiscal agent banks of
the State, aggregating approximately the sum of
•$3,^82,l5U.OO, more or less, incurred prior to
May 9, 1932, and the outstanding indebtedness of
Louisiana State University . . . amounting to
the sum of $ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 , . . .8 8
This act authorized the conversion of short-term bank debt
and certificates of indebtedness into bonds.

It may be that

the depression upset carefully laid plans to repay these
short-run liabilities and made this funding operation the
only alternative at that time.

Generally, however, it

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. I4., Sec. 12, as
amended 1932, Act 122.
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is undesirable for bonded debt to be created in this
fashion.
The "more or less" authorization of Act 122 turned
out to be "more."

The amount of the new Serial Gold Bonds

sold was $1|.,9 5 0 ,0 0 0 --almost half a million dollars more than
the act had indicated.

The maximum interest rate to be paid

had been established at 6 per cent, but the rate carried by
the obligations was £.5 per cent.

The new noncallable

Serial Gold Bonds were general obligations, but they were
Junior to the various State Bond and Interest Tax Pund
89
issues described above.
The final Board of Liquidation action in this period
in connection with the l.l£ mill tax resulted from the adop
tion of Act 3 of 1938.

This act provided for the refunding

of the $8,612,000 of outstanding Old Serial Gold Bonds of
191^ which were originally scheduled to mature in 196^.

The

Old Serial Golds bore rates of Ij.,5 per cent, but rates on
new Louisiana issues in 1937 and early 1938 were generally
much lower than Ij-.5 per cent.

It thus provAd fortunate that

the call privilege had been reserved when the bonds were

®^Ibid.: Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1930-31*
p. 7 7 ; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19lll-k^« P« 80; Moody 1 s,
193l|, p. ^13; 1939, p. 559* Smith, Compilation of Louisiana
State and Municipal Bonds. 1938, p. 3* and Ratchford,
American State Debts, p. 3 8 2 .
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90
sold in 191

This illustrates the desirability of con

sidering the inclusion of the call feature when interest
rates are extremely high.

It may take many years, but the

opportunity may present itself for the option to be
profitably used.
Act 3 of 1938 which provided for the refunding was an
unusual statute in more ways than one.

The passage of legis

lation in Louisiana providing for the calling of outstanding
issues was rare in itself.

The most striking thing about

this act, however, was the way the refunding was accomplished.
The plan to refund, which was under the auspices of the
State Board of Liquidation of the State Debt, had actually
reached contractual form before the act was ever signed by
the Governor.
Section 5. That the Contract heretofore
entered into on the 26th day of May, 1938*
between the Board of Liquidation of the
State Debt and Edward Jones and Co., Inc., for
the purchase and underwriting of said refunding
bonds is hereby ratified, validated and
confirmed, . .
It is not clear whether any public bidding preceded the
awarding of this contract or whether it was a private agree
ment.

If there was no public bidding, of course, there

90
Louisiana, Acts (1 9 3 8 ), Act 3, pp. 28-31; Moody’s,
1938, p. 639; and 1939, pp. 558, 562.
^Louisiana, Acts (1 9 3 8 ), Act 3> P. 30.

should have been.

But even If the bidding'was public, the

letting of the contract before this action was legally
authorized could not have lent certainty or security to the
State*s offering.

It is possible that the State might have

gotten better terms under more usual circumstances.
The refunding bonds offered were to be subordinate
only to approximately $8 7 * 1 8 2 of annual payment due to the
various school funds and other constitutional debt.

Since

the refunding bonds were to replace the 1 9 1 fy. bonds, they
would be the fifth item to be paid out of nine.

The bonds

were further secured by the full faith and credit status
like all of the other issues payable from the 1 . 1 5 mill
tax.^

The refunding of August, 1938* was quite successful

despite the unusual authorization.

The lj.,5 per cent was

converted to 2 . 5 per cent on $2 1 2 , 0 0 0 maturing between 1939
and 19^1 * 3 . 5 per cent on $5 *2 2 0 , 0 0 0 maturing from 19ij.2 to
1 9 5 6 ? and, 3 . 2 5 per cent on $3 *1 8 0 , 0 0 0 maturing between 1 9 5 7
and I960.

Equally important, but not so obvious, was the

saving that would accrue from the reduction of the life of
93
the bonds. The new bonds are noncallable
and are to be

lbid.: Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 1938-39* p. 55
Loulsianal financial Report. 19kl-ii2. p. 80; and Moody*s,
1939, PP. 5!>8-!>9.
93ln comparing the rates on the original issue and the
refunding issue, it should be noted that part of the differ
ential may perhaps be attributed to the fact that the issues
were unlike in their call provisions.
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fully retired by I9 6 0 while the previous ones were to run
until I96ij..

The saving from earlier retirement was partly

offset by the new retirement schedule which decreased the
size of the early installments and Increased the later
ones. 9k

Nevertheless, the total interest savings from the

refunding was approximately $2,2i|8,000.

The new bonds in

1938 were simply called "State of Louisiana Refunding Bonds.^
This refunding, of course, did not add to the State debt
outstanding since it merely replaced the Old Serial Gold
Bonds.

The security on the new issue duplicated that which

had been provided for the bonds it replaced.
V.

INDIRECT BORROWING, 1928-19^0

Indirect borrowing in Louisiana was relatively insig
nificant from 1928 to I9 I4.O.

There was little reason to use

authorities to circumvent the debt limitation when the Con
stitution could be so easily amended.

What Indirect borrow

ing did take place may have been influenced more by the
depression and counter-cyclical fiscal policy considerations
than by the debt limitation.

All of the new indirect

borrowers in Louisiana were educational or charitable agen
cies, and they were all authorized to borrow from the

^Louisiana, Acts (1938), Act 3, p. 30; Louisiana,
Treasurer*^ Report. 1938-39, p. £5; Louisiana, Financial
Report. 19b.l-li2, p. 80; and Moody*s, 1939, pp. 5>5>8-^9.
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Federal government.

The use of the agency in Louisiana

during this period, therefore, may have been partly a
method of attempting to borrow or otherwise obtain Federal
funds.
The Port of New Orleans was again one of the agencies
creating indirect debt.

New borrowing agencies were the

Board of Administrators of the Charity Hospital of Louisiana
in New Orleans, the Louisiana State Board of Education, and
the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University.
Port of New Orleans Borrowing. 1928-19lj0
The Port of New Orleans had been relatively free of
restraint in its borrowing prior to the 1928-191+0 period.
The obligations it issued were considered full faith obliga
tions, but there was no involvement of State funds in any of
the issues described previously.

This status of the Board

of Commissioners underwent a change in 1930.

The depression

made itself felt on Port revenues to the extent that the
State was obliged to aid in debt service.

The aid came in

the form of a constitutional amendment which adopted Act 1
of 1930.

The amendment levied a 1-cent gasoline tax in

addition to the

cents already collected.

The new 1-cent

tax was not dedicated exclusively to the Port of New Orleans,
but the Port did get 9/20ths of the tax.

The main purpose

of the dedication was to assist the Board in meeting
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principal and interest payments.

A secondary provision

stipulated that revenues resulting from the dedication would
be considered revenues of the Board of Commissioners and
would thus be counted in determining whether revenues were
sufficient to justify further borrowing as authorized in the
95?
Constitution of 1921.
Act 1 of 1930 obviously contributed more complexity
to Louisiana*s debt structure as well as to the Port*s:

the

gasoline tax was being diverted from highway uses and being
split between three different agencies; the Port*s revenues
now would not consist solely of operating revenues but would
be dependent upon tax support.

This situation is somewhat

ironic; one of the justifications for agency borrowing is
that sometimes state or municipal credit is so weak that the
pledge of specific revenues can be more attractive on the
market than the full faith and credit pledge.

Now, however,

the Port issues had to be secured by State tax revenues.
The characteristic of this important change in the
Port of New Orleans debt that may be the most significant
(as far as providing an insight into debt management
practice in the future is concerned) is the fact that the

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 16;
Art. 6, Sec. 22, as amended 1930, Act 1; and Smith, Compila
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 1938, p. lip.
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borrowihg had started out with the State involved only as a
guarantor.

There was no indication or intention that the

State would ever have to contribute to the support of this
Port debt.

It would be well to recall this case, along with

all of the other pertinent factors, when the persuasive
argument is made that "the statefs credit is needed only to
lend prestige to these issues, but no state funds are needed
or will ever be needed."

What happened in Port borrowing is

also ample reason for including under the category of State
debt all issues in which the State has either pledged its
credit or contributed any funds.
The first Port of New Orleans offering during the
period came in 1936.

The authorization for the issue came

from a provision of the Constitution of 1921 which had here
tofore not been used for any Port issue.

The Constitution

not only had authorized $ 6 ,^0 0 ,0 0 0 0f borrowing and set up
conditions whereby up to $ 35>»0 0 0 > 0 0 0 could be borrowed, but
it had also provided that the Port Commission could refund
maturing debt.

This refunding provision was the basis for

the July 1, 1936, sale of $l,30Jj.,000 of Ij. per cent Serial
Gold Refunding Bonds.

The refunding bonds replaced those

obligations maturing from July 1, 1936 to July 1, 1937»
inclusive.

The noncallable refunding bonds issued were

designed to mature between 1938 and 1961.

The issue was

23k
rated Ba by Moody*s in 1938* but the rating was raised to
96
Baa in 1939 with all of the other Port debt.
(See Table
XV, Appendix A.)
The final Port of New Orleans borrowing before World
War II was another refunding issue in 1939.

This issue of

$ 6 ^ 8 , 0 0 0 was sold under the same circumstances as were the
refunding bonds of 1936.

This time the refunding bonds paid

3.25 per cent and were to mature in 1959.
callable and bore a Baa rating.

97

They were non-

Port of New Orleans

borrowing for the 1 9 2 8 to 1 9 i}-0 period thus totaled $ 1 ,9 6 2 ,0 0 0 ;
it was all for the purpose of refunding maturing debt.
The practice of refunding maturing debt is not
compatible with the principle that provision should be made
for the retirement of debt.

When the maturing principal of

an issue is refunded, there is no retirement but rather a
perpetuation of the debt.

Economic conditions at the time

of these Port refundings may have made it necessary to take
extraordinary measures to pay maturing principal.

There is

no question that refunding is preferable to default.
However, the blanket authorization to refund, with only the

Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 16;
Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report, 1938-39, p. 56; Louisiana,
Financial Report, 19kl-ij2, p. 8 3 ; Moody*s, 1938, p. 61j.0;
1939, p. 558; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and
Municipal Bonds, 1938, p. 17.
^Louisiana,

^Moody*s, 19^0, p. Ijlj.0.
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approval of the Governor, probably was an undesirable provi
sion because it did nothing to ensure that the Port would
not refund all of its debt as it matured while diverting
Port revenues to operating or current expenditures.

Charity Hospital Borrowing, 1928-1914-0
One of the new, indirect, and somewhat narrow uses of
the State1s resources in this period was for the financing
of a new Charity Hospital in New Orleans.

The hospital

borrowing was authorized by Acts 166 of 193^4- and 72 of 1936.
The powers and limitations imposed on the Board of Adminis
tration were:

(l) to demolish the bid hospital and to

construct a new building;

(2 ) to borrow up to $ 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 and

to borrow from Federal agencies; (3) to pledge its own but
not the State* s credit to secure obligations; (ij.) to pay
obligations out of its revenues and such revenue as it was
authorized to receive from the State; and, (5) to pay the
bonds within thirty years and at a rate not exceeding 6 per
cent.

Section 2 of the authorization contained a sign of

the times in its reference to the acceptance of Federal
grants from the Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works or any other Federal agency dispensing funds.

The

State pledged, in Act 10 of the First Extra Session of 1935*
aid in the payment of any obligations issued under the above
conditions.

The State revenue pledged was the first $lj.00,000
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collected annually from the proceeds of the corporation
franchise tax.

98

The Legislature alone was responsible for the provi
sions above? there was no constitutional amendment in this
case.

Amendment was unnecessary because there was no pledge

of the State*s credit; the bonds were neither direct, full
faith and credit, nor general obligations.

The bonds were

obligations of the Board of Administrators of Charity
Hospital of Louisiana in New Orleans,

This borrowing was

possible because of the existence of the special fund
doctrine.

Even the fact that certain State revenues

($1^.00,000 of the corporation franchise tax) were pledged did
not make borrowing by the Board of Administrators subject to
the debt limitation.

However, it is doubtful that this

agency borrowing in Louisiana was primarily or solely a
result of the constitutional debt limitation? there had
not been much difficulty in getting constitutional amend
ments adopted in Louisiana since the late 1920*s.

There is

no doubt that this indirect borrowing helped to complicate
the debt structure.
The Board of Commissioners of the Charity Hospital in
New Orleans sold its bonds in October, 1936.

The noncallable

"Louisiana, Acts (1931*-), Act 166, pp. 537-^2? (1935),
1st E.S., Act 10, ppTTpT-511-; and (1936), Act 72, pp. 190-92.
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issue consisted of three serial blocks!

$ 3 lj.l, 0 0 0 bore an

interest rate of 1|..5 per cent and matured from 1 9 3 $ to 1 9 ^ U
$1,92^,000 paid I4. per cent and matured from 19^2 to 1956J
and, $ 2 ,1 3 ^ ,0 0 0 carried a rate of 3 . 5 P ©*1 cent and matures
from 195? to 1966.
99
Baa.

The Moody’s rating for the issue was

The full amount of bonds authorized under Act 166 of
193U- was never sold; the next borrowing for the Charity
Hospital in Hew Orleans had another authorization.

Act Ij. of

1 9 3 8 was very similar to the earlier act--the purpose was

the same, and the provisions relative to a maximum interest
rate of 6 per cent and a maximum term of thirty years were
identical.

The basic difference was that this act author

ized the borrowing of an additional $1|.,500,000.

The protec

tion offered again did not contain any pledge by the State.
Instead, the issue was protected specifically by an addi
tional $ij.00,000, dedicated by Act 5 of 193$, from the
corporation franchise tax.

This amount was the second

$lj.0 0 ,0 0 0 earmarked from corporation franchise tax receipts.
The bonds issued under this 1938 authorization thus were to

^Louisiana, Financial Report. I9 L1.I-I4.2 , p. 82;
Moody’s, 1937, P. 590. This borrowing was not reported in
the Louisiana, Treasurer’s Reports in 1936-37, p. 51, or
1938-39, PP. 55-56. Presumably, this was in keeping with
the special fund fiction that certain agency obligations are
not State obligations.
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have a first lien on this second $I|.00,000.

Additional pro-

tection was afforded in that any other fees and revenues of
the hospital were to be used to pay the 1 9 3 8 bonds subject to
100
the prior charge of the bonds sold in 1 9 3 8 .
The full $1).,500,000 authorized by Act 4 of 1938 was
sold in August, 1938, at 3.85 pen cent.

The call privilege

was not reserved in this Charity Hospital issue either.

The

retirement of this issue was to begin in 1 9 4 ^ and end in
1968.

(See Table XVI, Appendix A.)

The serial bonds were

rated Baa in 19^0, and because of the complexity of the
issue, there would appear to be no question of overrating
101
here.
The issue was secured by a first lien on the
second dedication from the receipts of a certain tax and by
a second lien on all other revenues and receipts of the
agency.

This Charity Hospital issue of 1938 is almost a

classic in its complexity— it was indeed an issue that
required a great deal of analysis to determine the nominal
protection and stability afforded to the bondholders.

Such

complexity obviously tends to impair marketability and thus
to lead to lower ratings and higher interest costs.

If this

1 0 0 Louisiana, Acts (1938), Act 4» pp. 31-38; and Act
5, PP. 38-ill.
1 (^Louisiana, Financial Hep or t , 1941 -i+2, p. 82;
Moody’s, 1939, pp. 562-63; and 1940, p. 44£.
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Charity Hospital borrowing in the 1930*3 was a classic of
complexity, this does not mean that it was necessarily
■unique.

On the contrary, it was representative of

Louisiana1s debt management and debt structure during the
period.

Board of Education Borrowing, 1928-19U.0
The next indirect Louisiana borrowing from 1928 to
19lf.O was incurred by the Louisiana State Board of Education.
The only State Board of Education borrowing came in the
closing years of the depression, apparently as a reaction to
the economic conditions of that period.

Act 6 of 1938

permitted the Board of Education to accept Federal grants
and to enter into agreements with the Federal Emergency
Administration of Public Works or any other Federal instru
mentality in order to secure a loan.

A related act, Act 7

of 1938, amended and reenacted Act 100 of 1922 and granted
the Board of Education power over certain institutions.

It

also indicated that the Board could incur debt which was to
be secured by any funds granted for that purpose by the
Legislature.

The more specific Act 6 of 1938 provided the

Board of Education with certain funds and granted the power
to borrow up to $ 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 for the purpose of constructing
and furnishing State educational and charitable institutions.
Bonds sold under the authorization were required to be

completely retired not more than thirty years after their
date of issue.

The maximum permissible deferment in the

first maturity installment was four years, and interest
rates on the bonds could not exceed 6 per cent.

The Board

of Education was given the responsibility of deciding
whether the bonds would be callable and was permitted to
sell the bonds either publicly or privately.

The security

provisions of the bonds made it clear that they were not a
liability of the State of Louisiana.

Other security pledged

consisted of a "first lien" on one-fourth of the surplus of
the corporation franchise tax remaining after the payment of
certain expenses and prior dedications (the Charity Hospital
of New Orleans had a prior claim of $800,000),

Finally, it

was provided that the tax and the Board (or a replacement)
would both be continued until the bonds were fully

102

retired.

The State Board of Education exhausted the entire
authorization granted in Act 6 of 1938 with the sale of a
single issue in August, 193®•

bonds of this issue were

serials; the schedule of principal retirement shows an
increase from $126,000 in 191+2 to $1+05>000 in 1966.

The

1 ^Louisiana, Acts (1 9 3 8 ), Act 6 , pp. 1+2-1+6; and Act
7, pp. 1+7-1+9.
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interest rate on all of the bonds was 1}..75 P®*» cent, and the
103
call option was not reserved.
(See Table XVII, Appendix A.)
The Board of Education borrowing in this issue was not
unique in any important respect.
Charity Hospital borrowing:

It was very similar to the

the year of the sale, the rela

tionship with Federal fiscal policy, the security used in
the bond pledges, the indirectness, and the nonrecurrent
nature of the borrowing all were similar.

It probably would

have been desirable for the State to provide for State educa
tional and charitable institutions directly, if not by means
of taxation, by means of direct State borrowing.

This

practice would have contributed to the achievement of the
objective of simplicity.

The combined and related circum

stances of depression and Federal policy, however, may have
justified a temporary departure from this objective.
Louisiana State University Borrowing. 1928-19lt0
The Constitution of 1921 in one section authorized the
Legislature to create the Board of Supervisors, and in
another it dedicated, beginning in 1 9 2 1 , up to $ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
annually of a 0.5 mill tax to support the University.

An

amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1932, provided
still more funds.

This time it was up to $1,000,000 of the

1 0 -^Loulsiana, Financial Report. 192+1—2+2, p. 82;
Moody* s, 1939» P. 56l7 This borrowing is not mentioned in
the Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report of 1938-39, pp. 55-56.
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excise-licnese taxes collected on insurance policies and
101;
from Insurance companies.
The third source of finds for
the University was not provided until 1938 when the surplus
of the soft drink tax was dedicated to Louisiana State
105
University.
The Board of Supervisors of the University used these
dedicated revenues and operating revenues to become one of
the more important borrowers in Louisiana during the period
before World War II.

Borrowing by the Board was indirect

because it was in the name of the Board of Supervisors.

For

this reason, there was no need for constitutional authoriza
tion of all of the borrowing, and legislative acts or reso
lutions of the Board of Supervisors sufficed as
authorizations for the issues.
The first borrowing by the Board of Supervisors was
carried out on its own authority.

"By resolution of the

University Board of Supervisors dated October 22, 193U there
was authorized for issuance $300,000 of 51$ Series Revenue
Bonds . . , " 1 0 6

Only $119,000 of the authorized $300,000

^^ouisiana,
175 (1921), Art. 12,
105
Louisiana,
106
Louisiana,

Constitution (1921), Art. 12, Secs. 7 ,
Sec. 17, as amended 1932, Act 116.
Acts (1938), Act 18, pp. 106-7.
Financial Report. 19J|1 -J|.2, p. 8 3 .
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was ever sold.

The bonds, which were predated June, 1934*

paid 5.5 per cent and were payable from revenues of the
stadium and cafeteria.

The obligations were callable serials

and were scheduled to mature between 1939 and 19+2,
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A second issue of 5.5 per cent serial revenue bonds
sold in 1935 amounted to $1,500,000.

A $500,000 issue which

followed in April, 1937> ranked on par with these 1935 bonds.
The purpose of the $2,000,000 of 1935 and 1937 sales was to
provide for the construction of buildings.

The bonds sold

were secured by rental and other operating revenues of the
University as well as by the BoardTs pledge of up to $200,000
annually from the receipts of the insurance excise tax
revenues received by the University.

(Up to $1,000,000

annually from the proceeds of this tax was appropriated to
the University under provisions of the constitutional amend
ment, Act 116 of 1932.)

The $1,500,000 of bonds sold in

1935 paid 5.5 per cent and was due between 1937 and 1955.

The 1937 issue was split with $300,000 at 2+.25 per cent and
$200,000 at I4..5 per cent.

The 2j..25*s were due from 1939 to

1951 and the 4*5* s between 1951 and 1956.

Only the 1932+
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Louisiana, Financial Report. 192+1—14-2, p. 82;
Moody!s, 1939» p. 562; 194°* p. I4I+6 ; 192+1* p. 470; and
Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds,
1938, p. 19.

2i|j|
issue of the Louisiana State University bonds was
10 8
callable.
(See Table XVIII, Appendix A.)
The next Louisiana State University borrowing was
authorized by the Legislature in Act 223 of 1936.

The act

was somewhat similar to other acts passed around 1936 because
it granted the Board the authority to borrow from any agency
of the Federal government.

The borrowing powers given to

the Board of Supervisors in this act were quite broad:
. . . the Board . . . shall have full authority
to borrow . . . in sums sufficient to provide
funds necessary to accomplish or execute any
purpose, power, or authority, now or hereafter
vested in said Board of Supervisors bv the
Constitution and laws of Louisiana,
In addition, the Board was given the right to issue refunding
bonds if funds were insufficient to retire the indebtedness
incurred under the above authorization.

Such refunding

bonds were not to exceed the amount of the indebtedness due
and were to conform to the same requirements that were
placed on other bonds sold under the authorizing act.

110

The usual requirements about interest rates and maturities
were included:

Interest rates were not to exceed 8 per cent,

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), as amended 1932,
Act 116; Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+1-1J-2, p. 82; and
Moody*s, 1938, pp. 6 3 8 -3 9 .
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Louisiana, Acts (1936), Act 223, P* 896.

110Ibid., pp. 896-600.
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the first retirement installment could not be deferred more
than three years, and all bonds issued would have to be fully
retired in not more than forty years from their dates of
issue.

The security provisions made it clear that the bonds

sold under the act would not be State obligations, but it
was indicated that the Board of Supervisors could pledge
its full faith and credit as security if it was deemed
proper.

More specific protection was made available for

prospective bondholders by the Legislature when the Board
was directed to pledge a sufficient amount of its gross
revenues including part or all of the undedicated portions
111
of the insurance excise tax.
Act 223 of 1936 was put to use almost immediately in
an issue of $1,000,000 dated December 1, 1936.

The purpose

of the issue was to construct and furnish buildings.

The

bonds were noncallable serials due December 1, 1938* to
1955.

The provisions of the authorizing act were followed,

and the bonds were general obligations of the Board of
Supervisors.

The 1}. per cent bonds were further secured by

the pledge of up to $100,000 annually from the University1s
$1,000,000 share of the Insurance excise tax if revenues
from the operation of the University facilities were
insufficient to pay the principal and interest requirements.

111 Tbid.
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The 1936 bonds thus were ranked after the issues of 1935 and
1 9 3 7 » to which were pledged $ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 of insurance tax
112
receipts in case of need.

Act 18 of 1938 was the next important development in
the growth of the Louisiana State University debt structure.
Act 18 amended and reenacted Act 95 of 1938, which had dedi
cated the first $ 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 collected from the tax on bottled
soft drinks to the Governor for financing the construction
and improvement of educational and charitable institutions.
In Act 18, a further dedication was made that the surplus of
the tax after $1,500,000 would be set aside for Louisiana
State University,

The purpose of the dedication was to

finance the construction and improvement of facilities at
113
the University.
The $2,000,000 of bonds resulting from Act 18 was
dated October 1, 1938.

The bonds matured from 1 9 I4-I to 1958

in amounts ranging from $ 8 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 l|l to $ 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 5 8 .
The interest rate was Ip.25 per cent, and the issue was noncallable.

Security for the obligations consisted of a

pledge of the first $ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 of the soft drink tax dedicated
to the University.

(Of course, the soft drink tax revenues

112

Louisiana, Financial Report, I9 I4.I-I4.2 , p. 82; and
Moody* s, 1938, p. 639*
"^Louisiana, Acts (1936), Act 95» pp. 288-307? and
(1938), Act 18, pp. 10^7.
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received by the University were subject to a prior annual
appropriation of $1,500,000.)

The bonds were also full
Ilk
faith and credit obligations of the University.
The pledging of the first $200,000 of surplus revenues
remaining after a dedication of $ 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 of soft drink
taxes was more the result of the legal framework than it was
a matter of debt management.

The Board of Supervisors

obviously was getting its funds in a piecemeal fashion and
was never really able to consolidate its funds to make more
effective use of them for borrowing purposes.

The use of

the B o a r d s full faith and credit in most of the issues of
the period may have been an attempt to overcome this weakness
of having dedicated revenues, some subject to prior charges,
as support for the issues.

The degree of complexity that had

been reached in the University borrowing in the short space
of five years, from 193^i- to 1938, was remarkable.
Summary of Borrowing, 1928-19k0
The total amount of money borrowed by Louisiana in
the twelve years after 1928 was $165 A 5 5 , 000.
XI, Appendix A.)

(See Table

Highway borrowing in the direct category

accounted for $ 1 2 9 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 or 78 per cent of this total.

Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lll-ij.2, p. 82; and
Moody's, 1939, p. 562.

2lj.8
This borrowing occurred roughly in the same period during
which all of the states were devoting approximately JL4J4. per
115
cent of their borrowing to highway development.
Other
direct borrowing during the 1 9 2 8 -1 9 lj.O period was as follows:
Confederate Veterans 1 Pension Fund borrowing, $5,589,000;
State Bond and Interest Tax Fund borrowing, $10,7l}-7,000.
The later years of the period, after 193k-* brought
three new agencies into the Louisiana debt structure:

the

Board of Administrators of the Charity Hospital of Louisiana
in New Orleans borrowed $8,900,000; the Louisiana State
Board of Education borrowed $6,000,000; and the Board of
Supervisors of the Louisiana State University borrowed
$5,119,000.

The final agency active in the period was not

a new one— the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New
Orleans refunded $1,962,000, but this did not add to the

>

debt.
VI.

DIRECT BORROWING, 191+1-191+6

In 19^.1, the total assessed value of property in
Louisiana was $l,l}.06,759,000, and the total taxes collected
amounted to $61}.,959,759. The debt outstanding at the time
116
was $185,692,020.
The standard ratios were as follows:

^"^Ratchford, American State Debts. p. 262.
^"^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lf.l-l;2, p. 8 3 ; and
Moody*s, 19l|-3, PP. i+38, ^50.
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taxes collected were equal to 35 P0n cent of the debt out
standing; debt outstanding was 1 3 . 2 per cent of the assessed
valuation of property.

The ratio of taxes collected to the

debt outstanding had increased markedly from 18.5 in 1928 to
the 35

cent.

This comparison, therefore, was indicative

of an improvement in debt-paying ability.

This was not the

case, however, in the ratio of debt to property values.

The

13.2 per cent in 191+1 did not compare favorably with the low
3.12 per cent in 1928.

The measure of taxes collected to

debt outstanding seems to be the more significant of the two
ratios--the other ratio is indicative of the decline in
importance of the property tax in Louisiana and the failure
of assessments to keep up with values.

The improvement in

the collection of taxes by 191+1 is a good sign that the
State was in a fairly strong credit position in 191+1.

Using

market standards, it might have been concluded that it was
safe to borrow.
However, World War II was to make heavy borrowing on
the state level inappropriate.

The War had a marked effect

on state borrowing; the gross debt of all the American states
declined from a peak of $14,614-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 191+0 to a low of
117
$2,367*000,000 in 191+6.
The same trend occurred in

■^■^Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures on Govern
ment Finance, 1952-1953 (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc.,
19^2i p. 200.
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Louisiana— the State was back in harmony with the other
states.

Louisiana borrowed for only four purposes:

high

ways, institutional improvement, welfare (for Confederate
Veterans* Pension Fund), and for funding and refunding.
There were no new indirect obligations issued through
agencies, and the direct borrowing was for purposes that
were already established in the debt structure except for
the State institutional improvement borrowing.
Highway Borrowing. 19kl-19b-6
There was no new highway debt creation from April,
19l]-0, 'until July, 19^-3.
only
war.

When borrowing resumed, it added

of highway debt during the course of the
This relatively small amount of borrowing is even more

remarkable because of the fact that Act 3 7 7 of 191+0— three
years earlier— had authorized $10,000,000 of bonds.

The

purpose of the 191+0 authorization was to provide funds for
the construction, maintenance, and extension of State
highways and bridges.

Authority to borrow was vested in

the Louisiana Highway Commission with the approval of the
State Advisory Board.

118

Besides the State*s full faith and

■j n Q

The borrowing was eventually carried out under the
auspices of the State Highway Department, which replaced the
Louisiana Highway Commission in 191+2. Ross, Financing High
way Improvements in Louisiana, p. 1|.8.
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credit, the other security pledged for the issues sold under
the provisions of Act 3 7 7 was the [(.-cent gasoline tax.

This

lien on the gasoline tax was subordinate, however, to the
claims of all of the outstanding general highway issues.
Another feature of the security was the stipulation that no
further bonds payable from the [(.-cent gasoline tax could be
issued on a parity with the $10,000,000.

If the l4.-ce.nt

gasoline tax was to be used as security for any later
issues, the claim would be subject to all of the prior
claims.

This practice was far from unique in Louisiana, of
119
course, but this does not make it acceptable.
The maximum interest rate permitted under the provi

sions of Act 377 of 191+0 was 5 per cent, and it was further
stipulated that the bonds should not be sold at less than
par.

Act 377 also provided that the first principal retire

ment could be deferred up to four years, and limited the
120
maximum life of the bonds to twenty-five years.
Serial
issues sold under the authority of Act 3 7 7 were Series DD,
EE, FF, and GG.

(See Table XX, Appendix A.)

Series DD of

$2,000,000 and Series EE of $2,000,000 were both sold In

^^Louisiana,
as amended 19l(-0, Act
1?n
Louisiana,
as amended 191+0, Act

Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22'('i),
377? and Moody's, 19l+l+> p. J4.2 6 .
Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(1),
377* and Moody's, 191+1+, p. 1+26.

252
July, 19l^3.

These split-rate bonds were set to be fully

retired in 1961.

In 19lfij- and 19l|-5, Series FP and GG sold

for sums of $2,000,000 and $1,000,000.

The retirement of

these bonds will not be complete until 1963 and I9 6 I4..

The

DD through GG bonds were made callable at par, and their
interest rates ranged between 1 . 2 5 and 2.5 per cent on all
121
of the larger blocks.
The Moody's rating in 191+5 on the $7,000,000 of bonds
122
in issues DD through FF was Baa.
These ratings seem to
have been appropriate from the traditional viewpoint because
of the complexity which the authorization had contributed to
the highway debt structure and because of the subordinate
nature of the bonds.

Fourteen years later, by 1958, the

Series DD through GG bends had been upgraded to A, and in
123
1959 they were rated Aa.
This does not mean, of course,
that there was anything wrong with the original rating.
Changes in the Moody's ratings can usually be traced to
improvements in the general credit standing of the govern
mental unit involved or to improvements in the protection
~\

121

Louisiana, Financial Report, 19H5-U6, pp. 62-63;
191+6-1+7, P. 67; Moody's, 19l|4, pp. ^25-26; 191+5, P. 1+21;
191+7, PP. 1+21—22; and 1959, pp. 663-65.
1 2 2 Moody's, 19U5, PP. U21-22.
123

Moody's, 1958, p. 623; and 1959, pp. 663-65.
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afforded to specific issues.

In the case of the DD through

GG highway bonds, by 1958 and 1959, the large highway Issues
of the 1 9 2 8 - 1 9 3 2 period had been retired, and the prior
claims were so greatly reduced that the amount of protection
afforded the remaining bonds was very large.

At the same

time, there was also an unmistakable growth In the Staters
wealth.
The highway issues described in this section were all
general highway issues, and there was no special Highway
1 2 I4.
Fund Number 2 borrowing during the World War II period.
In the six years of war, therefore, an average of only a
little more than $ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 was added each year for highway
purposes.

This amount was the smallest sum of highway debt

created in any period since the first borrowing for general
highway purposes began in 1928.

During the war years, high

way debt redemptions were greater than $ 7 *0 0 0 ,0 0 0 so that
the total outstanding highway debt, including the Chef
Menteur debt, declined from $106,328,000 in June, 19^1* to
125
$89,217,000 in June, 19i+6.
Louisiana highway debt and
the total Louisiana debt were still moving in concert,

■^^Act 7 1 of 1 9 3 8 would have permitted more borrow
ing from this fund, but the authority was not exercised
during the 1 9^i-l—1 9 ^4-6 period.
■^^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19^-1-42, PP. 81-82;
19ll-5-^6, pp. 62-63.

2£1+
Confederate Veterans* Pension
Borrowing, 19Ul-l9ll6" ~
Act 61 of 1936, discussed in connection with borrow
ing in the 1928-19l+0 period, provided that the Legislature
and the State Board of Liquidation could use the surplus
proceeds of the 0 .75? mill ad valorem tax for the support of
an economic and social welfare system.

The first activity

in the Confederate veterans* segment of the debt structure
during the World War II period, in April, 191+1, resulted
from that authorization.

(See Table XXI, Appendix A.)

obligations sold were the Certificates
Series A.

The amount of the issue

The

ofIndebtedness—

was $£ 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,a n <3 the

certificates, which could not be sold for less than par,
carried an interest rate of 3 pez* cent.

Pull retirement of

these noncallable obligations was set for 191+1+.
security provisions were as follows:

^he

the bonds were full

faith and credit obligations of the State, and they were
protected by a fourth lien on the revenues from the 0 . 7 5
mill levy.

In 191+2, Moody* s gave a rating of A to the

Series A Certificates of Indebtedness.

Series B of the

Certificates of Indebtedness followed two years later in
May, 191+3; this issue totaled $2,000,000 and matured in I9 £l.
The rates on this group of certificates was 3 per cent on
$1,££0,000 and 1+ per cent on the remainder.

The bonds were

not rated since they were sold to the State Teachers*
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Retirement Fund.

The critique of Series A and B bonds Is

the same as that which was presented In connection with the
12 7
previous issues authorized by Act 61 of 1936.
The next Confederate Veterans* Pension Fund offering
depended upon Act 390 of I9 I4-O.

The act provided:

That each Confederate Veteran, and each widow
of a Confederate Veteran, whose name was on the
pension roll on June 1, 1932, and who was entitled
to receive the pension provided for by this
Article, and whose pension was reduced from Sixty
Dollars per month to Thirty Dollars per month on
June 1, 1932, shall be paid the sum of Thirty
Dollars per month from June 1, 1932 to June 1,
1 9 3 5 > "the date when said pension was again
increased to $ 6 0 per month or a total sum of
One Thousand and Eighty Dollars.^2°
The Board of Liquidation was authorized to borrow up to
$9 0 0 ,0 0 0 to raise the funds needed to pay these back
pensions.

Although the act did not provide as much detail

as usual, it did specify a maximum interest rate of 5 per
cent.

The lack of further detail did not seem to affect the

status of the bonds, and they were accepted as full faith
and credit obligations without question.

This acceptance,

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 7 ,
as amended 1936, Act 61; Louisiana, Financial Report.
p. 80; 19^5-46, p. 64; and Moody*s, 1942* p. Iplp7? and 19lii|,

P. 425.
^ ^ Supra, pp. 2 2 0 -2 1 .
128

,
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 6 ,
as amended 1940» Act 3 9 0 .
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of course, was not unusual since the obligations were issued
payable from an ad valorem tax and by a State Board.

The

Board of Liquidation did not avail itself of the whole
authorization, arid in July, 191+1, issued only $675*000 of
Series H bonds.

This issue was now the fifth charge upon

the Confederate Veterans1 Pension Fund.

The rates on the

intermediate term bonds— maturing from 191+5 to 19l+7--were
from 1 to 1.5 per cent.

The issue was noncallable and got
129

an A rating from Moody1s.
The three sales of Confederate Veterans* Pension
Bonds during World War II added $3,17^*000 to Louisiana*s
debt and brought the total borrowing for this purpose since
1925 to $9,761+,260.
State Bond and Interest Tax Fund
Borrowing. 19hl-19l+6
Borrowing payable from the State Bond and Interest
Tax Fund during the World War II years depended upon Acts
1 3 8 and 3 8 3 of 191+0.

Act 1 3 8 of 191+0 raised the amount of

the ad valorem tax that was dedicated to the State Bond and
Interest Tax Fund from 1.15 to 1,1+7 mills.

The 1.15 mill

tax had been dedicated to the State Bond and Interest Tax
Fund originally by Act 109 of the Extra Session of 1921.

‘L2^Ibid.; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19i+l-i+2, p. 80;
191+5-1+6, p. 61+; and Moody* s, 191+2, p. 1+1+7^
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The same act had also provided for the payment of 0.32 mills
to the "General Engineer Fund."

Now, in 19lj.0, the 0.32 mill

dedication was shifted to the State Bond and Interest Tax
Fund to make the total dedication 1.1|.7 mills.

The funds

from the l.Ij.7 mill tax were to be used to pay interest on
bonds authorized by:

Act 6 of the Extra Session of 1927

(Flood Relief Bonds and Drought Relief Bonds); Act 10 of the
Extra Session of 1930 (New State Capitol Building Bonds);
Act 122 of 1932 (Louisiana Serial Bonds); and Act 3 of 1938
(Refunding Bonds).

In addition, the State Bond and Interest

Tax Fund was to continue to provide the minor funds needed
to pay the interest on the Free School Fund, the Seminary
Fund, and the Agricultural and Mechanical College Fund, as
required in Article 12, Sections 19-21, of the Constitution
of 1921.

Act 1 3 8 also authorized the use of the State Bond

and Interest Tax Fund to pay any bonds that might later be
130
authorized.
Subsequent authorization was not long in coming.

Act

3 8 3 of 1 9 ^ 0 , adopted as a constitutional amendment in

November, 19i|0, provided that the surplus of the l.lj.7 mill
tax could be funded Into general obligations up to $7,000,000.
It was also pledged that the State Bond and Interest Tax

^Louisiana, Acts (1 9 I4.O), Act 1 3 8 , pp. 5^-3-J+5
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Fund would bo maintained as long as any obligations were
outstanding.

The purpose of the funding was threefold:

(l) to pay short-term indebtedness incurred before May 15*
1 9 ^4-0 ; (2) to pay overdue Confederate veterans 1 pensions; and,

(3) to reimburse the General Highway Fund for certain funds
transferred from it to the Public School Fund by the Board
of Liquidation.

The maximum interest rate prescribed for

any issues under the authorization was 5 per cent, and the
maximum life of the bonds was set at twenty years.

The

Board of Liquidation was again named to administer the
131
issue.
The Serial Bonds of April 15, 19^1, were sold under
the authority of the act described above.

The amount of the

bonds was $ 6 ,ll]-5 ,0 0 0 , and they bore split rates as follows:
$1,173»000, maturing fully in I9 I46 paid L|..75> per cent
(noncallable); $ 3 ,0 lj.l,0 0 0 , maturing between 1 9 ^ 7 - 1 9 5 6 paid
2 , 2 5 per cent; and $ 1 ,9 3 1 *0 0 0 , maturing between 1957-1961

pays 2.5 per cent.

The two larger blocks were callable.

The whole issue was scheduled to be fully retired in
, 132
1961,
but the bonds were not destined to remain outstand
ing that long; they brought the next State Bond and Interest

■*•3^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. I4., Sec. 12(a),
as amended I9 I4O, Act 3 8 3 .
Louisiana, Financial
I4.6 , p. 62; and Moody's, 19^2, P
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Tax Fund activity a few years later— in 19l|6.

(See Table

XXII, Appendix A.)
By 19lj.5> and early I9 I46 , the State of Louisiana was
selling obligations at the following rates:

Institutional

Improvement Bonds from 1.5 to 1.75 Pe** cent on large blocks;
highway issues from 1 . 2 5 to 1 . 5

cent on the longer

maturities; and, in May, I 9 I46 , more Institutional Improve
ment Bonds were sold with the majority of them carrying
133
interest rates of 1.25 per cent.
Conditions in the bond
market, thus, made logical a refunding of the callable 2 . 2 5
and 2.5 per cent Serial Bonds of 19^1.

Act 3 ^ 8 of I 9 I4.6 was

intended solely to provide for the refunding of the
flj.,972,000 still outstanding from this I 9 I4-I Issue,

The act

provided that the Refunding Bonds would be payable from the
same taxes as the bonds they replaced.

This provision meant

that they would also be given the same lien.

It was further

stipulated in the authorization that the bonds would not be
sold for less than par and that the average interest cost of
2 per cent should not be exceeded.

The bonds were again to

be issued by the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt, but
this time the State Bond and Tax Board was required to review
13k
and approve of the bonds before they could be issued.

•^Moodyts, 1914-6, p. l|.l5; and 19klt PP. 14-2 1 -2 2 .
1"^Louisiana, Acts (1914.6 ), Act 3 I4.8 , pp. 1103-5*
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The Refunding Bonds were sold in September, 19^6, at

a rate of 1.7^ per cent on $ij.,397»000 and 1.5 per cent on
$5>75>*000.

The bonds were to be fully retired in 1958

whereas the bonds they replaced would have matured fully in

1961.

According to the Financial Report of 19lf7> the

refunding reduced average interest rates from 2J-J.93 per cent
to 1.6952 per cent. The noncallable issue was given a Baa
135
rating by Moody*s.
The only new feature of this issue
was the role assigned to the State Bond and Tax Board.

The

Board had been originally established in 1935 to deal with
the financing of subdivisions of the State, but it had not
been a practice even to mention its existence in the various
constitutional amendments authorizing State debt.

State Institution Improvement Borrowing.

mi-mb

One of the most important changes in Louisiana’s debt
structure during World War II was the appearance of borrow
ing for a new purpose.

This new direct debt was authorized

by constitutional amendment (Act 361}-) in 19lj-2 to finance the
repair, improvement, and construction of designated State
correctional and charitable institutions.

The practice of

dedicating taxes or revenues for the payment of bonds was

1 ^5
Louisiana, Financial Report, 19l|_5-l}-6, p. 62; 19J4.6I4.7 , pp. 6, 66; and Moody’s, 19lj.7> P. lj.21.
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extended to this institutional improvement borrowing.

In

this case, it was certain mineral lease royalties received
on State land that were pledged.

This case was not the

first time that these revenues had been earmarked; the
institutional improvement dedication was subject to the
following prior claims!

(l) 10 per cent paid into the "Road

Fund," (2) the portion pledged to cover office expenses, and
(3) the amount credited to State agencies and levee boards.
Besides the subordinate claim on the mineral royalty reve
nues, the State Institution Improvement Bonds resulting from
Act 361). were further secured by Louisiana*s full faith and
credit.

136
These provisions relating to institutional improve

ment borrowing merely carried on the practices that had
become well established in the State.

More revenues were

frozen, a new layer of dedications was established, and
another explanation would have to be given to anyone who
might be interested in buying the bonds.
The constitutional provisions of 191+2 authorized the
Board of Liquidation to issue $5>,000,000 of Institution
Improvement Bonds and required that the bonds be retired
between four and twenty-five years from the date of their

■'■^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Sec. 2(a),
as amended 19i|2, Act 3^>b*
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Issue.

The bonds were also required to pay no more than

5 pen cent, to be sold for not less than par, and to be in
denominations of not less than $1,000.

It was further pro

vided that the bonds be sold to the highest bidder at public
auction and that they should be callable.

137

This last feature— requiring that bonds be callable -was the only unusual requirement.

The unqualified provision

that the bonds be made callable would appear to be an
undesirable requirement.

It was noted earlier that the call

option usually has a price attached and that this price may
sometimes be prohibitive.

It would normally be more advisa

ble to leave some discretion to the fiscal authorities to
Include the call feature if it seems desirable.

The consti

tutional determination of the exact provisions In connec
tion with the call feature of bond Issues again is
Inconsistent with the meaning of debt management.
During the 195-1 to 195-6 period, two series of State
Institution Improvement Bonds were sold under the provisions
described.

Series A amounted to $378,000 and ran for ten

y ea rs~it was sold in March, 195-5.

These A-rated bonds bore
138
split rates of 0 . 7 5 and 1 . 2 5 per cent and were callable.

^■^Louisiana, Financial Report. 195-5-5-6, p. 65; 195-657, p. 68; 1951-52, p. 59; and Moody*3, 195-6, p. L}.l5•
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(See Table XXIII, Appendix A.)

It Is very doubtful that

bonds with such low rates will ever be called.

The low

interest rates that prevailed in 191+1+ and 191+5 on Louisiana
bonds were a good indication that the rates would be low on
Series A also, and thus it would have been undesirable to
pay anything extra for the call privilege when it was so
unlikely that the bonds would ever be called.

There is no

evidence, however, that the inclusion of the call option
raised the cost of borrowing in this case.
Series A was one of the several issues sold in
Louisiana during this period which raises the question of
whether long-term debt should be incurred for such small
amounts.

Series B of Institution Improvement Bonds was sold

on a parity with Series A and closed out the $5*000,000
authorization of Act 361+ of 191+2.
191+6, Issue was $1+,622,000.

The amount of this May,

These bonds, which were also

rated A, carried rates of 2 per cent on $622,000 and 1.25
per cent on $1+,000,000.

The issue was not made callable and

will not be fully retired until 1967.

Since Series B was a

relatively large issue and was not callable, the observations
139
made in connection with Series A do not apply here.

139

Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+5-1+6, p. 61+;
191+6-1+7, p. 68; 1951-^2 , p. 59; and Moody*s, 191+7, P. 1+22.
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Summary of Borrowing. 19li-I-19li6
The only four purposes of borrowing in Louisiana from
191+1 through 19^6 were Confederate veterans1 pensions, high
ways, institutional improvements, and funding and refunding.
The largest amount of bonds sold was the $7,000,000 for
highways.

A second component of the debt was the funding

issue of $6,ll|.$,000 that was serviced by the l.ij.7 mill ad
llj.0
valorem tax.
Institution Improvement Bonds, which made
their first appearance during the period, amounted to an
even $$,000,000.

The fourth and final borrowing during the

war period was the Confederate Veterans1 Pension Fund welfare
borrowing that amounted to $3,175,000.

The four purposes

together totaled only $21,320,000 for the war years, (See
Table XIX, Appendix A,) in contrast to the $165,^-55,000
borrowed from 1928-19J4-0.
VII.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, 1921-19l|.6

A chronological study of the Louisiana debt structure
overlooks certain general characteristics that are evident
only when all of the Issues are considered together.
of these general factors are:

Some

the ratings received by

Louisiana bonds, the use of the call feature in the State,

ll±0The balance of this issue, $If.,9 7 2 ,0 0 0 , was
refunded in I 9 I4-6 .
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debt reporting, the timing of bond sales, and the machinery
for managing the debt.
Ratings of Louisiana Bonds. 1921 -19ii6
Between 1918 and 1932, all Louisiana obligations were
rated Aaa by Moody1s.

The meaning of the ratings during

that time was not radically different from today— Aaa was a
top-grade issue.

Louisiana may not have deserved the high-

est rating in this period because of its record of repudi
ation and default in the earlier periods.

The complexity

that was building up slowly from the time the Constitution
of 1921 was adopted was also a factor which might have'
caused the ratings to be qualified.

Finally, the St a te d

economy was certainly not among the strongest of the states
at that time.

These factors, together with the depression

and the $51*000,000 of highway borrowing from 1928 to 1931*
may have been what prompted Moody’s in 1932 to lower the
rating on all Louisiana bonds to Aa (while the meaning of
the ratings remained unchanged).

The 1933 edition of
ll+l
Moody’s showed another lowering of the ratings to A.

The

lower ratings assigned to Louisiana obligations in the 1933
Moody’s manual probably were more appropriate than the
earlier ones.

^ M o o d y ’s, 1931, p. 11+99; 1932, p. 11+82; and 1933,
p. 1512.
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The practice of assigning blanket ratings for all of
a statets obligations did not take into account the issuing
of layers of subordinate bonds.

This practice of assigning

blanket ratings was abandoned around 1939.

By this time,

there was apparently enough fear, although only three states
had d e f a u l t e d , f o r the rating system to be revised.

The

present practice of assigning ratings to individual state
issues, therefore, is probably attributable to the depres
sion of the 1930's.

Whether this method is still appropriate

is questioned elsewhere.
Table A gives the distribution of the different bond
ratings according to directness for selected years since
1939.

(Bee also Tables XXIV, XXV, and XXVI, Appendix A.)

The $182,227*000 of Louisiana bonds outstanding in 1939 was
rated as follows:

almost $0 per cent were direct bonds

rated A; all of the Aa bonds (there were no Aaa bonds left)
were direct obligations; there was also $28,27^,000 of
direct obligations rated Baa--this was l£.£ per cent.

Most

of the indirect obligations outstanding in 1939, some
$lj.8 ,077,000, were rated Baa.

The remaining $8,000,000 of

ll+^Alvin H. Hansen and Harvey S. Perloff, State and
Local Finance In the National Economy (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 191}I|J> P»
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TABLE A
MOODY*S RATINGS OF LOUISIANA DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT
OUTSTANDING FOR THE YEARS 1939, X9^1, 19^6
(thousands)
YEAR

RATING

19l|-l

19lj-6

$10,169
0

$ 8 ,9 0 0
0

$ 7,525
9,300

$10,169'

$ 8,900

$16,825

$87,706
0

$83,^
0

$67,875
0

$87,706

$83All;

$ 6 7 ,8 7 5

Direct
Indirect

$28,275
1i8.077

$39,14-79
H.5,366

$ 14.1 ,8 3 1
28,073

TOTAL

$76,352

$8^,8^

$69,9014.

$

$

0
8.000

$ 2,009

$ 8,000

$ 8,001

1939
BONDS RATED Aa
b
Direct
Indirect
TOTAL
BONDS RATED A
Direct
Indirect
TOTAL
BONDS RATED Baa

BONDS NOT RATED
Direct
Indirect
TOTAL

o
8,000

$ 8 ,0 0 0

Ratings range from Aaa to C. These ratings are sometimes changed when new information indicates that the invest
ment quality is different. The ratings in the Table are as
of the reporting date and not at the time of issue.
V»

The classifications used here are the same as those
used in the text.
Source:
Appendix A.

Compiled from Tables XXIV, XXV, and XXVI,
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indirect bonds was not rated.

In 19lj.l, the only change that

was noticeable in the ratings was that there were now more
direct bonds rated Baa, but the amount was still less than
the amount of Baa indirect bonds.

This tendency changed in

19ll-6— 'by that time there was $lj.l,8 3 1 * 0 0 0 of direct bonds in
the Baa category.

An unfortunately minor change in the war

period was a relative and absolute Increase in the amount of
bonds rated Aa— they increased from $8,900,000 in I 9 I4I to
$16,825,000 in 19^4-6.

But, the most important fact about the

bond ratings in the war years is that there was no signifi
cant improvement In the ratings even though the State* s
economy was expanding and the debt was declining.
Use of the Call Feature in Louisiana
Bond Issues. 1921-19li6
The call privilege was reserved in only one of the
issues outstanding In 1921.

(See Table B.)

The twelve non-

callable issues outstanding were mostly the Indirect Port of
New Orleans Issues.

In 1928, there was still only one calla

ble issue, but there were now nineteen noncallable issues.
These nineteen issues were composed of fourteen indirect
ones and five direct ones.
issue had disappeared.

By 1914-1* even the lone callable

It had been called in 1938 and

brought a saving of over $2,2lj.8,000 during the life of the
bonds.
1 9 I4.I.

Thus, there were fifty-eight noncallable issues in
By 1914-6, there was an important change:

there were
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TABLE B
THE INCLUSION OP THE CALL FEATURE IN LOUISIANA BONDS
OUTSTANDING, 1921, 1928, 19*1-1, 191+6

Year
Description
1921

1928

1 9 I+1

191+6

CALLABLE ISSUES
Direct
Indirect

1
0

1
0

0
0

$
0

1
11

5
11+

37
21

37
21

0
1

0
1

NONCALLABLE ISSUES
Direct
Indirect
NOT INDICATED
Direct
Indirect

0
0

0
0

Source: Moody1s, 1922, p. 81|,0; 1929, p. 13*1-1? 191+2,
p. 1+1+7? 191+7, pp. 1+21-22, 1+28-29? and A, M. Smith, Compila
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans:
A. M. Smith Investment Co., 1 9 3 8 ), p p . 3-20.
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still fifty-eight noncallable issues, but there were also
five callable ones.

These five callable issues were all

direct issues of the State.
The success of the one refunding that depended upon
the call option is an indication of the difference which the
wider use of the feature might have made in the cost of the
borrowing in Louisiana.

At first glance, the use of the call

feature thus appears to have been very desirable in the case
of the expensive and large highway issues of the late
twenties and early thirties.

However, the State was having

such difficulty marketing its bonds that callable issues
might not have been sold at all.
Reporting of Louisiana Debt, 1921-19il-6
The classification of issues in the Treasurer1s
Reports placed the Highway Fund Number 2, Chef Menteur-New
Orleans and Hammond-New Orleans, borrowing in the indirect
category.

This misclassification probably is attributable

to the fact that the debt was not full faith and credit
debt.

Confusion surrounding the terms "full faith and

credit," "general," and "direct" debt apparently existed in
the reporting agencies.

Perhaps the most serious reporting

fault of the whole period was that the Treasurer1s Reports
did not include information about any of the indirect issues
of the Louisiana State University, the State Board of
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Education, and the Charity Hospital Board of Admlnlstrators.

IIlIj.

The only excuse which can be given for this omis

sion is that the indirect debt technically is not a part of
the State debt.

This reasoning may be satisfactory in the

courts; however, it is not acceptable in the bond market.
Indirect debt that is supported with state funds can obviously
affect the state*s ability to service its other direct obli
gations.

If the market is to evaluate all pertinent factors,

It must take into consideration the indirect debt.

If the

state makes It difficult for Interested parties to determine
how much indirect debt it is responsible for, there may be
damage to the state's credit standing.

It is advisable to

report all debt in which the state is involved, no matter
what the relationship.
The Financial Reports which took over the reporting
of State debt In 19i+2 corrected the omission of the indirect
debt and provided more information about authorization,
original amounts of the issues, and interest rates on the
bonds.

There still seem to have been a few errors or cases

of incomplete information on some of the details of particulb-9
lar issues even after the change.
However, the Financial

1^ o u i slana, Treasurer*s Report, 1938-39, pp. 55-^6.
lh-3
For example, the 19i|.l-^2 Financial Report showed
the Port Commission
per cent bonds of 193^ as authorized
by Act 180 of 1908 when the bonds were sold In accordance

2?2
Report was a definite improvement in debt reporting; it had
the merit of providing more information and being more
consistent in its reporting.
Louisiana debt reporting from the standpoint of
trying to provide enough information to all interested
parties in the market (so that the value of the State’s
obligations would not be underestimated) was not so success
ful.

The State should have gotten its bond ratings raised

to reflect strength of the outstanding obligations near the
end of the war period.

If Louisiana could have entered the

post-war borrowing period with better bond ratings, it might
have added greatly to the marketability of the post-war
Issues.
Timing of Louisiana Bond Sales, 1921-19ii6
Although seasonal fluctuations are only one of several
types which can occur in interest rates, the study of the
seasonal pattern may offer more promise in improving the
timing of bond sales than any other single timing technique.
The seasonal index that was suggested in Chapter II was

with the provisions relative to Port borrowing in the 1921
Constitution. The 19lj5-[j.6 Financial Report shows only
$1,000,000 of Series EE issued, while other reports give the
amount as $2,000,000. Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art.
6, Sec. 16; Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lil-l|2, pp. 80-86;
19li5-M>» pp. 62-66.
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based only on several recent years.

It probably would not

be correct to try to apply that Index to the issues sold
from 1921 to 19if.6 since it is possible and perhaps even
likely that the seasonal pattern has changed over this time
period.

It is obvious, however, that there was a great deal

of diversity in the dates of issue of obligations during the
period from 1921 to 19^6.

(See Table C.)

The years of

heaviest borrowing were from 1928 to 19lj.O; there were fiftyone issues.

Forty-one of the issues were direct issues with

highways accounting for thirty-one of this number.

The

large number of highway issues was scattered throughout the
year with concentrations in January, October, and
December.

llj.6

It is difficult to imagine that such scattered

borrowing could have taken advantage of anything but the
most unusual pattern which might have existed.
Administrative Machinery. 1921-19ll6
A review of the various constitutional amendments and
acts which provided for bonded debt creation in Louisiana
from 1921 to 19l;6 reveals thoroughly confusing intragovernmental relationships.

The governmental unit most frequently

'L^ I f there was a seasonal pattern at all similar to
the one of the 19f?0’s, about one-third of the highway obli
gations would have been in the high-yield months.
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TABLE C
DATES OP ISSUE OP LOUISIANA BONDS SOLD
DUPING THE YEARS 1921-191+6

INDIRECT

DIRECT

1921 192 ?

DATE

JANUARY

0
0

0
0

0
2

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
1

2
2

1
0

0
0

0
0

o'
0

0
0

0

15

5

0
2

0
0

1
0

0
0

l
15

0
0

3
3

2
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

i

0
0

1

3

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

0
0

2
0

1

3

0
0

2
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

1
0

2
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

1
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

k

0
0

0
0

2

1

1

0
0

1
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
1

1
It

1
0

2
0

1
0

0
0

1

i

15
AUGUST

i

15
SEPTEMBER

i

15
OCTOBER

i

15
NOVEMBER

l

15
DECEMBER

191+1 191+6

0
0

15
JULY

191+0

1
0

i

JUNE

1927

0
0

15

MAY

1928

0

1

APRIL

1921

9

15
MARCH

191+1
191+6

0
0

1

15
FEBRUARY

1928191+0

i

15_

...

Source: Compiled from Tables VII-XXIII, Appendix A.
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authorized to borrow for the State was the Board of Liquida
tion of the State Debt.

The Board of Liquidation was made

responsible for borrowing specific amounts for the following
purposes:

(1) highway construction, (2) Confederate veterans*

pensions, (3 ) funding of short-term debt, (Ij.) construction
of a new capitol building, (5 ) improving institutions, and
147
(6 ) welfare.
The administrative machinery might have been rela
tively simple if only the Board of Liquidation of State Debt
had managed all bonds issuedj this was far from the case.
Other governmental units that were involved at one time or
another in the borrowing during the 1 9 2 1 to 19M> period were
the Legislature, the State Advisory Board, and the State
Bond and Tax Board.

These units were only concerned with

the different types of direct borrowing.

The indirect debt

was managed by several agencies or authorities:

the Board

of Supervisors of the Louisiana State University, the State
Board of Education, the Board of Administration of the
Charity Hospital, the Manager of the State Penitent!ary, and
the Board of Commissioners of the Port of Hew Orleans.

"^^See various constitutional amendments mentioned
in this Chapter and "Louisiana*s *Little Legislature*," A
Study of the Board of Liquidation-of the State Debt, I8 7 O1945* Research Monograph No. 1 (New Orleans: Bureau of
Governmental Research, Inc., 1945)» PP« 6-7.
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There does not seem to have been a definite pattern
in the assignment of functions to the various bodies that
dealt with the direct debt.

The State Advisory Board

replaced the Board of Liquidation in the handling of highway
issues after 1930.

llj.8

However, the State Board of Liquida

tion seemed to manage most of the remaining direct authori
sations.

One exception was the direction in Act 3^4-8 of 191+6

that the Board of Liquidation should sell a refunding issue
subject to the approval of the State Bond and Tax Board.
This amendment was the only one which mentioned the State
Bond and Tax Board in connection with any State direct or
indirect debt during the period.

The State Bond and Tax

Board is a unit established to oversee the borrowing activi
ties of subdivisions of the State.

The general authority

of the State Bond and Tax Board does not seem to cover
State issues, although the act which created the Board
does mention protecting the State’s credit as one of its
lIj-9
purposes.
Besides naming boards and other governmental units to
issue debt, it was also a practice in many of the constitu
tional amendments during the 1921 to 19^6 period to charge

■^^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(e),
as amended 1930* E.S., Act 3.
^^Louisiana, Acts (19^}, Act 285, pp. 8 3 2-35» and
(191+6), Act 3 I+8 , pp. 1103-5.

certain State officials with specific responsibilities.
Again, the assignments of responsibilities to officials
seemingly did not follow any orderly plan.

Provisions

differed radically from one amendment to another.

The State

Treasurer and the State Auditor were mentioned about as
frequently as they were omitted in the debt amendments
during the period.

The Governor was also mentioned in some

cases and even the Manager of the State Penitentiary was
involved in one issue.

The most important of the State

officials connected with debt management in Louisiana during
the whole period were the members of the Board of Liquidation.
The power of these men and their influence on both the long
term and short-term borrowing in Louisiana during the period
requires closer examination.
The management of bond issues was one of the more
obvious functions of the Board of Liquidation.

The authori

zations for this function were given in the various consti
tutional amendments analyzed in this Chapter.

But, the

management of bond issues was not the most important func
tion of the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt during
the period.

The Board was probably more powerful and more

important in its control of spending and short-term
borrowing.

The Board was still operating under several
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legislative acts that provided for borrowing from fiscal
l£o
agent banks in case of "grave emergency."
The short-term borrowing of the Board from 1921 to
1936 was repaid by several methods.

As had been the

practice earlier, repayment of Board liabilities by legis
lative appropriation continued throughout the period.

This

method of payment was supplemented in 1931+ by a legislative
grant of power to the Board to use the surplus in the
general fund for debt retirement.

The Board in turn gave

the Treasurer continuing authority to use the general fund
surplus to pay debts.

A third method of repayment used both

before and after 1936 (in 1932 and 19ll-0) was the funding of
short-term debt into long-term obligations.1'’1

There is no

question about the validity of these two amendments although
the wisdom of creating long-term debt in this manner is
questionable.
There were, however, many questions directed at some
of the other acts under which the Board operated.

It was

claimed that there was neither clear-cut nor sufficient
authority for all of the functions which the Board performed

1'^"Louisiana*s *Little Legislature*," pp. 9-11.
1^1
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 12,
as amended 1932, Act 122;'”Art. Ij., Sec. 12(a), as amended
191+0, Act 3 8 3 ? and "Louisiana*s *Little Legislature*,"
pp. 1 1 -2 3 .
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152
before 1936.

Skepticism about the authority of the Board

of Liquidation led to the passage of Act 73 of 1936 which
had the following purpose:
To protect the faith and credit of the State
and of its parishes, municipalities, political
subdivisions, public boards, or corporations;
authorizing the Board of Liquidation of the
State Debt, when it deems such action necessary to
protect the faith and credit of the State or any
of its parishes, municipalities, political sub
division, public boards or corporations or to
adjust their financial affairs or that it is to
the best interests of any of them to suspend
the provisions of any law of this State providing
for the appropriation, deposit, expenditure or
dedication of public funds and to transfer any
sum of money appropriated, deposited, or dedicated
by any law of this State from the purpose for
which such appropriation, deposit or dedication
was made to other purposes by decreasing, adding
to or increasing one or more items, or adding new
items, of appropriation, deposit, expenditure or
dedication or by providing that such increases
or additions shall be paid out of the general
fund; providing that any finding of fact under
this act by the Board of Liquidation of the State
Debt shall be final, and that its action hereunder
shall be mandatory upon the State Treasurer and
State Auditor, and other officers.^-53
Act 73 of 1936 has been described as almost an abdica
tion on the part of the Legislature in favor of the executive
branch of the government.

The new legislation was put to

full use for almost every conceivable purpose from 1936 until

132

For example, see "Louisiana1s *Little Legislature*,"
pp. 1, 1^-15.
■^^Louisiana, Acts (1936), Act 73, PP. 192-93*
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19l+fy-.

One of the most impressive actions taken by the Board

of Liquidation during those years added another method for
financing the Board's activities.

This action was the

transfer of funds from the Bond and Interest Account of the
General Highway Fund to the State Public School Fund,
despite a constitutional provision that required that the
Bond and Interest Account maintain a sum sufficient to cover
the principal and interest requirements on highway bonds for
one full year.
The Board of Liquidation of the State Debt operated
without any challenge in the courts until 19^4-1.
specific decisions by the

A series

of

courts at that time served only

to curb slightly the powers of the Board.

It was not until

19J-J-U- that the Supreme Court ruled directly and conclusively
on the basic authority of

the Board of Liquidation.

The

ruling was that Act 73 of

1938 and all previous acts intend

ing to give the Board rights to manage State money and to
borrow were unconstitutional.

l£5

The basis of the ruling

was the first section of Article Ij. on limitations:
No money shall be drawn from the treasury
except in pursuance of specific appropriation
made by law; nor shall any appropriation of money

^ I b i d .; Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6,
Sec. 22(f), as amended 1936, Act 66; and "Louisiana's
'Little Legislature'," pp. 22-26.
^^"Louisiana's 'Little Legislature*," pp. 32-39.
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be made for a longer term than two years. A
regular statement and account of receipts and
expenditures of all public moneys shall be
published every three months, in.such manner
as shall be prescribed by law . 5°
The stripping from the Board of Liquidation of its
power left the problem of providing for necessary spending
between legislative sessions.

The solution was a reconsti

tution of the Board of Liquidation to fill this need without
leading to another shift of power from the Legislature to
the executive branch of the government.

This plan was

recognized and advocated by the privately supported Bureau
of Governmental Research, Inc., of New Orleans, which had
been instrumental in bringing the disputed acts before the
courts for review.

The reconstitution was provided in Act

3 2 7 of 191^, which was approved by the voters in November,

19lji|-j and provided the following:

(1) The Board would be

composed of the Governor (or his executive counsel), the
Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House, the Chairman
of the House Appropriations Committee, the Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, the Auditor and the Treasurer.
This change from the composition of the earlier boards added
the representatives from the House and Senate who were
responsible for appropriations.

The Attorney General of the

•^^Louisiana, Constitution (1921)* Art. Ij., Sec. 1
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State was omitted to ensure that legal advice to the Board
would not he prejudiced by membership upon the same Board.
(2)

The Board was limited to $100,000 of borrowing or to a

$100,000 appropriation for any budget unit in a fiscal year
and to $1,000,000 for all budget units in the same year.

It

was also provided that there should never be more than
$2,000,000 of outstanding debt.

(There is no indication in

the act about whether this borrowing is limited to short
term obligations.)

(3) The borrowing or appropriations to

the budget units depended upon a recognition of insufficiency
by the Board of Liquidation and the written consent of a
majority of the members of the House.

(1+) Borrowing by the

Board of Liquidation could be retired from the General Fund
whenever the Treasurer certified that there was a surplus
and requested authority from the Board of Liquidation to use
l£7
it for this purpose.
The activities of the Board of Liquidation from 1921
to 191+6 were very significant in many respects.

Hone of the

activities was more important than the way the Board incurred
short-term debt and then presented the accomplished borrowing
to the voters with requests to fund this debt into long-term
bonds.

The Board of Liquidation was an instrument for

^^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), as amended 19J+i+>
Act 327.
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turning what were largely minor, recurrent, and operating
expenses of the government into long-term debt.

This

practice appears to have been an undesirable use of the
borrowing authority.
This handling of short-term debt was one of the more
specific faults of the Board of Liquidation borrowing during
the period.

However, there was a more serious flaw in the

administration by the Board.

Management of state debt

obviously should be entrusted only to properly constituted
bodies.

Any questions about the authority of such bodies to

manage debt will be reflected in lower bond ratings and
higher interest rates.
Besides having so much of its debt managed under such
questionable conditions, Louisiana probably should not have
impaired its credit standing in this period by maintaining
such complex administrative machinery.

There appear to have

been too many officials and boards involved in Louisiana^
debt structure.

Furthermore, no apparent order or plan

existed in the relationships between the various bodies and
officials of the government.

This undesirable tendency

toward complexity was also being paralleled in the indirect
sector of the debt where there were three new agencies added
during the I9 2 8 -I9 I4-O period.

CHAPTER V
POST-WAR BORROWING IN LOUISIANA, 1914-7-1959
World War II produced a temporary pause in the growth
of debt in Louisiana and in other states.

The grand total

of all debt outstanding in Louisiana was $160, 7 6 I4.,020 on
June 30, I9 I4-6 , and $171}., 873,020 on June 30, 191+7.

These

debt totals did not differ significantly from the pre-war
total of $162,938,020.

The State collected $ 9 8 ,9 1 5 ,14-58 in

taxes in 1914-6 and $111, 8 5 2 ,514-6 in 19^7*

Assessed value of

property in I 9 I4-6 was $ 1 ,614-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , and in 19^4-7, it was
$1,738,5^7,000.

The ratios between the debt and these

ability measures were as follows:

In 1914-6 , tax receipts

were 61.5 pe** cent of the debt outstanding, and the debt
outstanding was 9 . 8 per cent of the assessed value of
property; in 1 9 l}-7 , taxes were 614-.0 per cent of debt, and debt
outstanding was 10.1 per cent of assessed valuation.

By

comparison, taxes in I 9 I4-I were only 3 5 * 0 per cent of debt
outstanding, and debt outstanding equalled 1 3 . 2 per cent of
1
the assessed valuation of property.
The ability to bear

Goody's, 1914-7, PP. U21-21+, [4.3 6 J 19lj-9, p. lj-52; and
Louisiana, Financial Ren or t. 1 9 I4.6 -I4.7 , p. 9? 19l|-7-li-8, p. 6.
281}.
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debt, according to these ratios, was greater in 1 9 4 7 than it
had been in 1 9 4 1 .
Louisiana was probably in a better position to borrow
in 1947 than ever before.

The actual amount which the State

could safely borrow in this improved situation is another
question and one which cannot be definitely answered.

It

appears that there was no abuse of borrowing at the start of
the post-war period.

The debt outstanding had increased to

only $169*658*020 by 1948.

The question of safety, however,

became more relevant in 1949 when veterans* bonuses were
proposed.

It appears debatable whether Louisiana was in a
,
2
position at the beginning of 1949 bo increase Its debt by
35 pei* cent.

But this large Increase was exactly what was

about to take place.
2Moody* a Bond Survey analyzed the debt structure In
Louisiana at this time (In an article entitled "Complex
Credit Environment Limits Appeal") in connection with a
proposed veterans* bonus bond issue of $60,000,000. This
reference to complexity, Incidentally, set the stage for the
Baa rating which was to follow the actual issue some time
later. The analysis had bearing not only on that particular
issue, but it also dealt with the question of whether or not
It was safe for the State of Louisiana to be borrowing at
that time. Conclusions about the debt structure were;
(1 )". . . each appreciable addition . . . has a cor
rosive effect upon the state*s general credit."
(2)"Including the . , . veterans* bonus bonds, the
direct general obligation debt will be . . . decidedly high
for a state of limited wealth."
(3)"The general level of resources . . . remains
quite modest and well below the average for the country as a
whole."
(4)”As a result of its lavish use of bond proceeds
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I.

DIRECT BORROWING, 191+7-1959

The direct obligations sold during the post-war
period consisted of the various veterans* bonus, highway,
and institutional improvement obligations.

Bonds issued for

all of these purposes were backed by certain dedicated taxes
and also generally by the State*s full faith and credit.
The taxes were the beer tax, the gasoline tax, certain motor
vehicle license revenues, and the 0 . 7 5 mill ad valorem tax.
Veterans* Bonus Borrowing. 19li7-1959
The first Important borrowing after World War II was
for a new purpose— to provide bonuses for World War II
veterans (See Table XXVII, Appendix A.)

Louisiana had

previously incurred debt in favor of Confederate veterans
and their widows.

The Confederate Veterans* Pension Bonds

for capital improvements, Louisiana has worked its general
affairs Into a somewhat vulnerable position.”
(5>)”The weight of debt service upon the state* s taxing
powers is such that the pledge of general state credit is of
limited value.”
(6 )”ln a period of unusually depressed business condi
tions, it is not inconceivable that some of the taxes ear
marked for debt might fail to produce revenues adequate to
meet specified bond charges."
(7 )"The state is already finding it difficult to meet
all of the demands being made upon a heavy and exceedingly
diverse tax structure.”
The above Moody analysis can be summarized as follows:
it was considered unsafe for Louisiana to borrow any substan
tial amounts In early 191+9. This pessimistic analysis appears
to have underestimated Louisiana*s potential. Moody*s Bond
Survey. XLI, No. 3 (January 17, 1 9 I+9 ), 673-71+.
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3
did not appear until 1 9 2 5 — about sixty years after the
war's end.

This new veterans* debt after World War II was

for bonuses rather than for pensions, and the bonds were
authorized and sold within three years after the conclusion
of the war.

Veterans* lobbies, eager politicians, and a

grateful public combined to make bonus debt a thing familiar
In many states.

Ten states issued veterans* bonus bonds

between 191+6 and 191+9 , and seven more borrowed for this
k
purpose In 1950.
Louisiana was an enthusiastic participant
in this movement.
Veterans* bonus borrowing is not consistent with good
fiscal management.

Prom the standpoint of finance alone,

veterans* bonuses are not considered a proper purpose for
5
borrowing.
Of course, good fiscal management is not an end
In Itself, but it is simply a means of furthering the general

3

Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 1921+-25, p. 57.
^"Tax Foundation, Inc., The Financial Challenge to the
States: An Analysis of State Fiscal Deve1opments. 19kipl957»
Project Note No. 1+3 (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., March,
1958), pp. 11+-15,* Tax Foundation, Inc., Postwar Trend in
State Debt: A State-by-State Analysis. Project Note No. 27,
(New Yorks Tax Foundation, Inc., 1950/, PP. 2, 8 ; and
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, PP. 83, 87-88.
^William J. Shultz and C. Lowell Harriss, American
Public Finance (sixth edition; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
195^), p T f F S T
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welfare.

After World War II, public opinion dictated that

that the general welfare would be furthered by paying
bonuses and borrowing took place.
The actual veterans* bonus borrowing had much clearer
undesirable aspects in Louisiana; it further complicated the
unwieldy debt structure.

The proceeds of another tax— the

beer tax— were dedicated to this specific purpose.

The tax

had just been raised from $1.50 to $10 a barrel by Act 8 of
19lp8.

This $10 tax would have brought in an average $l+.9

million annually in the pre-war period and $9 . 7 million in
the year before the issue.

Here was another significant

amount of revenue being channeled away from the payment of

6
governmental services.
The issue of the veterans* bonus bonds had still
another flaw besides complicating the debt and financial
structure.

The constitutional authorization did not indi

cate whether the bonds would be general obligations of the
State.

Through lack of planning or poor management, the State

of Louisiana approached the conservative bond market for
$ 6 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 with no more than the advice of counsel that the

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 8 , Sec. 10,
as amended 191+8, Act 530? Louisiana, Acts (19lp8), Act 8 ,
pp. 28-1+9; Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+9-50* P» 58; and
Moody's Bond Survey, XLI, No. 3 (January 17, 191+9), 529-31+.
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bonds would be general obligations.

There had been earlier

instances of this type of uncertainty, but this case
occurred after World. War II when enlightened management
should have been the rule.

The purchasers of the issue made

their bid subject to a Supreme Court ruling that the bonds
were full faith and credit obligations.

This instance is a

flagrant example of an offering of bonds fraught with need7
less uncertainty.
It is Impossible to calculate how much
this unfortunate circumstance cost the State, but It is
logical to assume that it did have a cost.

It Is dangerous

to oversimplify, but in a case such as this, the consequences
are not hard to trace:

the uncertainty created by the poor

handling probably influenced the Baa bond rating to some
extent and thus indirectly raised the interest rate that had
to be paid for the funds.

Finally, the higher Interest

charges incurred meant that fewer government services could
be made available for the residents of Louisiana with
existing revenues.

Such are the consequences of poor

planning and management.
The World War II veterans* bonus debt, which was not
to exceed $60,000,000, was authorized by Act 530 In 19^-8.

"^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 8, Sec. 10, as
amended 19^8, Act 530: Moody*s Bond Survey, XLI, No. 3
(January 17, 19^9)> 673-7V; and hoody*s Bond Survey, XLI,
No. 5 (January 31, 19l*9), 651.
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(See Table XXVII, Appendix A , )
January of 19lj.9 for #50,000,000.

Series A was sold in
This first series was

composed of four blocks that paid different interest rates
and matured serially from 1953 to I96i|.

Here is the explana

tion of how the State was able to add to its debt burden:
the serials were deferred serials— there was no provision
for retiring any of this debt for four years.
four years, the following maturities were due:

Then, after
$3 ,5 °0 , 0 0 0

on January 15, 1953» #3,605,000 on- January 15, 195^, and
#3 ,7 1 3 , 0 0 0 on January 15, 1955.

The debt retirement plan

was not intended to eliminate the bulk of the debt until
between 1956 and 196^.

With the 1953» 195U* and 1955

maturities eliminated, this would leave $3 9 ,1 8 2 ,0 0 0 outstand
ing out of the total $5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 sold seven years previously.
Earlier retirement than this was possible, however, since
the Series was callable.

8

The use of deferred serials in veterans' bonus borrow
ing compounded the evils of financially improper borrowing
and borrowing in amounts that raised doubts about safety.
Deferred serials are generally undesirable because they
Q
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 8, Sec. 10, as
amended 19i|£, Act 530? Art. 8, Sec. 10, as amended 1950,
Act 558? Moody's Bond Survey. XLI, No, 5 (January 31, 19i^9),
651? Louisiana, Financial Report. 19l}.9-50, p. 58; 1952-53*
p. 57; 1951+-55» p. 57; and Louisiana Legislative Research
Study No. 9, pp. 8 3 , 8 7 -8 8 .
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ignore the traditional criterion that the life of the bonds
should be as short as possible in order to save on interest
costs.

Series B of the veterans* bonus debt was also a

deferred serial issue and can be criticized on these same
grounds.
The rest of the World War II bonus debt amounted to
$10,000,000.

This second issue— Series B — was sold in June,

19l|-9» less than six months after Series A.

Series B was a

noncallable deferred serial issue, maturing from June 1,
195>1 to June 1, 1961.

One curious thing about Series B was

that it was sold privately to a syndicate of investment
9
dealers.
This fact and the reasons for the action are not
revealed at all in the Financial Report for that year.

10

It

appears that the issue was sold privately because the syndi
cate, at the time of sale of Series A, offered to buy Series
B at a better price.

Actually, though, it is not clear that

the rates were really better.

The two issues of bonds were

not the same because Series B was noncallable whereas Series
A was callable.

The higher price paid for Series B by the

buyers could have been equal to, greater, or less than the

^Moody*s Bond Survey. XLI, No, 20 (May 16, 19i+9)>
24-7 1 ; Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9» pp. 8 3 ,

87-88.
10Louisiana, Financial Report. 19i|-8—24-9» pp. vi, vii,
58; and 19149-^0, pp. vi7
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prevailing cost of avoiding the possibility of having the
bonds called.
Even if there is no reason to believe that the nature
of the sale had any adverse effect upon the rates paid by
the State, this does not mean that private sales can be
condoned.

Private sales eliminate competition that could

trim interest costs.

Furthermore, the closed nature of the

sale can lead to collusion between a state*s fiscal authori
ties and the investment dealers, although there is no indica
tion that this was the case here.

It is not clear why a

state should ever have to engage in private selling.

For

small municipalities where the authorities cannot be
expected to be experts in financing, the whole process of
borrowing may be placed in the hands of bankers who are
sometimes given the opportunity to buy the whole Issue with
out public sale.

But certainly a state should not have to

depend upon outside help to this extent.

Should a private

sale be necessary for some reason, the details surrounding
It ought to be fully publicized before and' after the
transaction takes place.
The World War II veterans* bonus debt added a total
of $60,000,000 to Louisiana*s debt structure in less than
six months* time.

This addition brought the total debt

outstanding at the end of the 1 9 ^8 -1 9 ll9 fiscal year to about
$220,000,000.

The two issues of bonus debt, in their first

293
appearance in the financial reports, were equal to over 2 7
per cent of the total Louisiana debt outstanding.

This

ratio compared with the 3 8 . 9 per cent of total long-term
debt outstanding in all of the states in 195>0 that was for

11
The 2 7 per cent in Louisiana was second

bonus purposes.

only to the lj.2 per cent of outstanding debt that was
12
attributable to highways.
The fact that most of the World War II bonus debt was
callable provided the opportunity in 1 9 ^ 2 for the next
development in this area of veterans* bonus debt— a refund
ing operation.

The refunding issue was clearly authorized

to be a direct issue of the State, but the full faith and
credit again was not specifically mentioned in the authori
zation.

There was no question about the State*s full faith

and credit this time, probably because the bonds refunded
Series A which had been eventually accepted as a full faith
and credit issue.

The interest rate had ranged from 3.1 to

Ij. per cent on Series A, and this relatively high rate
provided one Inducement for a refunding.

Another inducement

was the amount of veterans* bonus debt scheduled to mature

■^Tax Foundation, Inc., Project Note No. Ij.3, op. oit..
pp. l^-l£.
12
Louisiana, Financial Report. 19i|-8-lj-9* P* £8; and
19l*9-£0, p. £8.
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starting in 1953.

The legislation came in Act 109 of 1952,

and the refunding issue appeared on January 1, 1953.

This

new 1 0 -year issue amounted to $!|.6 ,5 0 0 , 0 0 0 and refunded all
but $1^,500,000 of Series A.

The lowering of the interest

rate to a mean rate of approximately 2.5l per cent, in
contrast to the 3.2Ij. per cent paid on the original Series A,
was estimated by the State reporting agency to have saved
the State $2,500,000 of interest over the life of the bonds.
This reduction in interest may have been at least partly the
result of the exclusion of the call feature in the new issue.
The new issue was noncallable even though its authorization
would have permitted this type of issue.

The refunding

issue was given the following maturity schedule:

$ 3 0 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0

in I9 6 0 ; $5 ,2 ^ 0 , 0 0 0 in 1 9 6 1 ; and $ 1 1 ,1 5 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 6 2 and
13
1963.
The refunding bonds of 1953 had a better rating
than the issue which they replaced; the original obligations
were rated Baa, but the refunding bonds were rated A.

llj-

■^Louisiana, Financial Report, 1951-52, p. iv; 195253* P. 57; and Louisiana, Acts (1952). Act 109, pp. 2 7 2 - 7 !$..
^^oody* s Bond Survey. XLIV, No. 1+7 (November 17,
1952), 139; and Moody*s Bond Survey. XLIV, No, 1+5 (November
3, 1952), 162. The beer tax dedication for the payment of
the new issue was no different from that provided for the
initial bonds. Thus the improved rating could have been due
to several factors:
(l) the larger margin of protection
resulting from the retirement of some of the debt and/or the
productivity of the beer tax (as noted in Moody* s Bond Survey.
of November 3 > 1952); (2) the difference in the call feature/
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The calling of such a large amount of veterans* bonus
debt in 1953 was an unusual occurrence for Louisiana.

Most

of the highway debt of the late twenties and the thirties
was not redeemable prior to the maturity date.

The call

feature had been exercised on the following issues:

the

H and I highway issues of 1932, the Old Serial Gold Bonds of
15
191i|- in 1938, and the Serial Bonds of 19UI in 19^6.
In
the other few cases where the call was included, the interest
terms happened to be so favorable that there was no advan
tage in refunding.

The inclusion and the exercise of the

call option on Series A of the veterans* bonus debt may not
have been a significant improvement in debt management
despite the interest savings.

If the call feature was

included in 1 9 ^ 9 in order to avoid prompt retirement of the

and (3 ) an improvement in the over-all credit standing.
It
is possible that all of these factors operated to cause the
rating to improve. The fact that the beer tax had provided
ample revenue prior to the refunding and that this may have
contributed to higher ratings is a mixed blessing at best.
The bonds issued originally as well as the refunding bonds
had a first lien on the beer tax revenues and any issue sub
sequently sold to be payable from the tax would be subject
to prior claim. If second lien bonds were sold, they could
be expected to reflect the fact that they were subject to
prior charges In lower ratings and higher rates of interest.
The State thus loses the full effectiveness for bonding
purposes of any surplus revenues that may be received from
this source.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(f),
as amended 1936, Act 6 6 ; Louisiana, Acts (1938)> Act 3 ,
pp. 28-31; (I9if.6), Act 31*8, pp. YL0?,-Z7~
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debt, then the calling of the bonds In 1 9 5 3 was a mockery of
good debt management made possible partly by the chance of
favorable ratings and partly by the sacrifice of the call
feature in the refunding.
By 1953, veterans* bonus debt had become an estab
lished and accepted fiscal phenomenon in the State of
Louisiana.

It was axiomatic that Korean veterans would also

receive bonuses and that these payments would also require
borrowing.

The borrowing, which came in the form of two

issues, differed only in title as a result of the fact that
the Korean action was not officially considered a war.

The

title carried by the new $12,000,000 of bonds was "Korean
Combat Bonus Bonds."

These obligations were sold in two

separate issues in 1955 and 1 9 5 7 , under two different authori
zations.

The first issue of $10,000,000, which had been

authorized by Act 7l|8 of 195^1-, was inadequate and had to be
supplemented to the extent of $2,000,000 under Act 6 ll| of

16
1956.
The $10,000,000 issue of Korean Combat Bonus Bonds
was rated A by Moody* s— the beer tax, which was dedicated
to the service of the bonds, had been adequate, and
the success of the tax seemed to overcome the fact that

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 11,
as amended 195U, Act 7lj.8; Art. 18, Sec. 12, as amended 1956,
Act 6 II4.; Louisiana, Financial Report.
P» £7j and
1956-57, P. 57.
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the issue was Junior to the existing veterans* bonus debt.

The $2,000,000 issue of 1957 was also subordinated to all
existing veterans* bonus bonds and thus became a third lien
on the beer tax receipts.

This supplementary issue of 1957#

which was also a general obligation issue, was given an A
rating.17
The next activity in the veterans* bonus area came in
1957 •

The purpose of this flotation was to finance bonuses

for the veterans of the Spanish American War, the Boxer
Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection, and World War I.

The Board of Liquidation of the State Debt was authorized to
borrow up to $16,000,000 for this purpose.

Bonds sold under

the authorization— Act 620 of 1956— are secured by a fourth
lien on the beer tax as well as by the full faith and credit
of the State.

The whole $16,000,000 of bonds was originally

scheduled for sale on June 6, 1957# fent market conditions
were so unfavorable that the offering was withdrawn.

As a

result, the $16,000,000 offering was abandoned, and the
State placed $10,000,000 of bonds with the State retirement
system shortly after the bonds were removed from the open

Bond
Bond
Bond
Bond

^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57# P« 57# Moody* s
Survey. XLVII, No* 8 (February 21, 1955)# 613; Moody* s
Purvey. XLVII, No. 10 (March 7# 1955)# 591# Moody*s
Survey. XLIX, No. 22 (May 27, 1957)# 525# and Moody*s
Survey. XLIX, No. 2l± (June 10, 1957)# 501*
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market.

A second issue, Series B, was successfully sold in

1958, but it amounted to only $1,000,000.

Series B, which

was described by Moody* s as ’’Various Combat and War Veterans*
Bonus Bonds," was rated A.

The fact that only $11,000,000

of the authorization has been utilized means that $5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
more can be borrowed for this purpose at any time.

X0

The placement of the various war and combat bonus
bonds in 1957 showed some skill in debt management.

The

withdrawal of securities from sale when conditions are not
as favorable as expected is a good practice.

The actions of

the fiscal authorities in the case of the $ 1 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 issue
indicates that discretion was used in the timing of the sale.
Even if the management of the sale was satisfactory,
there remains the question— was the borrowing that took
place proper?

This borrowing took place in 1957 and 1958 to

pay bonuses for wars that were fought in the period from
1 8 9 8 to 1920.

Certainly the post-war enthusiasm for

rewarding veterans had subsided by 1957*

What seems to have

happened is that the State and its politicians had gotten
themselves into a position where they could hardly refuse to

x0

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 13,
as amended 1956, Act 620: Moody^a Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 22,
(May 27, 1957), 5 2 5; Moody*s feond Survey. XLIX, No. 28
(July 8 , 1957), iUf-9; Moody* s Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 30
(July 22, 1957),
and Moody*s, 1959, P* 665.
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extend the bonus to all veterans.

It is not hard to visu-

alize what will happen if there should be other conflicts.

19

Highway Borrowing, 19li7-1959
After the conclusion of World War II, highway borrow
ing in Louisiana resumed on four fronts.

Bonds were again

issued that were payable from the proceeds of the l|.-cent
gasoline tax and the motor vehicle tax-supported Highway
Fund Number 2.

A third and new tax dedication for general

highway purposes was part of the nine-twentieths of the 1 cent gasoline tax.

Finally, a new Long-Range Highway Pro

gram, inaugurated near the end of the period, permitted the
issue of bonds payable from the £-cent gasoline tax and
certain mineral revenues.

The total highway debt outstanding

in 19^4-7 was $103,676,000.

The four types of highway bonds

to be issued in the subsequent period were to amount to

20
another $ 6 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .

19

Even more serious is the possibility that the prece
dent set by Confederate veterans* pensions will bring stag
gering pension expenditures and borrowing when the veterans
of World War II and the Korean War reach retirement age.
The Old Age and Survivors* Insurance program may offset
these demands to some extent.
20
Louisiana, Financial Report. 19f?6-£7» PP. £ 6 -£8 ;
Moody*s, 195>9» pp. 663-65>; and Louisiana Legislative Research
Study No. 9, pp. 82, 86-87.
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Was this highway borrowing safe, and if it was safe,
was it proper?

It was debatable in 19^8 or at the beginning

of 19i+9 whether or not the State had reached a position from
which it could wisely engage in large-scale borrowing.
References noted earlier first show a definite pessimism
about the safety of borrowing in January, 19i}-9* “but nine
months later, the same source noted that the State*s economy
showed such growth that the general credit, though only
21
fair, was improving.
The State*s economy continued grow
ing at a rapid pace after 19^-9 so that restrained use of.
credit by 1 9 5 3 &n<3 1 9 5 ^- (when most of the significant post
war highway borrowing took place) probably was not a serious
impairment to the safety of the debt structure.
If restrained use of credit was not unwise in 1953
and 1 9 5 ^» then it appears that borrowing for the construc
tion and improvement of highways was probably desirable.
The extension and repair of the highway network was postponed
during the war, and the needs grew accordingly.

It was

noted In discussing principles of debt financing that It Is
usually proper to borrow when the sums needed are too great
to be raised by taxes and when the purpose of the borrowing

21

Moody* s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 3 (January 17, 19^9)#
6?3-7^J Moody* s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 5 (January 31, 19l}.9)»
6515 and Moody* s Bond Survey, XLI, No. ij_7 (November 21,
19U-9), 138:

301
is for nonrecurrent capital construction.

Therefore, it

appears that highway borrowing in this post-war period not
only was reasonably safe but also proper.
The l|.-cent gasoline tax secured the January, 1914-7,
sale of Series HH.

(See Table XXVIII, Appendix A.)

This

serial issue of $3,000,000, authorized by Act 377 of 19l|-0,
is scheduled to mature in 1965.

A new act, number 393 of

I9 I4.6 , authorized the next post-war highway debt— up to
$25,000,000 payable from the J^-cent gasoline tax.

The

pledge of the gasoline tax revenue for this new authoriza
tion was subordinate to almost $ 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 of highway bonds
22
already issued.
The junior lien status of Series 1A and
IB, offered under the 19lj.6 authorization, was supplemented

^/tfhen the first bonds of the new authorization were
offered, Moody*s cautioned that having debt service as a
first charge on the receipts of the ij_-cent gasoline tax was
not especially significant because part of the taxes are
used for highway maintenance and are not available for
debt service. This criticism does not seem to have been
legitimate. A first charge means that the debt service
will be handled before maintenance. The State pledged
this specifically; it was not necessary to pledge that all
revenues would be used for servicing the debt. Louisiana,
Constitution (1921), Art. ij., Sec, 22(i), as amended 19l|-0,
Act 3771 Art. 6 , Sec. 22(j), as amended I9 I4-6 , Act 393?
Louisiana, Financial Report. X9^+7—If-8 , p. 59? Louisiana
Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 82, 8 7 -8 8 ; and
Moody 1 s Bond Survey, XLI, No. 7 (November 21, 1914-9), 138.
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by the fact that they were general obligations.

Both

Series 1A and IB were rated Baa at the time of their issue,
and Series IB was provisionally rated lower medium grade or
Baa before the issue was sold.
subsequently raised to Aa.

Both of these ratings were

21+

The two general highway issues authorized by Act 393
of 191+6 and payable from the l+-cent gasoline tax raised
$25,000,000 for highway purposes.

Series 1A was dated

January 1, 191+7» and consisted of $15,000,000 of serial
bonds that will be fully retired in eighteen years.

The

issue IB of November, 191+9» amounted to $10,000,000 and will
25
mature in 1961 }..

2^This pledge was also discounted in Moody’s
analysis— shortly before the issue of Series IB— on grounds
that the wide use of credit based on dedications left few
revenues unallocated. This charge was, unfortunately,
altogether valid. Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 ,
Sec. 22(i), as amended 191+0, Act 377? Art. 6 , Sec. 22(j), as
amended 191+6, Act 393? Louisiana, Financial Report. I 9 I+7 -I+8 ,
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9* pp. 82, 8 7 -8 8 ?
and Moody’s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 1+7 (November 21, I9 I+9 ),
138.
^ Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+9-50* P« 57
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9» P. 82; Moody’s,
1950, p. 1+69? 1959, pp. 672-73? Moody’s Bond Survey. XLI,
No. 1+7 (November 21, I9 I+9 ), 1 3 8 ; and Moody’s Bond Survey.
XLI, No. 1+9 (December 5* 191+9), lll+.

^Louisiana, Financial Report„ 191+7-1+8, pp. 67^68;
191+9-50, p. 57? and Louisiana Legislative Research Study No.
9 , pp. 82, 86.
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The second type of highway debt added during the
post-war period is that which is payable from surpluses in
Highway Fund Number 2 over and above existing dedications
and thereby from certain motor vehicle tax revenues.

Act 90

of 1952 disposed of surplus vehicular license tax revenues
collected from Orleans, Jefferson, St. John the Baptist,
St. Charles, Tangipohoa, and St. Tammany parishes.

The

surplus funds in Highway Fund Number 2 were dedicated
according to the following priority:

(l) $5 0 , 0 0 0 annually

to St. John the Baptist parish to be used for improving
roads and drainage facilities, (2) $200,000 annually until
1982, which could be funded, to finance an expressway in
New Orleans (3) $300,000 annually until 1982 to finance the
construction and improvement of U.S. Highway 5l, (Ij.) $750,000
annually until 1956 to the Mississippi River Bridge
26
Authority,
and (5) $350,000, plus up to $5,000,000 of
surpluses in Highway Fund Number 2, for the construction of
approach roads to a causeway across Lake Pontchartrain
(Greater New Orleans Expressway).

Other surpluses remaining

in the fund are dedicated to pay interest and principal on
the Greater New Orleans Expressway debt until it is fully
retired.

26

These annual dedications were authorized to be

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. (22)g,
par. ij., as amended 195^-, Act 71|5«

30if.
funded as followss

the $200,000 expressway dedication could

he used to secure $lj.,000,000 of bonds, the $ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 dedica
tion for Highway £l could service $6,000,000 of debt, the
$7£0,000 dedication to the Mississippi River Bridge Authority
could be used to secure bond issues, and the $ 3 5 0 ,0 0 0 and
$£,000,000 dedications for the causeway could support
revenue bonds.

These several purposes and dedications set

forth in Act 90 of 19£2 served to complicate the debt struc
ture.

In this one authorization, a State fund which was

supported by part of the motor vehicle license proceeds —
Highway Fund Humber 2— was pledged to the payment of both
direct and indirect obligations and these pledges were given
27
certain priorities.
The indirect obligations issued under the provisions
of this act are described with the other indirect debts, but
the direct issues sold under these terms In 19£3 and 195Uwere as follows*

Series A of $£00,000; Series A1 of

$3*750*000; and Series B of $£,l£0,000.

(Series A2 of

$2£0,000 and Series C of $3£0,000 were not sold until 19£8
at which time they exhausted all of the direct authorizetions.)

28

(See Table XXVIII, Appendix A.)

These new

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(g),
as amended 19£2, Act 90,
2®It Is somewhat Ironic that the debt structure of
Louisiana should have been so complex and confusing at the
time these bonds received A ratings from Moody* s while the
aforementioned highway issues received Baa ratings.
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Highway Fund Number 2 issues are classified with indirect
State debts in the annual financial reports; however, they
are really obligations of the State and can rightly be
considered direct obligations.

The circumstance which

caused the State reporting agency to classify these bonds as
Indirect probably is the fact that they are ’'special” obliga
tions payable from a specifically allocated portion of reve
nues in State Highway Fund Number 2, and they are not backed
by the State*s full faith and credit pledge.

But these con

siderations ignore the fact that directness depends upon
whether or not the State issues the debt in its name.

If the

bonds bear the State’s name, the State’s credit is at stake
29
just as surely as if it had been formally pledged.
The question of whether or not certain issues are
direct obligations of a state is Important on at least two
counts:

First, it is apparent that contradictory listing or

classification of a particular issue breeds uncertainty
concerning that Issue and the whole debt structure.

More

important, however, Is that direct debts— debts incurred in
the name of a sovereign state--should, under normal
-

-

■»

r

-

-i ii—

-

-

PQ
7This peculiar reporting was noted by Moody*s.
Notice was taken that the issues were not classified as
direct obligations by the State. But, Moody’s did include
the Issue with the bonded debt of the State of Louisiana—
with direct obligations. Louisiana, Constitution (1921),
Art. 6, Sec. 22(g), as amended 1952, Act 90; Art. 6, Sec.
22(g), par; 4* as amended 1954*
745* Moody* s, 1959*
pp. 663-65; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57, p. 58* and
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 8l, 85-86.
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conditions, receive higher credit ratings than indirect
debts.

Direct obligations should have higher standings than

bonds sold through authorities or agencies that control rela
tively limited assets and do not enjoy the state*s ability
to levy taxes.

If an obligation is really a direct obliga

tion, its status as such should be fully exploited.

Exploi

tation should take the form of clear and definite pledges,
advertisements, statements, and reports that the bonds are
direct obligations and, if so, general obligations.
More highway debt serviced from the gasoline tax-this time the nine-twentieths of 1-cent tax (and, in case of
emergency, any excess revenues from the [{.-cent tax)--made
its appearance in 195>3 811,3 19!?^.

A new amendment, Act 281]. of

1952, authorized the borrowing of $3 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 for the follow
ing purposes:

(1) the construction of a bridge or tunnel

over or under the Inner-Harbor Navigation Canal in New
Orleans; (2) the construction of approaches and an expressway
to the Mississippi River Toll Bridge; and (3 ) the construction
of roads in the State in connection with Federal aid.

The

bonds issued under the authorization were to be general
obligation bonds.

They were to be payable, however, from

excess revenues of the nine-twentieths of 1-cent gasoline
tax after certain other claims against the tax were satis
fied.

The charges against the tax were established as

follows:

(1) the service requirements on Port of New Orleans
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obligations over and above those that can be paid with funds
transferred from the Orleans Levee District and the New
Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission, (2) the payment of
up to $5 0 0 , 0 0 0 from any excess after the first charge to a
fund for current operations by the Port Commission Board,
(3 ) the payment of any remainder after the prior charges to
the General Highway Fund.

This third charge on the nine-

twentieths of 1 -cent gasoline tax is the primary source of
30
funds for the service of the $ 3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 issue.
The "First Series" of $7,500,000 was sold in two lots
as follows:

$636,000 to mature from January 1, 1958 to

January 1, 1963, and $6,861*, 000 to mature between 1961* and
1988.

The $6,861*, 000 portion of the Series is callable on

thirty days* notice.

The original rating of the First

Series Bonds was Baa (later changed to A) for both lots—
the funds from which they are paid are subject to prior
charges which impair both the elements of protection and of
31
stability.

^ Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 -A, Sec. 5*1»
5.2, as amended 1952, Act 2 8 I4.; Louisiana, Financial Report.
1953-£^> P.
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No, 9,
pp. 8 2 -8 3 , 86-87; Moodv*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. 9 (March 2,
195>3)» 601; and Moody*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. 7 (February 16,
1953), 623-21*.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 -A, Secs. 5.1>
5.2, as amended 1952, Act 281*; Louisiana, Financial Report.
19£3-5>1*» P* 51*; Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9,
pp. 82-83 1 8 6 -8 7 ; and Moody* s Bond Survey, XLV, No. 9
(March 2, 1953)* 601.
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The "Second" and "Third Series" of highway bonds
payable from the nine-twentieths of 1 -cent gasoline tax also
amounted to $ 7 ,£0 0 ,0 0 0 each, and they were similar to the
First Series in purpose as well as in the call and security
provisions.

The bonds were callable in all three series

except for small blocks with relatively short maturities.
The Second and Third Series issues were both rated Baa before
and after they were sold.

These ratings, however, have also

been revised; the First and Second Series are currently
32
rated A in the latest Moody's manual.
The next development in the highway debt came in 1955.
This development was the most important improvement in
Louisiana debt management of the decade and perhaps even of
the ceiitury.

The costly complexity repeatedly noted in this

Chapter had been recognized by the Louisiana Legislative
33
Council and the Public Affairs Research Council,
There had

Louisiana, Financial Report, 1953-5^ P.
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 82-83, 8 6 8 7 ; Moody's Bond Survey, XLV, No. 26 (June 29, 1953), 396;
Moody's Bond Survey. XLV, No. 28 (July 13* 1953), 373? Moody's
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. 15 (April 12, 19$k)* 533? Moody's
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. 17 (April 26,
, 510; and Moody's,
1959, pp. 672-73.
^ Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc..
"The Debt of the Louisiana State Government, 1950 and 1951*
No. 6 , March 31, 1952, pp. 1-11; and Louisiana Legislative
Research Study No. 9, pp. l-ll|.0.

also been a study of highway finance in the State.

All of

these studies contributed to the formulation and eventual
adoption of a Long-Range Highway Program in which the ele
ments of capital planning were evident— both physical needs
and fiscal needs were considered.

The plan, which was imple

mented in the form of five acts and two constituticnal
amendments, was as follows!

(1) It established a state

wide system of highways and provided fixed engineering
standards; (2) It established a Parish Road System and pro
vided aid to the System contingent upon the adoption of
better administration; (3 ) It established regulations for
acquiring property and settling damages and established
rules for limited access roads; (Ij.) It established an openend method of debt creation that would make all new issues
rank on a parity basis as full faith and credit, general,
obligations of the State payable as a first charge from the
Long-Range Highway Fund; (5) lb dedicated revenues from
mineral leases and bonuses directly to the Long-Range Highway
Fund and to debt service as a first charge; (6 ) It dedicated
all highway revenues to the Long-Range Highway Fund and to

^William D. Ross, Financing Highway Improvements in
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Division of Research, College of
Commerce, Louisiana State University, 1955)*
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debt service as a first claim, after all existing prior
35
claims have expired.
The part of the plan dealing directly with debt bears
closer examination.

The Long-Range Highway Fund was to be

sustained not only by the newly dedicated mineral revenues
(amounting to $ 1 ^, 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 annually) but also by surplus
revenues from prior dedications of motor fuel, lube oil, and
motor vehicle license taxes.

Surpluses in the Long-Range

Highway Fund, after the payment of all debt service require
ments, are available for highway operations and new construc
tion.

Another important change was the consolidation of the

two gasoline taxes— the lj.-cent tax and the 1 -cent tax— into
one 5 -cent per gallon tax which is pledged for debt service
as long as any bonds are outstanding.

Bonds authorized

under the amendment can be issued up to $ 6 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 over a
5 -year period with no more than half of this sum being sold

in any one year.

35

These bonds are not to be issued unless

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. lu Sec. 2(c),
as amended 1956, Act lij.2 of 1955? Art. 6 , Sec. 23.1, as
amended 1956, Act llj.1 of 1955; Louisiana, Acts (1955)> Act
lj.0, PP. U9—li|-3; Act 9 2 , pp. 197-98; Act 12HTpp. 293-9^;
Act 129# pp. 2 I1I4.—14.7 * Act 130, pp. 2 ^ 7 -148; Louisiana Legis
lative Research Study No. 9, pp. 8 8 -8 9 ; and Moody*s Bond
Survey. XLVIII, No. 23 (June 2ij., 1956), 522-23.
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certain revenue requirements are satisfied.

The Long-Range

Highway Program does not prevent subsequent authorizations
36
of parity issues.
One possible flaw in the Long-Range Highway Program
is that the maturity limit of twenty-five years appears to
be excessively generous.
have not lasted well.

Highways in Louisiana typically

It is not clear that highways in

Louisiana can be expected to last twenty-five years.

Issues

of the maximum duration may do Injury to the traditional
principle that bond issues should never have longer terms
than the life of the improvement.

Shorter terms generally

are desirable because of the interest savings they usually
bring.
Another provision of the Long-Range Highway Program
which is questionable is the 1| per cent maximum interest
rate.

If the predictions of a tremendous Increase in the

value of state borrowing noted In Chapter II should come to
pass, and if inflationary tendencies continue, it is possible
that states will have to pay more than ij. per cent for the
funds which they borrow.

The limitation on the Interest

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Sec. 2(c),
as amended 1956, Act 11|.2 of 1955>» Art. 6 , Sec. 23.1, as
amended 1956, Act II4.I of 1955? Louisiana, Acts (1955), Act
lj.0 , pp. lj.9-Uj.3J Act 92, pp. 197-98; Act 1287pp. 293-91J-;
Act 129, pp. 2ljlj-i|.7; Act 130, pp. 2 I4.7 -I4.8 j Louisiana Legis
lative Research Study No. 9, pp. 8 8 -8 9 ; and Moody1s Bond
Survey. XLVIII, No. 23 (June 21+, 1956), 522-23.
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rate that can be paid, therefore, does not seem to contrib
ute much to the program, but fortunately it will probably
not do much harm either since it undoubtedly will be changed
if it becomes necessary.

These two criticisms are minor in

nature and even relatively unimportant when they are compared
with the advantages of the Long-Range Highway Program.
The development of a long-range plan for highway
improvements and the financing of these improvements was an
extremely important step forward for the State of Louisiana.
Elsewhere in this study, it has been noted that transporta
tion has always been among the most important reasons for
state borrowing and that highways have been the most impor
tant purpose of borrowing in this century.

This tendency

has been apparent in Louisiana where highway costs histori
cally have been high.

When highway debt financing was

placed on a sound basis in 1955» a major part of the State*s
debt problem was eliminated.

Furthermore, the tremendous

improvements in highway financing may prove to be the
example for a revision of the whole State debt structure
along the same general lines.
The principles of good debt management that were
applied in this new Long-Range Highway Program may be
summarized as follows:

(1) There was a movement away from

the dedication of specific taxes to the payment of individual
bond issues which has characterized the Louisiana debt

313
structure until this time*

(2) The full faith and credit

concept was made more meaningful by directing revenues to a
general type of fund (the Long-Range Highway Fund) instead
of to smaller individual funds.

(3 ) The use of a general

fund to meet open-end debt service requirements eliminated
the subordinate lien which is so injurious to bond ratings.
(I4.) The use of a single fund for meeting all highway debt
service requirements and the consolidation of certain taxes
helped to simplify the tax system and the debt structure and
eliminate the complexity which is so disturbing to invest
ment bankers.

Louisiana*s debt structure and its financial

structure entered a new era with this improvement in highway
debt financing.
The fact that the State of Louisiana was on a new
footing in respect to its debt was quickly recognized by
Moody*s.

References to Louisiana highway borrowing since

the enactment of the new laws have taken full notice of the
37
improvements that are promised.
This immediate recogni
tion is somewhat remarkable when it is realized that the plan
would directly affect only bonds sold after the adoption of
this new legislation.

Such sales were not to occur until

four years later in 1959.

^ Moody*s Bond Survey. XLVIII, No. 23 (June ij., 1956),
522-23; and Moody*s Bond Survey. L, No. ll^ (March 31, 1958),
625.

Not only was the highway bond plan noted immediately
in the publications of the bond rating services, but it led
to a reappraisal of all Louisiana bonds then outstanding.
The reappraisal, in turn, resulted in an upgrading of all
highway bonds, and some other issues, by Moody's in December,
1955.

This chain reaction was an impressive example of the

importance and effectiveness of full reporting of all rele
vant information concerning the debt structure, including
data on public finances and economic conditions within a
state*

In this case, a delegation, representing the Joint

Highway Committee of the Louisiana Legislature and the
Louisiana Legislative Council, in the persons of State
Senator James D. Spark and State Representative Claude
Kirkpatrick; the Louisiana Department of Highways, in the
persons of Mr. George S. Convert, the Director of Highways,
and Mr. W. C. Pegues, Jr., the Chief Counsel of the Highway
Department; and with Dr. William D. Ross serving as consult
ant to both the Joint Committee and the Highway Department,
visited the major investment services, Moody's, Standard and
Poor's, and Pitch's, in New York in March, 1955*

The

complete Information concerning the debt structure of
Louisiana, and particularly the highway debt, that had been
developed by Dr. Ross in connection with his study, Financing
Highway Improvements in Louisiana, was presented in person
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at this time.

The plans for legislation to enact the new

Long-Range Highway Program were explained, and recommenda
tions and reactions concerning the new bond financing plan
were sought.

Arrangements were also made to keep the serv

ices fully informed of developments as these plans were
effected, and for supplying any other information requested
by the services in this connection on their own initiative.
The ultimate results of this action, in December, 1955* aa
mentioned above, were improvements in ratings on almost all
Louisiana bonds outstanding, highway and nonhighway issues;
the higher ratings could be expected to save the State
millions of dollars in interest charges on future bond
38
financing.
It is very important that the State*s outstanding
bonds be given higher ratings when they deserve them.

Any

improvement in the price of outstanding bonds will make
future offerings more attractive to buyers and will Improve
the terms on which they can be sold.

The most important

time to get better ratings, however, is when the provisional
ratings are given— before new issues are sold.

That is when

the ratings have the greatest effect upon what the market
thinks of the new issue and upon the price that will be paid.

-^Personal interview with Dean William D. Ross, College
of Business Administration, Louisiana State University,
June 30, 1959.
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It is extremely important, therefore, that the State authori
ties watch very closely these provisional ratings and also
the comments that accompany them.

If there is some misin

terpretation or lack of full appreciation of the protection
provided on an issue or of some other provision, full and
correct information should be pressed upon those responsible
for the ratings.

Sustained debt reporting consists of just

such activities.

Good management may even require that an
39
offering be delayed until clarification is made.
The rating services do their best to obtain complete
information and to keep abreast of new developments in the

thousands of state and local governmental subdivisions whose
credits they rate, but the magnitude of the task makes it
almost an Impossible one.

Without well-organized, authori

tative, and continuous effort by a given governmental unit
to develop and supply information to the services about its
outstanding issues as well as new offerings, it cannot
expect its ratings to be accurate.

Unfortunately, the

successful initial effort in this regard in Louisiana,
described above, has not been continued.

This element of

debt management was discussed in Chapter II as a matter of
debt reporting.

Its importance in the practical process of

Uo

3tate financing should not be underestimated.

39Ibid

ko

Ibid.
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The highway offerings of 1958 did not inaugurate the
new Long-Range Highway Program; rather, they consisted of
three distinct issues that differed radically in their
security provisions.

These three issues that exhausted

authorizations predating the Long-Range Highway Program were
as follows:

$350,000 of Series C bonds; $250,000 of Series

A2; and $7*500,000 of "Fourth Series” bonds.

Series C,

authorized by Act 90 of 1952, is secured by a special allo
cation from Highway Fund Number 2 of $300,000 annually.

The

A2 bonds, authorized by the same act, were also issued on
the basis of funds allocated from Highway Fund Number 2.
This time the annual allocation from Highway Fund Number 2
of $200,000 was shared on a parity basis with Series A1 of
1 9 5 ^- with both issues being used for the construction of a

New Orleans Expressway.

Neither Series A2 nor Series 0 was

a full faith issue, but rather they were special
obligations.

lj.1

The major part of the 1958 offering was the $7,500,000
Fourth Series which had the same protection as the first
three series authorized by Act 28i|. of 1952--a Junior lien on

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(g),
as amended 1952. Act 90: Moody*s' Bond Survey, L, No. llj.
(March 31, 1958), 625; and Moody1s Bond Purvey. L, No. 12
(March 17, 1958), 65l.
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part of the nine-twentieths of 1 -cent gasoline tax, a fifth
lien on the gasoline tax of Ij. cents, and finally the guarantee
of the State*s full faith and credit.

This issue was the

fourth and final $ 7 ,5 °0 » ° 0 0 offering under a $3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
authorization.

l\2

These three issues had the same character

istics and the same faults as their companion issues.
The first issue under the Long-Range Highway Program
was sold on February Ij., 1959; it consisted of $20,000,000 of
Long-Range Highway Bonds.

The review made by Moody1s before

the date of sale duly noted the changed nature of these
k-3
bonds, and they were given an A rating.
The issue initi
ated a desirable practice which it is hoped will be continued.
The maturity of the issue was limited

to twenty years

although the authorization would have
permitted atwentykb
five year term.
This type of debt management is reassur
ing and indicates that the objection given previously in
connection with this maximum permissible life of highway
bonds may not be very serious.

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 -A, Sec. 5,
as amended 1952, Act 28kt Moody^s Bond Survey. L, No. lip
(March 31, 1958), 625; and Moody* s Bond Survey, L,No. 12
(March 17, 1958), 65l.
^ Moody*s Bond
7^4-3; and Moody*s Bond
725.
~“

Survey. LI, No. 5
Survey, LI, No. 6

(February 2, 1959),
(February 9, 1959),

^ Moodv*s Bond
7U-3; and Moody*s Bond
725.

Survey, LI, No. 5
Survey, LI, No. 6

(February 2, 1959),
(February 9, 1959),
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The most recent highway borrowing was the sale of
$10,000,000 more of Long-Range Highway Bonds.

The April 30,

1 9 5 9 * offering ranks on a parity with the first series of

$20,000,000 and also bears an A rating.
Institutional Improvement Borrowing. 19li7-1959
Another component of the direct debt incurred from
19V7 to the present was for the purpose of institutional
improvement.

Institutional Improvement Bonds are payable

from the proceeds of the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax.

This tax

had been the security for the Confederate veterans* Issues.
Now, finally, the passing of Confederate veterans* pension
needs removed a burden from the ad valorem tax revenues.
The availability of these tax funds provided a wonderful
opportunity in 19^7 for making basic improvements in the
debt structure.

The logical thing to do with the 0.75 mill

ad valorem tax at the end of World War II would have been to
make it the keystone of a new debt structure.

The surpluses

of tax revenues over and above those needed for debt service
could have been channeled into the general fund.

All reve

nues flowing into the fund each year could then have been
pledged as a first charge to support debt service payments

h<

Moody* s Bond Survey. LI, No. 16 (April 20, 1959)
588; and Moody*s Bond Survey. LI, No. 18 (May Ij., 1959), 562.
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on all full faith and credit obligations of the State.

The

full faith and credit pledge would then have become more
meaningful and ratings and interest rates, undoubtedly, would
have a relative decline.

Unfortunately, this reform was not

accomplished; the surplus 0 . 7 5 mill ad valorem tax revenues
were not left free for very long.

The tax became the source

of funds from which State Institutional Improvement Bonds
would be paid.
Act I4.II4. of 19^6 authorized the issue of Institutional
Improvement Bonds and dedicated the 0.7£ mill property tax
to their payment.

The $16,000,000 of Series D through I

bonds sold under this authorization were secured by the full
faith and credit of Louisiana as well as by the greater
portion of the 0.75 mill tax.

There was only a small prior

claim upon these tax receipts at the time of the authoriza
tion.

The excess of these receipts over the amounts required

for debt service was intended to be used for general State
purposes after i 9 6 0 .

This dedication gave the Institutional

Improvement Bonds of Series D through I a closed-end charac
teristic since no bonds could be issued on par with the
I4.6

$16,000,000.

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 8 , as
amended I9 I4.6 , Act 14.1 )4.; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1952-53*
p. 57* Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9* PP. 81,
814.-85; Moody*s, 1959* pp. 663-65; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLI,
No. 21 (May 23, 1914-91, 14-5 8 ; and Moody*s iBond Purvey. XLII.
No. 16 (April 17, 19^0), 5 H 4-.
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The closed-end feature may be attractive to bond
holders, but it has an unfavorable impact upon the fiscal
structure of a state.

If, for example, the tax dedicated to

servicing an issue should become highly productive— more so
than anticipated--then the closed-end characteristic would
mean that a great surplus of revenues would be available for
securing one particular issue while the service needs might
not even be covered for other issues.

The closed-end

feature on the $16,000,000 authorization was not attractive
enough to overcome the "fair medium grade" label and an
initial Baa rating for most of the bonds.

Series D was not

rated because it was sold to the State Teachers* Retirement
System.

Series G, bought by the National American Bank of

New Orleans and not reoffered, was not rated because it was
not of general interest to investors.

Series E later was
kl
raised from the initial Baa rating to A,
The dates and
the amounts of these issues were as follows:

Series D,

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 8 , as
amended 19^6, Act I4.II4.; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1952-53*
p. 57* Louisiana Legislative Research Study No, 9, pp. 8 l,
8 I4 -8 5 * Moody's, 1959. pp. 663-65* Moody's Bond Survey. XLI,
No. 21 (May 23* 19^9)* 458; and-Moody*s Bond Survey, XLII,
No. 16 (April 17# 1950)* 5llj-. The relatively unsatisfactory
ratings that were given to the Institutional Improvement
Bonds were ascribed to the fact that the obligations were
marginally protected when the whole authorization was
considered. In the case of the $3,251,000 Series F issue of
19lj-9> the original Baa rating was given with full knowledge
that the State's credit was improving because of the broaden
ing of the State's economy. The State's general credit,
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$3*000,000 in 191+7; Series E and F, $5,000,000 together in
191+9; and, Series G, $1+,000,000 in 1950.

Issues of

$2,000,000 each, Series H and I of 1951 and 1952 , concluded
the borrowing for this purpose and brought the total insti
tutional improvement debt issued to the authorized
$16,000,000.

(See Table XXIX, Appendix A.)

The Institutional Improvement Bond Issues described
above were not destined to remain outstanding until their
scheduled maturity dates.

Early retirement by exercise of

the call option began In the 1951+—55 fiscal year.

The

remaining principal of $6,3lj-6,000 of Series F and Series G
was paid at that time.

In 1955-56, the $1,525*000 balance

of Series H was paid, and two years later, $1,569*000 of
lj-9
Series I bonds was retired.
II.

INDIRECT BORROWING, 191+7-1959

Louisiana* s debt history from 191+7 to 1959 has been
marked by a growing importance of indirect borrowing.

The

however, was still considered only fair because of the pre
vailing high tax and debt burdens in relation to other
states. Moody*s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 36 (September 5*
191+9), 2 7 0 .
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1952-53* p. 57*
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1951+-55, p. 57;
1955-56, p. 53* 1957-58* P* 56; and Louisiana Legislative
Research Study No. 9, pp. 81, 103-1+.
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reasons for this change are not entirely clear.

The first

impulse would be to blame the constitutional debt limitation
since this is the major reason for indirect borrowing in
other states.

In Louisiana, however, the importance of this

factor must be minimized because there is little difficulty
in amending the Constitution to authorize borrowing.

Most

of the agency issues in Louisiana during the recent period
have been authorized in this manner.

One of the main

reasons for the widespread adoption of the indirect tech
nique may well have been political.

Davis, in his recent

publication, Louisiana. The Pelican State, makes reference
to the establishment of citizens* boards to regulate high
ways, welfare, and institutions as part of Governor Kennon*s
50
reform of 1953.
This observation leads one to suspect
that the use of indirect borrowing may have been a manifesta
tion of reform designed to inject rigidities into the State
51
fiscal structure in order to reduce political Influence.

50
Edwin Adams Davis, Louisiana. The Pelican State
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959),
pp. 290-91.
51
The trend towards agencies In Louisiana has been
checked and perhaps even reversed If what has happened to
the Building Authority is any indication. The Building
Authority was stripped of most of its authority by Act 1 3 2
of 1956. The purpose of this act was nto curtail, limit
and restrict the powers, duties and functions of the
Louisiana State Building Authority solely to the issuance of
any remaining bonds authorized .
Louisiana, Acta (19^6),
Act 132, pp. 325-27.
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Another political factor which may have been impor
tant in the movement toward agency borrowing in Louisiana
was the fact that a great many of the improvements financed
by this means were geographically limited.

As a result,

their political backing may also have been so limited that
it might have been impossible to induce the people in the
entire State to support direct borrowing for these purposes.
People in the other parts of the State might not have been
favorably inclined to direct borrowing for the purpose of
financing the Greater New Orleans Expressway and the down
town New Orleans Mississippi River Bridge.

Finally,

Louisiana probably was influenced by the activities of other
states and by the common assumption that agencies and authori
ties expedite the acquisition of physical improvements.

The

State of Louisiana now has nine agencies which either have
acted or can act in the creation of debt.

Five of these

instrumentalities are of long standing in the State finan
cial structure.

The Port of New Orleans Board of Commis

sioners has been active since its charter in 1 8 9 6 .

The

Manager of the State Penitentiary engaged in borrowing as an
agent of the State in the 1920*s.

The Charity Hospital*s

Board of Administrators, the Board of Supervisors of the
Louisiana State University, arid the Louisiana State Board of
Education have all been agents of the State since the 1930*s.
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Of these older agencies, only the Port of New Orleans and
Louisiana State University have borrowed during the current
22
period.
Except for the Port of New Orleans Board, the various
authorities existing in Louisiana before World War II had
not played a very important role in the State’s debt struc
ture.

The debt activities of these five authorities alone

would not have been highly significant in the post-war
period either.

However, this relative insignificance of

authority borrowing was not to continue.
1922.

The change came in

Act 7 of that year was a general law that enabled two

or more parishes to join in establishing authorities for the
purpose of constructing toll bridges and ferries that would
improve the State highway system.

This legislation was the

first step in the organization of the Greater New Orleans
Expressway Commission and the Mississippi River Bridge
23
Authority.
Other legislation, also passed in 1922,
chartered the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission and the
Louisiana State Building Authority.

^ M o o d y ’s, 1929, pp. 672-71}.; and Louisiana, Financial
R
eport. 1927-28, pp. 26-28.
to
-^ Louisiana, Acts (1922), Act 7, pp. 9-21}..

21t

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 29, as
amended 1922, Act 9; Louisiana, Acts (1922), Act 3 1 7 ,
PP. 833-38 ; and Moody’s, 1929, pp. 672-76.
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The creation of new agencies, the dedication of tax
revenues to these agencies, and the granting to them of the
authority to borrow large sums of money would appear to have
been an undesirable development.

The specific objections to

the agency device noted previously seem to be valid criti
cisms.

The wide and increasing use of authorities in

Louisiana certainly has added complexity to the debt struc
ture when every effort should have been made to simplify the
structure according to principles of good debt management.
Port of New Orleans Borrowing. 19)17-1959
Of the "charter member" agencies in Louisiana*s debt
structure, the Port of New Orleans debt is somewhat unique.
The New Orleans Port debt is both an agency debt and a full
faith and credit debt of the State.

It is supported by the

operating revenues of the Port but also by part of ninetwentieths of the 1-eent gasoline tax and the State*s full
faith and credit.
When the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New
Orleans borrowed $10,000,000 in October, 1955* it was their
first venture into the bond market since 1939.

This 1955

issue was part of a planned expansion program which will
entail borrowing $20,lj.50,000.

This new issue is protected by

Port revenues, the first $500*000 annually from the ninetwentieths of the 1-cent gasoline tax, and the State*s full
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faith and credit.

The rating given the $10,000,000 offering

was A.

The bonds are of the serial variety, and they will
55
not be completely retired until 1990.
(See Table XXX,
Appendix A . )
Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission
Borrowing. 1952-1999
The Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission bonds are
supported, like the New Orleans Port debt, primarily by the
revenues resulting from the operation of the Port.

But in

this case, there is no specific dedication of any State tax
or of State funds for the purpose of servicing the debt.
The connection that the State has with this debt is as a
guarantor— the full faith and credit of the State is consti
tutionally pledged in case the revenues of the Port, the
sale of Port property, and the full faith and credit of
three parishes (East Baton Rouge, West Baton Rouge, and
56
Iberville) should be insufficient to pay the bonds,

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6-A, Sec. 5.1*
as amended 1952, Act 28I|Y Louisiana, Financial Report.
1956-57# P. 57? Moody1s, 1959# PP. 673-7*i.: Moody1s Bond
Survey. XLVII, No. IjJj. (October 31, 1955)# 177-79; and Moody* s
Bond Survey. XLVII, No. L{.5 (November 7# 1955)# 168.
-^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 29# as
amended 1952, Act 9# Moody1s, 1959# PP. 673-7*4-# Moody*s Bond
Survey. XLVI, No. !|1 (October 11, 195*4-)# 220; Moody*s -Bond
Survey, XLVI, No. I4.3 (October 25# 195*4-)# 201; and Moody* s
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 29 (July 15, 1957)# *4-32-3*4-.
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The bonds issued by this Commission, however, are not even
listed in the Financial Report of the State.

57

This report

ing practice can hardly be reassuring to investors who might
be considering obligations issued by this agency in the
future.
Series A of the Greater Baton Rouge Port bonds, which
was issued under the terms required by Act 9 of 1952, raised
$12,500,000 for the Port.

The same authorization can be

used to issue another $2,£00,000 for the Baton Rouge Port if
debt service requirements are covered one and one-fourth
times.

However, the $12,£00,000 Baa rated Series A issue —

now rated A — is the only one that has been sold under the
58
1952 authorization.
(See Table XXX, Appendix A.)
The next development in Greater Baton Rouge Port
Commission borrowing began with Act 597 o f 1956 , a constitu
tional amendment, that increased the borrowing authorization
from the original $l£,000,000 to $£0,000,000 of debt out
standing at one time.

Another change introduced by the

amendment was the addition of Ascension parish to the

^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57, PP* 56-59.
58
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 29, as
amended 1952, Act 9; Moody's,1959, pp. 673-74? Moody's Bond
Survey, XLVI, No. I4.I (October
11, 1954), 220; Moody's Bond
Survey. XLVI, No. 43 (October
2£, 1954), 201; and Moody's
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 29 (July 15, 1957), 432-34.
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parishes represented on the Commission Board; provision was
also made for the pledge of that parish’s full faith and
credit to support Commission bonds on a parity with the
original three, parishes.

The first issue under the revised

authorization was rated Baa.

This Series B issue consists

of $ 1 9 ,lj.0 0 ,0 0 0 of callable bonds which are junior to the
$ 12 ,

500,000 Series A,

1977.

Series B bonds mature from I960 to

The maturity provisions for Series B require annual

payments ranging from $ 1 6 0 ,0 0 0 in I9 6 0 to $ 1 ,6 5 9 ,0 0 0 in the
59
final year*
Series C of the Baton Rouge Port debt followed
quickly under the same authorization as Series B — it was
dated May 1, 1958.

This issue is junior to both Series A

and B, but it is secured by the same full faith and credit
pledges of the interested parishes and the State and also by
the proceeds from the operation of the Port.

These bonds

were rated Baa— medium grade— provisionally.

The $3,500,000

of Series C is scheduled to mature from I 9 6 0 to 1975, with
the maturity payments ranging from $l5 5 , ° 0 0 in the first
year to $267,000 in the last year.

The Port of Baton Rouge

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec, 2 9 , as
amended 1952, Act 9 ; Art. 6 , Secs. 29.1, 29.2, 2 9 .3 , 29.4,
as amended 1956, Act 597; Moody’s, 1959, pp. 673-74; Moody*s
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 29 (July-15, 1957), 4 3 2 -314.; Moody’s
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. I4.9 (December 2, 1957), 176-77; and
Moody’s Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 51 (December 16, 1957), 154.
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borrowing authorization was not exhausted by the sale of
Series C--under certain circumstances, an additional
$ 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 may be issued that will rank on parity with
Series C.

The sale of Series C, however, did have the

60
effect of closing out Series B which had been open.
Louisiana State University
Borrowing, 19U.7-I959
The Louisiana State University borrowing during this
period was very complex and had several different sources of
revenue for security.

The issues during this period came in

19l|7, 1950, 1952, 1953, X95U* 1956, and 1958.

The issues of

1952 and 195^ were payable mostly from operating revenues of
the University— for example, dormitory rentals.

These

issues were also secured by part of the $1,000,000 of dedi
cated funds received from the State insurance excise license
tax.

The 1950 and 1953 Louisiana State University issues

were secured on a parity basis by the portion of the State
corporation franchise tax that is pledged to the State
University after four other dedications.

Moody*s, 1959

6l

67ii.; and Moody* s Bond Survey

L, No.
^Louisiana, Financial Report, 19lj.9-50, p. 58;
1956-57, P* 58; and Louisiana Legislative Research Study No.
9, PP. 95-96.
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The recent borrowing by Louisiana State University
proceeded as follows.

Soon after the end of the war, in

I 9 I4.Y* a $3*500,000 issue of serial bonds was sold which was
to mature in 1 9 6 7 .

(See Table XXXI, Appendix A.)

But the

bonds were callable, and they did not remain outstanding
until that date, as noted below.

No further University debt

activity took place until after a new authorization, Act $\\
of 1950, was provided.

The first sales under Act 5U came

in December, 1950, when several blocks were sold that
amounted to $5*700,000.

Louisiana State University bonds

sold in 19^7 and 1950 were given A ratings while the
$ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 issue of 1953* floated under the same terms as the
62
1950 bonds, was given an Aa rating.
The 19^7 Louisiana State Uhiversity issue was refunded
in 1952.

Most of the original 19^7 issue was still out

standing in 1952 so that the amount refunded was large —
$3,235*000.

The first of these serial blocks totaled

$1,610,000 and matures in 1962, and the second block of
$1,625,000 matures serially between 1963 and 1967.

The

interest cost on these two refunding issues averaged 2 . 1 3

62
Louisiana, Acts (1950), Act 5^, PP* 87-91; Louisiana,
Financial Report. 195>2-f?3» P. 58; 1953-5^, P» 56; Louisiana
Legislative Research Study No. 9, p. 95; Moody1s, 1952,
p. 5l6; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLII, No. lj.7 (November 20, 1950),
llj.2; and Moody*s Bond Survey. XLII, No. lj.9 (December if.,
1950), life".
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per cent, as opposed to the 2.73 P©** cent carried by the
191+7 bonds they replaced.

The 1952 refunding issues are

protected by dormitory revenues primarily, but any deficiency
is covered by the full faith and credit of the Board of
Supervisors of the University; the bonds are not general
obligations of the State.

Any deficiencies which might

occur were to paid from all revenues of the Board that
are not specifically dedicated and also by a third lien on
the $1,000,000 of revenues dedicated to the Board from the
proceeds of the insurance excise tax.

A second issue with

this same security, except that it has a fourth lien on the
insurance excise tax, is the $850,000 issue sold in 195^-.
This callable issue of 195^# which matures in 1979* was
given an A rating.

The same protection was also afforded

to the holders of the $2,650,000 of bonds sold in December,
1956,

These A-rated bonds, which are also callable, were

sold for the purpose of financing the construction of two
63
new residence halls.
Recent activity in Louisiana State University borrow
ing began with a relatively small issue on April 1, 1958.
This issue, which was authorized by Act 230 of 195^-# consisted

^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19i{.6-l|.7» p. 68; 195152, p. 60; 1955-56, p . S'k* 1956-57* P . 58; Louisiana Legis
lative Research Study No. 9# p. 95; and Moody*s, 1959#
pp. 677-78.
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of $850,000 of serial bonds that are to mature from 1959 to
1978.

The purpose of this issue was very specific— to

construct and equip buildings for use in research on ferti
lizers, feeds, soils, and pesticides.

The sole protection

afforded the bondholders in this issue was the dedication of
$ 7 0 ,0 0 0 annually from the registration fees and fines
connected with the sale of feeds, fertilizers, and
pesticides.
A.

65

6i±

Moody*s assigned these bonds a rating of

(See Table XXXI, Appendix A.)
The security for the issue probably had an adverse

effect on its marketability.

The flotation indicates

clearly the extent to which the atomization of a debt struc
ture can be carried.

The issue also shows how far the State

of Louisiana has departed from the proper use of Its full
faith and credit in all of Its borrowing.
Another Louisiana State University sale in April,
1958# amounted to $7»500>000.

The Issue, which was to be

used to construct and improve University buildings, is
secured by the following:

(1) a first lien on $1,000,000

annually dedicated from the proceeds of the 0.5 mill State

^Louisiana, Acts (195U-)*
2 30* PP* ij.28-31;
Louisiana Legislative Council Report No. 9» p. 97» Moody*s
Bond Survey. L, No. 15 (April 7» 19^8)> 613; and Moody*s,
19^9, pp.' 677-78.
^ Moody* s Bond Survey, L, N0 . 15 (April 7# 1958),
613; and Moody*s, 195>9, pp. 677-78.
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ad valorem tax, (2) a fourth lien on $1,000,000 annually
dedicated from the insurance excise tax, and (3) a fifth
lien on $£00,000 annually dedicated from the racetrack and
bookmaking license taxes.

Additional bonds can be issued on

a parity basis with the $7»£00,000 if certain revenue
requirements are satisfied.

66

The $7,£00,000 issue of 19£8 was offered three
different times during a nine month period before finally
being placed on April 17 of that year.

The offering and

reoffering of the building issue resulted from a desire to
get better terms on the borrowing and appears to have been
67
good debt management.
However, this case exemplifies the
point made in an earlier chapter that good debt management
cannot be expected to overcome all debt difficulties arising
out of faulty debt structures and unfortunate political and
legal institutions.

Debt management could not overcome the

difficulties dating back at least as far as the adoption of
specific revenue dedications and subsidiary liens in
Louisiana bond financing.

The results are inefficient use

of the State*s credit with correspondingly higher costs for
borrowing and for State services.

^^Moody* s Bond Survey, L, No. l£ (April 7, 19£8), 613;
and Moody*s, 19^9, pp. 677-78.
^^Moody*s Bond Survey, L, No, l£ (April 7» 19£8), 613;
Moody* s Bond Survey, L, No. 17 (April 28, 19£8), £8ii.; and
Moody*s,“19^9, pp. 677*78.
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It is worth noting here that the uncertainties of
legal priorities of claims on the general revenues of the
State and the other complexities of the direct, general
obligation debt structure of the State of Louisiana result
In some of the subsidiary State agency obligations, such as
the Louisiana State University bonds, receiving higher
ratings and involving lower interest costs than many direct,
'full faith and credit bonds of the State.

The $7»500,000

issue described above was rated A while most of the direct
and full faith and credit Institutional Improvement Bonds
outstanding were rated Baa.

(See Table XXXI and XXIX.)

Greater New Orleans Expressway
doirHm'i'as'ion Sorrowing. 1952-1959
A recently created agency which has authority to
issue bonds ultimately Involving the State*s credit is the
Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission.

This agency was

established in October, 195ty» according to the provisions of
enabling Act 7 of 1952.

The purpose for the creation of the

Expressway Commission and for borrowing by this group was to
construct a toll bridge across Lake Pontchartrain.

The

bridge tolls were pledged to service the debt so that the
68
obligations are nominally revenue bonds.
The Greater

68

It Is somewhat misleading to call the Greater New
Orleans Expressway bonds "revenue” bonds. Revenue bonds
usually are considered to be self-sustaining and
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New Orleans Expressway Commission is not strictly an agency
of the State; it is primarily an instrumentality of the
parishes of St. Tammany and Jefferson.
involved to the following extent:

But the State is

(1) it pledged $£,000,000

of surpluses from Highway Fund Number 2 for the construction
of approaches to the Expressway; and (2) it pledged remain
ing surpluses over $£,000,000 to the payment of the Express
way bonds until all such bonds are retired.

The Greater New

Orleans Expressway was originally given a fourth lien on the
surpluses in Highway Fund Number 2, but this was changed to
a fifth lien when the Mississippi River Bridge Authority was
chartered and given priority.

It must be stressed that only

a portion of Highway Fund Number 2 was being pledged here—
only the surplus over the existing dedications.

There is no

full faith and credit pledge by either the State or the
parishes to the payment of any of these Expressway bonds.
However, the subordinate claim upon the revenues of a State
department requires the inclusion of the Expressway Commis
sion debt in the indirect category with the obligations of

self-liquidating. This Greater New Orleans Expressway issue
has neither of these characteristics. The use of such
issues is not advisable if a state»s cnedit Is to be
improved.
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agencies of the State of Louisiana, even though there is no
69
general State pledge.
The original amount issued by the Expressway Commis
sion in November, 1951*, was $1*6,000,000,

These bonds were

initially rated as substandard— long after their issue in
August of 1958 they were still simply rated as "speculative."
The reason for this rating was that the toll operation was
70
unproven.
There also seemed to be some specific doubt
about the chances of success of the toll bridge because of
proposed Improvements on competing toll-free facilities.
It was not until March of 1959 that the $[(.6,000,000 issue of
1951* finally received a regular rating— It was rated Baa but

was still considered speculative because of the threat of
71
competition.
(See Table XXXII, Appendix A.)
The New Orleans Expressway revenue bond issue in 1951*
created what may amount to a perpetual debt if the maturity
schedule Is followed.
are as followss

The terms of retirement of the issues

$ 1 , 0 0 0 each year until 1993 and $1*5 *9 6 3 ,0 0 0

69

Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(g),
par. 5* as amended 1952, Act 90; and Moody*s, 1959, PP. 6?5-76.
? % h e practice of not rating toll operations until they
are proven may be a result of recent disappointing toll
ventures in several states.
71
Moody’s, 1959, PP. 671*.—75? Moody’s Bond Survey.
L, No. 32 (August 1*, 195o ), 309? and koodyrs £ond Purvey.
LI, No. 9 (March 2, 1959), 6 8 7 .
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in 1991]-.
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If this amount requires refunding in 199l]-» there

will have "been no debt retirement and the issue will resemble
a perpetual debt.

Perpetual debts were found to be unde

sirable because they reduce the State’s ability to borrow in
the future— they make no provision for sustaining the State’s
credit standing.

Furthermore, the interest costs on this

type of borrowing are great.
Mississippi River Bridge Authority
Borrowing (Greater New Orleans'
Bridge). 1992-1999
The second agency or authority resulting from the
general enabling Act 7 of 1992 was the Mississippi River
Bridge Authority.

The two units directly involved in this

Authority are Orleans and Jefferson parishes.

The purpose

of the proposed borrowing was to construct a bridge over the
Mississippi River in downtown New Orleans.

The State, as In

the case of the New Orleans Expressway Commission, is commit
ted to the extent that after 1 9 9 7 * 9 0 per cent of the
surplus of the State Highway Fund Number 2 is pledged to the
Authority.

The State also contributed $790*000 either for

preliminary work or for use as security for bond issues.
These pledges together were the fourth charge on the surplus

72

Moody’s, 1999* PP. 67ij--79» Louisiana, Constitution
(1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(gj, par. 9* as amended 19!?2, Act 90.
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in Highway Fund Number 2.

The Mississippi River Bridge

Authority was given its place ahead of the Greater New
Orleans Expressway by a constitutional amendment in 195^4-.
State Highway Fund Number 2 is sustained by motor vehicle
license taxes collected in the six parishes around New
73
Orleans.
This revenue from the State is not, however, the
only source of revenue for the Authority.

The Authority is

expected to derive toll revenues from the operation of the
bridge and from ferries.

Thus, the bridge bonds that were
7-

issued are also (somewhat carelessly) called revenue bonds.
(See Table XXXII, Appendix A.)
The Mississippi River Bridge Authority exercised part
of its borrowing power by selling a $ 6 5 *0 0 0 ,0 0 0 issue on
October 5* 1954*

There is no specific limit to the amount

that the Authority can borrow.

The bonds, which were dated

November 1, 195U» are callable and are due to mature in
75
November of 19914-.
This large bridge Authority issue of

71
1^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec, 22, as
amended 19514-* Act 7l|5» Moody*s, 1959* pp. 671+-75? and Moody*s
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. lj.0 (October 1|, 195k) t 231-33*
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(g),
par. I4., as amended 195^* Act 7 I4.5 ? Moody*s, 1959* PP. 6714--75?
Moody*s Bond Survey. XLVI, No. lj.0 (October I4., 19510* 231-33?
and Moody*s Bond Survey, XLVI, No. I4.I (October 11, 19510*

222

.

75

Moody*s, 1959* pp. 6 7 I4-7 5 ; Moody*s Bond Survey,
XLVI, No. lj.0 (October l\.t 195 (14.), 2 3 1 -3 3 } and Moody*s Bond
Survey, XLVI, No. I4.I (October 11, 19510» 222.
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1951+ has the same characteristics as the Greater New Orleans
Expressway Commission debt described previously.

The evalu

ation is no different except that in this case, the purpose
of the borrowing was to construct a major river bridge.

The

tendency toward piecemeal financing had progresed still
further.

The $65*000,000 of bridge Authority bonds still
^ 76
were not rated by Moody*s as late as February, 1959.
The Mississippi River Bridge Authority has had a rare
opportunity to exercise some of the principles of good debt
management in 1959.

During this time, the Authority has

been able to retire a part of its debt by buying its bonds
on the open market.

The funds which have made these pur

chases possible have come from bridge tolls and from the
State.

Bridge tolls actually have been less than antici

pated, but the receipts from the surpluses dedicated to the
Authority by the State have been greater than estimated.
The Authority has retired the bonds by purchasing them on
the open market although the obligations are callable.

The

open market purchase has been more appropriate because the
relatively low nominal interest rates on the bonds have
caused them to be valued at considerably less than par

*^Moody*s Bond Survey, LI, No, 5 (February 2, 1959),
714-5-
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during this period.

Retirement of the bonds by exercise of

the call feature would have been considerably more expensive.
The open market purchases have been as follows:
January, 1959, $2,550,000; June, 1959, $l|.00,000; July, 1959,
$900,000; and, September, 1959, $770,000.

The amount of

bonds retired in this fashion thus totaled $1^,620,000 and
reduced the amount of the Mississippi River Bridge Authority
debt outstanding to $60,380,000.

It has been estimated that

these bond purchases have reduced the annual interest costs
by $ 1 6 6 ,3 2 0 . 77
The debt management in this phase of the Mississippi
River Bridge Authority financing seems to have been excel
lent.

There is no intention of disparaging this performance

when it is pointed out that the whole process depended upon
the unexpectedly large receipts from State tax dedication as
well as the extremely high yields that prevailed in the
market during this time.

Debt management is passive to some

extent, and some of the best debt management results from
seizing upon such favorable circumstances.

?7Times New Orleans Picayune, June 22, 1959, p. 10;
Times [New Orleans! Picayune. August 1, 1959, p. 1? and
Times °New Orleans] Picayune. September 18, 1959, p. 1#
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Louisiana State Building Authority
Borrowing. 19$2-1959
The Louisiana State Building Authority was created by
Act 3^7 of 1952 for the express purpose of providing adequate
buildings for educational, correctional, and charitable
institutions.

The Authority was empowered to borrow

$ 9 ,7 ^ 0 , 0 0 0 under this act for certain designated purposes as
well as $20,000,000 for the general purpose.

This additional

$ 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 could be borrowed on a parity basis with the
originally specified $ 9 ,7 5 0 ,0 0 0 of bonds as soon as addi
tional legislation was provided.

The initial A, B, and C

issues of $ 9 ,7 5 0 ,0 0 0 , and any bonds sold under the blanket
authorization, are payable from the proceeds of the State»s
l.lj.7 mill ad valorem tax.

At the time of the sale of

Series A, B, C, and AA, the tax was already dedicated to the
payment of about $8,800,000 of bonds serviced from the State
78
Bond and Interest Tax Fund.
The second lien status of the
bonds appears to have been responsible for the Baa rating
which they were given.

The prior claims are scheduled to be

eliminated completely by I960.

Series A, B, and C were sold

This fund is the same State Bond and Interest Tax
Fund that originally serviced direct debt payable from the
1 . 1 5 mill ad valorem tax.

31+3
in 1 9 5 2 *

;5 3 » and 1951 + and exhausted the specific authori79
zation of $9,7^0*000.
(See Table XXXIII, Appendix A.)
Before any further Building Authority borrowing could
take place, there had to be more legislation.

It came in

the form of Act 13 of 1951+ which provided for the issue of
the aforementioned $ 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 of bonds that would rank on
par with Series A, B, and C.

The act also went further and

amended the original act of 1 9 5 2 so that still another
$ 2 1 ,981+,500 can be borrowed to be junior to the $ 2 9 ,7 5 0 *0 0 0 .
The last $21,981+,500 was scheduled to remain in this subor
dinate position until the first $9*750,000 (Series A, B, and
C) had been retired.

It was provided that after this

retirement the remaining bonds would all be paid on a parity
basis.

The $20,000,000 authorization resulted in the sale

of Series AA, BB, and CC in 1951+, 1955, and 1956.

The final

$21,91+8,500 came in the form of Series DD, EE, and FF in
80
1956 and 1957.
(See Table XXXIII, Appendix A.)

^Louisiana, Acts (1952), Act 317* pp. 833-38;
Louisiana, Financial Report. 1953-51+* P. 56; Louisiana
Legislative Research Study No. 9* PP. 3* 92; Moody*s, 1959,
p. 675* Moody*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. i+9 (December 7, 19531*
128: and Moody*s Bond Survey, XLV, No. 1+2 (October 19* 1953),

208

.
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Louisiana, Acts (1951)-)» Act 1 3 , pp. 21-31;
Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57* P. 57* Moody*s, 1959,
675-76; Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 3*
92; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. 1+9 (December 7, 1953),
128; and Moody*s Bond Survey, XLV, No. 1+2 (October 19* 1953),

208.
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The retirement of the senior Building Authority issues
of 19,750,000 was accomplished early by the use of the call
feature.

Series A was called at the end of 195? and Series

C, in September of 1958.

Series B thus was the only barrier

to the establishment of parity among the Building Authority
issues.

That issue was scheduled to mature serially until

81
1962, but it was called in May of 1959.

The use of the

call feature to eliminate subordination of liens and to
simplify debt structures is recognized as one situation in
which the use of the call feature is proper.

The removal of

Series B by this method thus seems to have been an example
of good debt management.
The issues of the Building Authority totaling
$1}.1,9U8,500— AA through FF— are all serial issues now payable
on a parity basis.

The last of these will mature by 1985.

They are callable except for Series EE, which was sold to
the State Teachers* Retirement System,

Series EE is not

rated by Moody*s, but all of the other issues in the AA-FF
82
group were rated Baa.
There was one other Building Authority issue during
the current period.

This issue of $3,925,000, dated

On

Moody*s, 1959, pp. 675-76; and Moody *3 Bond Survey.
LI, No. 20 (May 11, 1959), 552.
82Moody*s, 1959, PP. 675-76.
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April 15, 195&, was sold to improve a medical center and a
charity hospital.

The issue was sold at the same time as

Series DD and also "bears that identifying symbol.

This

issue of $3 ,0 2 5 ,0 0 0 was different from the others sold by
the Authority because it was secured by an entirely differ
ent tax— the 0.53 mill ad valorem tax.

The tax had

previously been paid into the general fund.

The issue of

1 9 5 6 represented the whole amount that was authorized to be

borrowed.

The bonds, which are not callable, are scheduled
83
to mature by 1 9 6 !|..
The last $3*025,000 Building Authority issue

described above is another example of complexity being
added to the debt structure.

The other Building Authority

issues required analysis, but this issue was entirely
different and thus required a new study and a new explana
tion.

The fact that another tax which had been free of any

dedication was being diverted from the general fund was also
an undesirable feature in that issue.
Summary of Borrowing. 19U.7-1959
The direct obligations added during this period con
sisted of $83,000,000 of Veterans* Bonus Bonds, $98,000,000

^Louisiana, Acts -(1955), Act 3 0 , pp. 30-33; Louisiana,
Financial Report, 19S>6-57, p. £7? Louisiana Legislative
Research Study No. 9, pp. 98-99? and Moody*s, 1959, p. 6 7 6 .
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of highway obligations, and $16,000,000 of Institutional
Improvement Bonds.

(See Table XXXIV, Appendix A.)

The

direct obligations sold during the decade thus totaled
$197*000,000.

This borrowing was added in a decade when the

State1s credit was not well recognized relative to the other
states, although tremendous economic growth occurred during
the period.

Some of this direct borrowing was for ques

tionable purposes.

Furthermore, some of the management in

connection with the issue of this new debt was not as
efficient as it should have been.

Finally, the continued

dedication of taxes for servicing specific issues had the
effect of further undermining the value of the full faith
and credit pledge offered to secure these direct obligations.
The indirect obligations, sold by agencies in which
the State had some interest,were as follows:

Board of Com

missioners of the Port of New Orleans, $10,000,000; Greater
Baton Rouge Port Commission, $35*2+00,000; Louisiana State
University $21,350,000; Greater New Orleans Expressway
Commission, $1+6,000,000; Mississippi River Bridge Authority,
$65*000,000; and the Louisiana State Building Authority,
$51+,723*000.

Indirect borrowing totaled $232,1+73*000 in the

period since 191+7.
Much of this indirect borrowing came in 1951+ a^d
later— after the State had made great progress in its post
war economic development.

For this reason, it probably

3kl
should not he concluded that this large amount of indirect
borrowing was unsafe.

This indirect borrowing generally was

for proper purposes, but the management of the issues was
not always satisfactory.

Finally, the main defect in this

indirect borrowing since 1 9 l|.7 has been its addition of so
much complexity to the debt structure.
III.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, 1914.7-1959

Several general matters in connection with Louisiana*s
debt structure are not brought out clearly when individual
purposes of borrowing and specific bond issues are analyzed.
Have Louisiana bond ratings tended to improve or deteriorate
over the period?

To what extent has the call provision been

used lately by the State?

Has recent debt reporting in

Louisiana been satisfactory?

Has the timing of bond sales

during recent years been consistent with the finding in
Chapter II that there was a seasonal pattern to interest
charges during the same period?
Ratings of Louisiana Bonds, 19ii7-1959
There have been several changes in the composition of
the ratings of Louisiana debt during the last decade.

(See

Table A below and Tables XXVI, XXXV, and XXXVI, Appendix A.)
In 1914.6 , A and Baa bonds accounted for 85 P©** cent of the
outstanding debt.

The Baa rated debt amounted to $ 6 9 »9 0 l4-,000
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TABLE A
MOODY*S RATINGS OP LOUISIANA DIRECT AND INDIRECT
DEBT OUTSTANDING FOR THE YEARS 1946, 1952, AND 19^8
(thousands)
RATING

1946

BONDS RATED Aa v
Direct
Indirect

$ 7,525
9.300

$

6,268
111. 321

$ 50,159
9.621*.

116,825

$ 20,589

$ 59,783

167,875
0

$11*5,591
_ -5,530

$ 85,151
47*23.2

$67,875

$ 1 5 1 ,1 2 1

$132,383

$11.1,831
28.073

$ 6 8 ,011*.
2 0 .21l8

$

$69,901}.

$ 88,262

$117,672

$ 2,009
. 5..9S2

$

7 ,0 0 0
900

$ 1 3 ,0 0 0
65.180

$ 8 ,0 0 1

$

7,900

$ 7 8 ,1 8 0

TOTAL
BONDS RATED A
Direct
Indirect
TOTAL
BONDS RATED Baa
Direct
Indirect
TOTAL
BONDS NOT RATED
Direct
Indirect
TOTAL

1952

1958

u

0
1 1 1 ,6 1 2

C

Ratings rang© from Aaa to C. These ratings are some
times changed when new information indicates that the invest
ment quality is different. The ratings in this Table are as
of the reporting date and not at the time of issue.
Several issues sold during the 1947-1959 period were
rated Baa, but by 1958 they had either been called or rerated.
cThe classifications used here are the same as those
used in the text. For example, Port of New Orleans and
Baton Rouge Port Commission debt is classified as indirect.
Sources
Appendix A.

Compiled from Tables XXVI, XXXV, and XXXVI,

3*4-9
and the A rated debt totaled $67*875*000.

Only 10.3 P©r

cent of Louisiana*a outstanding debt was rated Aa at the
beginning of this period.
By 1952, and before the agency debt had its greatest
growth, the modal rating of Louisiana debt was the A rating.
Over 5*4- per cent of all the direct and indirect debt was
rated A.

Baa rated debt was second in importance, account

ing for almost 33 per cent of the outstanding debt.

The

ratio of outstanding debt rated Aa actually declined during
this period and comprised only 7.7 per cent of the total,,
Of course, the absolute amount of Aa rated bonds did
increase slightly from 19*4-6 to 1952.
By 1958, there was a significant change in the distri
bution of ratings in the State.

There was an encouraging

increase both absolutely and relatively in the amount of
debt rated Aa— now l5.*J- per cent of the total debt outstand
ing— and a slight decline in the per cent of the debt rated
81+
Baa— to 30.3 per cent.
But there was another develop
ment:

$78,180,000 of the debt was not rated by Moody*s.

The main reason why so much of Louisiana’s debt is not rated
is that one of the recent large issues was floated to

^Probably the most important factor contributing to
this change was the temporary improvement in reporting which
led to higher ratings in 1955. Supra, pp. 3 1 *4.-1 6 .
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finance construction of a major river toll bridge.

Moody1s

practice is to label all such issues as "speculative11 until
such time as facilities are completed and some earning record
is established.
When ratings given to Louisiana bonds in the 1924.7 —
1959 period are studied in terms of whether the debts are
direct or indirect, it appears that the improved ratings
have been associated with direct borrowing while indirect
debt includes the large percentage of bonds that are rated
Baa.

Examination of the differences between the debt out

standing in 1952 and that outstanding in 1958 reveals the
following changes:

(1) Direct bonds rated Aa increased from

$6,268,000 in 1952 to $50,159*0 0 0 — an increase of about 7 0 0
per cent; (2) Indirect debt in the Aa category declined from
$ 114,3 2 1 ,0 0 0 to $9»62l].,000— 32.2 per cent; (3 ) Bonds rated A
in the direct category declined from $ 1145,5 9 1 , 0 0 0 to
$85,151,000— a decline of Ij.1.5 Per cent; (2;) Bonds rated A
increased in the indirect class from $ 5 ,5 3 0 ,0 0 0 to
$247,2 3 2 ,000--an increase of over 7,50 per cent; (5) In the
Baa category, the amount of direct bonds fell from
$ 6 8 ,0114,000 to nothing; (6 ) In the indirect grouping, where
there had been $ 2 0 ,2148,000 of Baa bonds in 1952, there was
$117,672,000 in 1958— an increase of I48 I per cent; (7 ) The
bonds not rated almost doubled in the direct class from
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$7,000,000 in 1952 to $13,000,000 in 1958? (8) In the
indirect class, the unrated bonds increased from $ 9 0 0 ,0 0 0
to $65,180,000.
From the changes noted in the preceding comparisons,
it appears that the direct debt is faring better than the
indirect debt when ratings are given.

The existence of

$117,672,000 of indirect debt in the Baa category— -where
there was only a little more than $20,000,000 before— is
especially disturbing.

It is perhaps even more disturbing

since agency borrowing is a relatively new phenomenon and
since further borrowing by these agencies will probably be
secured by the same dedicated taxes and funds subject to
prior charges.

Thus, if the agency device is widely used in

the future, and if there are no large increases in the funds
made available for debt service, there will probably be more
subrated bonds added to Louisiana*s debt structure.
Use of the Call Feature in Louisiana
Bond Issues. 19U7-1959"
Another important characteristic of a debt structure
is the extent to which the call feature is employed.

The

inclusion of a call feature may or may not be desirable,
depending upon the price charged for the privilege.

It will

be wise, however, for the state to consider using the option
if there is any prospect that the state*s debt structure and
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management will improve markedly in the future, and/or if
the market and the rating services are underrating the
state*s credit.
Both of these conditions appear to have existed to
some extent in Louisiana during the current post-war period.
If a comprehensive debt improvement plan had been in the
process of being formulated, it would have been desirable
(other things equal) to use the call option in issues sold
prior to the implementation of such a plan.

Although there

should have been, there was no such plan for the whole debt
structure.

But there was a suitable situation in the case

of highway borrowing.

If the price of the call feature was

not prohibitive in 1958, it might have been suitable to make
the three highway issues of that year callable.

This

practice was followed in the case of only one of these
issues, but since there is no data available about the cost
of the call, this approach Is suggested only as one which
may be useful In the future.

(See Table XXVIII, Appendix A.)

Louisiana*s economy obviously has gained strength in
the past fifteen years.

This economic growth, however, has

apparently not been quickly recognized by the rating services
and by the bond market.

Louisiana’s credit seems to have

been underrated during the early part of the post-war
85
period. Later the situation was temporarily
remedied when

0£lnfra, Chap. VI, p. 3 8 0 .
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the bond ratings were revised as a result of a single and
short-lived, but highly successful, debt reporting program.
If Louisiana*s credit was generally underrated during this
period, the use of the call feature, other things being
equal, would have been appropriate.
The actual use of the call feature in Louisiana is
analyzed in Table B.

In 19^6, 8 per cent of Louisiana1s

TABLE B
TEE INCLUSION OP THE CALL FEATURE IN LOUISIANA
BONDS OUTSTANDING, 19^6, 1952, 1958
DESCRIPTION

19^6

1952

1958

5
0

12
2

12
18

37
21

29
21

31

1

1

2

CALLABLE ISSUES
Direct
Indirect
NONCALLABLE ISSUES
Direct
Indirect
NOT INDICATED
Indirect

Source: Moody1s, 19U-7» pp. lf.21-29; 1953, PP. I4.7 2 -8 3 ;
and 1959, PP. 663-78.

obligations were callable and 91 per cent were not callable.
By 1952, the callable obligations constituted 21 per cent
^ Supra. pp. 311j.-l6 .

3$k
of the total, and the per cent of noncallable bonds declined
to 78 per cent.

The same tendencies were apparent in 1958 s

3$ per cent of the bonds were callable and 62 per cent were
noncallable.

If the assumption made previously is correct--

that is, if it was advisable for Louisiana to include the
call feature more frequently since World War II--then
Louisiana has been improving her debt structure in this
respect.
Also commendable is the fact that the call options
that were being included more often were also being effec87
tively exercised during the period.
One case was cited in
this Chapter where the State called bonds with a consequent
saving in interest payments.

In another case, a senior

issue was eliminated with the result that subsequent issues
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were put on a parity basis.

These are the advantages that

accrue to good debt management.

Still another, and perhaps

a greater, benefit is possible.

The fact that 35 P©^ cent

of the debt outstanding is callable would help greatly in
89
any large-scale revision of the debt structure.
8?The call feature was included and exercised in one
case that led to the question of whether good debt manage
ment or good fortune was the most important characteristic.
Supra, pp. 293-95, 3 2 2 , and 3I&,
89

A debt reform based on the use of the call feature
has been suggested by William D. Ross and B. F. Sliger.
William D. Ross and B. F. Sliger, "Dedication of State
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Reporting of Louisiana Debt, I9li-7-l959
The reporting of Louisiana*s debt in the period,
1 9 U 7 -1 9 5 9 , left something to be desired if a major objective

of reporting is to inform the taxpayer and the general
public.

The following inadequacies are apparent:

(l) There

is no indication in Louisiana Financial Reports that the
State is involved at all in the Greater New Orleans Express
way, the Mississippi River Bridge Authority, and the Greater
90
Baton Rouge Port borrowing.
Yet the State*s credit is
clearly involved in each of these issues,

(2) The Financial

Reports have never given the specific purposes for which the
various issues were sold, and they presently do not indicate
interest rates and maturity schedules.

Thus it is impossible

to determine whether a prompt payment is planned or whether
deferred serials are being issued.

(3) The Financial

Reports contain some incorrect and misleading information.

91

Revenues in Louisiana," Louisiana Business Review. XXII,
No. I4. (April, 19^8), 20-23. For a description of this plan,
infra. Chap. VI, pp. 3 8 3 - 8 if..
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57* PP* 56-59.
^ F o r example, in the 1956-57 Financial Report, the
1950 issues of Louisiana State University bonds were listed
as having been sold in 1953. The $9,1^00,000 issue of highway
bonds payable from Highway Fund Number 2 which were sold in
1953 and I951j- were listed as indirect obligations. Still in
the same report, there is no mention of the State*s commit
ment in the borrowing noted in (l) above.
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(1|_) Another difficulty is the lack of coordination and
consistency that is evidenced by the variety of dates upon
which the debt outstanding is reported.
Reporting in another sense— that of Informing investors
and those that serve them of all pertinent matters and espe
cially of improvements which would make offerings more
attractive— apparently has been somewhat more satisfactory
in Louisiana,

The debt reporting carried on by a special

group in 1955 showed just how important and worthwhile this
could become if it were sustained.

The task of supplying

investors complete information on coming issues has been
difficult because of the complexity of the debt structure.
Improvements in the general debt structure will make good
reporting easier.
Timing of Louisiana Bond Sales, 19^7-1959
Another question that was not covered in the analysis
of individual bond issues concerns the timing of bond sales.
Since the date of issue is usually the same or very close to
the date of the bond sale, a review of these dates of issue
provides a basis for determining whether Louisiana has taken
advantage of the seasonal pattern which seems to exist in
92
bond yields.
Of the fifty-one bond sales in Louisiana

^^Supra, Chap. II, pp. 128-32.

between X9lj-7 and 1959, twenty-seven (52.9 pen cent)
consisted of direct obligations.

(See Table C.)

These

direct obligations were sold mostly in the first seven
months of the year when rates appear to

be lower than

normal.

of the direct bond

Twenty-four, or 88.9 per cent,

issues were floated in those months.

The only three issues

sold at other times were two institutional improvement
flotations totaling $ 6 ,2 5 1 ,0 0 0 and one highway issue of - '
$10,000,000.

Only one issue was sold in April when the

seasonal yields apparently are lowest, but
sales of these direct obligations seems

the timing

ofthe

to have been

generally satisfactory.
In the indirect category, there were twenty-four
separate sales during this post-war period.

Five of these

issues were sold in the favorable month of April and eleven
issues were sold in the first six months of the year.

But,

there were also eleven or l|.5,8.per cent of the indirect
issues sold in the months of November and December.

On the

whole, direct borrowing seems to have been better timed to
take advantage of the favorable rates.

If the seasonal

pattern is important, there remains a great deal of room for
Improvement in the timing of indirect sales.

Less efficient

timing in the sale of indirect obligations Is perhaps addi
tional evidence of the overuse of the authority device— the
result being loss of effective control and efficient fiscal
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TABLE C
DATES OP ISSUE OP LOUISIANA BONDS SOLD
DURING THE YEARS 19^7-1959a
TYPE OP DEBT
DIRECT
INDIRECT
1
k
0
3

DATE
JANUARY

1
15

FEBRUARY

1
15

1
0

2
0

MARCH

i
15

0
0

APRIL

l
15

2
1+
1
0

MAY

l
15

2
0

1
0

l
15
JULY
l
15
AUGUST
l
15
SEPTEMBER i
15

2
1

1
0

2
2

1
0

0
0
1
0

0
0
1
0

0
0

1
0

1
0

6
0

1
0

k
JL

JUNE

OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
TOTAL

i
15
l
15
i
15
.....

27

3
2

.

2k

^Phe classifications of direct and indirect obliga
tions here are the same as those used in this Chapter. For
example, the Port of New Orleans and Port of Baton Rouge
debts are listed under the indirect heading above. Two of
the direct issues above are classified by the date of sale
instead of the date of issue.
Source:

Compiled from Tables XXVII-XXXII, Appendix A.
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management.

The consequences can be better appreciated if

it is realized that indirect borrowing since 1 9 ^ 7 has
amounted to $232,^73*000.

The lowering of the interest rate

by even one-half of 1 per cent on say

per cent of this

indirect debt would make careful timing very worthwhile.
The classification of the dates of issue of bonds
sold recently clearly brings out another indisputable fact
about the debt; there have been a great many issues— fiftyone— in the 12-year period.
relatively small ones.

Many of these issues have been

According to good debt management

principles, frequent and relatively small Issues are unde
sirable.

They tend to clutter and complicate debt structures

and to drive up interest costs and administrative expenses.
Better planning could have undoubtedly reduced the number of
issues that were sold by the State in recent years.
Administrative Machinery. 19ii7-1959
There have been no significant changes in the func
tions of the Board of Liquidation since 19lp7•

During the

same period there have been only a few types of direct
borrowing.

The only new direct borrowing, which was for the

purpose of financing veterans* bonuses, was managed by the
Board of Liquidation and thus did not change or add to the
administrative machinery for debt management.

The most
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important change in the direct deht administration since
World War II has been the improvement in the machinery for
managing highway issues.

This highway debt reform was

actually much more significant than would have been the case
for any other borrowing.

This change alone has made the

1 9 l4.7 “ 1 9 5 9 period more successful than previous periods in

Louisiana*s debt history.
Another major recent change in the machinery for
managing the debt structure in Louisiana has been the tendency
toward more indirect agency borrowing.

Pour new agencies

have been added to the administrative machinery since 1952,
bringing the total number of agencies with outstanding debt
to nine.

This growing list of authorities bespeaks the lack

of any centralization and order in this important segment of
the debt structure.

When there are so many agencies, there

is really no "administrative machinery" in the sense of
coordinated and unified administration.

When reference is

made to Louisiana*s debt'Administrative machinery" and its
debt "management," therefore, the terms are used loosely.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The final Chapter of this study summarizes Louisiana
debt experience with emphasis on the important trends in
this borrowing.

The major defects that have appeared in the

debt structure and in debt management in recent times are
also outlined.

Important characteristics of the existing

debt structure are then compared with debt structures that
are found in several other states.

Finally, proposals for

the improvement of Louisiana’s debt structure and debt
management are submitted.
I.

TRENDS AND INFLUENCES OF EARLY BORROWING
ON LOUISIANA’S DEBT STRUCTURE

From the standpoint of influence on the present debt
structure in Louisiana, one of the more significant develop
ments before 1900 was the establishment of the Board of
Liquidation of the State Debt.

The Board of Liquidation,

however, has changed a great deal; its original function of
exchanging bonds in a refunding operation has been greatly
expanded.

Another obvious influence of the early period was

the carry-over of some of the early debt into this century,
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although the amount brought forward was relatively insignifi
cant,

A third influence of early borrowing is that the

record of default and repudiation in the nineteenth century
was not overlooked when some of the Louisiana debt was
refunded in 1911j.,

It is even possible that this repudiation

has had a subtle and indirect influence on the State*s more
recent credit standing.

Finally, some of the provisions of

acts in the early period were incorporated in whole or in
part into the Constitution of 1921 and some of them still
affect the debt structure.

One of the most important of

these provisions in the present Constitution is the debt
limitation.
For the first two decades of the twentieth century,
Port development in New Orleans was the major reason for
borrowing in Louisiana,

On the whole, these twenty years

were conservative and peaceful ones in debt matters.

A

major factor contributing to this quiet was that Louisiana
did not engage in bonus borrowing after World War I as did
some of the other states.

The tempo of borrowing increased

rapidly at the end of the twenties and continued at a very
high rate until about 1932.

After 1932, the rate of borrow

ing declined somewhat, but debt financing still continued at
a high level.

Highway borrowing was the most important debt

issuance throughout the 1930*s.

When World War II came,

Louisiana practically suspended her borrowing and debt
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development, while the economy kept growing.

By the end of

World War II, the State was in a relatively strong financial
position, but pressure was put on the debt structure by
veterans* bonus borrowing.

The most important recent trend

in the evolution of Louisiana*s debt structure has been the
movement toward indirect borrowing which has taken place
since 1952.

In most periods, Louisiana*s debt practices

have had some unique characteristics, but in general,
practices and trends have paralleled closely the experience
of other American states.

This similarity is evident when

the debt structure in Louisiana is compared with the debt
structure in other states.
II.

MAIN DEFECTS OF THE DEBT STRUCTURE AND

DEBT MANAGEMENT IN LOUISIANA SINCE 1921
The major defects of structure and management In
Louisiana borrowing in recent times have been of two types.
In the first category are the Institutional defects which
are included In the Constitution of 1921.

The second group

of flaws, resulting partly from the poor legal framework,
are the inefficiencies in the administrative machinery.
Legal Impediments to Efficient Borrowing
Many institutional Impediments to efficient public
finance are contained and perpetuated in the Constitution of
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1921.

There la no systematic treatment of debt policy in

this document, and the provisions relative to borrowing are
detailed and scattered.

The constitutional debt limitation

is highly Inflexible and is not representative of the public
attitude toward borrowing in the State.
Other institutional flaws that have their origin In
the Constitution of 1921 are the various tax dedications.
Tax dedications developed at a time when the State*s credit
was relatively poor; they were apparently intended to lend
security to bond issues in order to make them more marketa
ble.

The main results of the dedications, however, have

been to add complexity to the debt structure and to use tax
revenues and other funds inefficiently as protection for
bond issues.

The dedication of tax revenues to certain bond

issues has also contributed to wide use of prior and subor
dinate liens in Louisiana.

Other things equal, bonds with

subordinate liens are less marketable and such borrowing is
more expensive.

Still another defect in the relationship

between taxation and borrowing is the existence of a property
1
tax limitation in the Constitution.
This restriction is
not at all reassuring to bondholders.

It has been noted

that the states which have received the highest ratings on
their bond issues usually have had unlimited taxing power.

^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 1 0 , Sec. 3 , as
amended 1 9 5 ^.
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Administrative Impediments to
Efficient Borrowing
The second major Institutional impediment in
Louisiana*s debt structure is in the administrative machin
ery.

This problem, of course, cannot be entirely separated

from the constitutional or legal framework.

The administra

tive machinery for debt management in Louisiana has had
these weaknesses!

(1 ) there has been no centralized manage

ment of the entire debt structure; (2 ) the lines of authority
in debt management have been changed repeatedly and provi
sion has not always been made for clear and consistent
administrative machinery; (3 ) there has seldom been enough
flexibility in administrative authority to permit efficient
debt management; and, (I4.) finally, there has been no clear
and consistent planning or comprehensive policy in the
shaping of the debt structure.
Examples of these major flaws in Louisiana*s debt
structure and management are numerous.

The lack of central

ized management, which has resulted from the use of separate
and uncoordinated constitutional authorizations, is evident
in the fact that not all Louisiana borrowing is reviewed by
a single governmental unit but rather the borrowing is done
on an independent or semi-independent basis by the several
agencies and departments of the State.

The fact that the

administrative machinery has been changed frequently and is
still not clear is illustrated by the "off-agaln-on-again”
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role of the Board of Liquidation in State borrowing.

Today

it is still difficult to discover exactly the relationships
between say, the State Treasurer, the Board of Liquidation,
the Highway Commission, and the State Bond and Tax Board.
The lack of freedom to vary provisions in bond sales,
which freedom is necessary if debt management is to take
place at all, has been an especially serious flaw in
Louisiana.

Authors of constitutional amendments authorizing

borrowing have usually included a superabundance of direc
tions about bond provisions.

It has often been indi

cated that bonds should be serials, that they should be
deferred, that they should be callable, and even, on one
occasion, the exact date of issue was specified.

The

problem of getting the best terms is a matter requiring
the utmost in flexibility to cope with fast changing condi
tions in the bond markets— it is, therefore, a function of
management and not a matter of policy.
In addition to the overdetailing of debt provisions
in Louisiana*s Constitution, there has also been a lack
of clarity and consistency in debt policy.

Some bonds

have been direct obligations without being full faith and
credit obligations.

Other bonds have been secured by the

State*s full faith and credit pledge while at the same time
being indirect obligations.

In still other issues, the
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State's role Is not expressly given.

The use of the call

feature has not been consistent, and the timing of bond
sales has been less predictable.

Even the offices charged

with the actual process of selling the bonds have often
been changed.

All such practices have contributed uncer

tainty to the debt structure, and this uncertainty is
considered reprehensible by the rating agencies arid the
bond buyers.
III.

LOUISIANA'S DEBT STRUCTURE, 1957

Louisiana's debt structure is summarized in Table
XXXVII, Appendix A.

The 1957 data are used in order to

facilitate comparisons with other states.

2

The total

Louisiana debt outstanding on June 30, 1957* was approxi
mately $351j.,359,000.

This total consisted of $114-3,763,000

of direct debt and $210,596,000 of Indirect debt.
Debt Outstanding in 1957 Compared
to Debt'Out standing' in 19^.6
On June 30, 19^6, the total debt outstanding In
Louisiana was $160,676,000; In 1957* it had increased by
p

The data in the Table were compiled from three
sources. The Financial Report omits $123,299*000 of debt
for which the State either contributes funds or has guaran
teed payment by pledging its full faith and credit. Moody's
is the most complete of the three sources. The Census
Bureau's Compendium of State Government Finances reclassi
fies data supplied by the states according to uniform
categories.
(See Table XXXVIII, Appendix A.)
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121 per cent to #35J|-*359* 000.
A.)

(See Table XXXVII, Appendix

Debt service requirements reported in the Financial

Report were #12,387*000 in the fiscal year 19ij.7-19Ji.8j and
they reached a high of #21,730,000 in 1955-3-956— an increase
of 75 per* cent.

The absolute debt burden thus has increased

considerably over the last decade.
The State*s economy has also grown since 19if6.

Total

tax collections in Louisiana have increased from #98,915*000
in 19ij-6 to #351*893*000 in 1958— an increase of over 250 per
cent,

(See Tables XXXIX, XL, and XLI, Appendix A.)

The

various taxes dedicated for the payment of the State*s obli
gations have all increased in yield over the last seven
years.

Total revenues have Increased by about threefold.

Personal incomes within the State increased during the same
period by over 130 per cent.

The ability to bear debt has

increased in Louisiana more than enough to offset the
increase In debt.
Louisiana1s Debt Structure Compared
to Other States, 1957
The present debt burden in Louisiana is somewhat
lighter than it was in the past.

But, how does this burden

^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lj.7-Jj-8, p. 3* and 195556, p. 8. Actual debt service payments were somewhat higher
than this sum because the report omits several issues.

\
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compare with state debt burdens in other states?

The

Compendlum of State Government Finances in 1957 is the
source of much valuable information for comparing the debt
structures of the states.

The states selected for this

comparison are the five states that in 1953 had significant
amounts of general obligations outstanding, all rated Aaa.
Louisiana^ general obligations outstanding at that time
consisted of

per cent rated Aa, lf.8.2 per cent rated A,
k
Ijij-.ij. per cent rated Baa, and 3.1 P®r cent not rated.
The
comparison then is a rigorous one for the State of Louisiana—
it compares the State with the leaders in the field.
The purposes of borrowing in the six states in the
comparison were the familiar ones.

The percentage of total

long-term debt devoted to highway finance ranged from 1(.7 . 2
per cent in Louisiana to 67.1 P®** cent in Connecticut.
Table A . )

(See

Highway borrowing was the most important purpose

for borrowing in the selected states as well as in all
forty-eight states.

(See Table XLII, Appendix A.)

Highway

obligations accounted for 5 ^ . 3 Pe** cent of long-term debt
outstanding in the forty-eight states in 1957.

Assuming that

amounts outstanding indicate the volume of borrowing, high
way borrowing has actually accounted for a smaller share of
total borrowing in Louisiana than in other states.

^Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, p. 81.
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TABLE A
LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING BY PURPOSE FOR ALL STATES
AND SELECTED STATES, l957a

Highways
to LongTerm Debt
Outstanding
(per cent)

State

Education
to LongTerm Debt
Outstanding
(per cent;

Veterans*
Bonus to
Long-Term
Debt Out
standing
(per cent)

Nonhighway
Transportation
to Long-Term
Debt Out
standing
(per cent)

All ij.8
States

54*3

13.1

8.9

1.8

Louisiana

47.2

5.5

14.5

10 .3

Conn.

67.1

10.8

6.7

0.5

Maryland

64.7

18 .2

Mas s.

60.2

.7

6 .0

3.6

New York

52.1;

.4

1.5

6.5

Ohio

60.8

4.9

21.7

---

—

a

The percentages here are based on
in Table XLII, Appendix A. The Louisiana
changed in order that the comparison with
be valid. The Compendium classifications
Source:

Table XLII, Appendix A.

the amounts given
amounts are not
other states will
are uniform.
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Other important purposes for which the states have
borrowed heavily are education and veterans* bonuses.

The

states as a group devoted 1 3 . 1 per cent of their borrowing
to education.

Louisiana was far below this average with

only 5.5 per cent of its borrowing for education.

Veterans*

bonus debt was 8.9 per cent of the total debt outstanding in
all states in 1957.

In this case, Louisiana was much higher

than average— 11^.5 pen cent of the debt outstanding was
incurred for this purpose.

Among the states in the sample,

only Ohio borrowed more to finance veterans* bonuses.
Another very important fraction of the Louisiana debt out
standing at that time was for nonhighway transportation.
The average borrowed for nonhighway transportation was only
1.8 per cent in all the states, but it was 10.3 per cent in
Louisiana.

Two of the other states in the selection also

had substantial amounts for this purpose— New York had 6.5
per cent of its borrowing in the nonhighway category, and
Massachusetts had 3.6 per cent.
Table B contains several comparisons which show the
relative importance of borrowing in the various state
financial structures.

The State of Louisiana had the lowest

ratio of borrowing to borrowing plus other revenue of any of
the individual states selected.

Only 2.8 per cent of State

funds in Louisiana in 1957 came from borrowing.

However,

average annual borrowing in Louisiana actually has been much
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TABLE B
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES IN ALL STATES AND
SELECTED STATES, 1957

Per
Per Capita
Borrowing
Debt Re- Borrowing
to
deraption
to
Capita
Debt to
Expend!Debt
Personal
Revenue
to
ture
(dollars)
Income
and
Revenue
(per cent)
Per Capita
Borrowing
and
(per cent) Borrowing
(per cent)
(per cent)

State

All 48
States

5.7

2.6

6.2

I 81.25

4 .2

2.8

2.5

2.9

106.74

7.4

Conn.

23.5

2.8

22.8

175.00

6.5

Maryland

1 2.0

5.4

1 2.2

184.17

8.8

Mass.

17.4

6.0

17.0

210.61

9.5

New York

5.9

4.5

6.4

124.75

5.2

Ohio

9.9

2 .2

11.5

78.08

3.6

Louisiana

a

If the average borrowing in Louisiana for the period
1 9 4 7 - 1 9 5 7 had been used instead of the borrowing in 1 95 7
alone, borrowing as a per cent of revenue and borrowing would
have been 5 P©r cent and borrowing as a per cent of expendi
ture would have been 5 . 1 P®** cent.
Sources

Tables XLII and XLIII, Appendix A.
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greater* than the $l8,7i(-8*000 upon which this ratio was based.
If the average of $33,036,381}.. 62 for the years 19l}.7-1957 had
been used, the figure would have been 5 per cent.

In all of

the forty-eight states in 1957, borrowing was 5.7 P®** cent of
the total revenue and borrowing.

In the same Table, Louisiana

debt redemption was a slightly smaller percentage of revenue
and borrowing than the average for all states and considera
bly smaller than the average for most of the states In the
sample.

This ra#!o could mean that the State was postponing

its debt retirement and/or that it had a relatively light
debt burden.

Other evidence will show that the second

proposition is the correct one.
In the third comparison in Table B, borrowing as a
percentage of expenditure, Louisiana in 1957 again depended
far less upon borrowing than the average state.

Borrowing

in 1957 constituted only 2.9 per cent of Louisiana's expen
ditures, but it was 6.2 per cent in all states.

If average

Louisiana borrowing for the years 19^7-1957 ($33*036,381}..62)
is used instead of 1957 borrowing only, the State of
Louisiana still compares favorably, with borrowing consti
tuting 5*1 Pe** cent of expenditures.

The nearest other

state in the sample was New York, which was above the in
state average with 6.1}. per cent.

The remainder of the

states in the sample ranged from 11.5 P®** cent in Ohio to
22.8 per cent in Connecticut.
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Louisiana*s per capita debt in 1957 was $106.7^4-.
This sura was substantially greater than the national average
of $ 81.25.

There were, however, five other states with per

capita debts between $100 and $120 and eight others with per
capita debts greater than $120.

Of the five other states

in the above comparison, only Ohio had a lower per capita
debt than Louisiana.

Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,

and New York all had greater per capita debts than Louisiana.
The fact of greater per capita debts in other states, of
course, is not a sufficient test— per capita debt must be
related to some income figure to measure relative burdens.
This comparison is also made in Table B.

Per capita

debt was 1^.2 per cent of per capita income in the fortyeight states.

Louisiana*s per capita debt was J.k per cent

of per capita income.
ratios were as follows:

In the states with prime ratings, the
Connecticut, 6.5 P©r cent; Maryland,

8.8 per cent; Massachusetts, 9.5 P©r cent; New York, 5.2 per
cent; and Ohio, 3.6 per cent.

The debt in Louisiana measured

by this criterion was greater than the national average, but
less than the average for the five other states.

^United States Bureau of the Census, Department of
Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957.
State Finances: 1957~TWashlngton! Government Printing
Office, 1958), p.’T r ’
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As of 1957* Louisiana was using its borrowing power
sparingly.

In this respect, Louisiana compares favorably

with states that have far surpassed it in the bond ratings.
This difference in ratings does not seem to be justified on
the basis of relative debt burdens and ability to pay.

Yet,

these are nominally the basic criteria used in the bond
market.
The next important table, Table C, shows the long
term debt outstanding in selected states in 1957 and clas
sifies this debt according to its character.

Of the five

states selected for the comparison, only one state had rela
tively as much full faith and credit debt as did Louisiana.
Louisiana and Massachusetts had 27.2 per cent of their debt
in the nonguaranteed category.

New York had 39.1 per cent

nonguaranteed while Connecticut and Maryland had 6ij..3 and
65.8 per cent of their debt nonguaranteed.

Ohio had 75.7

per cent not covered by the full faith and credit of the
state.

In all of the forty-eight states, 52 per cent of all

long-term debt was nonguaranteed.

6

It has been Indicated in

^The relatively high percentage of nonguaranteed debt
in most of the selected states may have another implication;
it may be a reason why all of the guaranteed or full faith
and credit bonds of these states have been given the top
rating by Moody’s. There may be some significance to this;
however, the states were selected not only because they had
Aaa ratings but also because they had large amounts of general
obligations outstanding.
It cannot be concluded, therefore,
that the states had Aaa ratings on their full faith and
credit debt mainly because they specialized in nonguaranteed
Issues and thus had little full faith and credit debt.
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TABLE C
LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OF FISCAL YEAR
BY CHARACTER FOR ALL STATES AND SELECTED
STATES IN 1957

State

Nonguar
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
anteed
Payable
Total
General
Initially
(per cent)
(per cent) Obliga
From Specific
tions
(per cent) Nontax Revenues
(per cent)

52.0

All 48 States

48.0

3 3 .9

Louisiana

72.8

72.8

Connecticut

3 5 .7

2 9 .5

6.2

6 4.3

Maryland

3 4 .2

20.6

13.6

6 5.8

Massachusetts

72.8

5 8 .9

13.9

27.2

New York

6 0 .9

2 0 .9

40.0

3 9 .1

Ohio

24*3

21).. 3

li^.l

fit

m m m

27.2

7 5 .7

aThis information Is not entirely accurate. The Port
of New Orleans debt, which is a long-term full faith and
credit liability of the State, is payable partly from Port
revenues.
Source:

Compiled from Table XLIV, Appendix A.

377
several places in this study that use of the full faith and
credit of a state appears to be desirable; if the state is
to be involved at all in debt financing, it is probably best
to make the most of the involvement by making it as effec
tive as possible.

If this reasoning is correct, it would

appear that Louisiana is following good debt management
policy by giving its pledge to a large portion of its issues.
Another Interesting part of Table C is the breakdown
of the full faith and credit debt of the states into the
debt that was payable initially from specific nontax reve
nues and the debt secured solely by the full faith and
credit pledge.

Louisiana Is shown as having only general

obligations and no debt payable Initially from specific
nontax revenues.

7

The other five states have a relatively

high incidence of full faith and credit obligations that are
payable initially from specific nontax revenues.

Here it

appears that the rating services may have drawn a distinc
tion between tax dedication and nontax revenue dedication.
The distinction has validity in Louisiana; the pledge of
specific tax revenues is backed by the full faith and credit
pledge.

But this practice amounts to financial redundancy.

7

This information is not entirely accurate. The Port
of New Orleans debt, which is a long-term full faith and
credit liability of the State, is payable partly from Port
revenues.
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In some other states, significant portions of full faith and
credit obligations are payable from nontax revenues and then
ultimately from tax revenues if all else fails.

Whether

this type of double protection actually Is really necessary
for the protection of holders of state bonds still seems to
be questionable.

However, as long as the present bond

criteria remain unchanged, it behooves alert state authori
ties to shape their debt structures and debt management to
make the best of the situation.
Another important comparison between Louisiana and
the selected states concerns the rate at which obligations
are retired.

(See Table XLV, Appendix A.)

In this compari

son, Louisiana’s scheduled maturities decline from
$20,565,000 in I960 to $7,01^1,000 In 1969.

During the

period from 1957 to 1969, 5^.2 per cent of the debt out
standing will be retired.

Massachusetts* debt maturity

schedule will require approximately $25,000,000 each year
until 1969, and the portion retired by that time will be
almost the same as in Louisiana.

The only state, of those

examined, that will retire its debt more quickly than
Massachusetts and Louisiana is Maryland.

(See Table D.)

In

that state, 61.5 pen cent of the debt will be retired before
1970.

In the other states In the sample, Ohio will retire

only 14}..7 P©r cent of its debt before 1970; New York will
retire only 32 per cent, and Connecticut will retire 31.3
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TABLE D
LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OP FISCAL YEAR, BY
SELECTED SCHEDULED MATURITY PERIODS FOR ALL
STATES AND SELECTED STATES, 1957

Total
Debt
(thousands)

Maturing 1970
and thereafter
(thousands)

#13,521,970

#7,577,616

56.0

321,301

1146,859

1*5.8

Connecticut

388,671

266,935

68.7

Maryland

520,271}.

192,928

38.5

State

All I4.8 States
a
Louisiana

Maturing
1970 and
thereafter
(per cent)

Massachusetts

1 ,0 1 3 , 6 8 1

1463,1430

1*5.7

New York

1,971)-, 278

1,3142 ,52 0

68.0

708,307

393,310

55.3

Ohio

aThls sum does not include all of Louisiana*s
indirect debt, but it has not been changed in order that
the comparison with other states will be valid.
Source:

Compiled from Table XLV, Appendix A.
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per cent.

All of the forty-eight states will have only kk

per cent of their debts retired by the end of 1969.
Louisiana, therefore, is providing well for debt retirement
in comparison with selected states and all states.
In most of the above analysis, Louisiana1s debt
structure compares favorably.

The amount borrowed for

highways Is not disproportionate.

The debt burden is higher

than the average for all states but lower than in the
selected states.

Pull faith and credit obligations have

been widely usedj and, finally, the debt is being retired
rapidly.

If the basic economic strength of the State and

the intrinsic soundness of Its financial structure were
given the weight they deserve (and the weight that the
rating services claim to give these factors), Louisiana
would have a good part of its outstanding debt rated Aaa,
There Is, nevertheless, ample opportunity for improvement In
debt management and in the debt structure in Louisiana.
This Internal improvement is imperative as long as the
rating systems and the market criteria are unchanged.
IV.

PROPOSALS

Alternate proposals suggested here for improving
the State*s debt structure and debt management are based
upon two different assumptions:

the first assumption is
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that a full scale reform of the Constitution and the admin
istrative machinery is possible; the second assumption is
that present legal institutions will be continued.

Some

general ideas are presented at the end of this Chapter which
raise questions about intergovernmental relationships and
relationships of state and local units to each other and to
the various rating services.
Constitutional Codification and
Reform Objectives
A comprehensive reform of Louisiana's debt structure
and management could best start with the Constitution of
1921,

It would probably be easier to adopt a new constitu

tion than to try to amend the present one into a satisfactory
form, but it would not be impossible to amend certain
existing provisions of the Constitution and to add others.
In either case, constitutional provisions covering the debt
structure and debt management should be treated separately
and in an orderly fashion.

This procedure would be a very

Important first step in any reform because it would attack
the evil of complexity at its source.
In codifying and revising constitutional debt provi
sions, there are several other objectives besides simplicity
which would be important in improving the debt structure.
These objectives would include:

building confidence in the

State*s credit standing; allowing for more flexibility In
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debt management; and, providing greater margins of protec
tion for all issues.
The observation was made in Chapter II that the
success of a state’s debt structure and debt management
depends to a great extent on building confidence.

With the

market criteria prevailing today, a state must give very
careful attention to creating confidence in issues by
observing all of the conventions which are highly regarded
in the market, even if there is less than one chance in one
thousand that a threat of default or repudiation will ever
cause the extra guarantees to be tested.

For this reason,

the constitutional reform must be written so as to inspire
confidence in the State’s intention to repay and also in the
protection offered to the bondholders.

A good starting

point in establishing this debt policy might be a paragraph
like the following:
The State government of Louisiana and any
agency chartered by the State is hereby charged
with the responsibility of maintaining the State’s
credit by every means possible. It is hereby
provided that there shall always be prompt and
complete payment of every valid outstanding^
obligation of the State and of the interest due

The term "valid outstanding obligation" is used to
eliminate difficulty from the Reconstruction issues that may
be still outstanding.
It is possible that Louisiana made a mistake in not
paying this debt, If only for the purpose of removing this
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on such obligations on their due dates. The
State of Louisiana hereby waives its sovereign
right to repudiate any valid direct or indirect
obligations of the State.
The objective of permitting better debt management
could be achieved in a comprehensive reform of the Constitu
tion by leaving decisions

about such matters as timing,

advertising, selling, and

other sundry bond provisions tobe

determined by some body created
debt management function.

primarily to perform the

More latitude can be providedfor

the debt managers by omitting the management details from
the constitutional debt ordinance.
Methods of Increasing Protective Margins
An entirely feasible approach to the matter of
increasing protective margins was proposed by Ross and
Sliger in a 19f>7 study of Louisiana tax dedications.

9

The

relationship between tax dedications and the debt structure

blemish from its credit record. Such action would have
required about $llj.,000,000 and could have been extended over
several years. The decision of the United States govern
ment to assume the debts incurred by the states during the
Revolutionary War succeeded dramatically in building this
nation*s credit. More recently, the repayment of Its World
War I debts by Finland did much to improve that nation*s
credit. A similar effect might have resulted from the
action suggested above for Louisiana. Of course, fortuitous
windfalls and other problems make the suggestion impractical
at this late date.
^William D. Ross and B. F. Sliger, ’’Dedication of
State Revenues in Louisiana," Louisiana Business Review,
XXII, No, if. (April, 1958), 20-537

was analyzed in that study, and proposals were made as to
what might be done about existing dedications which were
considered to be undesirable.

The study distinguished three

time periods and indicated what action would be possible in
each period.

It was found that it would have been possible

for the Louisiana Legislature alone to free 35 per cent of
existing State tax dedications between 1957 and the beginning
of 1959.

It was also possible that 25 per cent more of the

dedications could have been removed by constitutional change
in the short-run.

Since 16 per cent of Louisiana taxes was

not dedicated at the time of the study, this meant that
about 75 per cent of all State tax dedications could have

10
been eliminated by the end of 1958.
The second time period examined was the period from
January 1, 1959 to December 31, 196lj.,

Scheduled debt

retirement would have freed most nonhighway tax revenues by
the end of this Intermediate period.

A longer period would

have brought more debt retirement which would have eliminated
most of the remaining tax dedications.

Complete freedom

from tax dedication would have been possible by 1975 if some
dedication-supported bonds with 1985 maturities had been
called.

11

10ibid.
■^Ibld.
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The value of this analysis has not been altered sub
stantially by the lapse of time since 1957.

Changes in tax

dedications are not necessarily an almost impossible matter
pertinent only in the long-term.

Changes in the handling of

tax revenues should be started as soon as it is decided that
they will make the State*s fiscal structure sounder.

The

elimination of such tax dedications by constitutional and
other means would be important in its effect on the debt
structure, but, of course, dedications are only one aspect
of the debt problem.
Another type of reform, similar but more comprehen
sive than that proposed by Ross and Sliger and provided by
means of a new State Constitution, could follow these lines!
1.

All existing pledges and dedications to holders
of outstanding bonds could be reenacted. It
could be made clear that no existing pledges
will be extended to bonds or Issues sold subse
quent to the adoption of this policy.

2.

There could be no borrowing except in the
State’s name either by departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards, for financing ports,
expressways, public institutions, or similar
public improvements or for any other reason.
There could be no indirect State debt, and
all State debt could be full faith and credit
debt of the State of Louisiana,

3.

All direct State bonds could be payable from
the general fund of the State. The general
fund could consist of: (a) all tax and
license revenues, mineral lease and royalty
receipts which are not dedicated to the
payment of bonds or for other purposes at

38$
the date when the document is ratified;
(b) all taxes and revenues presently dedi
cated, as the bonds issued and payable from
the said taxes and revenues are retired
and/or called; (c) all undedicated surpluses
of presently dedicated taxes in the interim
until they revert to the general fund.
i|.

There could be no further dedication of either
taxes, revenues, or receipts for the payment of
specific bond issues or for any other purpose.12
All taxes and revenues not presently dedicated
and all taxes and revenues presently dedicated,
as soon as bonds backing them are retired,
could be paid into the general fund. Taxes
and revenues presently dedicated for other
purposes than debt service could be either
undedicated or the other purposes clearly
could be given a subordinate claim to debt
service,

5.

The first charge upon the general fund could
be for the payment of principal and interest
on all direct obligations. No other payments
could be made out of said fund until all debt
service requirements are satisfied.

6.

There could be no legal limitation on the
Legislature*s authority to levy ad valorem
taxes for the payment of interest and principal
on the full faith and credit obligations of the
State.

Greater margins of protection for the State’s issues
would result automatically if the various obligations of the
State were not differentiated.

The use of the State’s full

faith and credit pledge, made fully and unequivocally effec
tive by a constitutional prior claim on all State revenues,

■^The views here about dedications are similar to
those recommended in the Pro .let, II, p. 227*
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in support of each new State issue would mean that no issue
would he subordinate to any other issue.

All issues,

individually and in the aggregate, would then clearly be
protected by the total revenues and other resources of the
State.

Such action would have to be taken in the beginning

subject to prior specific bond liens.

Eventually, however,

all issues outstanding would be single lien bonds protected
by the total resources of the State government of Louisiana.
The results could unquestionably be expected to be Aaa
ratings for all Louisiana bonds.

Every existing excuse for

not awarding such ratings would have been removed.
Constitutional Debt Limitation
A very important part of any constitutional reform of
the debt structure in Louisiana would have to deal with the
present debt limitation.

Louisiana may still need some sort

of debt limitation, but the present one is too rigid.

A

flexible limitation, somewhat along the lines suggested by
Ratchford,

13

might be appropriate.

The Legislature could be

permitted to borrow so long as the debt outstanding, including

13B. U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, i9llj.lV, pp. lf.92-95;
See also, B. U. Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations,"
Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Conference on Taxation
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax Association, 1959),

215. 29.
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new borrowing, does not exceed a certain amount or a certain
percentage of taxes or revenues collected in the preceding
year or in several earlier years.

Because of the time lag,

the percentage rule would tend to limit borrowing when
prices and tax collections are rising and permit borrowing
when they are falling.

Borrowing in excess of the basic

permissible amount might be made possible by having proposed
borrowing approved by means of referenda.

A referendum

would give the electorate the opportunity to control borrow
ing when the limit of safety is being approached, but such
action would not involve complicating the Constitution by
amendment.

A debt limitation might also be modified to give

special consideration to borrowing for projects that are
self-supporting.

Borrowing for such self-supporting projects

might properly not be counted at all against the debt limita
tion or else be counted at some fraction of the actual
amount borrowed.
Capital Budgeting
Capital budgeting could be an important part of any
111constitutional debt reform.
It would be desirable to
establish procedures whereby various departments and agen
cies of the State would prepare estimates of their long-term

^ R o s s and Sliger, loo, clt.
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capital needs.

These different needs could then be reviewed,

compared, and ranked according to priority.

The next step

would be to compare the cost of the various needs with the
current revenues available to finance them.

The difference

between current revenues and needs would then be subject to
still another set of considerations.
State to borrow for these purposes?
State to engage in borrowing?

IS it proper for the
Is it safe for the

Can these needs be postponed

and how long can they be postponed?

Any planning that would

make possible discretion in the timing of bond sales would
be extremely important.
Some refinement of capital budgeting might be neces
sary to recognize the fact that there are many existing
agencies in the State and that these agencies would probably
continue in operation even after constitutional reform, if
for no other reason than that they have debt committments
that must be honored.

It might be necessary to consider

these agencies separately in the capital budget.

In review

ing the different requests, it would appear to be proper to
allow the anticipated receipts of revenue-producing projects
to be given special consideration.
Administrative Machinery
After the capital budget has been formulated, and if
it includes any proposals for borrowing, these proposals
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could be reviewed by a constitutionally established special
Board (or perhaps two Boards).

Reports about the financial

and economic feasibility of this proposed borrowing could
then be returned to the budget group for a decision.

The

Bond Boards would have the authority to manage the borrowing
that might eventually result and to administer any special
bond service fund that might be established.

In Louisiana,

it would not be necessary and it probably would not even be
desirable to eliminate the highway debt structure that has
recently been put in order.

In fact, the long-range highway

plan which has been implemented could well serve as a model
for redesigning the remaining debt structure of the State.
The long-range highway plan embodies the basic techniques
15
for improving a debt structure.
Remarks here about a Bond
Board, therefore, could apply either to a single board system
or to all other parts of the debt structure except the
highway debt.

If a dual system were installed, both would

benefit from close cooperation, and it might be desirable and
economical for the two bodies to share research and other
facilities since their objectives would necessarily be
similar.

•^^Por an analysis of the long-range highway plan,
supra, Chap. V, pp. 3 0 8 ff.
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There should be one or two bodies clearly responsible
for all phases of State borrowing.

These units would best

be composed of legal experts, economists, statisticians, and
possibly representatives in the financial centers.

The

savings realized by eliminating duplications of debt manage
ment personnel and facilities in the several agencies of the
State would probably more than cover the expenses required
to operate these new units.

Consolidation would then provide

a net gain for the State if it could improve bond ratings
and make possible lower cost borrowing.

One function of

such a Board would be to establish and to maintain legisla
tive liason.

The debt Board would be responsible for

receiving and processing requests for borrowing indicated in
the capital budget.

With this as a guide, the Board could

formulate and even draft bills for submission to the proper
legislative committees.

The initiation of borrowing legis

lation by a body concerned with building and maintaining an
effective debt structure would eliminate some troublesome
provisions from Louisiana’s debt structure which have never
been eliminated simply because no one has had either the
responsibility or the authority to study, suggest, explain,
or protest against the effects of such provisions.

It might

be more politic for the drafting of legislation to start
with the liason group in the Legislature rather than with
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the Board.

However, it would be necessary and proper for

the Board to explain to the legislative group fully and
exactly the nature of the provisions recommended for such
legislation.
The Bond Board, of course, would have to be wellinformed.

In order to be well-informed, it would have to

include within its organization a research unit.

The second

important function of the Bond Board, therefore, would be
fact finding.

Data that would aid in the advertisement and

marketing of bonds, the timing of sales, and the reporting
of debt would need to be gathered.
After bills authcsizing borrowing are approved —
either by the Legislature or by the Legislature and the
public in the case of a referendum— the problem would then
again revert to the Bond Board where the advertising and the
requesting of bids would be initiated.

The same group then

could review the bids received and select the best bid or
reject them all according to priorities established in the
capital budget.

After the bid is accepted, the Bond Board

could begin the process of preparing and finally delivering
the bonds.

Funds received as a result of the borrowing

would then be placed In the Treasury and made available for
the purpose designated.
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A final but extremely important function of the Bond
Board would be debt reporting.

This reporting function

would include responsibility not only for seeing that
complete information is published in the regular State
reports, but also informing rating services and investors
about the State*s debt structure.

In addition to answering

all inquiries about the debt structure, the Bond Board
should review all official published statements about the
debt structure in order to avoid errors.

Finally, it would

also be helpful for the Board to study all information
released by rating services about the State*s outstanding
and new offerings and to correct any misinterpretations
which do the State injustice.
Another of the major policies that would have to be
decided in any constitutional revision of the administrative
debt machinery would be what to do about agency or authority
borrowing.

The agency appears to be popular today mainly

because it circumvents debt limitations and because it has
met with some success in expediting the financing, the
construction, and the operation of certain improvements.
These reasons, however, are predicated on the failure of the
normal machinery of government.

If institutional Impedi

ments are eliminated and the normal channels of government
are made more effective, and if there is no outdated consti
tutional limitation, then there may be less justification

3%
for the use of the agency device.

The question here,

however, is not primarily whether the agency is justified
but whether it should borrow for the state.

If states

engaged only in direct borrowing and agencies were not
permitted to exercise this function, the alleged advantages
of the agencies might be utilized without running the risks
or suffering the disadvantages which may be associated with
borrowing by the agency means.

Agencies could continue

planning, supervising, and operating improvements while
being relieved of their borrowing powers.

This change would

not only ensure better control of funds but would also make
more effective use of the state*s credit In the financing of
improvements which usually contribute to economic growth on
the state level.
Improving the Debt Structure and
Management Under Existing Institutions
A great deal can be done to Improve the State*s debt
structure and management and its credit standing even under
the existing legal framework and administrative machinery.
If these cannot be changed, the various agencies authorized
to borrow in the State*s name could each follow individually
as far as possible the principles of good debt management
suggested In Chapter II.

For example, agencies requesting

legislative approval for borrowing could ask for more
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flexibility in the provisions of the act.

Or, if it is

impossible to get this freedom of action, it would be
desirable for the agencies to request specifically those
provisions which will make the bonds more marketable.
Agencies could also keep in mind the general objectives of
simplicity and confidence, could try to afford maximum pro
tection to the bondholders, and could try to time their
issues as effectively as possible.

These objectives are

valid for an entire debt structure and for each individual
Issue comprising that debt structure.

If the structure In

the aggregate cannot be given these characteristics, it
would still be desirable to try to extend them to the debt
structures of the individual agencies and to their Issues.
Another very general improvement that could be made,
with existing Institutions, would be for the various
agencies of the State to cooperate on a voluntary basis.
There is no limit to what could be accomplished by this
approach.

Cooperation would make agencies more cognizant

of their influence on the entire State*s debt structure.
Cooperation would also provide a wealth of Information about
the methods and techniques of debt management as well as
about market conditions.

This knowledge would benefit the

individual agencies as well as the taxpayers.

The various

agencies could also cooperate in research and in field work
in the financial centers of the country.

Finally, one of
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the places where cooperation is extremely important, and
■urgently needed if more direct means are not provided, is
in debt reporting.

Not even the Financial Report of the

State gives a true picture of the debt structure.

In 1957*

for example, the following agency debts were not even men
tioned:

Mississippi River Bridge Authority, $65*000,000;

Baton Rouge Port Commission, $12,500,000; and, the Greater
New Orleans Expressway Commission, $lj.6,500,000.

16

State is clearly involved in each of these debts.

Yet, the
It Is

very doubtful that the State can profit in the long run by
providing incomplete or inaccurate information to those who
are Interested.
V.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

These miscellaneous considerations relate to matters
external to state debt structures such as bond ratings and
Federal and local relationships.
Bond Ratings
A state has a good credit standing if its obligations
have a high standing In the market, i.e., if Its bonds are
highly rated.

But how accurately do bond ratings reflect

true ability and willingness to bear and to pay debts?

■^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57* PP. 56-58.
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Bond ratings are subject to question from several different
standpoints.

Prom what has been seen in the comparisons of

Louisiana ratings with the ratings in selected states, it
would appear that, with respect to the really fundamental
measures, Louisiana*s debt structure compares very favorably.
Why then are Louisiana's ratings substandard?
The superficialities upon which the bond ratings are
so largely based have been thoroughly violated in the State.
There has been widespread neglect of even the most obvious
amenities which would help to get better ratings.

The debt

structure has been made more and more complex, and the
margin of protection has been dissipated by the device of
dedication.

Specific taxes have been pledged many times,

and there has evolved a maze of liens.

Detailed studies are

thereby made necessary before the rating services and
investors can determine the nature of Louisiana's
obligations.
Violation of market standards is not the only factor
that underlies the poor ratings.

First, appropriately or

not, Louisiana's credit standing may still be affected by
the fact that the State twice defaulted on interest payments
and once repudiated part of its debt.

Second, the State is

relatively remote from the financial centers where munici
pals are rated and traded.

Distance may act as a baffle to

obscure the fact of rapid economic growth in Louisiana.
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Another factor which cannot be ignored in trying to
explain why ratings seem to be too low in Louisiana is the
nature of the ratings themselves.

The ratings are not

intended primarily as a public service but as a commercial
service.

The rating agencies thus actually depend for their

existence upon finding or emphasizing differences upon which
they can base and vary their ratings.

There are many differ

ences in indenture provisions and in the nominal protection
afforded to various issues, and these superficial differences
can be used very plausibly to justify differences in ratings,
without any intention of discriminating against any specific
state or political subdivision.

Unquestionably, ratings

based upon more profound criteria would tend to become more
uniform, no doubt in the upward direction, but the rating
services can hardly be expected to lead such a movement.
They may be willing to follow if someone else supplies the
necessary information to support it.
If the rating services have an Interest in perpetu
ating the present system of ratings based on traditional
criteria, they are not alone.

The investment bankers and

the investors have something to gain from the existence of
differences In ratings.

The difference in ratings Is sup

posed to reflect differences in investment quality.

This

"Investment quality” apparently also is supposed to show
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differences in risk.

The difference in quality and risk is

then a basis for differences in bids and yields.

Lower

ratings lead to higher yields and higher yields normally
will enable bidders to enjoy higher spreads between their
bids and their reofferings.

If the risk is more superficial

than real, then the buyers of the lower-rated state obliga
tions profit from the unreal differentiation caused by the
ratings.

It must not be expected that investment bankers or

investors would be in favor of revised criteria which would
emphasize only the total protection afforded by a state*s
wealth, resources, and honor.
Federal. State, and Local Debt
Relationships
This study analyzes the means by which a state may
make its debt financing more efficient.

Federal-state-local

cooperation in this connection may also offer possibilities.
One of the things that might be done would be to insure
municipals under some type of plan similar to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Perhaps bondholders could

have the first $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 of any state {or state and local)
bonds insured.

States might be induced to support sueh a

plan by paying into a fund according to the amount of bonds
they sell.
The Federal Government would have a great deal to
gain from participation in this type of program.

It would

ij.00
aid In any coordinated Federal-state local fiscal policy.
Also, any aid that the Federal government makes available to
the states may lessen the chances that the Federal govern
ment will have to assume more of the functions of government.
The Federal government would also be helping its own credit
standing by protecting that of the states.

The identifica

tion of the American states with the Federal government in
the minds of investors and other nations may be greater than
is generally recognized.

For example, when there was a ques

tion of whether foreign nations should pay their war debts
after World War I, one of the arguments against payment was
that the American states had defaulted on their bonds in the
nineteenth century when many of these state bonds were held
17
by foreign bondholders.
It might be possible for states to join regionally or
nationally, even without Federal aid or encouragement, into
this type of plan.

If either of these programs were estab

lished, it would not be difficult to take the next logical
step and to add an organization that would provide research
facilities, expert consultants, Information about market
conditions, and perhaps even new market outlets to the

^Reginald C. McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and Ameri
can State Debts (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 193^1,
p.
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member states.

The development of such an organization

would automatically tend to reduce dependence upon invest
ment bankers and vulnerability to rating services.

This

type of organization might also be better prepared to cope
with the problems that states some day may have in finding
enough funds for their needs.
Another great intergovernmental problem which has
been entirely neglected in this study is that facing subdi
visions of the states in their borrowing.

They, too, could

certainly profit greatly from assistance from some sort of
centralized reviewing and reporting agency.

For example,

one of the problems presently facing many subdivisions of
this State is that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
is rating some of the bank-heId bonds of Louisiana subdivi
sions as substandard, largely because there is insufficient
information available about these small issues.

There are

many problems confronting subdivisions, which cost the
citizens of the State dearly, that probably could be solved
with some State assistance.

Of course, this assistance

should be predicated on the State*s first putting its own
house In order.
The State*s responsibility to improve its own credit
may even require that the State first deliberately disas
sociate itself from the '’municipal” category.

There Is

really a great deal of difference between state borrowing and
city or subdivision borrowing*

One basic difference is

found in the respective abilities to raise revenue.

The

State obviously can control more funds beoause it is able to
use some highly productive taxes which are unavailable on
the local level.

The income tax is the most obvious example

of this type of tax, and the same thing is true to a lesser
extent of sales and excise taxes.

Since state governments

have greater revenue potential and sounder financial founda
tions than the local governments, should their obligations
be appraised according to the same basic standards that are
applied to local obligations?

Perhaps states should

emphasize these differences and demand that they be rated
according to different standards, especially when their full
faith and credit is involved.

APPENDIX A
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TABLE I
LOUISIANA BORROWING BY PURPOSE, 1913-1920
a
(thousands)
DIRECT

INDIRECT

YEAR

TOTAL
Serial
Gold
Bonds

Port
of New
Orleans

Peniten
tiary

I 3,000

$250

111*, 21*2

---

1913
191k

Chef
Menteur
Hwy. Fund
No. 2

110,992
--

mm mm m

1 ,2 5 0

--

1,250

M M

--

lj.,000

1*00

l*,l*oo

1918

--

mm mm am

6,000

--

6 ,0 0 0

1919

--

$700

8,000

--

8 ,7 0 0

......

7,500

__

7^500

$700

$29,750

$650

$1*2, 092

1915
1916
1917

1920
TOTAL

$10,992

_

bounded to the nearest thousand.
Source:

Compiled from Tables II-V, Appendix A.

kO$

TABLE II

a
STATE BOND AND INTEREST TAX FUND BORROWING, 1913-1920
Series
Date Interest
Original Callable
and
of
Rate
Amount or NonAuthor!- Issue (per cent)
Issued callable
gatlon_____________ (thousands)_________

Maturity Moody's
Date
Rating

Louisiana, Constitution (1913),
Article 32i(.:
Serial Gold Bonds
c

d
1/1/llp

110,992

C

1915196k

Aaa

^ h e s e direct and full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the proceeds of the 1 .15> mill ad valorem
tax in the State Bond and Interest Tax Fund.
1^
Interest rates given throughout this Appendix are
nominal or coupon rates unless it is otherwise indicated.
g

These bonds were called and refunded prior to 1939;
the rating is that which was given at the time of issue.
d
Rounded to the nearest thousand.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1913)> Art. 321p;
A. M. Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal
Bonds (New Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment Company, 1933)>
p. 1; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1922-23, pp. ix-x;
Moody's, 1918, pp. 191-92; and Louisiana, Board of Liquida
tion, 11Constitutional Provisions in Reference to Louisiana
Bonded Debt," (Baton Rouge: November and December, 1913)»
pp. 1 0 -1 2 .

lj.06

TABLE III
HIGHWAY BORROWING, 1913-1920**

Series
and
Authori
zation

Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody* 1
Date
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
of
Issue (per cent) Issued Callable
(1939;
(thousands)

Act 1 8 , Special Session,
1918
A

2/1/19

5.0

|700

NC

19201939

Aa

aPayable from the portion of motor vehicle licnese
taxes in Highway Fund Number 2. These obligations were not
full faith and credit obligations of the State, but they are
considered to have been direct obligations.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1913), as amended
1918, Special Session, Act 18; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report.
1922-23, pp. ix-x; "Schedule of Bond and Coupon Maturities
Handled by the Treasurer, State of Louisiana," Compiled by
H. B. Conner, State Treasurer(corrected to December 31,
1 9 2 9 }, p. 2£; Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and
Municipal Bonds. 1933, p. 8j and Moody1s, 1919, p. 2lHjT

407
TABLE IV
PORT OP NEW ORLEANS BORROWING, 1913-1920*
Series
and
Authori
zation

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*s
Date
Rating
of
Rate
Amount or Non
Issue (per cent) Issued call able
(1939)
(thousand s1

Louisiana, Constitution (1913)*
Article 322; and Act 133 of 1910:
4/ 1 / 1 4

5.0

$3 , 0 0 0

NC

1920-54

Baa

5/1/15

5.0

1 ,2 5 0

NC

1923-55

Baa

3/1/17

4 .5

4 ,0 0 0

NC

1925-57

Baa

3/1/19

5.o

2 ,0 0 0

NC

1927-59

Baa

Louisiana, Constitution (1913).
Article 322; and Act 244 of 1914$
and Act 3 of 1918:
7/1/18

5.o

6 ,0 0 0

NC

1929-58

Baa

1/1/19

5.0

6 ,0 0 0

NC

1930-59

Baa

1/1/20

5.o

5 ,0 0 0

NC

1931-60

Baa

1/1/20

5.0

2 ,5 0 0

NC

1931-60

Baa

aThese Indirect but full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the operating revenues of the Port,

.

These bonds were dated in 1920 but not Issued until

1921

Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1913)» Art. 322;
Louisiana, Acts (1910), Act 133, p. 209; (1914)» Act 244,
pp. 475-76; (1918), Act 3, pp. 5-10; Port of New Orleans,
"Statement of Amortization," 1922, pp. 1-17? Louisiana,
Treasurer*s Report. 1922-23, pp. ix-x; Moody*s, 1918, pp. 19192; 1923, p.“"8 7 0 ; .1938, p. 61+0.

1+08

TABLE V
STATE PENITENTIARY BORROWING, 1913-1920*

Series
and
Authori
zation

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody's
of
Rat6
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent)
Issued Callable
(1939/
(thousands)

Act 71,
1912
3/1/11+

£.0

$2^0

NC

1915-39

Baa

NC

1918-27

Aaa

Louisiana, Constitution (1913),
as amended 1916, Act 131+5
1/ 1 / 1 7

5 .0

1+00

b

£L
These indirect but full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the revenues of the Penitentiary.
This rating was given at the time of issue rather
than in 1939.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1913)» as amended
1916, Act 131+J Louisiana, Acts (1912). Act 7 1 , p. 82;
Louisiana, Treasurer* s Report. 1922-23, p. x; Smith, Compila
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 1933> p. 5? and
Moody's, 1 9 1 8 ",~PP". 191-92.

TABLE VI

LOUISIANA BORROWING BY PURPOSE, 1921-1927
(thousands)

INDIRECT

DIRECT
YEAR

TOTAL
Highway

Confed
erate
Veterans'
Pension

1921

---------------

1922

rnm mm mm

1923

mm ^ m m

Port of
New
Orle ans
$3 , £ 0 0

Peniten
tiary

----------------

$1 , 0 0 0
----------------

3 ,0 0 0

,
1
1

----------------

1926

—

$

£00

Source:

—

£00

£00
3 ,0 0 0

$2 , 0 0 0
$2 , 0 0 0

0
0
^

1925

TOTAL

1 ,0 0 0

3 ,0 0 0

1 9 2 J+

1927

$ 3 ,£ 0 0

#1 , 0 0 0

$9 , £ 0 0

. £ ,0 0 0
$1 , 0 0 0

$1 3 , 5 0 0

Compiled from Tables VII-X, Appendix A.
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TABLE VII
HIGHWAY BORROWING, 1921-1927

Series
and
Authori
zation

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
(19397
(thousands)

Act 179,
I 92 I4.
B

1
3/15/27

5.0

•*
$2,000

NC

1928-39

Aa

These obligations were payable from a portion of
motor vehicle license taxes in Highway Fund Number 2. They
were not full faith and credit obligations of the State.
Since borrowing by a department is considered borrowing in
a state*s name, these bonds are considered direct obliga
tions regardless of the fact that they were not full faith
and credit bonds.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art 6, Sec.
2 I4..I, as amended 192I4., Act 179, Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report.
1926-27, p. 59; and Moody*s, 1928, p. 12l£j..

IpXl

TABLE VIII
CONFEDERATE VETERANS* PENSION BORROWING, 1921-1927**

Series
and
Authori
zation

Date
interest Original Callable Maturity Moody* 1
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent) Issued Callable
(thousands)

Act 176,
1921 ).
b
A

12/1 5 /2 5

B

11/1/26

$500

NC

500

NC

1931

Aaa

1932

Aaa

D
5 .0

a
These direct and full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the proceeds of the 0 . 7 5 mill ad valorem
tax in the Confederate Veterans* Pension Fund.
These ratings are those which were given at the time
of issue.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, as
amended 192ij., Act 176; Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report,
1926-27, p. 59; and Moody*s, 1927, p. 1128; 1931, p. Iip99.
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TABLE IX
PORT OF NEW ORLEANS BORROWING, 1921-1927®

Series
Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody* s
and
of
Rate Amount or NonDate Rating
AuthoriIssue (per cent) Issued callable
(1939)
zation__________________ (thousands_)_________________________
Louisiana, Constitution (1921),
Article I4., Section 16:
12 / 1 / 2 1

9.0

$3 , 9 0 0

NC

1931-71

Baa

12 / 1 / 2 3

U-79

3 ,0 0 0

NC

1933-73

Baa

8/ 1 / 2 7

b.5

3 ,0 0 0

NC

1937-77

Baa

These indirect but full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the operating revenues of the Port. These
three issues sold by the Port during this period were all
General Improvement Bonds.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. I4., Sec.
16; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 192)i-25. p. 97; 1926-27,
p. 99; Moodyts, 1923, p. 970; 1929, p. 939; 1928, p. 1 2 1 )4.;
and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal
Bonds. 1933, PP. 10-11

U3

TABLE X
STATE PENITENTIARY BORROWING, 1921-19273,

Series
and
Author!zation

bate
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody’:
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent) Issued Callable
(1939)
(thousands)

Louisiana, Constitution (1921),
Article 20, Section 1:
1/ 1 / 2 2

5 .0

$1 , 0 0 0

NC

1923-62

Baa

aThese indirect but full faith and credit obligations
were payable from revenues of the Penitentiary.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 20, Sec.
1; Louisiana, Treasurers Report. 1922-23, p. x; Moody’s,
1922, p. 8 J4-O; and A. M. Smith, Compilation of Louisiana
State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A, M, Smith Invest
ment Company, 193&), P« 6 .

TABLE XI

LOUISIANA BORROWING BY PURPOSE, 1928-191+0
{thousands)

Highway

19 28
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
193I+
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
19lj.O

INDIRECT

DIRECT

YEAR

Confed
erate
Veterans*
Pension
500

I
$ 15,000

21,000
15,000
32,000

589

2,000

5 00
17,000
8,500
1 0 ,6 0 0

2.5 0 0
$ 129, 100°

Board of
Comm.
Port of
N.0.

Board of
Admin.
Charity
Hospital

.

----------------

---------------

---------------

----------------

.

.

.

----------------

.

.

.

5,502

----------------

----------------

----------------

.

.

.

.

ma m m am

----------------

----------------

----------------

■■• m t m

.

---------------

l; ,95o

.

.

2 , 000

----------------

----------------

----------------

. _ _

--- b
8,612

.

.

.

500
mmmwm

$ 5 ,5 8 9

Board of
Super
visors
of L.S.U.

_ _ _

295

$ 1 0 ,71+7^

.

.

MHW

----------------

~

TOTAL

Louisiana
State
Board of
Education

_ _ _

$

----------------

—

7 ,5 0 0
5 , 000,

State
Bond and
Interest
Tax Fund

-- b

.

.

.

.

----------------

.

.

.

---------------

$ 1+, 1^.00

$ 1 ,3 0 1 +

.

---------------

■
b
658
—

1'

.

C

.

.

.

l+ , 5 o o
.

.

.

—

.

.

$6,000

.

■IIPW

8

119

1,500
1,000
500
2,000

-

■

$ 8,9 0 0

—

-

$ 6,000

.

.

.

$ 5 ,H 9

$

795
1 5 ,5 8 9

21,000
22,502
32,000
l+ ,9 5 0
619

ll,000r
10,Ij.00®
12,000
21,000®
11,100
2, 500.
$ i6 5 A 5 5 w

bounded to the nearest thousand.
■L^
Refunding issues
cRefunding issues are not included in the totals.
^This sum Includes $£>£00,000 of Series Q, that was sold in order to call Series H
and I.
Source:

Compiled from information In Tables XII-XVIII, Appendix A.

■P’
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TABLE XII
HIGHWAY BORROWING, 1928-1940*
Series
Date Interest
Original Callable Maturity Moody's
and
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Authori- Issue (per cent)
Issued callable
(19391
zation__________________ (thousands_)_________________________
PAYABLE PROM THE 1-CENT GASOLINE TAX:
Act 219, 1928; and Act 1, E.S., 1928:
A
3/1/29
5.0
$10,000
NC
B
12/15/29
5.0
5,000
NC
0
3/15/30
5.0
6 ,0 0 0
nc

1930-49
1930-Ip9
1932-50

A
A
A

PAYABLE PROM THE 3-CENT GASOLINE TAX AND THE SURPLUS OF THE
1-CENT GASOLINE TAX:
Act 3, E.S., 1930, as amended by
Act 2, 1934:
1 5 ,0 0 0
D
12/15/30
4 .5
15,000
E
5/1/31
4.5
1 5 ,0 0 0
5.o
P
3/15/32
7 ,0 0 0
G
10/1/32
5.0
7,500
H
9/20/32
5.0
2 ,5 0 0
1
10/15/32
5.0
J
2 / 15/ 3 I1.
500
5.0
1,000
5.o
K
7/1/35
5 ,0 0 0
5.o
I*
9/1/35
1 ,5 0 0
4.5
M
12/ 1 5 / 3 5
2 ,5 0 0
N
3/1/36
4.5
2 ,5 0 0
P
U/15/36
I; . 25
Act 66, 1936:
Q
1/1/37
R
1/1/37
S
7/1/37
T

1/1/38

U

10/1 /3 8

V

1/1/39

W

5/1/39

3.75
3.5
U. 0
3.75
Ij-.O
3.5
I4-.0
3 .7 5
14-.0
3.5
3.5
3.0
2.75

5 ,5 0 0
6 ,5 0 0
2,580
2 ,14.20
2 ,014.1
1,959
1 ,0 5 2
1,1448
731
1,269
126
675
199

NC
NC
NC
NC
C
C
c
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC

1934-55
1935-56
1936-57
1936-57
1936-39
1936-to
1939
1939-1+9
1939-60
1939-60
1940-60
19l|0-61

A
A
A
A
b
n.r •b
n.r
A
A
A
A
A
A

NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC

1 9 I4-I-6 O
1941-60
1914.1-57
1958-60
1943-56
1957-60
191+2-55
1956-60
19l].3-55
1956-61
1943-51
1952-59
1960-61

A
Baa
Baa
Baa
1
Baa
i
Baa
(
Baa

lj.16
TABLE XII (continued)

Series
and
Authorization
X
Y

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity faoodyfs
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
of
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
(1939)
(thousands)
c
NC
$
801
Baa
4.0
1943-59
6/15/39
NC
I960
155
3.75
44
NC
1961
c
3.5
NC
Baa
750
3.5
4/ 1 5 / 4 0
19lj.l4.-55
NC
1,200
3.0
1956-59
NC
I960
550
2.75

Act 39, 1938:
AA
5/1/39
BB
6/15/39
CC
12/15/39

3.5
3.25
2.0
1.75

1,000
1,000
2 ,5 0 0
500

NC
NC
NC
' NC

1947
1947
1942-43
1944

c
Baa
Baac
Baa

PAYABLE FROM PORTION OF MOTOR VEHICLE LICENSE TAXES (HIGHWAY
FUND NUMBER 2)!
Act 7 1 , 1936:
C
1/1/38
D

10/1/38

E

1/1/39

F

6/15/39

n
4.0
3.5
3.0
3.5
3.25
3.0
2.75
3.0
3.25

7 50
250
100
700
200
360
2i|.0
750
250

NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC

1943-56
1957-61
1942-43
1944-57
1958-61
1943-54
1955-62
1943-57
1958-62

A
A

c
f*

A
A

c

aThese obligations are direct and full faith and credit
ones.
Series H and I were not rated at the time of their
sale and were either matured and/or called by 1939.
£
All of these ratings are those which were given at
the time of issue instead of 1939.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec.
22(d), as amended 1928, Act 219; Art 6, Sec. 22, as amended
1930, Act 3, E.S.j Art. 6, Sec. 22, as amended 1934, Act 2;
Art. 6, Sec. 22(f), as amended 1936, Act 66; Art. 6, Sec.

TABLE XII (continued)

22(g), as amended 1936, Act 71; Art. 6, Sec. 22(h), as
amended 1938, Act 39; Louisiana, Acts (1928), E.S., Act 1,
PP.-3-6; Louisiana, Treasurers Report, 1922-23, p. x; 192627, p. 5>9, 1932-33, p. 82-83; Louisiana, Financial Report.
19J+1-J+2, pp. 80-81; 19l(-5“l|-6, p. 62; Smith, Compilation of
Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 1933, pp. 6-8; A. M.
Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation of Louisiana State and
Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment Co.,
1931+), pp. 3>-6; A. M. Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation
of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A. M.
Smith Investment Co., 1935>)» p. 6; and Moody1s, 1930-191+2.
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TABLE XIII
CONFEDERATE VETERANS * PENSION BORROWING, 1928-1940*
Series
Date Interest
Original Callable Maturity Moody’s
and
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Author!Issue (per cent)
Issued callable
(1939)
zat ion_______________
(thous ands )_________________________
Act 1 7 6 , 19214.:
C
10 / 1 / 2 8

b
500

NC

1933

Aaa

5.o

589

NC

1938

Aa

4.5

2 ,0 0 0

NC

1939-42

Aa

5.0

2 ,0 0 0

NC

1943-50

A

2 .3
2 .5
3.0

70
180
250

NC
NC
NC

1951
1951
1951

A

5.0

$

Act 2 3 , 1 9 2 8 :

D

1/1/29

Act 7 , E.S., 1930:
E
4/15/31
Act 82, 193)4-:

F

6/1/35

Act 61, 1936:

G

4/15/39

c

aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the 0,75 mill ad valorem tax revenues in
the Confederate Veterans* Pension Fund,
Since this issue was not outstanding in 1939* the
rating shown is the one which was given at the time of issue.
£
This rating was assigned in 1940.
Sources Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18,
Secs. 2 and 3, as amended 192)p,~Act 178; Art. 18, Sec. 6, as
amended 1928, Act 23; Art. 18, Secs. 2 and 3» as amended
1930, E.S., Act 7; Art. 18, Sec. 3* as amended 1934, Act 82;
Art. 18, Sec. 7 , as amended 1936, Act 61; Louisiana,
Treasurer*s Report, 1928-29, p. 77, 1932-33, p. 82; 1934“35,
p. l\2V 1 9 3 8 -3 9 , p. 55; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19lpl—Ip2,
p. 80; Moody* s, 1929-19^-0; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana
State and Municipal Bonds, 1938, P. 5.

1*19

TABLE XIV
STATE BOND AND INTEREST TAX FUND BORROWING-, 1928-19i;Oa

Series
and
Author!zation

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody’i
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
(1939)
(thousands)

Act 6, E.S., 1927;
Flood Relief Bonds:
12/1/28
5.0

295

NC

1930-38

Aa

502

NC

1932-1*1

Aa

Act 5t 1930; and Act 10, E . s . , 1 9 3 0 ;
Capitol Building Bonds:
5 ,0 0 0
2/1 5 / 3 1
lp. 2 5

NC

1933-52

A

Act 122, 1932;
Serial Gold Bonds:
1/1/33

NC

193l*-53

Baa

NC
NC
NC

1939-1*1
191*2-56
1957-60

Aa

ft

Drought Relief Bonds

k/15/31

k-5

5.5

l* ,9 5 o

Act 3 , 1938;
State of Louisiana Refunding Bonds:
8/1 / 3 8
2 .5
212
5 ,2 2 0
3.5
3,180
3.25

^ h e se direct and full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the proceeds of the l.lf? mill ad valorem
tax in the State Bond and Interest Tax Fund.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 10, Sec.
11, as amended 1928, E.S., Act i*; Art. 1*, Sec, 12, as amended
1930, Act 5; Art, i*, Sec. 12, as amended 1932, Act 122;
Louisiana, Acts (1927), E.S., Act 6, pp. 18-20; (1930),
E.S., Act 10, pp. 39-1*1; (1938)> Act 3, pp. 28-31; Louisiana,
Treasurer's Report. 1928-29, p. 77; 1930-31, p. 77; 1938-39,
P. 55; Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lpl—U-2, p. 80; Moody's,
1930, p. lL*55; 1932, p. 11*82; 1 9 3 I*, P. $13; 1938, p. 639;
1939, pp. 558-62; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State
and Municipal Bonds. 1938, pp. 3-If-'.
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TABLE XV

;

PORT OF NEW ORLEANS BORROWING, 1928-191*0**

Series
and
Authorization

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody1s
Date
Rating
of
Rate
Amount or NonIssue (per cent) Issued callable
(1939)
(thousands)

Louisiana. Constitution (1921).
Article 6, Section 16;
Serial Gold Refunding Bonds:
7/1/36

Ip.O

7/1/39

3.25

$1,301*.

NC

1938-61

Baa

658

NC

19 U - 5 9

Baa

aThese indirect but full faith and credit obligations
were payable from operating revenues of the Port and from
part of nine-twentieths of the 1-cent gasoline tax.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec.
16; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1936-39. p. 56; Louisiana,
Financial Report. 19iil-ii2. p. 83; MoodyTs, 1938* P. 61*0;
1939, p. 55>8? 191*0, p. 550; and Smith, Compilation of
Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1938, p. 17.
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TABLE XVI
CHARITY HOSPITAL BORROWING, 1928

Series
and
Authori
zation
Act 1 6 6 ,
Act 7 2 ,

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody1s
Rate
Amount
Date
or Non
Rating
of
call able
Issue (per cent) Issued
(1939)
(thousands)
193lf»
1936:

as

amended by

3.5

2 ,1 3 k

NC
NC
NC

3.85

If,500

NC

U.5
l{..0

$

3 U
1,925

.

1938 - I f l

Baa

19ij-2-56
1957-66

Act Lj., 1938:
8/1/38

19lf2-68

Baa

aThese indirect obligations were not full faith and
credit obligations but were payable from the operating
revenues of the hospital and from a portion of the corpora
tion franchise tax.
Source: Louisiana, Acts (193)f)> Act 1 6 6 , pp. 5 3 7 “If2;
First E.S., Act 1 0 , pp. ifl).-5IfJ ( 1 9 3 6 ) , Act 72 ,
pp. 1 9 0 -9 2 ; (1 9 3 8 ), Act !|, pp. 3 1 -3 8 ; Act 5 , pp. 3 8 -I4-I;
Louisiana, Financial Report, 19ifl-lj2, p. 8 2 ; Moody*s, 1 9 3 7 ,
P. 5 9 0 ; 1 9 3 9 , PP. 5 6 2 - 6 3 ; and 1 9 ^ 0 , p. 1^$.
(1935),
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TABLE XVII
a
BOARD OP EDUCATION BORROWING, 1928-191+0

Series
and
Authori
zation

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody’i
Amount or NonDate
Rating
of
Rate
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
(1939)
(thousands)

Acts 6 and1 7, 1938:
b
8/1/38

1+.75

$6,000

NC

191+2-66

n.r.

g

These indirect obligations were not full faith and
credit obligations but were payable from a portion of the
corporation franchise tax.
^This Issue was never rated by Moody’s.
Source: Louisiana, Acts (1938), Act 6, pp. 1+2-1+6;
Act 7, pp. 1^.7—if.9i Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+1-1+2, p. 82;
and Moody’s, 1939> P. £61.
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TABLE XVIII
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY BORROWING, 1928-191+0*

Series
and
Authori
zation

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*s
Date
Rating
of
Rate
Amount or NonIssue (per cent) Issued callable
(1939)
(thousands)

Serial Bonds:
c
$

c

1939—1+-2

n.r.

1 ,5 0 0

NC

1937-55

Baa

119

6/l/3l+b

5.5

10/1/35

5.5

1+/1/37

In 25
1+.5

300
200

NC
NC

1939-51
1951-56

Baa

Ij-.O

1 ,0 0 0

NC

1938-55

Baa

2 ,0 0 0

NC

19^1-58

n. r.

Act 223, 1936:
12/1/36

Act 95, 1 9 3 6 , as amended by
Act 1 8 , 1938:
10/1/38

I+ .2 5

c

aThese indirect obligations were not full faith and
credit obligations of the State; the security pledged for
these issues was not the same. Some of the funds involved
were University operating revenues, the proceeds of the 0.50
mill tax, a portion of the excise license tax collections on
insurance policies and companies, and a portion of the taxes
collected on bottled soft drinks,
b
The University Board of Supervisors on October 22,
1931+, authorized the issuance of $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 of 5.5 per cent
revenue bonds, only $119*000 of which was ever sold.
c
Neither of these issues was ever rated by Moody1s.
Source: Louisiana, Acts, (1936), Act 95* PP. 288-307;
Act 223, pp. 596-600; (19387, Act 18, pp. 106-7; Louisiana,
Financial Report. 191+1-1+2, p. 82; Moody*s, 1938, pp. 638-39;
1939* P* 562; 191+0, p. 1+1+0; 191+1, p. 1+70; and Louisiana
Legislative Research Study No. 9* P. 95.
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TABLE XIX
LOUISIANA BORROWING BY PURPOSE, 191+1-191+6
!

(thousands)

DIRECT&
YEAR

Highway

Confed
erate
Veterans*
Pension

State
Bond and
Interest
Tax Fund

$1,175

$6,11+5

191+1

mm mm

^

191+2

m mm

mm

---

---

2,000

—

---

6,000

—

---

2,000

191+5

1,000

---—

$3,175

1,378

b
1+.972

i+,622

1+.622

$6,ll+5b

$ 5,000

$ 21,320

f-

---

CO

2,000

ro

1910+

$ 7,000

$ 7,320

—

$1+, 000

TOTAL

TOTAL

—

191+3

191+6

State
Insti
tution
Improve
ment

b

aThere was no Indirect borrowing during this period.
This refunding issue is not included in the totals.
Sourcet

Compiled from Tables XX-XXIII, Appendix A.
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TABLE XX
HIGHWAY BORROWING, 19*4-1-19*46*

Series
and
Authori
zation
Act 3 7 7 ,
DD

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody 11
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
of
at
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
Issue
(thousands)
19*4-0:

7/1/14-3

-

*l-.0
3 .0

2 .2 5
1 .2 5
2 .0
1 .5

EE

7 /l/k 3

50
50

1 .2 5

225

1 .5
1 .5

GG

7/1/h b

12/1/kS

5o
50
275
275
675
675

3 .0
2 .2 5

1 .2 5
PP

$

675

150
850

b
Cb
C
C
C
C
C

19*1-7-*1-8
19*t7“*4-8
19*1-9-59
19*1-9-59

1960-61
1960-61

cb
C
c
c
c
c

19*1-7-*1-8
19*1-9-50
1 9 5 1 -5 9

Baa

Baa

Baa

1 960-61
1 9 5 1 -5 6
1 9 5 7 -6 1

2 .5
1 .5
1 .7 5

100
700
1 ,2 0 0

NC
C
c

19 *48- / 4.9
1 9 5 0 -6 1
1 962-63

*4-. 0
1 .2 5
1 .5

50

225

NC
C
C

1 9 * 4 9 -5 0
1 9 51-59
1 9 6 0 - 6*4

725

Baa

aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the proceeds of the *j.-cent gasoline tax.
Bonds maturing after July 1 , 19V? are callable on
July 1, 19*4-8 at par.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 ,
Sec. 22(i), as amended 19 *4-0 , Act 377; Louisiana, Financial
Report. 19*45“*46, p. 63; 19*1-6-14-7, P. 67? Moody’s, 19*5*13
p. *|2^; 19*4-7, PP. *}.21-22; and 19*1-8, p. *433.

TABLE XXI
CONFEDERATE VETERANS' PENSION BORROWING, 19i+l-19^6a

Series
and
Authori
zation

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*:
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent)
Issued callable
at
(thousands)
Issue

Act 61, 1936 ;
Certificates of Indebtedness:
5oo

NC

19104-

A

i,5 5 o

k*o

NC
NC

1914.7-50
1951

n.r.

14-50

1.5

225
175
125
150

NC
NC
NC
NC

1924.5
1914-6
1914-6

A

li/iS/U

3.0

B

5 A A 3

3.0

Act
H

390,

$

■
Vu

19^-0!

7/ 15/ U 1

1.25
1.5

1.0

A

19k7

aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the proceeds of the 0.75 mill ad valorem
tax in the Confederate Veterans' Fund.
^This issue was not rated because it was sold to the
State Teachers' Retirement System.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec.
7, as amended 1936, Act 61J Art. 18, Sec. 6, as amended
I9 I4.O, Act 390; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19i|l~i)-2, p. 80;
19i4-5-2j-6, p. 6I4.; Moody's, 19^2, ~p~. 1+1+7; and 1 9 I4I]., P.

427

TABLE XXII
STATE BOND AND INTEREST TAX FUND BORROWING, 194l-1946a
Series
and
Authorization

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*!
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
at
(thousands)
Issue

Act 383 , 194-0:
4/15/4-1

4.75
2.25
2.5

$1,173
3,041
i,93i

NC

1946
1947-56
1957-61

Baa

c
c

1.75
1.5

4,397
575

NC
NC

1947-57
1958

Baa

Act 3 4 8 , 1946:
9/1/46

These direct and full faith and credit obligations
were payable from the proceeds of the 1 .I).7 mill ad valorem
tax in the State Bond and Interest Tax Fund.
*|^

This issue refunded the outstanding portion of the
above bonds; the issue was privately placed.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 1}.. Sec.
12(a), as amended 194°, Act 303? Louisiana, Acts (194°),
Act 1 3 8 , pp. £ 4 3 - 4 5 ; ( 1 9 4 6 ) , Act 3 ^ 8 , pp. 1 1 0 3 - £ ; Louisiana,
Financial R e p o r t , 1941-4-2, P. 8 0 ; 1 9 45-46, p. 6 2 ; 19^1*6—i|*7»
p. 6 6 ; Moody's, 1 9 4 2 , p. 4 4 7 5 194-6, p. 4-15>5 and 194-7,
pp. 4.2 1 -2 2 .
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TABLE XXIII
STATE INSTITUTION IMPROVEMENT BORROWING, 19i(.l-19l;6a

Series
and
Authori
zation

Date
of
Issue

Interest
Original
Rate
Amount
(per cent)
Issued
(thousands

Callable Maturity M o o d y 1:
or NonDate
Rating
callable
at
Issue
)

Act 361;, 19l;2:
A

3/1A5

1.25
0.75

B

5/1A6

2.0
1.25

$

78
300

C
C

19U9-51

622

NC
NC

1950-51
1952-67

1;, 000

A

1952-55

A

9.

These direct and full faith and credit obligations
were payable from certain mineral lease royalties.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 1;, Sec.
2(a), as amended 19i|2, Act 36 I4.; Louisiana, Financial Report,
19l;5-l;6, P. 61;; 19)±6-1±7, p. 6 8 ; 1951-52, p. 59; Moody's,
19l|6, p. )4.l5; and 19l;7> p. 1+2 2 .

TABLE XXIV
MOODY'S RATINGS OF LOUISIANA DEBT OUTSTANDING IN 1 9 3 9 &

(thousands)

RATING

AMOUNT

TOTAL

DIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from 0.75 mill tax

$> 8,669
1,500

$ 10,169

BONDS RATED A

Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from 0.75 mill tax
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes
Payable from gasoline taxes

3>600
78,356

87*706

BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from gasoline taxes

l+*275
21+,000

28,275

3*250

2,500

TOTAL DIRECT DEBT

$126.150
INDIRECT DEBT

BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from earnings of]-,
' the State Penitentiary
Payable from Port Commission
revenues and nine-twentieths
of 1 -cent gasoline tax
Charity Hospital of Louisiana
at New Orleans
Louisiana State University
and A & M College

$

575
35*819
8,820
2,863

I 1+8,077
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TABLE XXIV (continued)

RATING-

BONDS NOT RATED
Louisiana State Board of
Education
Louisiana State University
and A & M College

AMOUNT

TOTAL

$ 6,000
2,000

TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT

$

8,000

$ 56,077
#182,227

aDirect debt as of August 31* 1939* and indirect debt
as of various other dates.
b
The classification used here is the same as that used
in the text.
Source:

Moody's, 19*1-0, pp. I4.39—U-0,

TABLE XXV
M O O D Y 1S RATINGS OP LOUISIANA DEBT OUTSTANDING IN l ^ l * 1

(thousands)

RATING

AMOUNT

TOTAL

DIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa

Payable from I.I4J mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from 0.75> mill tax

$ 8 ,24.00
£00

$

8,900

BONDS RATED A

Payable from I . J 4.7 mills
-ad valorem tax
Payable from 0.75 mill tax
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes
Payable from gasoline taxes

3,600
73.139

BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from 1.14-7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from gasoline taxes

29Jx£9

3 j000

3,675>

10,020

TOTAL DIRECT DEBT

39.1x79
$131.793

INDIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from earnings of^

the State Penitentiary
Payable from Port Commission
revenues and nine-twentieths
of 1 -cent gasoline tax
Charity Hospital of Louisiana
at New Orleans
Louisiana State University
and A & M College

$

£2£

33 >7^1-2

8,6£0
2,1x1x9

$ 14-5,366

k32

TABLE X X V (continued)

RATING
BONDS NOT RATED
Louisiana State Board
of Education
Louisiana State University
and A & M College

AMOUNT

TOTAL

$ 6,000
2.000

TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT

$

8.000

$ ^3,366
$189.199

£L
Direct debt as of August 5, 19^1, and indirect debt
as of various other dates.
The classification used here is the same as that
used in the text.
Source:

Moody’s, 19^2, pp. iplj7, JL|-53-5U.
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TABLE XXVI

a
MOODY1S RATINGS OF LOUISIANA DEBT OUTSTANDING IN 19^6
(thousands)

RATING

AMOUNT

TOTAL

DIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Payable from I.I4.7 mills
ad valorem tax
BONDS RATED A
Payable from 1.I+7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from 0.75 mill tax
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes
Payable from certain royalties
from mineral leases
Payable from gasoline taxes
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from 1.U7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from gasoline taxes

$ 7,525

$

7,525

1,750

1,750
2,830
5,000

£6 ,E>[(-5

67,875

12,569

29,262

BONDS NOT RATED
Payable from l.Ij.7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from 0.75 mill tax

[(.1,831

9

2,000

TOTAL DIRECT DEBT

2,009
$119,2k0

INDIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Charity Hospital of Louisiana
at New Orleans
Louisiana State University
and A & M College

$ 7,505
1,795

$

9,300

]^3b
TABLE XXVI (continued)

RATING
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from earnings of,
■ the State Penitentiary
Payable from Port Commission
revenues and nine-twentieths
of 1 -cent gasoline taxb
BONDS NOT RATED
Louisiana State University
and A & M College
Louisiana State Board
of Education

AMOUNT

$

TOTAL

lj.00
27,673

$ 28,073

$3k
5>,li£8

TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT

5.992
$ k3.365
$l62.605

di r e c t debt as of August 1, 19i|6, and indirect debt
as of various other dates.
v

The classification used here is the same as that
used in the text.
Source;

Moody's, 19li7» PP. Ij.21-29.

}
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TABLE XXVII
WORLD WAR II VETERANS' BONDS, KOREAN COMBAT BONUS, AND
WAR VETERANS' BONUS BORROWING, 191+7-1959a

Series
Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody's
and
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Ratine
Author!- Issue (per cent) Issued callable
(1959)
zation
____________ (thousands)_________________________
Act 5 3 0 , 191+8;
World War II Bonus Bonds:
1 9 53-51+
1 9 53-51+
1955
1 95 6 -6 1 +

Baa

1 0 ,0 0 0

NC

1 9 5 1 -6 1

A

Act 1 0 9 , 1 9 5 2 ;
Bonus Debt Refunding Bonds «
*3 0 ,1 0 0
1 /1 5 /5 3
2 .7 5
5 ,2 5 0
2 .2
2 .1
1 1 ,1 5 0

NC
NC
NC

I 960
1961

A

1 /1 5 /1 + 9

1+.0

1+.0
3 .2 5
3 .1

Act 8 and 5 3 0 , 191+8;
World War II Bonus Bonds:
B
6/1 /1 + 9
2 .7$

$ 3 ,5 0 0
3 ,6 0 5
3 ,7 1 3
3 9 ,1 8 2

b

c
c
c
c

A

c

1962-63

Act 71+8, 1951+;
Korean Combat Bonus Bonds:
3 /1 /5 5

2 .7 5

2 .0
2 .2 5

Act 61l+, 1 9 5 6 ;
Korean Combat Bonus Bonds:
1+ / 1 / 5 7
2 .9
3 .0

1 , 1+00
3 ,1 0 0
5 ,5 0 0

NC
NC
NC

1+00

NC
NC

1 ,6 0 0

1960-62

1961-62

1 /1 5 /5 8

2 .6

1 ,0 0 0

NC

A

1 9 6 3 -7 0

Act 6 2 0 , 1 9 5 6 ;
Various Combat and War Veterans* Bonus Bond s :
NC
1961+
3 ,0 0 0
6 /1 5 /5 7
3 .1
NC
3 ,0 0 0
3 .2
1965
NC
1966
l +,000
3 .3
B

A

1 9 6 3 -6 5
1 96 6-7 0

1966

n.r.

A

d

436
TABLE XXVII (continued)

aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations
are payable from the $ 1 0 per barrel beer tax.
This issue was refunded in 1953; the rating is that
which was given at the time of issue.
cMoody*s rating has changed from Baa to A on this
issue.
d

The issue was sold to the State Teachers* Retirement
System and was not rated.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution ( 1 9 2 1 ) , Art, 8 ,
Sec. 10, as amended 1948, Act 530; Art. 8 , Sec. 11, as
amended 1954# Act 748; Art. 8 , Sec. 12, as amended 1956,
Act 6l4; Art. 8 , Sec. 13, as amended 1956, Act 620;
Louisiana, Acts (1948), Act 8 , pp. 28-49; (1952), Act 109,
pp. 272-74? Louisiana, Financial Report. 1948-49, P* 58;
1949-50, p. 58; 1952-53, p . '57ri954-55, p . 57; 1956-57,
p. 57? Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, p. 83;
Moody*s, 1959, pp. 663-65; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 5
(January 31, 1949), 651; Moody* s Bond Survey, XLI, No. 20
(May 16, 1949), 471; and Moody*s Bond Survey, XLIV, No. 47
(November 17, 1952), 139.
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TABLE XXVIII'
HIGHWAY BORROWING, 19*17-1959

Series
and
Authori
zation

a

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
(1 9 5 9 )
(thousands)

PAYABLE FROM Ll-CENT GASOLINE TAX:
Act 3 7 7 , 19*|0.:
HH
l/l/kl
Act 3 9 3 , 1911-6:
1A
1 /1 /1 1 7
IB

1 1 /1 A 9

3 .5 2 .5

$

19 51-52
1 9 5 3 -6 5

Aa

1 9 5 1 -5 2
19 5 3 -6 5

Aa

A , 800

NC
C

150
6 ,3 5 0
3 ,5 0 0

NC
C
C

195*1
19 5 5 -6 3
1 9 6 3 - 6*1

Aab

b
3 .5 2 .5

ll-.O
2 .5

2 .2 5

200

PORTION OF NINE-TWENTIETHS 1DF 1-CENT
PAYABLE OUT OF A :
GASOLINE TAX:
Act 28*1, 1 9 5 2 : •
First
1 /1 /5 3

c
3 .5
3 .5 2 .7 5

636
6 ,8 6 !i.

NC
C

b

1 958-63
1 9 6 *1-88

A

Ab

a
Second

Third

Fourth

7 /1 5 /5 3

5 /l/5 * i

3 /1 5 /5 8

lo

NC
C

5o.
2 ,9 5 0

5 .0
3 .2 5
3 .5
3 .6
5 .0
2 .5
2 .7 5
2 .9

ll-.O
3 .5
1 .0

636
1 ,5 7 2

NC
C

2 ,8 9 2
2 A 00

c
c

195 8 -6 3
19 6 *1-69
1 97 0-8 0
1 9 8 1 -8 8

NC
C
C
C

1 9 5 9 -6 * 1
196 5 -7 0
1 9 7 1 -8 0
1 9 8 1 -8 9

Ab

NC
C
C

19 63-68
1 9 6 9 -9 2
1993

A

636
1 ,5 7 2
2 ,6 2 9
2 ,6 6 3

636
6 ,5 6 1 ;

30 0

i+38
TABLE XXVIII (continued)

Series
and
Authorization

Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody* s
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
(1 9 5 9 )
(thousands)

PAYABLE FROM THE 9-CENT GASOLINE TAX. CERTAIN MINERAL REVENOES. AND SDRPLUS REVENUES FROM OTHER SOURCES (LONG-RANGE
HIGHWAY FUND):
Acts lj.0 and 9 2 , 1 9 9 5 :
2 /J 4./59
2 . 75-

$ 2 0 ,0 0 0

C

1979

A

1 0 ,0 0 0

C

1979

A

3 .5 5
^ •/3 0 /5 9

2 . 83 .6

PAYABLE FROM PORTION OF MOTOR VEHICLE LICENSE TAXES (HIGHWAY
FDND NUMBER 2 ) :
Act 9 0 , 1 9 5 2 !
A
1 /1 /5 3
A1

7 A M

NC®
C

1978
1 9 7 9 -8 3

A

NC
NC

1965
1 9 6 6 -81).

A

2 4

1 ,0 0 9
2,714-1
2 ,1 2 9
3 ,0 2 1

NC
NC

1970
1971-81).

A

U2

NC
NC
NC

1 9 6 0 -6 2
1 9 63-78
1 979-61).

A

NC
NC
NC

1 9 6 0 -6 2
1963-78
1979-81).

A

3 .2
3 .0

ll-.O

B

7 A M

2 .5
2 .6

C

3 /1 5 /5 8

ll-.O
3 .0
3 .3

A2

3 /1 5 /5 8

ll-.O
3 .0
3 .3

387
113

22k
8I4-

30
160
60

These obligations are all direct obligations, but
they are not all full faith and credit bonds. The excep
tions are the several issues sold under the authority of
Act 90 of 1952 which are payable from a special allocation
of Highway Fund Number 2.

k39
TABLE XXVIII (continued)

Moody*a ratings have changed from Baa to Aa and A on
these issues.
°This block of the issue is callable on January 1 ,
1963, or any interest date thereafter.
dThis block of the issue is callable on July 15, 1963*
or any interest date thereafter.
eThis block of the issue is callable after January,
1963.
Source! Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6,
Sec. 22(i), as amended 194°, Act 377; Art. 6 , Sec. 22(j),
as amended 1946, Act 393; Art. 6 , Sec. 22(g), as amended
19^2, Act 90; Art. 6 -A, Secs. 5.1, 5.2, Act 284; Art. 4,
Sec, 2(c), as amended 1956, Act llf.2 of 1955; Art. 6 , Sec.
23.1, as amended 1956, Act llj.1 of 1955; Louisiana, Acts
(1955), Act 40, pp. 49-143; Act 92, pp. 197-98; Act” 12F,
pp. 293-94, Act 129, pp. 244-47; Act 1 3 0 , pp. 247-48;
Louisiana, Financial Report, 1946-47, p. 67; 1956-57, P. 56;
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 8 1 -8 3 ;
Moody’s, 1950, P. 469; 1959, pp. 663-65; Moody* 3 Bond Survey.
XLV, No. 9 (March 2, 1953), 601; Moody*s Bond Survey. LI,
No. 5 (February 2, 1959), 743-45; Moody*s Bond Purvey. LI,
No. 6 (February 9, 1959), 725; Moody*s Bond Survey, LI,
No, 16 (April 20, 1959), 588; Moody’s Bond Survey. LI, No. 18,
(May 4, 1959), 562.

1*0
TABLE XXIX

INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENT BORROWING, 191*7-1959

Series
and
Author!zation

Date Interest
Original Callable
of
Rate
Amount or NonIssue (per cent)
Issued callable

Act l*.l4, 1946 s
b
D
12/1/47
E
3/1/49
F

9/1/49
a

G

3/15/50

H

6/1/51

I

7/15/52

#3,000
2.7
3.0
1 ,2 9 9
450
2.75
5.0
478
2.3
2,773
2,641
1.75
2.25
1,359
4.5
575
2.3
1,425
545
2 .5
2.0 ... 1,455...

NC
NC
NC
NC
C
C
C
c
c
c
c

a

Maturity Moody* s
Date
Rating
(1 9 5 9 )

1969-73
1969-72
1972-73
1954
1955-68
1963
1964—68
1956
1957-68
1957
1958-68

n.r.
Ac
d
Baa
n.r.
d
Baa
d

Baa

aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations
are payable from the 0.75 mill tax in the Confederate
Veterans* Fund.
Td
This issue was sold to the State Teachers* Retire
ment System and was not rated.
cMoody*s rating has changed from Baa to A on this
Issue.
These issues were called prior to the maturity
schedule above; the ratings are those which were given at the
dates of issue.
eThis issue was sold to the National American Bahk of
New Orleans and was not reoffered for sale; It was not rated.
The whole issue was retired in the 1951*--55 fiscal year.
Sources Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 8, Sec.
8, as amended 1946, Act I4.ll*.; Louisiana, Acts (1956), Act 132,
pp. 32£-27; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1947-46. p. 60;
i 9 i* - 9 - 5 o , p . 5 7 ; 1 9 5 0 - 5 1 7 ~ p . “ 5 6 ; 195f t - ? 2 , p. 5 9 ; 1 9 5 4 - 5 5 ,
P. 57? 1955?-56, p. 53? 1957-58, P. 56; Louisiana Legislative
Research Study No. 9, pp. 81, 103-1*.; Moody*s, 1950, p. 469?
1952, p. 506; 1953, P. 478; and 1959, pp. 663-65.

y+1
TABLE XXX

PORT OF NEW ORLEANS AND PORT OF BATON ROUGE
BORROWING, 19l;7-1959a
Date
Interest Original Callable Maturity koody* i
Series
Date
Rating
of
Rate
Amount or Nonand
■
Issue
(per
cent)
Issued
Callable
Authori
(1959)
zation
(thousands)
-

PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
PAYABLE FROM REVENUES OF NEW ORLEANS PORT COMMISSION, NINETWENTIETHS OF 1-CENT GASOLINE TAX. AND FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT OF LOUISIANA
Act 281;, 1952:
1 0 /1 /5 5

2 .5 8

$ 1 0 ,0 0 0

c

1990

A

GREATER BATON ROUGE PORT COMMISSION
PAYABLE FROM OPERATING REVENUES OF THE PORT, AND THE FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT OF LOUISIANA AND THREE PARISHES
Act 9 , 1 9 5 2 :
A
ll/l/5 Ii

Act 5 9 7 , 1 9 5 6 : ,
B
n /l/5 7

C

19 6 1 -6 8
19 6 9 -7 3
197*1.-85
1 9 86-95.

A

2 ,3 9 3
8 ,0 1 2
8 ,9 9 5

NC
Cc
C

1960-61;
1 9 6 5 -7 1
19 7 2 -7 7

Baa

311|1 ,7 1 2
1,5-75-

I960
196 1 -6 9
1 9 7 0 -7 5

Baa

cd
c

$ 1 ,8 9 0
1 ,6 9 5
3 ,9 5 5
It-,9 6 0

5 .0
3 .2 5
3 .3
3 .0
3.*J-

5 /1 /5 8

b

C
C
C
C

2 .7 5
2 .6
2 .7 5
2 .8

aThe indirect and full faith and credit obligation
of the Port of New Orleans is payable from the nine-twentieths
of the 1-cent gasoline tax as well as operating revenues of

TABLE XXX (cont inue d )

the Port, The indirect and full faith and credit obliga
tions of the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission are payable
from the operating revenues of the Port and are also pro
tected by the full faith and credit pledge of three Interested
parishes of Louisiana.
Moody's rating has changed from Baa to A on this
issue.
Callable beginning November 1, 1967.
j

Callable beginning November 1, 1963.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution
Sec. 5.1* as amended 1952, Act 281+; Art.
amended 1952, Act 9j Art, 6, Secs. 29.1,
as amended 1956, Act 597; Moody's, 1955,
pp. 663-65, (ilk*

(1921), Art.
6, Sec. 29,
2 9 . 2 , 29.3,
p. 5^3; and

6-A,
as
29.1\.t
1959,

¥{-3
TABLE XXXI
.a
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY BORROWING, 1914-7-1959

Series
and
Authorization

Date
interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*;
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
Issue (per cent) Issued callable
(1959)
(thousands)

Serial Bonds:
1/1A7

Act

¥ 0
2.5
2.75

1950:
12 / 1 / 5 0

•u
A

265
1,610
1,625

NC
C
C

19U9-52
1953-62
1963-67

893
788
1,570
2,^9

NC
C
CC

1953-55
1956-59
1960-66
1967-75

A

150
150

NC
NC

1958
1959-63

Aa

NC
C
C

1957-62
1963-75
1976-81

A

3.6

305
1,380
965

2.0
2.25

1,610
1,625

C
C

1953-62
1963-67

Aa

A
ce
c
c

1955-69
1970-76
1977-79

A

I4..O
2 .5
2.0
2.1

11/1/53

2.5
2.25

12/1/56

Ij-.o
3 .5

$

c
Refunding Bonds:
7/1/52
Act 230, 195^:
11/lM

l|/l/58

Act 5 I4., 1950:
U/l/58

d

2.252.5
2.65

ii5 o

If.O
3.5
3.7

850

NC
C
C

1959-63
I9 6 I4.-67
1968-78

A

7,500

NC
C
C
C

1959-63
19614-67
1 9 6 8 -7 8
1979-83

A

¥5
3.5
3.7
3.75

280
120

TABLE XXXI (continued)

These indirect obligations are not full faith and
credit obligations but are payable from "University operating
revenues, proceeds of the 0 . 5 mill tax, certain proceeds of
the excise license tax on insurance policies and insurance
companies, and certain proceeds of the tax on bottled soft
drinks.
These bonds were refunded in 1952; the rating is
that which was given at the time of issue.
cThese bonds refunded the balance of the Serial Bonds
of 1947.
^Callable after July, 1957.
eCallable after November 1, I960.
Source: Louisiana, Acts (1950), Act 54, PP. 8 7 - 9 1 j
(1951;), Act 2 3 0 , pp. 428-31; Louisiana, Financial Report.
1946-47, P. 6 8 ; 1951-52, p. 60; 1952-53, p. 58; 1953-54,
p. 56; 1955-56, p. 54, 1956-57, p. 58; Louisiana Legislative
Research Study No. 9, p. 95, Moody*s, 1959, pp. 677-78;
Moody* s Bond Survey, XLII, No. Ii9 (December 4, 1950), 118;
Moody* s Bond Survey, L, No. 15 (April 7, 1958), 613? Moody* s
Bond S u r v e y , L, No. 17 (April 28, 1958), 584.

TABLE XXXII
GREATER NEW ORLEANS EXPRESSWAY COMMISSION
AND MISSISSIPPI RIVER BRIDGE AUTHORITY
BORROWING, 195>2-19S>9a
Series
and
Author!zation

bate
of
Issue

Interest Original bailable Maturity !Moody*~s
Rate
Amount
or NonDate
Rating
(per cent)
Issued
callable
(1959)
(thousands)

GREATER NEW ORLEANS EXPRESSWAY COMMISSION
PAYABLE PROM OPERATING REVENUES AND CERTAIN SURPLUS MOTOR
VEHICLE LICENSE TAXES:
Act 90, 1952:

II/I/5 I1-

1^.0

$i).6,000

C

b
1991 }.

Baa

MISSISSIPPI RIVER BRIDGE AUTHORITY
PAYABLE PROM OPERATING REVENUES AND CERTAIN SURPLUS MOTOR
VEHICLE LICENSE TAXES:
Act 7l|-5,i 1951).S

11/1/51)-

3.6

$65,000

C

1991)-

n.r.

c

aThese indirect obligations are payable from operating
revenues and certain surplus motor vehicle license taxes.
They are not protected by the full faith and
credit of either
the parishes or the State of Louisiana,
^Due $1,000 on each January 1 to 1993 and $l)-5»799* 000
on January 1, 199l|.. Callable after January 1, 1961)..
cNot rated pending the establishment of a stable
record of toll receipts.
Callable on January 1, 1959, from
debt service funds or after January 1, 1961)., from revenues
other than debt service funds.
Sources Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec.
22(g), par. I)., as amended 195^, Act 7 I4.5 J Art. 6, Sec. 22(g),
par. 5, as amended 1952, Act 90; Moody*s, 1959. pp. 67l)--75;
Moody*s Bond Survey, L, No. 32 (August!}., 1958), 389; Moody*s
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. lj.0 (October 1)., 1951)-),231-33; Moody*s
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. tj.1(October 11, 195l)J, 222; and
Moody*s Bond Survey. LI, No. 9 (March 2, 1959), 6 8 7 .

TABLE XXXIII
LOUISIANA STATE BUILDING AUTHORITY BORROWING, 1947-1959*

Series
Date Interest
Original Callable Maturity Moody*s
and
of
Rate
Amount or NonDate
Rating
AuthoriIssue (per cent)
Issued callable
(1959)
zation__________________ (thousands)______________ ___________
PAYABLE FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE l.lj.7 MILL AD VALOREM TAX:
Act 3 1 7
A

B

C

Act 1 3 ,
AA

, 1952:

12 / 1 / 5 2

2 .2
2 .1

1 2 /1 5 /5 3

9/ 1 M
1954: ,
12 / 1 / 5 4

b

500
1 ,5 0 0

NC
C

1956
195 7 -6 1

Ba a

2 .6
2 .6

200
650

rc

Baa

2 .5

3 ,1 5 0

c

1 9 5 7 -5 9
19 5 7 -5 9
196 0 -6 2

2 .7 5
3 .0

3 ,7 5 0

c
c

1958 -7 4
1 9 5 8 -7 4

2 .7 5

2 ,4 0 0

_d
C
C

1 9 5 9 -8 2
1983

Baa

2 .0

1

100

_
b
Baa

BB

6/ 1 / 5 5

If-.o
2 .9
2 .7 5
2 .9

9 ,9 0 0

ce
C
C
c

1 9 6 0 -6 3
1 9 6 4 -7 0
1 9 7 1 -8 0
1 9 8 1 -8 4

Baa

CC

2 /1 /5 6

4 .0
3 .1
3 .0
3 .1

593
2 ,2 9 1
3 ,8 2 1 ;
892

NCf
C
C
C

1 9 6 1 -6 3
196 4 -7 2
197 3 -8 3
1 9 8 4 -8 5

Baa

DD

4 /1 5 /5 6

3 .3
3 .3
3 .0

2 ,5 0 0
50 0
6 ,0 0 0

196 1 -6 6
19 61-66
1 9 6 7 -8 5

Baa

cs
c

EEh

2 /1 /5 7

3 .5

3 ,0 0 0

n.a.

19 6 2 -7 7

n.r.

PP

4 /1 /5 7

4 .0
3 .7 5
3 .7
3 .7 5

9 ,9 4 8

NC
NC1
C
C

1 9 62 -65
1 96 6-6 7
1 9 6 8 -6 9
1 9 7 0 -7 1

Baa

TABLE XXXIII (continued)

Series
and
Author!zation

Date Interest
Original Callable
of
Rate
Amount or NonIssue (per cent)
Issued callable
(thousands)

Maturity Moody*s
Date
Rating

(1959)

PAYABLE PROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE 0 . 5 3 MILL AD VALOREM T A X ?
Act 3 0 , 1955:

DD

5-/15/56

3 .2 5

$3,025

NC

1960-61;

Baa

These indirect but full faith and credit obligations
are payable from the proceeds of the l.lj.7 and 0.53 mill ad
valorem taxes.
Issue A was called on December 1, 1957, and issue
C was called on September 1, 1958. The ratings are those
which were given at the times of issue.
cCallable after December 1, 1958.

Called in May, 1959.

Callable on December 1, 1962.
eCallable on June 1, 1962.
f
Callable on February 1, 1 9 6 3 .
^Callable on April 15, 1965
Issue EE was sold to the State Teachers* Retirement
System and was not rated. Information about the call feature
is not available on this issue.
^Callable on April 1, 1967.
Source: Louisiana, Acts (1952), Act 317, PP. 8 3 3 -3 8 ;
(195U), Act 13, PP. 21-31; Tl955), Act 30, pp. 30-33;
Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57, P* 57; Moody*s, 1956,
p. 57^+5 1959. p p . &75-76; Moody*s Bond Survey, XLIX, No. 13
(March 2f?, 1957J, 61;!; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. );9
(December 7, 1953), 128; Moody* s Bond Survey. XLV, No. ij.2
(October 19, 1953), 208; Moody*s Bond Survey, LI, No. 20
(May 11, 1939), 552; and Louisiana Legislative Research
Study No. 9, p. 92,

TABLE XXXIV
DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOUISIANA BORROWING BY PURPOSE, 1 9 /4.7 - 1 9 5 9
(thousands)
DIRECT

YEAR
Various
Veterans*
Bonus
i w r
191+8
191+9
1950
1951

$ 6 0 ,0 0 0

Highway

Institutional
Improvement

$ 1 8 ,0 0 0

¥ 3 ,0 0 0

10,000

5 .0 0 0
^,000

Ports of
La.
New Orleans
New
State
Expressway
OrleansUniver& Miss,
& Baton
sity
River Br.
R o u g e _________________ Auth.
¥ 17500"

La.
State
Bldg.
Auth.

5 ,7 0 0

2.000

19^2

2,000
lj.6 ,5 0 0 *

1953

1955
1956

10,000

1957
1958
1959

12,000

$ 2,000

3,235*
300

1 5 ,5 0 0

$ 1 2 ,5 0 0
10,000

16,^00

195U

TOTAL

INDIRECT

850

I+,000
9 ,9 0 0
1 9 ,6 2 5

2,650
1,000
$8 3 . 0 0 0

8 ,1 0 0
3 0 .0 0 0
$ 9 8 .0 0 0

—
----$ 1 6 .0 0 0

6,2^0

$111,000

12 ,91+8

19 ,1+00
3 ,5 0 0

8 ,3 5 0

luixoo

= 2 1 .3 5 0

$ 1 1 1 .0 0 0

fe lt. 723

aThe classification used here is the same as that used in the text,
■L

These are refunding issues; they are not included In the totals.
Source:

Compiled from Tables XXX-XXXVI, Appendix A.

TABLE XXXV
MOODY*S RATINGS OP LOUISIANA DEBT OUTSTANDING IN 19$2&
(thousands)

RATING

AMOUNT

TOTAL

DIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax

$

BONDS RATED A
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes
Payable from gasoline taxes
Payable from certain royalties
from mineral leases
Payable from $10 per barrel
beer tax

6.268

$

6,268

1 ,8 0 0
33*891

l+,200
109.700

11+5,591

3*350
9,000
55.661+

68,011+

7.000

7.000

BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from 0.75 mill tax
Payable from gasoline taxes
BONDS NOT RATED
Payable from 0.75 mill tax
TOTAL DIRECT DEBT

$226.873
INDIRECT DEBT

BONDS RATED Aa
Charity Hospital of La,
at New Orleans
Louisiana State University
and A & M College
Louisiana State Board of
Education

$

5*935

3*967
It.1+19

$ li+,321

TABLE XXXV (continued)

RATING
BONDS RATED A
Louisiana State University
and A & M College
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from Port Commission
revenues and nine-twentieths
of 1-cent gasoline tax
Payable from earnings of^
the State Penitentiary

AMOUNT

$

TOTAL

£.530

f

£,£30

19,998

BONDS NOT RATfiD
Louisiana State University
and A & M College

2£0

900

TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT

$ 20,21^.8

900
$ k0,999
1267*872

aDirect debt as of January 1, 19£2, and indirect debt
as of various other dates.
i.

The classification used here is the same as that used
in the text.
Source:

Moody*s, 19£3, pp. lj.72-83.

i£l
TABLE XXXVI
a
MOODY*S RATINGS OP LOUISIANA DEBT OUTSTANDING IN 1958

RATING

AMOUNT

TOTAL

DIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Payable from 1.1^7 mills
ad valorem tax
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes
Payable from gasoline taxes
BONDS RATED A
Payable from 0.75 mill tax
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes
Payable from gasoline taxes
Payable from certain royalties
from mineral leases
Payable from $10 per barrel
beer tax
BONDS NOT RATED
Payable from 0.75 mill tax
Payable from $10 per barrel
beer tax

$ 2,1$.28
670
b.7.061

$ 50,159

1,7^9
9,177
29,850
2,2£0
U2.125

85,151

3,000
10.000

13.000
V
$lii8.3l0
.

TOTAL DIRECT DEBT
INDIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Charity Hospital of La,
at New Orleans
Louisiana State University
and A 8s M College
Louisiana State Board of
Education

$ 3*9^8
2,650
3.026

$

9,621$.

1+52
TABLE XXXVI (continued)

RATING
BONDS RATED A
Louisiana State University
and A & M College
Payable from Port Commission
revenues and nine-twentieths
of 1-cent gasoline tax
Payable from revenues of Baton
Rouge Port Commission13
BONDS RATED Baa
Louisiana State Building
Authority
Payable from revenues of Baton
Rouge Port Commission
Greater New Orleans Expressway
Commission
Payable from earnings of,
the State Penitentiary
BONDS NOT RATED
Mississippi River Bridge
Authority
Louisiana State University
and A & M College

AMOUNT

TOTAL

$16,213
18,519
12,500

$ 1+7,232

1+8,873
22,900
1+5,799
100

117,672

65,000
180

TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT

65.180
$239.708
$388.018

aDlrect debt as of June 30, 1958* and Indirect debt
as of various other dates.
Id
The classification used here Is the same as that
used in the text.
Sources

Moody*s, 1959, pp. 663-78.

8-53
TABLE XXXVII

OUTSTANDING DEBT OP THE STATE OP LOUISIANA AS OP
JUNE 30, 195>7a

Description

Amount
(thousands)

DIRECT
State Bond and Interest Tax Fund
Confederate Veterans* Fund
Highway Fund Number 2
Special Allocation of Highway Funds
General Highway
Institutional Improvement
Veterans* Bonus
TOTAL DIRECT DEBT OUTSTANDING

$

3,755
8-,78-9
800
8,789
76,63k
2 ,5 0 0
8,6,5.36

4343jJ63

INDIRECT
New Orleans Port Commission
Baton Rouge Port Commission
Penitent!ary
Mississippi River Bridge Authority
Greater New Orleans Expressway
Louisiana State University
Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans
Louisiana State Board of Education
TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT OUTSTANDING

$ 2 0 ,6 3 2
1 2 ,5 0 0
125
6 5 ,0 0 0
8-5,799
10,693
3,98-8
. 3,026
$210,596

TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT OUTSTANDING

The major portion of indirect debt is from Moody*s
report of 1959, reported for 1958, instead of for 1957.
However, since most of the issues are deferred serials, the
difference in amounts would be slight.
Source: Moody’s, 1958* p. 623; 1959, pp. 672-78;
United States Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce,
Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 38-39* Louisiana,
Financial Report. 1956-57* PP. 56-58.

TABLE XXXVIII

TOTAL DEBT OUTSTANDING IN LOUISIANA AS REPORTED
BY THREE AGENCIES, JUNE 30, 1957

Description

Financial
Report

Moody*s

Compendium

#2^0,723

$351j-,359a $321,301

Debt Reported
Total Debt Outstanding
Debt Not Reported
Mississippi River Bridge
Authority

65,000

Baton Rouge Port
Commission

1 2 ,5 0 0

Greater New Orleans
Expressway Commission
ADJUSTED TOTAL

.... 11-5,799
$ 351+, 022

$ 35 % 35 9

*
$ 3 6 7 ,1 0 0

^

aAll of the indirect debt or other debt of the State
of Louisiana is the amount outstanding as of 1958, not 1957.
However, most of the issues were deferred serials, and the
total amount outstanding in Moody1s as of 1957 would not be
much larger than that reported for 1958. A $10,000,000 issue
sold after June 3 0 was included in Moody1s but is omitted
here,
The Compendium data are classified according to a
uniform census classification and are not usually expected
to compare exactly with data supplied by state reporting
agencies.
Source: Moody*s, 1958, p. 623} 1959, pp. 672-78}
United States Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce,
Comoendium of State Government Finances in 1957 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1958%' PP. 5, 3 8 -3 9 } Louisiana,
Financial Report. 1956-57, PP. 56-58.

455
TABLE XXXIX

TOTAL DEBT OUTSTANDING, STATE-WIDE INCOME, TAX REVENUES,
AND TOTAL AD VALOREM TAX COLLECTIONS
IN LOUISIANA, 1946, 1952, AND 1958
(thousands)

Year
1952

Description
1946
State Ad Valorem Tax
Collections

$

9,266

1958
a

$

13,781

98,915

2 Jj.0 ,2 ? 0b

Total Revenues

lJj.1 , 1 0 6

36l,771b

557,246

Total Expenditures

107,459

336,417

576,967

Total Direct Debt
Outstanding

1 ^ 2 ,961^

199,371

202,107

Total Agency Debt
Outstanding

16,778

21,255

70,905'

Total Tax Collections

State-Wide Income
Louisiana Total
Louisiana Per Capita
U. S. Per Capita

2,066,000
(#814)
($1,215)

3 ,1 2 8 ,OOObb
(#1,135)*
■(li,584)

$

351,893

4 ,8 0 4 ,0 0 0 '
(#1,566)'
($2,027)

Collections not complete for this year.
Reported for the year 1951.
cReported for the year 1957.
^Reported for the year 1945.
0
Does not include Mississippi River Bridge Authority
or the New Orleans Expressway Commission debt outstanding.
Source: Moody1s, 1947, pp. i{.2J;-26; 1953, PP. Jf-75-77»
and 1959, pp. 6 6 6 -6 9 .

TABLE XL

TOTAL REVENUE, TOTAL EXPENDITURES, AND DEBT SERVICE IN
LOUISIANA IN SELECTED YEARS

Total
Revenue a
(thousands)

Fiscal
Year

Total ■'~
Expenditures
(thousands)a

Debt
Service a
(thousands)

Debt
Service
to Total
Expendi
tures
(per cent)

1914-7-14-8

$199,928

$170,761

$12,387

7.25

I9 I4-8 -I4-9

322,635

3*44,336

13,013

3.78

19^9-50

3*1-8,660

327,171

15,781

*(..82

1953-5*1

*1-37,9*1-5

*105,373

18,619

*1.59

1955-56

535,399

*196,326

21,730

5.50

1956-57

585,676

576,967

18,979

*(-.09

aAraounts are rounded to the nearest thousand.
Source: Louisiana, Financial Report. 19*j-7-*l8; 19*|8-*j.9
19*19-50; 1953-5*1,’ 1955-56; and 1956-57.

L

TABLE XLI

REVENUES PROM THE VARIOUS TAXES DEDICATED FOR THE PAYMENT OP CERTAIN
OBLIGATIONS OP THE STATE OP LOUISIANA, 1950-1957
(thousands)
TAX
YEAR
Gen, Hwy.
Fund: [f.jz
Gas Tax

Gen. Hwy
Fund: Part
of Auto
License Tax

$ 1 0 bhl.
Beer
Tax

#1,652,733

#18,711-0,7914

#14,653,3141

$ll,2lil4,l4l42

1,1^93,2514-

1,831,911.6

20,087,837

14,921,811.7

11,0014,689

3,080,309

1,672,01^9

1,953,111-8

21,901,903

14,91414,900

11,501,669

1953

3,1492,201

1 ,8 9 6 ,1 6 6

1 ,9 6 2 ,7 8 8

23,176,727

5,7143,1462

11,1477,716

19514-

3,W,^99

1 ,8 7 7 ,1 0 1

2,200,62?

25,260,5114

6 ,0 8 3 ,2 3 8

1 2 ,0 3 2 ,0 8 2

1955

3,568,899

1,953,11-01

2,2li-8,312

26,626,883

6 ,6 1 5 ,2 0 0

11,9149,073

1956

3,553,025

1,91^8,911-2

2,1^98,231}-

29,585,762

7,175,652

1 2 ,0 8 6 ,9 6 8

1957

3 ,890,14614

2,150,616

2,1i.96,911

31,5714,890

7,531,983

12,7714,9142

l.Lj-7 Hill
Ad Valorem
Tax

0.75 Mill
Ad Valorem
Tax

Hwy. Fund
#2: Motor
Vehicle
License Tax

1950

# 2 ,9 ^ 5 , 6 6 6

$1,586,23^

1951

2,7^-1,363

1952

Source:

Moody*s, 1951-1958.

4-*
vn.

TABLE XLII

LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OP FISCAL YEAR BY PURPOSE
FOR ALL STATES AND SELECTED STATES, 1957
(thousands)
State

" Total-... "Education;
Higher

All 58
States $13,521,970
Louisianaa
321,301
Conn.
3 8 8 ,6 7 1
Maryland
520,275
Mass.
1,013,681
New York
1,974,278
Ohio
708.307
State

Highways;
Other

All ij.8
States $2,260,893
Louisiana
86,778
Conn.
Maryland
161,523
356,100
Mass.
New York
219,215
175,620
Ohio
State

Nonhighway
Transports
tion

Education;
Other

Highways;
State Toll
Facilities

$706,1+23
$1,068,319
$5,075,191
65,000
15,559
3,287
32,092
9,611
2 6 0 ,9 0 5
175,131
6,190
88,1+83
6,981
263,759
8,825
815,955
35,528
326.000
(continued)
Natural
Public Hospitals
Public
Resources
Welfare
Safety
$5,533

$165,157
13,581

$20,579
125

$579,368
3,178

--

2,216

1,273
359,563

(continued)
Hous ing &
Community
Redevelopment

Miscellaneous and
Unallocable
Other
Veterans*
Bonuses

All Ij.8
States
$397,575
$ 1 ,2 0 2 ,0 7 2 $1,895,231
$2l|7,729
Louisiana
-56,536
58,503
33»l52
Conn.
1,750
25,950
55,185
Maryland
85,558b
36,160
60,960
Mass.
299,731
2 6 ,3 0 1
1 2 8 ,9 0 I4.
New York
386,515
3 0 ,0 0 0
18.750
Ohio
.....
-r1 5 3 7 5 0 9 ...
aThis sum does not include $57,799,000 of Greater New
Orleans Expressway debt and otherwise does not reconcile with
the Financial Report and Moody1s. The figures are used despite
this in order to make valid comparisons with other states.
^Includes $150,865,000 for Metropolitan District,
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 39.

TABLE XLIII

COMPARISONS OP FINANCIAL STRUCTURES IN ALL STATES AND
SELECTED STATES, 1957
(thousands)
State

Revenue
and
Borrowing

All i+0
States $26,157,796
Louisiana
661}.,017
Conn.
k31,k52
Maryland
1+15,685
Mass.
779,51-1-2
New York
2,l+81+,059
Ohio
1.52k,821
State

Revenue

All k 8
States $21).,665,793
Louisiana
6k5»269
Conn.
329,999
Maryland
365,6k9
Mass.
6k3,398
New York
2,336,38k
Ohio
1.37k.k78
State

Total Tax
Revenue

Expenditure
and Debt
Redemption

Borrowing

$2k,903,68l
660,889
k56,779
k2k,177
8k9,ook
2,k06,239
1,339,387
(continued)
Expenditure

$1,502,003,,
1 8 ,7k8 1
1 0 1 ,k53
5 0 ,0 3 6
1 3 6 ,ikk
lk7,675
1 5 0 ,3k3
General
Revenue

$2k,233,988 $20,381,595
606,389
6k3,975
2 8 3 ,6 5 6
Mpk,85°
koi ,8 5 9
328,k33
5k8,92k
802,39k
2,29k,352
1,799,233
1.306,560
... 902,235.
(continued)
Total Popu- £ Personal
Income0
lation (1 9 5 6 )

Debt
Redemptio]
$669,693
1 6 ,91k
11,929
2 2 ,3 1 8
k6 , 6 1 0
111,887
32,827

General
Expenditure
$ 2 1 ,0 8 k , 6 6 6
626*3k1
1+11,158
379,651
7 2 0 ,0 8 2
l,9k6,821
____963*331
Personal
Income Per
Capitad

All k 8
States $lk,530,7k9
I66,k28,000
$3 2 2 ,2 2 8
$1,937
3
.
0
1
0
.0
0
0
Louisiana1
k,338
372,927
i,kkk
2 .2 2 1 .0 0 0
Conn.
5,966
227,61k
2 ,6 7 3
2 ,8 2 5 ,0 0 0
2,102
Maryland
5,911
250,637
k,8 1 3 ,0 0 0
2,206
Mass.
10,61k
k!3,595
1 5 ,8 2 6 ,0 0 0
New York
2,395
3 8 ,7 8 k
i,kko,k5k
9 ,0 7 1 ,0 0 0 __
Ohio
2,15k
676,731
12:52*1&The sura borrowed in the 1956-57 fiscal year in
Louisiana was less than average. The average borrowing
between 1 9 k 7 and 1 9 5 9 was $ 3 3 ,0 3 6 ,381}.,6 2 .
^Estimated population excluding armed forces overseas.
cMillions of dollars.
^Actual dollar amount.
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), PP. 10, 11,
58.

TABLE XLIV

LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT THE END OP FISCAL 195?, BY
CHARACTER FOR ALL STATES AND SELECTED STATES
(thousands)

State

Total
Long-Term
Debt
Outstanding

Full Faith and <Credit
Payable
Total
General
{Jbligatlons Initially
from
Specific
Nontax
Revenues

Nonguar
anteed

All 1|_8
States $13,521,970 $6,14.90,261). $lj.,581).,800 $l,905A6i). $7,031,706
a

Louisiana

321,301

233,902

233,902

Conn.

3 8 8 ,6 7 1

138,671

111).,638

2k,033

2 5 0 ,0 0 0

Maryland

520,271).

117,897

107,3l;6

70,551

3^2,377

Mass.

1,013,681

737,521

596,657

ll).0,861t-

276,160

New York

1,971)-, 278

1,203,381

14-16,866

786,515

770,897

708,307

172,259

172,259

Ohio

am M *

m*

87,399

536,0^8

a„
This information does not seem to be entirely accurate.
The Port of New Orleans debt, which is a long-term full faith
and credit liability of the State, is payable partly from
Port revenues.
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 9 5 8 ), p. 10.
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TABLE XLV

LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OF FISCAL YEAR 1957,
BY SCHEDULED MATURITY PERIODS FOR ALL STATES
AND SELECTED STATES
(thousands)
State
Total
1958
1957. _
All 1+8
States $13,521,970 $221,1+53 $519,096
3 2 1 ,3 0 1
Louisiana a
2,81+7
18,523
Conn.
8 ,3 8 6
1 2 ,9 6 1
388,671
Maryland
ll+, 076
21,61+3
520,27k
Mass.
1 ,0 1 3 ,6 8 1
28,1+1+7
50,599
2 5 ,8 6 2
New York
53,176
l,97l+ ,278
Ohio
kk
.2 8 0
__ 708,307 __ 2 0 ,21+1+
(continued)
1962
State
1961
1.963
All L+B
States
$522,358 $520,1+59 $1+66,927
1 9 ,1+01+
Louisiana
19,376
20,205
6,996
Conn.
11,621+
7,266
Maryland
2
7 ,2 0 8
26,1+61+
26,937
5 0 ,21+0
Mass.
1+9,760
50,358
New York
28,960
60,956
5 9 ,2 2 7
Ohio
... 31,080
__33,51!+. ... 26,233
(continued)
State
1966
1968
1967
Ail" 1+6
States
Louisiana
Conn.
Maryland
Mass.
New York
Ohio

. 1959. .
$513,037
1 8 ,1 3 2
11,571+
22,529
50,998
1+6,663
3 2 .1 8 1
196k

1960
$5ol+, 5 5 3
20,565
11,373
2 6 ,0 0 8
50,587
31,1+63
_3_2.,_67iL_
1965

$508,795 $1+6 8 ,1+28
7,568
13,91+2
7 ,6 1 6
8,061
2 7 ,0 7 0
2 7 ,8 2 8
1+5,718
l+i+,199
55,1+18
82,21+3
18,218 .__. .!!+,59k
1969

4.

1970 and

$1+51+, 981+ $k02,209 $376,818 $7,577,616
6,778
7,0kl
lk6,859
6,k23
8,886
9,126
9,356
266,935
2 5 ,7 0 8
192,928
25,31k
27,93k
28,1+00
k63,k30
32,191+
30,583
59,71+9
35,057 l,3k2,520
35,677
393,310
15,061
15,213_
. Ik,915
aThis sum does not include all of Louisiana* s indirect
debt, but it has not been changed in order that the compari
son with other states will be valid.
$1+65,137
7,568
8,511
28,627
38,168
55,307
111, 790

The per cents of debt outstanding in each state for
1970 and thereafter are as follows: All states, 56.0;
Louisiana, k5«8; Connecticut, 68.7; Maryland, 38.5;
Massachusetts, 1+5.7; New York, 68.0; and, Ohio, 55.3.
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), P. ^+2*
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